



DIPLOMETRICS

Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD)

Version 4.3

Codebook and Country Case Narratives

Last Updated: 17 September 2024

Collin J. Meisel,

Austin S. Matthews,

Ruth Byrnes, Haylie Castor, Mia Grant,

Alexandra Brodsky, Kerent Benjumea, Phoebe Cribb,

Collin Van Son, Juliet Wishner,

Oliver Kaplan,

and Jonathan D. Moyer

Diplometrics Program,

Frederick S. Pardee Institute for International Futures,

Josef Korbel School of International Studies,

University of Denver

Table of Contents

Introduction	9
Scope	10
Diplometrics	10
Acknowledgements	10
Contact	10
Perceived Mass Atrocity Definition	11
Key components	11
Points of clarification	11
Definition of Key Terms	13
Perceived mass atrocity sub-category definitions.....	13
Defining security forces/actors.....	17
Defining intent	18
Coding Procedure	19
Country-Year Data	21
Identifying information	21
Perceived mass atrocity information.....	21
Types of perceived mass atrocities.....	23
Gender and sexual orientation-based violence	27
Information on reliability.....	28
Supporting information	30
Country Case Narratives	31
Afghanistan	31
Albania	31
Algeria	33
Andorra	35
Angola	35
Antigua and Barbuda	37
Argentina.....	37
Armenia.....	38
Australia	39
Austria	39
Azerbaijan	40

Bahamas.....	41
Bahrain	41
Bangladesh.....	41
Barbados	42
Belarus	45
Belgium	45
Belize.....	47
Benin	48
Bhutan.....	49
Bolivia.....	49
Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	50
Botswana.....	50
Brazil.....	51
Brunei.....	52
Bulgaria	55
Burkina Faso.....	55
Burundi.....	56
Cabo Verde.....	58
Cambodia	59
Cameroon.....	59
Canada	60
Central African Republic	61
Chad	61
Chile	63
China	65
Colombia	65
Comoros.....	68
Congo-Brazzaville.....	70
Congo-Kinshasa.....	70
Costa Rica.....	70
Côte d'Ivoire.....	73
Croatia.....	74
Cuba	74

Cyprus	75
Czech Republic	76
Denmark.....	76
Djibouti.....	76
Dominica	76
Dominican Republic	77
Ecuador	77
Egypt	78
El Salvador.....	78
Equatorial Guinea	80
Eritrea.....	82
Estonia.....	82
Ethiopia	84
Fiji.....	84
Finland.....	87
France.....	87
Gabon.....	88
Gambia.....	89
Georgia.....	89
Germany.....	91
Ghana	91
Greece	91
Grenada.....	94
Guatemala.....	95
Guinea	96
Guinea-Bissau.....	97
Guyana	98
Haiti	99
Holy See	99
Hungary.....	103
Iceland.....	103
India	105
Indonesia.....	105

Iran	108
Iraq	110
Ireland	113
Israel-Palestine.....	113
Italy	113
Jamaica.....	117
Japan	117
Jordan.....	118
Kazakhstan	119
Kenya.....	120
Kiribati	121
Korea, Republic of.....	122
Kosovo.....	123
Kuwait	123
Kyrgyzstan	123
Laos	125
Latvia.....	127
Lebanon	128
Lesotho.....	128
Liberia.....	130
Libya	130
Liechtenstein.....	130
Lithuania	132
Luxembourg	133
Madagascar.....	134
Malawi.....	135
Malaysia	137
Maldives.....	137
Mali	139
Malta	139
Marshall Islands	143
Mauritania.....	143
Mauritius.....	145

Mexico.....	145
Micronesia	145
Moldova	149
Monaco	151
Mongolia	151
Montenegro	151
Morocco	152
Mozambique	154
Myanmar.....	154
Namibia	156
Nepal	160
Netherlands.....	162
New Zealand	162
Nicaragua	162
Niger.....	162
Nigeria	166
North Korea.....	166
North Macedonia	170
Norway	171
Oman.....	171
Pakistan.....	172
Palau.....	174
Panama	174
Papua New Guinea.....	175
Paraguay	176
Peru	176
Philippines.....	177
Poland	178
Portugal.....	179
Qatar	180
Romania	181
Russia	181
Rwanda	183

Saint Kitts and Nevis.....	184
Saint Lucia	184
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	184
Samoa	184
San Marino.....	185
Sao Tome and Principe	185
Saudi Arabia	185
Senegal.....	187
Serbia	188
Seychelles.....	189
Sierra Leone	189
Singapore	190
Slovakia	190
Slovenia.....	191
Solomon Islands	192
Somalia.....	192
South Africa.....	194
South Sudan	195
Spain.....	197
Sri Lanka	197
Sudan	198
Suriname	200
Swaziland	200
Sweden.....	201
Switzerland.....	202
Syria.....	202
Taiwan.....	204
Tajikistan	205
Tanzania	205
Thailand.....	206
Timor-Leste	207
Togo	207
Tonga.....	208

Trinidad and Tobago	208
Tunisia	208
Turkey	209
Turkmenistan	211
Tuvalu.....	212
Uganda	213
Ukraine.....	214
United Arab Emirates.....	216
United Kingdom	217
Uruguay.....	218
Uzbekistan.....	218
Vanuatu.....	219
Venezuela.....	219
Vietnam.....	221
Western Sahara.....	222
Yemen	222
Zambia.....	224
Zimbabwe.....	224
Case Narrative References.....	227

Introduction

Reliable data sources cataloguing atrocities are crucial for advancing our theoretical understanding of such events. They are also valuable sources of information when considering policy interventions that can help prevent their future occurrence. Researchers for some time have sought to gather representative samples of atrocities and related events with the goal of understanding and anticipating atrocities.¹ These samples have been utilized in advanced statistical modeling to forecast fragility and predict onset, which have garnered a large amount of academic attention, although also drawing criticism.²

Existing datasets on atrocities and similar events have been criticized for their lack of consistency, incomplete information, and discordant or overly broad definitions. These shortcomings and oversights can skew and even confuse our understanding of the occurrence, causes, and consequences of such events.³ This raises questions about the validity of results in the extant literature that have relied on these potentially flawed data. Of particular concern are the robustness of works where researchers' goals have been to develop statistical models meant to identify countries that are at risk of being a party to future atrocities. Flawed data may similarly skew the descriptive record of atrocities that have occurred in specific countries or conflicts. Similarly, data ignoring less lethal atrocities may bias our conclusions.

We created the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) to improve the available data on atrocities. Specifically, our goal is to allow for the systematic comparison of the scope and scale of atrocity campaigns and events suspected to have been perpetrated by state and/or non-state actors against groups across countries and time. We collected data on “perceived” atrocities since some events may not be observed or reported (“perceived” by analysts) and because the definition of atrocity is highly subjective – they are “perceived” to be so according to the criteria presented here. These data, described further below, are recorded in country-year format, which are accompanied by country case narratives. The country-year format aggregates information from events into a panel dataset that can be used for statistical analysis, including predictive models if desired. The variables coded for the country-year data include: country identification information; perceived atrocity information, including atrocities overall as well as sub-types of atrocities, the information from which could possibly be used to build an atrocities index; information on data reliability; and supporting information.

¹ Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Systemic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35(5) (1998): 551-579; Philip Schrodt and Jay Ulfelder, *Political Instability Task Force Atrocities Event Data Version 1.1b1. The Computational Event Data System* (<http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/atrocities.html>, 2016); Charles Butcher et al., “Introducing the Targeted Mass Killing Data Set for the Study and Forecasting of Mass Atrocities,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64(7-8) (2020): 1524-1547.

² Drew Bowlsby et al., “The Future is a Moving Target: Predicting Political Instability,” *British Journal of Political Science* 50 (4) (2020): 1405-1417; Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Peder Landsverk, “Can We Predict Armed Conflict? How the First 9 Years of Published Forecasts Stand Up to Reality,” *International Studies Quarterly* (2021): 1-9.

³ Kristine Eck, “In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47 (1) (2012): 124–141; Benjamin E. Bagozzi and Ore Koren, “Using machine learning methods to identify atrocity perpetrators,” December 11, 2017 (Boston, MA: 2017 IEEE International Conference, 2017). <https://www.orekoren.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/BagozziKorenIEEEofficial.pdf>; Leila Demarest and Arnim Langer, “How Events Enter (or not) Data Sets: The Pitfalls and Guidelines of using Newspapers in the Study of Conflict,” *Sociological Methods & Research* (forthcoming). (2019).

Scope

The country-year data for PMAD version 4.3 cover 195 countries from January 2018 through June 2024. For 10 priority countries (listed in the Country Case Narratives section), the data extend through August 2024. Case narratives, which accompany each country, cover events from at least 2018 through mid-2024, though some narratives reach further back in history to provide additional context. Perceived mass atrocities are coded from a variety of sources, including news media, U.S. State Department annual reports, Human Rights Watch reports, and other non-governmental organization reports.

The next regular update is tentatively planned for December 2024, with data for all 195 countries through September 2024. Quarterly updates for ten priority countries and revisions for the remaining 195 countries are tentatively scheduled thereafter. The next full annual update is tentatively scheduled for March 2025.

Diplometrics

This effort is part of the Diplometrics research program at the University of Denver's Frederick S. Pardee Institute for International Futures, an academic, non-profit research center within the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. The Diplometrics program at the Pardee Institute seeks to better understand and measure relationships in the international system by gathering data, building tools, and conducting analysis. For more on Diplometrics and the Pardee Institute's broader research portfolio, visit our website at <https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/research/diplometrics>.

Acknowledgements

In addition to the codebook's authors, several other individuals have made valuable contributions to the PMAD project in various capacities. To date, this includes: Anajulia Barney, Haylie Castor, Mary Louise Cates, Caitlin Clemens, Whitney Doran, Dámaris Escobar, Zoe Evans-Funk, Henry Heilbroner, Pam Hoberman, Camryn Hoelle, Emma Loeber, Bill McDonald, Evan Montgomery, Hari Raavi, Ryan Retzlaff, MacKenzie Roth, Avantika Singh, Henry Valuck, Cory Vandenberg, and Bailey Yamshak.

Contact

If you notice potential errors in the data or narratives or have questions about PMAD, please email Pardee.Institute@du.edu.

Citation

In addition to this codebook, if you publish with or reference PMAD, please also cite:

Meisel, Collin J., Moyer, Jonathan D., Matthews, Austin S., Kaplan, Oliver, Byrnes, Ruth, Benjumea, Kerent, Cribb, Phoebe, & Van Son, Collin. (2024). Bearing witness: Introducing the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD). *Journal of Peace Research*, OnlineFirst, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249333>.

Perceived Mass Atrocity Definition

The Diplometrics research team at the Frederick S. Pardee Institute for International Futures has created the following **definition of “perceived mass atrocity”** to guide this project:

“A perceived mass atrocity is an act of violence against 25 or more civilians or otherwise defenseless individuals with the intent of destroying their social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group *or* intimidating their group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival through systematic or random, planned or unplanned acts by a group of official or unofficial state forces or non-state actors directly or indirectly resulting in death, injury, or widespread damage of property, excluding acts of terrorism that do not involve the pursuit of or threat of group elimination.”

Key components

Stated again according to key definitional components, a perceived mass atrocity is an act of violence that:

- is **perceived**, according to the PMAD definitions, inclusion criteria, and available information,
- to have been targeted against **25 or more** civilians or otherwise defenseless individuals
- with the **stated or inferred intent of destroying** their social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group other cohesive group of individuals with a common, widely recognized identity *or* **intimidating their group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival**
- through **systematic or random, planned or unplanned** acts
- by a group of **official or unofficial state forces or non-state actors**
- **directly or indirectly** resulting in **death, injury, or widespread damage of property**
- **excluding acts of terrorism** that do not involve the pursuit of, or threat of, group elimination.

Points of clarification

1. Note that **we are describing “perceived” atrocities, which acknowledges that many events are shrouded in uncertainty**. This allows us to include more than just instances where individuals were convicted of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in a court of law.
2. **We define acts of violence broadly**, where arbitrary detention is a form of violence, as is forced sterilization. Our focus is on unlawful acts, with “unlawful” referring to violation of domestic law where events occurred or violation of international human rights law, even if an act may be technically legal according to a country’s domestic law (e.g., state-sanctioned massacres).
3. For the threshold of 25 victims or more, **violent acts can be part of a single event or a broader, cohesive campaign** (for example, a series of coordinated but distinct targeted assassinations).⁴
4. For victims, we include civilians and “otherwise defenseless individuals,” meaning that **an atrocity can be committed against an enemy force that is or has been rendered defenseless**. This extends from the laws of war, which require that enemy forces be allowed to surrender. Similarly, it is acceptable to shoot at descending enemy paratroopers, but it is unacceptable to shoot at a pilot parachuting to safety from a disabled aircraft.
5. We include both the **stated or inferred intent** to destroy as well as the stated or inferred intent

⁴ Kaplan observes that in countries such as Colombia atrocities can take various forms, and occur as large-scale massacres or an accumulation of many smaller-scale and distributed violent acts. Oliver Kaplan, “War Crimes, Atrocities, and Resistance in Colombia,” in Barбора Hola, Hollie Nyseth Nzitatira, and Maartje Weedesteijn (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on Atrocity Crimes* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2022).

to intimidate by creating a perception of imminent threat to survival. Acts must be intentional and do not include, for example, accidental civilian casualties in war. We acknowledge, however, that **intent must often be inferred. Survival refers to survival of the group, which includes generational survival as well as personal survival.** Similar to the Targeted Mass Killings dataset, we set a lower threshold of 25 individuals affected by a given event or campaign.⁵

6. To identify distinct groups of victims, we include social, cultural, ethnic, religious, and political groups, which are standard in other atrocity-related definitions. These categories appear to capture most if not all cases of atrocities we have reviewed in extant data series. For the purposes of this dataset, we do not include “women” as a single, distinct social group for reduced citizenship, although we acknowledge that gender-based discrimination and violence is tragically common. Instead, we code the severity of violence against women and LGBTQI+ groups in separate variables. Where “civilians” are the target group, we seek as accurately as possible to identify a common identity among the civilians targeted (e.g., opposition demonstrators; child soldiers from a particular ethnic group, community, or tribe). Note that gang and drug-related violence, such as in Central America is largely omitted given its pecuniary rather than prejudice-based motivations.
7. By systematic or random **we mean to include organized campaigns**, such as the Holocaust, **as well as atrocities that might target a group in an ad hoc manner.** Thus, these terms refer to target selection, where a perpetrator can plan to round up or kill members of a target group either at random or through systematic means of selection (e.g., moving from house to house).
8. By planned or unplanned **we mean to include events that were premeditated as well as events that occurred at the spur of the moment**, without prior planning. A perpetrator could plan to commit an atrocity but choose to select targets at random, or they could decide on the spot to commit an atrocity against a purposefully selected group of individuals as targets.
9. We include perpetrator groups of official or unofficial state forces. This includes rogue commanders, such as the leader of the Mai Lai Massacre, who acted without direction from senior leaders but who used his position of power to commit an atrocity. **For groups of unofficial state forces, command authority of at least one perpetrator is likely but not required.**
10. We code perpetrator group actions, where **“group” indicates that the perpetrators are members of an organized collection of individuals.** This includes military units and mercenaries hired by private corporations but excludes lone actor terrorists, such as Theodore Kaczynski.
11. **We include events that have direct or indirect effects.** This includes events such as sieges when, for example, food aid is prevented from entering a conflict zone to starve trapped individuals.
12. We include events causing death, injury, and widespread destruction of property. Here, **injury includes physical harm as well as those resulting from arbitrary detention, whether physical or mental. Widespread destruction of property includes razing of villages, cropland, or other property that supports to livelihood of a people**, whether the intent of the action is to kill individuals, displace them, or otherwise generally threaten their way of life.
13. Finally, **we exclude most acts of terrorism** to limit the size and focus of the dataset. For acts by terrorist organizations to be included, they must involve the pursuit of, or threat of, group elimination. For example, if Boko Haram surrounds and burns down an entire village predominantly populated by a particular ethnic, religious, or social group, these events would be included. However, the employment of suicide bombs would not necessarily be included.

⁵ Butcher et al., “Introducing the Targeted Mass Killing Data Set”, 1524-1547.

Definition of Key Terms

Aside from the general definition of perceived atrocity, we provide definitions for specific categories of atrocities, perpetrator-specific definitions, and criteria for determining elements of perpetrator intent. The definitions are intended to aid in parsing PMAD's country case narratives and country-year data.

Perceived mass atrocity sub-category definitions

- **Genocide**

According to the UN Convention on Genocide, "Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part: Killing members of the group; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."⁶

- **War crimes**

War crimes means any of the following acts against persons or property during a time of armed conflict: "Willful killing; Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully; Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power; Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; Taking of hostages."⁷

- **Crimes against humanity**

"Crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health."⁸

"In contrast with genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specific group. Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian population, regardless of its affiliation or identity. Another important distinction is that in the case of crimes against humanity, it is not necessary to prove that there is an overall specific intent. It suffices for there to be a simple intent to commit any of the acts listed, with the exception of the act of persecution, which requires additional discriminatory intent."⁹

⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, (1948), Article II.

⁷ United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, (1998), Article 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 7.

⁹ United Nations Office on Genocide Preventions and the Responsibility to Protect, "Crimes Against Humanity," <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml>

- **Politicide**
 “[P]oliticide means... any of the following acts committed with an intent politically to oppress, in whole or in part, any human group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Terrorizing members of the group; (c) Kidnapping, incarcerating or arbitrarily restricting the movement of members of the group; (d) Torturing or causing other serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (e) Arbitrarily restricting access of any members of the group to the media; (f) Imposing other measures intended to prevent a relatively free participation by members of the group in a political process.”¹⁰
- **Terrorism**
 “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”¹¹
- **Enslavement**
 “[T]he exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, particular women and children”¹²; “when committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” constitutes a crime against humanity.”¹³
- **Forced labor**
 “[W]ork that is performed involuntarily and under the menace of any penalty. It refers to situations in which persons are coerced to work through the use of violence or intimidation, or by more subtle means such as manipulated debt, retention of identity papers or threats of denunciation to immigration authorities.”¹⁴
- **Forced conscription**
 Forced labor in an army, militia, violent non-state actor group, transnational criminal organization, or other armed group. Note, this only includes conscription through illegal means, as defined by the legal structures of the country where the event occurred, whether ruled through democratic, autocratic, or anocratic legal structures. Recruitment of child soldiers is considered forced conscription in this dataset.
- **Forced displacement**
 Deportation, forcible transfer, and forced displacement of civilian populations. “The movements of refugees, displaced persons (including those displaced by disasters or development projects, or armed conflict), and, in some instances, victims of trafficking,” which “involves force, compulsion, or coercion.”¹⁵

¹⁰ Jordan J. Paust, “Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide, and Other Crimes Against Human Right,” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 18(2) (1986): 304.

¹¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Global Terrorism Database*, (2009), <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

¹² United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, (1998), Article 7(2)(c).

¹³ *Ibid.*, Article 7(1)(c).

¹⁴ International Labour Organization, “What is Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking,” (2021), <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm>

¹⁵ International Organization for Migration, *Glossary on Migration*, (2019), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf.

- **Forced disappearances**
“The arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”¹⁶
- **Arbitrary detention**
“The arrest and deprivation of liberty of a person outside of the confines of nationally recognized laws or international standards.”¹⁷
- **Ethnic cleansing**
“... A purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”¹⁸
- **Massacre**
“[A] generally collective form of action, involving the destruction of non-combatants, men, women, children, or disarmed soldiers”¹⁹
- **Targeted mass killing**
“[T]he direct killing of noncombatant members of a group by a formally organized armed force that results in twenty-five or more deaths in an annual period, with the intent of destroying the group or intimidating the group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival. A targeted group is defined in terms of political and/or ethnic and/or religious identity.”²⁰
- **Mass murder**
Deliberate killing of unarmed civilians by armed actors.²¹ This includes extrajudicial killings by security forces and police. For the purposes of this dataset, “mass” will be defined as roughly 25 individuals or more, where reports stating “two dozen” or some other estimation approaching 25 will be included.
- **Mass sexual violence**
Acts such as rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced sterilization or mutilation, forced abortion, and forced pregnancy.²²

¹⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, *International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance*, (2007), Article 2.

¹⁷ Trial International, “What is Arbitrary Detention?”, (2021), <https://trialinternational.org/topics-post/arbitrary-detention/>.

¹⁸ United Nations, Security Council, *Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780*, Section III.B.130, (1994), <https://undocs.org/S/1994/674>.

¹⁹ Jaques Semelin. *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2009), 323.

²⁰ Butcher et al., “Introducing the Targeted Mass Killing Data Set”, 1524-1547.

²¹ Government Accountability Office, “Overseas conflicts: U.S. agencies have coordinated stabilization efforts but need to document their agreement.” Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate. (Washington, DC, 2018), 9.

²² Human Rights Watch, “Sexual violence as international crime.” (1999), <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/seviolence.shtml>.

- **Insurgency**
“The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”²³
- **Targeted Violence**
Violence intentionally targeted against civilians.²⁴
- **Ethnic violence**
Violence intentionally targeted against an ethnic group.²⁵
- **Religious violence**
Violence intentionally targeted against a religious group.²⁶
- **Class violence**
Violence intentionally targeted against a class group.²⁷
- **Violence against women**
“[A]ny act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”²⁸
- **Dehumanization**
“A group as a group is defined as unworthy of moral consideration afforded to members of the in-group.”²⁹ Characteristics include groups being likened to animals, diseases, demons, etc. One stage of a larger process that facilitates the commission of mass atrocities.³⁰
- **Torture**
“[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”³¹

²³ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (2012), 106, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

²⁴ Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “What should we mean by “pattern of political violence”? repertoire, targeting, frequency, and technique.” *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(1), (2017): 20-41.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ World Health Organization, “Violence against women,” <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women>. Retrieved 17 November 2022.

²⁹ Rowan Savage, “Modern genocidal dehumanization: a new model,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, 47(2) (2013): 144, DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2012.754575

³⁰ Stephanie Berry, “A positive state obligation to counter dehumanisation under international human rights law,” *Erasmus Law Review*, 13(3) (2020), 7–8.

³¹ United Nations, General Assembly, *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.*, (1984), Article 1.

Defining security forces/actors

- **Official government forces**

- **Government individual acting on behalf of the state**
“Someone acting in an official capacity on behalf of a Federal government,”³² including the leaders, cabinet, elected or government appointed officials, institutional representatives, diplomatic representatives, and state military officials.
- **Law enforcement/Peace officer**
“The department of people who enforce laws, investigate crimes, and make arrests: the police”³³
- **UN armed military and police**
United Nations Police (UNPOL) are “active-duty members of their home police services and work under the command and control of the UN.”³⁴ “All UN military personnel members of their own national armies under the command and control of the UN.”³⁵
- **Gendarmerie**
“A member of a body of soldiers especially in France serving as an armed police force for the maintenance of public order.”³⁶

- **Unofficial government forces**

- **Pro-government militia (PGM)/Irregular armed forces**
In either an informal or semi-official capacity, is identified as armed groups that have a link to the executive (either informally or semi-officially) and some level of organization, but they exist outside the regular security apparatus, using these criteria to measure link/connection to government:
 - Person/minister
 - Political party
 - State/military institution
 - Sub-national government
 - Unclear
 - Greater level of autonomy than paramilitary forces.³⁷
- **Paramilitary**

³² “Definition of a Government Agent Under the 4th Amendment (MP3),” Go to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers Producer Resource Steward seal, accessed April 28, 2021, <https://www.fletc.gov/audio/definition-government-agent-under-4th-amendment-mp3>.

³³ “Law Enforcement,” Merriam-Webster (Merriam-Webster), accessed April 28, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law%20enforcement>.

³⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping (n.d.) “UN Police,” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-police>

³⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping (n.d.) “Military,” <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military>

³⁶ “Gendarmes.” Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Accessed April 28, 2021. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gendarmes>.

³⁷ Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell and Will Lowe, ‘States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-Government Militias.’ *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2) (2013): 249-258.

“Militarized security units, which are trained and organized under the central government to support or replace the regular military.... Paramilitaries tend to be established by the incumbent, and they have a clear and official association with the regime (yet outside the regular command-and-control chain of the military).... [T]he government has stronger control over paramilitaries” than PGMs.³⁸

- **Other non-state actors**

- **Terrorist organizations**

Non-state organizations that use “[t]he threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence ...to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”³⁹

- **Criminal organizations/violent gangs**

“A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences ..., in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”⁴⁰

- **Private sector actors**

“The part of an economy which is not controlled or owned by the government”⁴¹ including sole proprietorships, partnerships, small and mid-sized businesses, large corporations and multinationals, professional and trade associations, trade unions, charities, etc.

Defining intent

- **Planned Atrocity**

“The requisite participation in and knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population,” which may not be explicitly stipulated or formally adopted.⁴² Can be measured by “public statements of intent to destroy a group or public statements that deadly violence was specifically directed toward a group....**Can often be inferred from level of lethality, degree of coordination, and scope** (portion of victims affected)” [emphasis added].⁴³

- **Systematic Atrocity**

“Violence with patterns of periodicity, similitude and organization;” widespread. Can be measured through patterns of crime/violence.⁴⁴

³⁸ Tobias Böhmelt and Govinda Clayton, “Auxiliary Force Structure: Paramilitary Forces and Progovernment Militias.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(2) (2018): 198. doi:[10.1177/0010414017699204](https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017699204)

³⁹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Global Terrorism Database*, (2009), <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

⁴⁰ UN General Assembly, *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*, (2000), Art. 2.

⁴¹ “Private Sector,” Merriam-Webster (Merriam-Webster), accessed April 28, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private%20sector>.

⁴² International Criminal Court. *Elements of Crimes*, (2011), 3, available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf>

⁴³ Butcher et al., “Introducing the Targeted Mass Killing Data Set”, 1524-1547.

⁴⁴ United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes - A tool for prevention*, 2014, 20, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf.

Coding Procedure

When reviewing source materials, coders first conducted a preliminary review of available information and focused on identifying all major events they could locate for a given country and year, noting key information, such as suspected perpetrator and victim groups and group types, atrocity types, and estimated victim counts. Once the events in a country-year were identified, their collective information of the events was used to code information for the country-year variables. When coding an event, **coders kept in mind that many atrocities involve multiple actions and can be best described by multiple categories.** For example, arbitrary detention or ethnic cleansing may also be accompanied by sexual violence. Forced displacement may be accompanied by targeted mass killings, whether they be massacres or broader pogroms.

The specific coding procedures for these data will continue to evolve as the project matures. Present recommendations for manual searches for information on perceived atrocities include the following.

- When possible, coders utilized verified, reputable sources, including well-established media outlets, peer-reviewed publications, and court records.
- Key search terms included the following, which were identified using a common word search of several annual Human Rights Watch reports: “genocide,” “massacre,” “beatings,” “rapes,” “crackdown,” “ethnic cleansing,” “ethnic violence,” “forced sterilization,” “forced abortion,” “political imprisonment,” “torture,” “mass execution,” “mass displacement,” “forced migration.”
- Exclusion terms included the following, which were identified by a high frequency of false positives generated during initial scoping efforts: "sport*"; "soccer"; "football"; "stock market"; "invest*"; "international criminal court"; "judge*"; "court"; "indict*"; "Holocaust"; "Holodomor"; "Armenian genocide"; "Rwandan genocide"; "Rwanda genocide"; "museum"; "Nobel"; "colonial*"; "1994"; "movie"; "film"; "game"
- Key search terms also included specific country, group, and year information, if appropriate.
- When searching, coders recognized that some search engines allow special characters to modify the search. In Google, an asterisk means any prefix or suffix. So, for example, *kit** would include a search for kits, kites, kittens, kitchens, and any other word begging with the letters k-i-t. In Google, a plus sign signals that one word in the search phrase is particularly important, while a minus sign tells Google to exclude a word. For example, if searching for information on the musician Prince and not Prince Harry, one might search *Prince +Harry*. Outside of Google, other search engines use Boolean modifiers such as *AND*, *OR*, and *NOT*. Quotation marks around a word or phrase, which indicated a coder is looking for an exact match, were often necessary when an initial search yielded an overwhelming number of irrelevant results.
- Human Rights Watch Reports; US State Department annual reports; LexisNexis; ProQuest Central Database; ProQuest Historical Newspapers; and outlet-specific digitized newspaper collections served as core coding resources along with reporting from major international news outlets.
- International non-governmental organization reports, particularly those from Human Rights Watch, were often the primary coding resource, augmented by reports from news media.

For the initial PMAD scoping effort, coding guidelines allowed for three sources per event. If an additional source was found, it was only used to replace one of the first three sources coded if a) the new source added information that an earlier source was lacking, or b) the new source was more reputable, as defined source type, than the previous three sources cited. In this case, the source

deemed to be least reputable or which had information duplicated in another source was replaced. The project will continue with three sources per country-year when possible, recording a list of additional source links in separate columns for reference.

Regarding estimations of the number of suspected perpetrators or victims, coders used their best judgement. The ranges provided by the magnitude variables in the country-year dataset indicate approximate values. When exact numbers or estimates are not provided by sources, coders relied on the context of the article to make an educated guess. When an educated guess was made, it was explicitly stated in the notes column for a specific country year or listed under the uncertainty variables.

Country-year data are accompanied by country case narratives. These narratives summarize the recent history (typically 2018 onward) and current state of perceived mass atrocity campaigns by country. After having established a baseline narrative for the 195 countries included in PMAD (events through December 2022), emphasis will be placed on events occurring within the most-recent quarter of the calendar year with each narrative being updated at least once per calendar year.

Country-Year Data

The country-year dataset on perceived atrocities includes the following variables.

Identifying information

- **Country:** Includes all countries with full or partially-recognized independence that exist in a given year according to the Frederick S. Pardee Institute for International Futures Members of the Interstate System (MIS) list.
- **Country Code:** The country's ISO three-letter code.
- **Country Region:** The region the selected country belongs to according to UNSD M49 standard.
- **Country Subregion:** The subregion the selected country belongs to according to UNSD M49 standard.
- **Year:** This variable includes a country-year observation for all years for which data have been collected.
- **Country Total Population:** UN Population Division total population estimate for each country-year (*World Population Prospects 2024* for PMAD 4.3).

Perceived mass atrocity information

- **Total Event Category:** This variable measures the total perceived atrocity occurrence of a country within a given year based on the following scale:
 - 0 = no reports of any in that country in that year
 - 1 = one in that country in that year
 - 2 = multiple in that country in that year
- **Total Event Type Count:** This variable is a count of the total number of perceived mass atrocity event types (e.g., mass murder; mass displacement) in a given year, where at least one event type was recorded in that year.
- **Total Magnitude:** This variable measures total perceived atrocity magnitude; this could be a sum of the values in the atrocity type magnitudes coded below *or* a general estimate across all atrocities. If multiple estimates are given, we should take the mean average, if possible.⁴⁵
 - 0 = no reports of more than 25 individuals affected
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year

⁴⁵ The PMAD magnitude scales roughly follow a base-10 logarithmic scale, where each category is roughly ten times larger than the previous category. Ted Robert Gurr, *Politimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). Exceptions in the PMAD magnitude codes include: 1, which is our initial threshold for "mass" and thus dataset inclusion; and 2 and 3, which split the range of 100 to 999 to distinguish "major" events (500+).

- 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
- 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected by the sum of atrocities that occurred in that country in that year
- -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Total Prevalence Index:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Total Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of a perceived mass atrocity in a given year.
- **Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH):** A maximum-minimum normalized index of perceived mass atrocity scope and scale in a given year for each country. Calculated by: 1) multiplying the occurrence and magnitude codes for each atrocity type (excluding the Violence Against Women and LGBTQI+ Severity variables), described below; 2) summing these products for all seven perceived mass atrocity types included in this coding framework; 3) and normalizing this sum to a zero to 100 scale, where 100 in a country-year would be roughly equivalent to the scope and scale of the worst atrocities of the 20th century (maxing out each atrocity index for all atrocity types described below, which would sum to 98).
- **Suspected Perpetrator Types:** Based on the following categories.
 - None = no reports of atrocities in that country in that year
 - Government – Official – Military = all atrocities coded for this year were the result of official government-organized or sponsored military actions or policies
 - Government – Official – Security = all atrocities coded for this year were the result of official government-organized or sponsored security force actions or policies
 - Government – Official = all atrocities coded for this year were the result of official government officials who may not be directly associated with military or security forces
 - Government – Unofficial = all atrocities coded for this year were the result of undisciplined government agents or pro-government militias not subject to direct government control
 - Non-State = all atrocities coded for this year were the result of non-state actor groups
 - Mixed = the perceived atrocities perpetrated in this year were the result of a roughly equal mix of official government, undisciplined government agent, and/or non-state group actions
 - Mixed – Government = roughly two-thirds or more of the perceived atrocity events perpetrated in this year were by official or unofficial government actions, though some events in this year are suspected to have been perpetrated by non-state groups
 - Mixed – Non-State = roughly two-thirds or more of the perceived atrocity events perpetrated in this year were by non-state actors, though some events in this year are suspected to have been perpetrated by official or unofficial government actors
- **Suspected Perpetrator Groups:** This variable is an entry of semi-colon-separated list of the names of all groups suspected to have been involved in at least one of the atrocities coded in this year.
- **Victim Group Type:** Based on the following categories. If more than one group type has been targeted, group types are listed in alphabetical order and separated by a semi-colon and space.
 - Cultural

- Ethnic
- Political
- Religious
- Social
- **Victim Groups:** This variable is an entry of semi-colon-separated list of the names of all groups suspected to have been victims of at least one of the atrocities coded in this year.

Types of perceived mass atrocities

- **Mass Murder:** This variable is a rating of mass murder occurrence based on the following scale:
 - 0 = no reports of mass murder events in that year
 - 1 = one mass murder event in that year
 - 2 = multiple mass murder events in that year
- **Mass Murder Magnitude:** This variable is a rating of mass murder magnitude based on the following scale:
 - 0 = fewer than 25 deaths reported in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 deaths reported in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 deaths reported in that year
 - 3 = 500-999 deaths reported in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 deaths reported in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 deaths reported in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 deaths reported in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more deaths reported in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Murder Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Murder Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass murder in a given year.
- **Mass Murder Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass murder in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Murder code (0 to 2) by the Mass Murder Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Mass Less-lethal Violence:** This variable measures less-lethal violence occurrence, including mass beatings, torture, and sexual violence, based on this scale:
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year
- **Mass Less-lethal Violence Magnitude:** This variable measures magnitude of mass less-lethal violence based on this scale:
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals affected in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals affected in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals affected in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals affected in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals affected in that year

- 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals affected in that year
- 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals affected in that year
- 7 = 1 million or more individuals affected in that year
- -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Less-lethal Violence Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Less-lethal Violence Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass less-lethal violence in a given year.
- **Mass Less-lethal Violence Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass less-lethal violence in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Less-lethal Violence code (0 to 2) by the Mass Less-lethal Violence Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Mass Displacement:** This variable includes forced internal and external displacement, including violations of the principle of non-refoulement, based upon the following scale. It does not include flight from gang violence (unless specific groups are being targeted) or dire economic conditions.
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year
- **Mass Displacement Magnitude:** This variable measures the magnitude of displacement based on the following scale.
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Displacement Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Displacement Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass displacement in a given year.
- **Mass Displacement Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass displacement in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Displacement code (0 to 2) by the Mass Displacement Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Mass Conscription:** This variable includes mass illegal conscription (including recruitment of child soldiers, whom we deem unable to consent) based on the following scale:
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year

- **Mass Conscription Magnitude:** This variable measures the magnitude of mass conscription based on the following scale.
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Conscription Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Conscription Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass conscription in a given year.
- **Mass Conscription Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass conscription in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Conscription code (0 to 2) by the Mass Conscription Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Mass Containment:** This variable includes arbitrary detention, including enslavement, forced labor, forced disappearances, and mass withholding of worker's passports such as with the *kafala* system, based on the following scale.
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year
- **Mass Containment Magnitude:** This variable measures the magnitude of mass containment based on the following scale.
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Containment Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Containment Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass containment in a given year.

- **Mass Containment Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass containment in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Containment code (0 to 2) by the Mass Containment Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Mass Erasure:** This variable measures the occurrence of mass erasure, including ethnic cleaning but also less lethal acts such as cultural erasure, sterilization, and permanent kidnapping of children with the stated or inferred intent of erasing a culture or people by means other than mass murder. Other examples include destruction of religious sites.
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year
- **Mass Erasure Magnitude:** This variable measures the magnitude of mass erasure based on the following scale.
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Mass Erasure Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Mass Erasure Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of mass erasure in a given year.
- **Mass Erasure Index:** An index of the scope and scale of mass erasure in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Mass Erasure code (0 to 2) by the Mass Erasure Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.
- **Reduced Citizenship:** This variable measures the occurrence of reduced citizenship, which includes mass denial of equal protection under the law. Discrimination of a minority group is not coded as an atrocity unless it manifests legally, such as segregation in schools or restricted access to state services. This excludes phenomenon such as structural racism and is meant to record reduced citizenship that is codified in law (e.g., a particular racial or ethnic group is denied the right to run for public office). For women and LGBTQI+ groups, see the severity variables under the “Gender and sexual orientation-based violence” section.
 - 0 = no reports of events in that year
 - 1 = one event in that year
 - 2 = multiple events in that year
- **Reduced Citizenship Magnitude:** This variable measures the magnitude of reduced citizenship on the following scale:
 - 0 = fewer than 25 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 1 = 25 to 99 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year

- 2 = 100 to 499 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 3 = 500 to 999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 4 = 1,000 to 9,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 5 = 10,000 to 99,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 6 = 100,000 to 999,999 individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - 7 = 1 million or more individuals reported to be affected in that country in that year
 - -99 = unknown (Note: only in extreme circumstances is this code used. In reality, victim magnitudes are rarely perfectly known, and some degree of estimation is required.)
- **Reduced Citizenship Magnitude per Million People:** This variable takes the mid-point of the magnitude range for Reduced Citizenship Magnitude (e.g., magnitude 5 = 54,999; or the actual estimate for magnitude 7), divides it by the total population for a country, and multiplies by one million. It is a measure of how many individuals per million in a country were victims of reduced citizenship in a given year.
 - **Reduced Citizenship Index:** An index of the scope and scale of reduced citizenship in a given country-year, calculated by multiplying the Reduced Citizenship code (0 to 2) by the Reduced Citizenship Magnitude code (0 to 7). Scaled from 0 to 14.

Gender and sexual orientation-based violence

- **Violence Against Women Severity:** An index intended to measure to severity of group-perpetrated or group-endorsed violence against women in a given country-year. Here violence is defined broadly and includes intentional acts that knowingly or are reasonably expected to cause physical, mental, or sexual harm. However, it *excludes* individually perpetrated acts, such as domestic violence, individual acts of rape, or other interpersonal violence. The scale for this variable is based on Allport's scale for prejudice, which included anti-locution (i.e., "to speak against"), avoidance, discrimination, physical attacks, and extermination.⁴⁶ PMAD excludes anti-locution-like acts such as verbal dehumanization. Severity, which is not included in the ASSH index, is measured according to the following scale.
 - 0 = no reports of group violence against women in that year.
 - 1 = non-state-sanctioned, group discrimination against women, where discrimination includes active exclusion "from certain types of employment, from residential housing, political rights, educational or recreational opportunities, churches, hospitals, or from some other social privileges."⁴⁷
 - 2 = state-sanctioned, group discrimination against women.
 - 3 = physical attacks, which include group perpetration or sanctioning of intentional physical harm against women, including genital mutilation.
 - 4 = extermination, which includes group perpetration or sanctioning of lethal violence against women, including so-called honor killings and group-perpetrated femicide.
- **Violence Against LGBTQI+ Severity:** An index intended to measure to severity of group-perpetrated or group-endorsed violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and/or intersex (LGBTQI) groups in a given country-year. Here violence is defined broadly and includes intentional acts that knowingly or are reasonably expected to cause physical, mental, or sexual harm. However, it *excludes* individually perpetrated acts, such as domestic violence or

⁴⁶ Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954), 14–15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

individual hate crimes or other interpersonal violence. The scale for this variable is based on Allport's scale for prejudice.⁴⁸ Severity, which is not included in the ASSH index, is measured according to the following scale.

- 0 = no reports of group violence against LGBTQI+ groups in that year.
- 1 = non-state-sanctioned, group discrimination against LGBTQI+ groups.
- 2 = state-sanctioned, group discrimination against LGBTQI+ groups.
- 3 = physical attacks, which include group perpetration or sanctioning of intentional physical harm against LGBTQI+ groups.
- 4 = extermination, which includes group perpetration or sanctioning of lethal violence against LGBTQI+ groups.

Information on reliability

- **Source 1:** Here source 1 will be recorded by a hyperlink or Chicago-style footnote citation.⁴⁹
- **Source 1 Type:** Source 1 will be typed according to the following categories.
 - 1 = peer-review published (academic journal)
 - 2 = international governmental organization report (e.g., UN Human Rights Council)
 - 3 = international, mainstream or independent news source (e.g., New York Times, The Independent) – excluding opinion-editorials
 - 4 = local news sources
 - 5 = private research institution report (e.g., Brookings)
 - 6 = non-perpetrator government source or statement
 - 7 = suspected perpetrator government source or statement
 - 8 = blog or other unofficial media or opinion-editorials
- **Source 2:** Here source 2 will be recorded by a hyperlink or Chicago-style footnote citation.
- **Source 2 Type:** Source 2 will be typed according to the following categories.
 - 1 = peer-review published (academic journal)
 - 2 = international governmental organization report (e.g., UN Human Rights Council)
 - 3 = international, mainstream or independent news source (e.g., New York Times, The Independent) – excluding opinion-editorials
 - 4 = local news sources
 - 5 = private research institution report (e.g., Brookings)
 - 6 = non-perpetrator government source or statement
 - 7 = suspected perpetrator government source or statement
 - 8 = blog or other unofficial media or opinion-editorials
- **Source 3:** Here source 3 will be recorded by a hyperlink or Chicago-style footnote citation. *Note: It is only necessary to include three sources. If an additional source is discovered, coders will replace an existing source only if the new source is more reputable (a determination based on Source Type, where a lower value indicates greater reputability). Additional sources will be recorded in the "Additional Source Links" variable columns.*
- **Source 3 Type:** Source 3 will be typed according to the following categories.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 14–15.

⁴⁹ These and all other hyperlinks, including those in the country case narratives, were gathered at the time of coding of the data and authoring of the narratives. If a source link no longer works, visit Archive.org and copy the link into "The Wayback Machine," which will likely provide snapshots of past versions of the site in question.

- 1 = peer-review published (academic journal)
- 2 = international governmental organization report (e.g., UN Human Rights Council)
- 3 = international, mainstream or independent news source (e.g., New York Times, The Independent) – excluding opinion-editorials
- 4 = local news sources
- 5 = private research institution report (e.g., Brookings)
- 6 = non-perpetrator government source or statement
- 7 = suspected perpetrator government source or statement
- 8 = blog or other unofficial media or opinion-editorials
- **Source-Derived Validity:** This variable is a measure of our certainty of the accuracy of the coded information based on a slightly modified version of Ackerman and Pinson’s framework.⁵⁰
 - Here, validity is rated 0 through 4, where:
 - 0 = No sources obtained;
 - 1 = One or more non-official sources (source types 7 and 8 [see Source Type variables]);
 - 2 = Single official source, including government documents a well-established media company, or peer-reviewed publication or book from a well-established publishing house or journal (source types 1 through 6 [see Source Type variables]);
 - 3 = Two independent official sources, where independence means one source does not cite or base its reporting on the other;
 - 4 = Three independent official sources.
- **Uncertainty:** This variable is a measure of uncertainty based on Ackerman and Pinson.⁵¹ Data can be filtered to exclude observations that include notable uncertainty.
 - Here uncertainty is rated 0 through 2 where:
 - 0 = at least three sources agree that an atrocity occurred in the general manner described by the variables coded and affected a similarly estimated number of individuals (e.g., three news reports each describe roughly 30 members of a particular ethnic minority being arbitrarily detained);
 - 1 = two sources agree that an atrocity occurred in the general manner described by the variables coded and affected a similarly estimated number of individuals, but either a) at least one source does not corroborate certain types of atrocities, or they explicitly describe uncertainty or b) a third source does not exist;
 - 2 = only one source exists or each source provides information that was coded for an atrocity type but not corroborated by other sources and/or all sources explicitly described uncertainty regarding whether perceived atrocities in fact took place.
- **Uncertain Information Variables:** A list of the variables where the coder is uncertain if a specific element coded is accurate (e.g., the magnitude was coded base on an educated guess), even if the occurrence of the overall atrocity itself is not in question. For example, it may be clear that mass displacement occurred, but perhaps only one of three official sources makes a reference to

⁵⁰ Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, “Speaking Truth to Sources: Introducing a Method for the Quantitative Evaluation of Open Sources in Event Data”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39:7-8 (2016), 617-640, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1141000.

⁵¹ Ibid.

mass containment. Or, for example, reports describe an entire village being displaced but no information is provided on the population size of the village. If uncertainty value is 0, code Uncorroborated Information Variable as None.

- **Disputed:** This variable is a measure of discrepancy based on Ackerman and Pinson (2016).
 - Here disputes are coded as 0 or 1 where:
 - 0 = no element that has been coded is explicitly disputed by one of the sources.
 - 1 = an element that has been coded is explicitly disputed by one of the sources. For example, two sources might allege that torture took place, while one source describing an atrocity says that torture did not place or that evidence presented to prove this is highly questionable.
 - *Note: Disputes are only coded if they appear in one of the primary three sources that has been coded. So, for example, a fourth source involving an official denial by suspected perpetrator group will not be coded and the atrocities will not be coded as disputed.*
- **Disputed Information Variables:** A list of the variables where the coder information that has been coded is disputed by a least one of the sources used to code the event. If discrepancy value is 0, code Disputed Information Variable as None.

Supporting information

- **Notes:** Additional relevant context provided by the coder.
- **Data Last Updated:** The most recent date (YYYYMMDD) that a country's data was reviewed and updated.
- **Additional Source Links:** Several columns that allow for the inclusion of additional source links. Variables are numbered (e.g., Additional_source_link1, Additional_source_link2, etc.), with one hyperlinked source per Additional_source_link variable.

Country Case Narratives

To accompany and provide context for the PMAD country-year data, we have produced accompanying country case narratives. These narratives provide brief summaries of the recent history and current state of perceived mass atrocity campaigns for the 195 countries in PMAD. Narratives will be revised quarterly with detailed quarterly updates for up to ten countries. Detailed updates for the remaining countries will be released annually in March of each year. Each country case narrative is accompanied by a note at the end on new developments for the September 2024 release of PMAD (version 4.3).

At present, our ten priority countries include: Afghanistan, Brazil, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.

AUTHORS, LISTED IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF CONTRIBUTION:

COLLIN VAN SON, RUTH BYRNES, ALEXANDRA BRODSKY, KERENT BENJUMEA, PHOEBE CRIBB, AVANTIKA SINGH, CAITLIN CLEMENS, EMMA LOEBER, EVAN MONTGOMERY, HARI RAAVI, ZOE EVANS-FUNK, CAMRYN HOELLE, AUSTIN S. MATTHEWS, AND COLLIN J. MEISEL

Afghanistan

Afghanistan's elected government collapsed on August 15, 2021, as the Taliban, a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist and predominantly Pashtun movement, seized control of the capital, Kabul (Center for Preventative Action, 2022). As U.S. and coalition troops withdrew, fighting between the Taliban and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) continued to intensify, with the first half of 2021 seeing record-high civilian casualties (Center for Preventative Action, 2022).

Recent years have witnessed religiously, ethnically, and politically motivated mass atrocities, including bombings of mosques, schools, and hospitals; extrajudicial killings; arbitrary arrests and detentions; torture; forcible evictions; and the recruitment of child soldiers. The majority of these atrocities can be attributed to three groups: (1) the ANDSF and other affiliates of the elected government, including the Afghan Local Police; (2) the Taliban; and (3) Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP or ISIS-K), an affiliate of the Sunni jihadist group ISIS. Following the collapse of the Afghan government on August 15, ISKP began an insurgency against the new Taliban government (Blue et al., 2021).

Prior to August 15, Afghan police and security personnel were responsible for arbitrary arrests, systematic torture, extrajudicial executions, and enforced disappearances. This includes allegations that Afghan special forces summarily executed civilians during raids against the Taliban (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Afghan Local Police and pro-government militias were also perceived to have recruited child soldiers, though this became less frequent in the 2010s (United Nations, 2021).

Since taking control of the country, the Taliban has embarked on a campaign of repression and reprisals. The first 10 months of Taliban rule saw reports of 160 extrajudicial killings, 178 arbitrary arrests and detentions, and 56 instances of torture and ill-treatment against former government and ANDSF officials (United Nations, 2022a). Mass atrocities were also perpetrated against individuals with suspected ties to ISKP, individuals with suspected ties to the National Resistance Front, journalists and media workers, and human rights defenders (United Nations, 2022a). Taliban forces have conducted forcible evictions against residents perceived to have supported the former government; one instance in September 2021 saw hundreds of ethnic Hazara families forced from their homes (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The Taliban also has a history of recruiting child soldiers (United Nations, 2021).

Since taking power, the Taliban has ushered in a wave of social restrictions, with women as the primary targets. The Taliban government is entirely male, and when a crowd of about 100 women protested their exclusion in September 2021, they were reportedly met with tear gas, electroshock weapons, and beatings (Amnesty International, 2022). Women lawyers, judges, and prosecutors have been forced into hiding in order to escape reprisals from convicted men who have since been freed by the Taliban (Amnesty International, 2022). In contrast to the relative openness of pre-August 15 society, girls continue to be barred from attending school past the sixth grade (Afzal et al., 2022).

The Taliban criminalizes same-sex sexual activity, which is punishable by death, flogging, or imprisonment (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In a three-month period (October–December 2021), 60 members of Afghanistan’s LGBTQI+ community reported being attacked, sexually assaulted, or directly threatened by the Taliban because of their sexual orientation or gender identity (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Recent years have seen ISKP escalate its campaign of atrocities aimed at ethnic and religious minorities, primarily the Hazara Shia, but also Shia Muslims generally, Sufi Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus (United Nations, 2022b; Human Rights Watch, 2019). Attacks on Hazaras include the bombing of a school in Kabul on May 8, 2021, which killed 95 and wounded over 200, the majority of them schoolgirls (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The situation has only worsened under the Taliban government, which has committed its own atrocities against the Hazaras and allows ISKP to target Hazara communities with impunity (Ochab, 2022). Since the Taliban takeover, ISKP attacks have included the bombings of Shia mosques, a Hazara school and educational center, and several Sufi religious gatherings (United Nations, 2022b). In September 2022, a suicide attack on a Hazara educational center killed over 35 girls and young women (Ochab, 2022). A British government inquiry has concluded that the Hazara are at serious risk of genocide at the hands of the Taliban and ISKP (Hazara Inquiry, 2022).

New for June 2023 release: In January 2023, it was reported that the Taliban had detained more than 29,000 individuals in the preceding 18 months, with an estimated 14,000 still in prison (Dawi, 2023). While Taliban officials have claimed that all those imprisoned are being held on criminal charges, this has not been confirmed by independent observers, leaving open the possibility of large-scale political imprisonment (Dawi, 2023).

ISKP recently made clear that it intends to target Chinese and other foreign nationals in Afghanistan as part of its efforts to isolate the Taliban diplomatically (Najafizada, 2023). In December 2022, five Chinese nationals were wounded in an ISKP attack on a hotel in Kabul (Gul, 2022). The following month, 20–25 people were killed or injured when ISKP bombed a government building in Kabul where Chinese officials were reportedly present (i24 News, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: The UN special rapporteur for Afghanistan published a report in June 2023 accusing the Taliban of “widespread and systematic discrimination” against women and alleging Taliban “may be responsible for gender apartheid” (UN News, 2023). On July 2nd, the minister for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice announced that 12,000 beauty salons would be closed countrywide, which will cost 60,000 women their jobs (Crisis Group, 2023). As authorities late July began enforcing ban, dozens of women protested the decree in capital Kabul, prompting security forces to disperse crowd with water cannons and firing in air (Crisis Group, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for April 2024 release: The human rights situation for women living under Taliban rule continued to worsen in late 2023, with widespread reports of beatings, arbitrary detention, and torture of female political protestors demanding improved gender equality (Barr and Fetrat, 2023). Targeted attacks against the Hazara community and other Shi'a also persisted, with suicide bombs and other improvised explosive devices reportedly killing 21 and wounding 30 others in Pul-e-Khumri city on October 13, killing 8 and wounding 35 others in West Kabul on October 26, and killing 11 and wounding 21 others in Kabul on November 7 – attacks all claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (UNAMA, 2024)

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: Ethnic, political, and religious violence in Afghanistan in the first half of 2024 has included bombings from ISIS targeted against Hazara and Shi'a communities in January and April, respectively, as well as the murder of “several” protestors by the Taliban in May 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024; UNAMA, 2024). Many more Taliban and ISIS forces have been killed this year; however, the PMAD coding criteria exclude armed force-on-armed force conflict.

Early in 2024, the Taliban began arresting women for not wearing hijabs, marking the first known, widespread enforcement of a law enacted in 2022. This came alongside Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada announcing that women will be flogged and stoned to death for adultery (Kumar, 2024). Meanwhile, former Afghan government officials and security forces reportedly continue to be targeted with lethal and less-lethal physical violence, including arbitrary detention, torture, and execution (UNAMA, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: The Taliban enacted several new laws in August 2024, called vice and virtue laws, that require the faces and bodies of women to be completely covered at all times in public and forbade women from speaking in public or from singing or praying loud enough in their homes to be heard outside (Kelly and Joya, 2024). The UN has condemned these laws.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan terrorist group, or TTP, have gained power in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and have regularly launched attacks in both countries that have resulted in civilian casualties while receiving support from the Afghan Taliban (Gul, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Albania

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Algeria

In recent years, Algerian security forces have detained and expelled tens of thousands of Sub-Saharan African migrants to Niger and Mali, including hundreds of children, often without individual screenings or

due process. Migrants reported theft and violence by security forces during detainment. Some, including asylum seekers, were ordered to walk to Nigeria once being left at the border, which is a violation of the principle of non-refoulement under international refugee law (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Since the “Hirak” protesters began the movement to advocate for regime change and political reforms, Algerian security forces increased their crackdown on civil disobedience. Security forces have arbitrarily arrested protesters, journalists, and activists and used excessive force against them (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The crackdown started in February 2019 but died down during the COVID-19 pandemic starting in March 2020. This was until another flare-up of political protests and police brutality in February 2021 (Carnegie, 2021). Hundreds have been arbitrarily arrested (Aljazeera, 2021). In addition to Hirak protesters, police also target political opposition and ethnic minority activists for arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Additionally in Algeria, femicides against wives persist throughout the country (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Féminicides Algeria has reported 212 femicides since 2019 (Féminicides Algeria, 2022). In recent years, gender-based violence against women has caused shelters to reach their capacity (Middle East Institute, 2021; Radio Algérienne, 2019; Wilson Center 2021). Same-sex relations are punishable under Article 338 of the penal code by up to two years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Article 333 increases the penalty up to three years in prison for public indecency if it involves “acts against nature with a member of the same sex,” whether between men or women (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: More than 300 journalists, “Hirak” protestors, and human rights activists remain in politically-motivated arbitrary detention imposed by Algeria security forces (North Africa Post, 2023). Mass deportation of African migrants without due process has also continued, with more than 9,000 persons having been deported between January and March 2023, many of whom “have been systematically beaten, abused and robbed by Algerian security forces” according to the NGO Alarme Phone Sahara (2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Meisel

New for June 2024 release: Arbitrary and collective deportation of migrants from Mali, Niger, and other Sub-Saharan nations continued at Algeria’s southern border with Niger throughout the end of 2023. In total, the NGO Alarme Phone Sahara estimated that at least 26,301 migrants had been deported back to Niger during the year (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2023b). All deportations by the Algerian security forces are conducted in a remote desert location at the Algeria-Niger border, where deportees are dropped off by security forces and then proceed on foot for 15 kilometers to the Nigerien village of Assamaka (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2023b).

Repression against non-Muslim minorities continued in 2023. Eleven Evangelical Protestant churches were either forcibly closed by the government or voluntarily closed due to fears of government targeting, and the few remaining ones operate on a limited basis (USCIRF, 2024). There also remains no operational synagogue in the country for the roughly 200 Jewish Algerians to worship in, and antisemitic rhetoric has been promoted by government officials and state media since the start of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in late 2023 (USCIRF, 2024).

Legal mechanisms were also used to repress religious minorities. Ordinance 06-03 in Algerian law requires all non-Muslim organizations to register with the government to conduct activities and establish places of

worship within the country (USCIRF, 2024). Evangelical Protestant communities continue to be denied authorization to worship collectively as stipulated under this law, and the non-Sunni Ahmadiyya Muslim community have been prevented from successfully registering due to a government precondition that the group renounce their identity as Muslims. As a result, some of the 230 members have been subject to government surveillance, passport seizure, and detention (USCIRF, 2024). As of the end of 2023, over 30 members of the community have been arrested and are serving prison sentences (ranging from six months to three years) on charges including unauthorized worship, distribution of religious material, proselytization, undermining national unity, and "desecrating the Qur'an" (USCIRF, 2024).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Half-way through 2024, at least 14,328 Sub-Saharan migrants have been violently and forcibly deported by Algerian authorities at the southern border with Niger (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2024). Migrants being deported are detained by security forces through mass round-ups and raids across the country, transported to a remote desert location at the Nigerien border, and forced to walk 15 km to the Nigerien village of Assamaka (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2024). During the journey to the border, migrants report frequent mistreatment by state security forces including being subject to beatings, having their belongings and travel documents taken away, and being transported in overcrowded buses and lorries in extreme heat (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2024). In May, eight migrants died during the walk across the border due to heatstroke (Alarme Phone Sahara, 2024).

Ahead of the September 2024 presidential elections, journalists, political opponents, and critics of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune continue to be detained or held in custody. Instances of repression also include citizens being placed under judicial supervision for making social media posts or being accused of calling for protests against the government (Ouali, 2024). As of 2024, it is estimated that over 450 people remain detained for free speech or peacefully calling for regime change (North Africa Post, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

Andorra

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Angola

Through 2022, state security forces have continued to be implicated in serious human rights abuses in Angola. Security forces have used excessive force and arbitrarily arrested protesters, activists, and journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2022). People who violate lockdown restrictions or human rights defenders who disseminate COVID-19 public health information have been particularly vulnerable to arbitrary detention and police violence, including lethal violence (Amnesty International, 2021). Violent clashes continued in Angola's Lunda Norte Province between security forces and non-state separatist groups, such as the Lunda Tchokwe Protectorate Movement (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Pro-independence activists and protesters have been summarily executed during these clashes (Freedom

House, 2022). Additionally, a severe drought has caused a major humanitarian hunger crisis in mostly southern Angola, which heightened tensions and civil disobedience (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2021).

Through an operation to combat diamond trafficking and illegal immigration known as “Operation Transparency,” Angolan security forces detained and deported hundreds of thousands of Central and West African, mostly Congolese, migrants from Angola near the end of 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Reuters, 2018). The operation continued through 2019 and slowed in 2020 (Further Africa, 2020).

New for September 2023 release: Angolan security forces forcibly evicted citizens in Luanda and demolished over 300 homes, leaving hundreds of residents homeless (Human Rights Watch, 2023). During the raid police beat and arrested dozens of peaceful protestors.

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In 2023, Angolan police and security forces committed several human rights abuses, primarily against civil society activists. Excessive force against protesters resulted in the deaths of 15 people during the year as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of hundreds of others protesting government policies (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). In the northern province of Cabinda, 45 activists attending a human rights education program were arrested after Angolan authorities forcibly entered the program’s venue (Campos Lima, 2023). Protests occurred in June in multiple major cities due to fuel price increases, where 87 more protesters were arbitrarily detained and more injured after security forces used live ammunition against the crowds (Crisis Watch, 2023). There are also reports that freedom of movement was restricted to residents in the Lunda Norte Province by both state and private security forces who guard the region’s diamond mines, but exact figures of those contained are still unknown (Freedom House, 2024).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: At least 200 citizens remain in arbitrary pre-trial detention in Angola as of July 2024 after being initially detained in October 2023 (Rodrigues, 2024). Following the arrest of two more protesters in July, some local estimates place the number of political prisoners in the country at more than 400 (Bun, 2024). Excessive preventative and pre-trial detention is a major problem in Angola’s judicial system, as roughly half of the country’s 24,000 inmates haven’t been sentenced, and instead are being held in pre-trial detention while they are investigated (Bun, 2024b).

Complaints from civil society activists about human rights violations by Angolan police officers have prompted responses from officials. In April, the president of Angola’s Observatory of Social Cohesion and Justice acknowledged that torture is still present within prisons and that detained civilians can go weeks without being heard from while in prison (Bun, 2024c).

In 2024, there have been at least 15 reported unlawful killings in Angola, primarily carried out by the police and other security forces. These incidents have mostly targeted political activists, artists, and protest organizers. Angolan state security forces have been implicated in serious human rights abuses, including more than a dozen extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, excessive use of force against peaceful protesters, and arbitrary detentions (Agence France-Presse, 2023) (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery and Avantika Singh

Antigua and Barbuda

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. While there are no recorded perceived mass atrocities that fit our framework, consensual same-sex relations continue to be outlawed.

Last updated: July 2024.

Argentina

Violence in Argentina persists through police abuse, poor prison conditions, and endemic violence against women. Argentina’s national security forces, including the Argentine National Gendarmerie (GNA) – a militarized police force – have reportedly used arbitrary detention, excessive force, torture, and ill-treatment against detained individuals in recent years (Human Rights Watch, 2022). There have been 1,232 alleged cases of torture or ill-treatment in federal prisons from January 2018-June 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2021; Human Rights Watch 2022). The UN Committee against Torture reported the abuse in 2017, and it appears to have continued into 2022. Security forces are reportedly using excessive force to enforce COVID-19 lockdown restrictions. There were 297 reported cases of violence by security officers in 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Additionally, at least 250 femicides occurred in 2020, one every 35 hours (The Washington Post, 2021).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Mass protests in the Jujay province started in June 2023 following reforms to the provincial constitution that restrict the right to protest and modify rights to indigenous land (Booth, 2023). On June 17, police cleared a protest that was blocking a road in the town of Purmamarca, injuring some and leading to the arrest of 30 individuals (Booth, 2023). Once the constitutional reforms were adopted on June 20, more protests erupted around the legislature building in the city of San Salvador which ended with 30 more protesters being arrested (Booth, 2023). The excessive force used by local police and the arbitrary detention of 25 non-violent protesters compelled the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to release a statement voicing concerns about violations of the protesters’ freedom of expression (IACHR, 2023).

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: Civil unrest and mass protests have been constant occurrences during 2024 in response to sweeping economic reforms. Most notably, a protest in Buenos Aires drew over 500,000 people who gathered to march against spending cuts to education (Al Jazeera, 2024). Protests against economic and political reforms in June led to the arbitrary arrest of at least 33 people and included security forces and plainclothes officers using pepper spray, water cannons, rubber bullets, and batons to disperse crowds (Buenos Aires Herald, 2024; IACHR, 2024). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) denounced the police’s excessive force against protesters and expressed concern over the characterization of protesters as “terrorists” by high-ranking Argentine officials (IACHR, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Armenia

Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict involving Armenia, Armenia-supported separatists, and Azerbaijan ended in a 2020 ceasefire, sporadic clashes between the opposing sides have continued. Some ethnic Armenian prisoners of war are still detained in Azerbaijan, and many have reported torture or ill-treatment (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Civilians continue to be at risk in the Nagorno-Karabakh region due to the periodic violence with Azerbaijan. Approximately 90,000 ethnic Armenians fled and were displaced during the violence in 2020 (Amnesty International, 2021). Armenian and Armenian-supported separatist forces have been accused of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law, including their use of land mines, unguided artillery rockets, and firing heavy artillery shells and ballistic missiles in population centers. This included locations where there were no evident military targets and caused civilian deaths and injuries (Amnesty International, 2021).

During the “velvet revolution” protests from April 13, 2018 – May 3, 2018, Armenian security forces used arbitrary detention, torture, and both lethal and non-lethal violence against political protesters and journalists (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Armenian security forces reportedly continue to use force against largely peaceful protesters, and torture in custody by security forces reportedly persists (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

LGBTQI+ people in Armenia continue to face harassment, discrimination, and violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In August 2018, a crowd of about 30 men violently assaulted the activists in Shurnoukh, a village in southern Armenia. The crowd shouted homophobic slurs and threats, demanding the activists leave the village (Pilishvili, 2020). For recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh, see the Azerbaijan narrative.

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In September 2023, Armenia received over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh as refugees as a direct result of an Azerbaijani military offensive to reintegrate the territory that borders both countries into Azerbaijan (Crisis Watch, 2023). The mass displacement of civilians to Armenia created a humanitarian and housing crisis in the country, and the offensive caused the deaths of at least two hundred people in Nagorno-Karabakh (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Within 24 hours of the offensive, Azerbaijan controlled the disputed territory and brokered a ceasefire with the self-declared government that ended its rule in January 2024, allowing the region to reintegrate with Azerbaijan and starting the process of, “returning 140,000 Azerbaijanis to their ancestral lands by the end of 2026” (Crisis Watch, 2023).

LGBTQI+ citizens continue to face discrimination and violence. LGBTQI+ members of the military receive homophobic harassment and violence, but if they apply for service exemption, they must receive a diagnosis of “homosexuality” or “transsexualism”, before it is then documented in an electronic information system, potentially creating the possibility for further discrimination in the future (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In April 2023, police raided an LGBTQI+ friendly club in Yerevan, where 41 people were arbitrarily arrested and detained as part of a drug trafficking investigation. Some of those arrested were thrown on the floor and beat by police, verbally harassed for their gender identity, and even strip-searched (Yeghiazaryan, 2023).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Fallout from Azerbaijan’s military offensive to re-occupy Nagorno-Karabakh continued to be felt in Armenia during 2024. Tensions along the country’s border with Azerbaijan remain high, with occasional shooting and brief clashes taking place as the leadership from both nations continue to work towards delimitation agreements (International Crisis Watch, 2024).

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and other border villages to Azerbaijan has resulted in mass protests in the capital city of Yerevan, where protestors continue to call for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s resignation. In two separate protests in Yerevan in May, over 400 protestors were arrested by Armenia police (Galstyan & Bulghadaryan, 2024; Khulian et al., 2024). In June, police used stun grenades to disperse a group of protestors and journalists, injuring over 100 people while at least 70 more were detained by police (ACLEED, 2024; Radio Free Europe, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Australia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

New for June 2024 release: While there are no recorded perceived mass atrocities that fit our framework, the indigenous population continue to face discrimination and inequality. Despite only comprising 3.8% of the country’s population, about one third of Australia’s adult prison population is indigenous (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Menon, 2023). The indigenous population also face experience high unemployment rates, workplace harassment, low education levels, and relatively limited access to health services. The NGO Diversity Council Australia released a report that stated about 59% of indigenous workers faced discrimination and harassment at work in 2023, a 9% increase over two years (DCA, 2023; US State Department, 2023). On October 14, a proposed constitutional referendum was defeated that would have formally recognized Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people as the First People of the land as well as granted them an advisory body to Parliament on indigenous issues (Menon, 2023).

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Austria

From January to August 2021, Austrian authorities deported 64 Afghan refugees in violation of the country’s commitment to non-refoulement principles and despite a real risk of serious human rights violations upon return (Amnesty International, 2021). In July, the Styrian Regional Administrative Court ruled that a group of seven asylum seekers had been illegally pushed back to Slovenia, noting that such illegal pushbacks were a recurrent practice (Amnesty International, 2021).

– Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in Austria during 2023.

Last updated: May 2024.

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Azerbaijan

Against the backdrop of a six-week war involving Armenia, Armenia-supported separatists, and Azerbaijan, which ended in a 2020 truce, sporadic clashes have continued. Some missing ethnic Armenian prisoners of war are either still detained in Azerbaijan or have been forcibly disappeared or killed (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Ethnic Armenians living in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region continue to be at risk due to the periodic violence.

Azerbaijan security forces have reduced the right to privacy and association against journalists, government critics, and activists. Many government critics and political opposition, including the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (APFP) have been subjected to arbitrary detention and arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Security forces have used excessive force and arbitrary arrests against peaceful protesters (Amnesty International, 2021; Freedom House, 2022). Torture has reportedly remained widespread for detained Armenians, including some extrajudicial killings. Many of the 40,000 Azeri civilians displaced during the 2020 conflict have returned to their homes. However, many of the 650,000 people displaced since the 1990s because of mines, destruction of infrastructure, and lost livelihoods are still displaced (Amnesty International, 2021).

New for September 2023 release: Since December 2022 the Lachin corridor has been blocked by dozens of Azerbaijani protestors, most likely tied to and backed by the Azerbaijani government (Amnesty, 2023). The situation has left 120,000 ethnic Armenian residents in Nagorno-Karabakh without access to essential goods, including severe food shortages (Amnesty, 2023). Violence, harassment, and discrimination against the LGBTQI+ community persist. Members of the LGBTQI+ community face group-perpetrated violence, violation of rights, and police raids leading to arbitrary detention and arrests (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women face societal and employment-based discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive through a joint ground assault and shelling campaign to retake the contested territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (Crisis Group, 2023). Within two days, the military had regained control over the entire region, ending over three decades of self-governance of Nagorno-Karabakh, and displacing over 100,000 ethnic Armenians to Armenia (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). The offensive also resulted in the deaths of over 200 people, 25 of which were civilians, according to Armenian officials (Armen Press, 2024; CNN, 2023). In January 2024, Nagorno-Karabakh's former government formally dissolved, and the region integrated as part of

Azerbaijan, with a declared goal of resettling 140,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to Nagorno-Karabakh by 2026 (Crisis Group, 2023).

Religious freedom conditions deteriorated in 2023 when the government conducted mass arrests against Shi'a Muslims during a campaign to crack down on alleged Iranian espionage, although a large majority of the known charges of those arrested were drug-related (USCIRF, 2024; US State Department, 2023). Local activists estimated that over 500 Shi'a Muslims were arrested in the early months of 2023, with some claiming that some of those detained were only practicing their religion (EurasiaNet, 2023; USCIRF, 2024). The exact number of those arrested and their charges were either unable to be confirmed or were not publicly available.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: Only around 50-1,000 ethnic Armenians remain within Azerbaijan following the reintegration of the Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh territory to Azerbaijan in January 2024 (BBC, 2023). Azerbaijani control over the territory has led to a troubling pattern of cultural erasure, including the destruction of ethnic Armenian villages, churches, cemeteries, and schools for the purpose of redevelopment (CHW, 2024).

Following mass religious crackdowns on nonconforming Shi'a Muslims in 2023, an estimated 216 prisoners were detained in the country for their religious beliefs, activities, or activism as of June 2024 (IPD, 2024; USCIRF, 2024). Although the national constitution describes Azerbaijan as a secular state, the central government continues to regulate which religious groups can legally engage in activities and worship. For at least three straight years, the government has refused to register any non-Muslim religious communities (USCIRF, 2024; US State Department, 2024). As a result of these forms of religious repression and erasure, the United States Department of State designated Azerbaijan as a "Special Watch List" country for engaging in and tolerating severe violations of religious freedom (USCIRF, 2024; U.S. Department of State, 2024b).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Bahamas

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Bahrain

In recent years, a government crackdown on dissent has led to repression and violence against government critics, political opposition, and human rights defenders. This has included arbitrary detention, reduction of citizenship, and torture by government authorities (Amnesty International, 2018). All independent media and political opposition parties have been banned by the government (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Detainees have reported ill-treatment, torture, and medical negligence in prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Freedom House, 2022; ADHRB, 2018). The prison system has made heavy use of the death penalty, reportedly performing mass executions of

individuals who have been denied due process, as well as victims of torture (Human Rights Watch, 2020). From 2012 through 2019, authorities stripped many individuals of their Bahraini nationality and citizenship. While this order has been rescinded, approximately 300 people who had their citizenship previously revoked remain without legal Bahraini citizenship, rendering them stateless (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Bahraini authorities continue to enforce the *kafala* system of sponsored employment, under which migrant workers—the majority of whom come from India and Bangladesh—can face arrest, fines, and/or deportation for leaving a job without their employer’s consent (Human Rights Watch, 2023; The Vatican: Migrants & Refugees Section, 2021). Women face legal discrimination in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and are required to obey their husbands as the head of the household (Human Rights Watch, 2023). While same-sex sexual relations are not explicitly illegal, authorities reportedly use vague charges of “indecent” and “immorality” to target sexual and gender minorities (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Despite constitutional protection of basic political rights and association, political opposition in Bahrain continued to be suppressed and criminalized throughout 2023 as a result of restrictive political laws implemented in 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The laws ban former opposition party members from running for parliament and holding positions within civil society organizations and eliminates full participation for anyone who has been sentenced or imprisoned for political crimes including: holding membership in illegal political societies, political speech, and political assembly (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Citizens currently detained for these crimes live in deteriorating prison conditions within Bahrain and many are subject to torture, beatings and sexual harassment while serving their sentence. In August 2023, as a form of protest against prison conditions as well as unfair trials and charges, around 800 prisoners participated in a hunger strike in the Jau detention center (Jamal, 2023).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: In April 2024, Bahrain’s king Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa issued a royal pardon that released 1,584 prisoners, most of whom were facing protest-related criminal charges (ADHRB, 2024; Agence France-Presse, 2024). The pardon was a welcome surprise for human rights activists in Bahrain, who continue to call for the release of an estimated 600 political prisoners still detained in the country (ADHRB, 2024; Wintour, 2024). Many of the remaining political prisoners are held in the Jau detention center, where hundreds of inmates staged a protest in August 2023 over inhumane treatment and living conditions (Wintour, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

Bangladesh

Amid an influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Bangladesh has struggled with its own governmental repression. Violence has increased since 2018, targeting independent media and journalists, civil society actors, and political activists. Enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killing by government authorities have reportedly persisted, with suspected perpetrators including

members of the ruling Awami League and the Rapid Action Battalion, an elite unit of the Bangladesh police (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Amnesty International, 2021). Between 2019 and 2020, 616 alleged extrajudicial executions were reported, with most seemingly politically motivated (Human Rights Watch, 2022). There are reported cases of Rohingya refugees being targeted, ostensibly for ethno-religious reasons (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The Bangladeshi government has denied allegations of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Political opposition and government critics reportedly continue to face arbitrary detention and arrest. In addition to politically motivated violence, religious tensions between Muslims and Hindus have increased in recent years as hate speech has proliferated via social media (Hasan et al., 2022).

In December 2021, the United States imposed human rights sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion, leading to a dramatic—but seemingly temporary—decline in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, which continue to be aimed at the ruling Awami League’s political opponents (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). With general elections scheduled for January 2024—the first since the Awami League allegedly rigged the 2018 elections—violence and repression against the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has already begun to escalate, with the BNP reporting that 9,000 of its leaders and workers were arrested in the last five months of 2022 (Rahman, 2023).

Abuses against Rohingya refugees have persisted. On the remote island of Bhasan Char, some 28,000 Rohingya face food and medicine shortages and reportedly endure abuses by state security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). In other refugee camps, authorities have reportedly closed Rohingya-led schools and arbitrarily destroyed refugees’ shops (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). In refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, located on Bangladesh’s southeast coast, the Armed Police Battalion in charge of camp security is perceived to engage in widespread extortion of refugees, as well as collusion with local gangs and armed groups (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). According to one researcher, at least 25 people were killed in the camps in a recent five-month period, most of them Rohingya community leaders (Islam, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Same-sex sexual activity is illegal in Bangladesh and can carry prison sentences of 10 years to life (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). The law also does not protect against marital sexual assault for victims older than 13. Violence and discrimination against women continue to be a widespread issue including dowry-related assaults and murders, acid attacks, child marriages, and religious leaders enforcing fatwas (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Bangladeshi authorities arrested roughly 10,000 activists from the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) after an opposition rally in Dhaka was met by ruling-party counter protesters and police (Human Rights Watch, 2023c; Ellis-Peterson & Azizur Rahman, 2023; Reuters, 2023). Meanwhile, conditions remained poor for the estimated 965,467 registered Rohingya refugees in the country during 2023, who are restricted by the government in Dhaka from leaving designated refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and the island of Bhasan Char (Crisis Group, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2024; Youth Congress Rohingya, 2023). An estimated 924 Rohingya refugees were arrested outside of camps in 2023, and within the camps, they are denied the right to work, and some are subject to extortion and torture by Bangladeshi police (Crisis Group, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2024; Youth Congress Rohingya, 2023). The refugee crisis continues to be exacerbated by the insistence of the Bangladeshi government to repatriate the refugees back to Myanmar, the result being that nearly all Rohingya refugees are completely dependent on foreign humanitarian aid to live, and are not afforded freedom of

movement, education, or livelihood opportunities by the government (Crisis Group, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Mass student protests erupted in July 2024 after a controversial job quota system was reinstated by a Bangladesh court order (Ahmed & Ellis-Peterson, 2024a). Protesters claim that the quota system, which reserves 30 percent of government jobs for family members of veterans who fought in the country's war of independence in 1971, favors ruling party supporters in an already unstable national economy and limited job market (Ahmed & Ellis-Peterson, 2024a). Thousands of student protesters have clashed with police forces and heavily armed members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the militant student wing of the ruling party, Awami League (Ahmed & Ellis-Peterson, 2024a). Bangladesh has arrested more than 10,000 people and banned a major opposition party in response to weeks of protests that began as a student-led movement against government-job quotas (Ahmed & Ellis-Petersen, 2024b). Approximately 560 people have died in protest-related violence in Bangladesh over the last 23 days. This includes 328 deaths from July 16 to August 4 during clashes related to the quota movement and student protests, followed by 232 additional fatalities after the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on August 5 (Prothom Alo, 2024). Originally peaceful, the protests escalated after attacks by ruling party activists and a heavy-handed response from security forces. These escalations led to deadly clashes, with pro-government groups attacking demonstrators and the police responding with teargas, rubber bullets, and pellets. This crackdown has resulted in widespread dissent and turmoil across the country (Alam, 2024). Schools and universities were closed indefinitely across the country as the government attempted to restore order (Agence France-Presse, 2024). The government also shut down mobile internet access due to "various rumours" and the "unstable situation" created by social media coverage of the protests (Al Jazeera, 2024). Eventually, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country seeking refuge after crowds stormed her official residence (Paul & Ganguly, 2024).

Insecurity within the country's Rohingya refugee camps persisted in 2024. Separate armed groups, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), have forcibly and illegally recruited refugees from within camps in Bangladesh, primarily from those in Cox's Bazar (Azizur Rahman, 2024; International Crisis Watch, 2024; Radio Free Asia, 2024). At least 500 refugees have been forcibly recruited for military training and deployment in 2024, while other estimates claim 750 to 1,000 refugees have been recruited for military use (Azizur Rahman, 2024; Radio Free Asia, 2024). Refugees as young as 14 years old have been forced into military training by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army to fight in the Rakhine state against the Myanmar army, while the Rohingya Solidarity Organization has forcibly sent refugees to the Myanmar army for conscription (Azizur Rahman, 2024; International Crisis Watch, 2024). As conflict increases in the Rakhine state, forced recruitment within Bangladesh's Rohingya refugee camps will likely increase as well.

An estimated 427,000 citizens remain internally displaced from conflict within Bangladesh, a majority from the ongoing ethnic conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the southeastern part of the country (IDMC, 2021). The separatist group Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), comprised of several ethnic groups in the region, continue to conduct political and military operations against predominate ethnic groups (Chakma and Marma) and government security forces over land rights and territorial claims in the CHT (Jarin, 2023). The emergence of KNF as a militant separatist group, their allegiance with the Islamic militant group Jama'atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, and recent conflict surges with security forces in the

CHT during April and May 2024 continue the prolonged displacement of tens of thousands of citizens in the region and diminish the possibility of peace in the near future (International Crisis Group, 2024; Jarin, 2023; Mahjabeen, 2023).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery and Avantika Singh

Barbados

While there are no recent reports of being enforced, the law does criminalize consensual same-sex conduct between adults with penalties for men being up to life in prison, and up to 10 years in prison for men and women convicted of “acts of serious indecency (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Last updated: July 2024.

Belarus

Following the 2020 presidential election, Belarusian authorities cracked down on dissent and peaceful protest. Freedoms of expression, assembly, and association remain severely restricted (Amnesty International, 2021). Plain-clothes police have used excessive and indiscriminate force while arbitrarily detaining journalists, activists, and peaceful protesters. Medics, students, and union leaders have also been targeted for arbitrary arrest; in agreeing to represent such clients, defense lawyers risk disbarment (Amnesty International, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2022a). Between November 2020 and October 2021 at least 8,712 people were detained in relation to peaceful protests (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; Amnesty International, 2021). Many detainees reported torture or ill-treatment while in custody, including the use of sexual violence against women and minors (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; Amnesty International, 2021). In February 2022, peaceful demonstrations took place across Belarus in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; security forces reportedly responded with hundreds of arrests and the beating and ill-treatment of protestors (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In March 2023, the UN Human Rights Office published a report on the “near-total destruction of civic space and fundamental freedoms in Belarus,” including the ongoing detention of over 1,460 people on politically motivated charges (United Nations, 2023).

Security forces are also perceived to target Roma and Polish ethnic minority communities for arbitrary detainment and harassment. One recent high-profile incident occurred in May 2019, when security forces conducted mass round-ups and arbitrarily detained hundreds of ethnic Romani citizens (Anti-Discrimination Center, 2019; FIDH, 2019; ERRC, 2019).

Beginning in August 2021, Belarusian authorities orchestrated a series of humanitarian crises at Belarus’s borders with European Union member states Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Having facilitated the arrival of thousands of migrants from the Middle East, Belarusian authorities engineered unprecedented migrant flows at the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish borders, prompting accusations that Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko was weaponizing migration as a form of “hybrid warfare” (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Henley et al., 2021). Migrants who were pushed back into Belarus reportedly faced beatings and ill-treatment at the hands of Belarusian border guards, and Belarusian authorities are perceived to have imperiled the lives of hundreds of migrants by forcing them to endure inhospitable conditions in the forests and swamps of the border region (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2022b).

New for September 2023 release: Belarusian police often target LGBTQI+ individuals with “hooliganism” when dressing in non-gender normative clothing, using dating apps to find gay men to falsely charge with sex work, and forcing LGBTQI+ detained individuals to confess to crimes and state their sexual orientation on camera to later post online (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Detailed accounts of the ill-treatment and torture of political prisoners continued to come out of Belarus during 2023. At the end of the year, there were 1,452 political prisoners being held in detention in Belarus, mostly as a result of continued political repression following the mass protests to the 2020 presidential elections (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Viasna, 2024). Political prisoners face life-threatening and inhumane conditions while in prison because of their positions against the Belarusian regime, including being severely beat by officers before being refused medical care, forced sleep deprivation, and even being placed in cells with non-political prisoners who have known communicable diseases (OHCHR, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2024). Eyewitness reports describe how political prisoners in Belarus are forced to wear yellow tags on their uniforms so they are easily identifiable by prison officers to receive extra humiliation or punishment (Karmanau, 2023).

While there are currently no laws that deny any minority citizen equal rights/protection based on their identity or ethnicity, the regime took an increasingly hardline stance against minority groups in 2023. In two separate rulings, a regional court shut down two public Lithuanian associations, whose combined membership was over 500 members of Belarusians with Lithuanian ethnicity (U.S. State Department, 2024). In November, the EU acknowledged increased repression against Lithuanian and Polish minority groups under President Lukashenka and stated, “...the Lukashenka regime is continuing its policy of Russification of Belarus, with the strategic aim of marginalising and destroying expressions of Belarusian national identity, including its language and culture” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2023).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Around 1,413 political prisoners remain detained in Belarus as the human rights situation in the country remains poor (Human Rights Watch, 2024b; PenBelarus, 2024). In May 2024, a report presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council by Special Rapporteur Anaïs Marin acknowledged that political prisoners wear special identification marks and are forced to live in deliberately inhumane prison conditions that degrade their health and liberty (UNHRC, 2024). Political prisoners routinely face arbitrary restrictions of communication with their families and lawyers and are frequently placed into solitary confinement, where they are deliberately malnourished and subject to sleep deprivation by officers, and in some cases have even been prohibited from receiving medication or health care (UNHRC, 2024).

In the first three months of 2024, an estimated 33 cultural organizations faced obstruction, censorship, or forced liquidation from the regime as Belarusian and other minority cultural figures and their communities are targeted (Council of Europe, 2024; PenBelarus, 2024b). Belarusian language is perceived by the government as a sign of political disloyalty, and minority Lithuanian and Polish schools have in some cases been forced to provide education on Russian language and culture or risk discrimination and closure (Council of Europe, 2024). The magnitude of individuals impacted by the targeted erasure of their cultural identity during 2024 could not be determined and therefore has not met inclusion criteria for this year.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Belgium

In recent years, Belgian police have been accused of using excessive force, mainly against peaceful protesters, violators of the COVID-19 lockdown, and migrant communities (OHCHR, 2019; Amnesty International, 2021; The Brussels Times, 2021; Freedom House, 2022). Amnesty International reported that police used unnecessary and excessive force to disperse about 100 peaceful protesters in 2021 (Amnesty International, 2021). In 2019, several dozen detainees and inmates were found to have been victims of “violence, harassment, and degrading treatment” by prison guards (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

– Ruth Byrnes

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: In May 2024, 60 peaceful climate protesters were detained by police for blocking traffic on Rue Belliard in Brussels (The Brussels Times, 2024). Before they were detained, riot police were deployed and used water cannons to forcibly remove protesters who had refused to vacate the street (The Brussels Times, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Belize

Since 2020, there have been reports of arbitrary killings, arbitrary detainment, and mistreatment by police in Belize, particularly when enforcing COVID-19 policies in 2020 (Breaking Belize News, 2020; Freedom House, 2021; LoveFM, 2020; MONITOR – Civicus, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2021). However, these atrocities appear to be indiscriminate against civilians due to police corruption, and not targeted towards a particular victim group.

– Ruth Byrnes

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024

Benin

In recent years, state security forces in Benin have reportedly made arbitrary arrests and used excessive force against political opposition, journalists, peaceful protests, and human rights activists (Freedom House, 2022; BTI, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Amnesty International, 2021). While these events did not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion, there was political violence around the 2019 and 2021 elections during which police used excessive force on protestors (France24, 2019; Amnesty International, 2019). Sources have reported a range of 36 to 200 nonviolent individuals who were arrested during the 2021 political protests (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: Women in Benin continue to face employment discrimination including legal restrictions on occupation types, equal pay, and in managing or owning a business (U.S. Department of State, 2023). While FGM/C is prohibited by law it continues as enforcement is rare. Public indecency laws are used to prosecute LGBTQI+ individuals. LGBTQI+ individuals face physical and verbal violence, and intimidation by nonstate actors and police (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 Release: Civilian targeting in the northern provinces of Benin increased in 2023 as a result of continued incursion from Niger and Burkina Faso by the extremist group Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) (de Bruijne, 2023). In May, the group was suspected of killing 20 civilians in the province of Atacora (Ahissou, 2023; Berger et al., 2024). In September, nine more civilians were killed by JNIM militants in Alibori, the province that borders Niger (ACLED, 2023). The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimated that in total, 35 civilians were killed in northern Benin during 2023 as a result of a troubling pattern of violent extremism in the region (de Bruijne, 2023). Violent extremists, mainly from JMIN, were also responsible for 49 forced disappearances in Benin during 2023, all of which occurred in northern provinces where the group is continuing to compete for territory (Berger et al., 2024).

Because of the violence caused by the presence of Islamist extremist groups in northern Benin, thousands of civilians were forcibly displaced from the Atacora and Alibori provinces during 2023. A joint report by the UNHCR, UNICEF, World Food Program and International Organization for Migration, as well as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) both estimate that around 8,785 civilians were internally displaced as a result of conflict in the two northern provinces during 2023 (IDMC, 2023; UNHCR, 2024), while AP News and the World Food Program estimated that through August 2023 over 12,000 civilians were internally displaced in Atacora and Alibori due to conflict-related factors (Mednick, 2023; WFP, 2023).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Around 100 labor union members were arrested during a two-week period of unrest in April and May, as they protested high costs of living (France24, 2024; International Crisis Watch, 2024). Police used tear-gas to disperse a peaceful demonstration of trade union members and arrested nearly 30 members after the gathering was banned by the government (France24, 2024). Beninese law provides protection for peaceful assemblies and demonstrations, but the government has consistently not respected this right in recent years (U.S. State Department, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Bhutan

New for September 2023 release: In the early 1990s, a government policy that stripped ethnically Nepalese people of their citizenship forced more than 80,000 Nepali-speaking people to flee from Bhutan (U.S. Department of State, 2022; AHURA, n.d.). Those who remained in Bhutan are either detained as political prisoners or their rights are severely restricted (MONITOR, 2020; CIJ, 2021; Seattle Times, 2022). However, these events did not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion. The law does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics resulting in LGBTQI+ individuals facing societal discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 Release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country in 2023.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: As of July 2024, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 34 political prisoners remain detained in harsh prison conditions within Bhutan (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Some groups claim that the majority of those who are still detained were originally arrested in the early 1990s for expressing their political identity and continue to be held as “anti-nationals” despite Bhutan becoming a constitutional democracy in 2008 (Freedom House, 2024; VoicePK, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Bolivia

Following a disputed presidential election on October 20, 2019, political opponents and critics were reportedly targeted for arbitrary arrests and excessive use of force by police and national armed forces; however, these events did not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion (Amnesty International, 2021). Security forces used violence to disband many political protests. The Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) has reported that 37 people were killed and 170 were injured during the violence between September 1 and December 31, 2019 (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The GIEI also reported arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, and torture by police forces (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Since then, former interim president Jeanine Áñez Chavez has been imprisoned on charges of “terrorism,” “sedition,” and “genocide,” although some international entities have alleged that Chavez was denied a fair trial (Amnesty International, 2021). As of 2022, the military and police continued to use arbitrary detainment and torture against political opposition and critics (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: While prohibited by law, gender-based violence such as domestic violence, femicide, and sexual assault continue to be prevalent due to rare enforcement by security officers (U.S. Department of State, 2023). High levels of corruption in the legal system have allowed those accused or sentenced for gender-based offenses to bribe judges and other officials to lessen sentences. The LGBTQI+ community faces high levels of violence and discrimination in employment, schools, and in

accessing government services. The government does not effectively enforce discrimination laws to protect LGBTQI+ individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 Release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the Perceived Mass Atrocities Dataset (PMAD) codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in Bolivia during 2023.

Despite this, both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) released separate reports during the year that expressed similar concerns about “consistent structural issues within Bolivia’s justice system” (OHCHR, 2023) as well as concerns that the country’s judicial system favoring prevailing political interests (IACHR, 2024). CERD specifically acknowledged that the non-discrimination principle in Bolivian law is not enforced adequately, leading to the continuation of structural racism and inequality, especially for the indigenous population (OHCHR, 2023), and could lead to a deterioration in humans rights by undermining the country’s institutions and rule of law (IACHR, 2024). These concerns are compounded by the increase in harassment and physical violence journalists faced in 2023, as well sustained government efforts to dictate how media organizations portray the state and its policies (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Media and journalists have reported threats or intimidation by government authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). As more information becomes available, historical PMAD data may be revised to include non-zero values for these perceived mass atrocity types.

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In August 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) formally acknowledged the country’s democratic elections as being undermined by ethnic distinctions in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Constitution that separate the “constituent peoples” of Bosnian, Serb, and Croat ethnicity and “others and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which includes all ethnic minorities and unaffiliated citizens (ECHR, 2023). This distinction only grants the right to run for elected office in the House of Peoples and the Presidency to “constituent peoples”, while any citizens who do not affiliate with one of the three recognized ethnicities are denied the right to do the same (Human Right Watch, 2019; ECHR, 2023). The ECHR also concluded that the discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities to run for office, “...was [also] true in respect for the right to vote in elections to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ECHR, 2023). By most recent estimates, the citizens that comprise ethnic minority groups account for roughly 2.7 percent of the country’s population (CIA, 2024).

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

New for September 2024 release: Secession efforts by the country’s ethnic-Serb territory Republika Srpska (RS) increased during 2024, after European Union leaders approved the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina (International Crisis Group, 2024). In April, as a response to a UN resolution that officially recognized a day of remembrance for the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide, RS President Milorad Dodik declared that RS will reintegrate with Serbia, “as soon as the first opportunity arises” (International Crisis Watch, 2024).

Dodik has openly expressed a desire to organize a referendum on independence for the territory and has even taken legislative steps to reject any authority of the Bosnian constitutional court or High Representative within RS (International Crisis Watch, 2024b). As tensions between the ethnically divided territories and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their leaders increase, the possibility of ethnic violence within the country also increases.

Significant human rights issues persist including credible reports of torture by police; harsh prison conditions; violence and threats against journalists, adoption of the law criminalizing defamation; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on political participation for minority candidates; government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, violence against children, and early and forced marriage in the Roma population; targeting members of ethnic groups; attacks targeting various religious groups; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Botswana

New for September 2023 release: During the 43rd Universal Periodic Review (UPR) conducted at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, some United Nations (UN) member states expressed concern that mining, tourism and agriculture activities are displacing the indigenous community of the Basarwa tribe (Human Rights Council, 2023). This indigenous community is pushed out of their ancestral land and face arbitrary arrests, and denial of access to basic government services including health care, food assistance, and education (Human Rights Council, 2023). Domestic violence continues to be a serious problem in Botswana and spousal rape is not prohibited by law (U.S. Department of State, 2023). While the constitution grants men and women the same rights, customary law based on tribal practice restricts women’s property rights and economic opportunities (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In 2021 same-sex sexual conduct was decriminalized but members of the LGBTQI+ community continue to face violence, societal harassment, and discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Brazil

In recent years, Brazil's police are perceived to have systematically used excessive and lethal force on real or suspected criminals, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Military and civil police killed more than 6,300 people in 2019 and more than 6,400 in 2020 (U.S. Department of State, 2022). It is unknown how many of these deaths were the result of excessive force, but not all are thought to have resulted from self-defense (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Most victims of police violence are recorded as being Afro-Brazilian men—84 percent of the 6,145 people police killed in 2021 were Black—and most incidents of violence occurred during anti-drug trafficking operations in Brazil's favelas (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023). On May 6, 2021, for instance, the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police's Coordinator of Special Assets (CORE) conducted an operation that led to 27 civilian deaths amid accusations of summary executions by CORE officers (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Additionally, police forces in Brazil reportedly use torture against detainees. There were reports of physical harm by police against more than 3,200 detainees in 2018 and more than 2,600 in 2019 (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Approximately 5,500 cases of femicide were pending in Brazil's courts as of 2020, and more than 1,300 femicides were reported in 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that such killings do not clearly qualify as group-perpetrated atrocities, and under PMAD coding guidelines, women are not considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women is coded separately under PMAD's Violence Against Women Severity index. As a result, violence against women is not reflected in PMAD's Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

In 2021, 226 Indigenous lands were reportedly impacted by unauthorized occupations by companies aiming to exploit local mineral and water resources (U.S. Department of State, 2023). One hundred and seventy-six Indigenous persons were killed throughout the year, with some of the deaths reportedly linked to the above-mentioned occupations (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

On the whole, violence against the LGBTQI+ community has decreased since 2017, though violence aimed at transgender individuals is on the rise (U.S. Department of State, 2023). One hundred and thirty-five LGBTQI+ persons were killed in the first six months of 2022, though such killings do not clearly qualify as group-perpetrated atrocities. Furthermore, under PMAD coding guidelines, LGBTQI+ persons are not considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD's Violence Against LGBTQI Severity index. As in the case of women, the exclusion of LGBTQI+ persons from PMAD's Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, and ASSH entries is intended to prevent those variables from over-saturation due to the global prevalence of violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons.

New for June 2023 release: On January 8, 2023, a week after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as Brazil's new president, supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed the presidential palace, Congress, and Supreme Court in the capital city Brasilia (Garcia, 2023). In the aftermath of the violence, authorities formally arrested over 1,200 people and detained roughly 300 more (Debusmann, 2023). At present, these arrests have *not* been coded in PMAD as an instance of mass containment; this could change should evidence come to light indicating that these arrests were arbitrary.

In January 2023, it was reported that at least 30 girls and teenagers belonging to the indigenous Yanomami people had been abused and impregnated by illegal gold miners, constituting an incidence of mass less-lethal violence (John et al., 2023). According to a January report by the UN, the rate of femicide in Brazil increased 44 percent from 2016 to 2021, with one woman dying as a result of femicide every seven hours; indigenous Brazilian women are perceived to be particularly vulnerable to such gender-based violence (United Nations, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for April 2024 release: By year’s end, more than one hundred Yanomami Indigenous people were killed as part of a broad campaign by illegal gold miners to forcibly displace indigenous peoples from the northern Amazon (Reuters, 2024). While this and other lethal violence in rural Brazil saw a decrease in 2023 relative to 2022, the frequency of less lethal violence over ethnic and social tensions related to “agrarian issues... hit a record high: 2,203 cases [—] the highest number since the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT in Portuguese) began compiling these data in 1985” (Moncau, 2024). Meanwhile, a “time-marker” law came into force in December 2023, which “establishes that Indigenous peoples can only lay claim to land they physically occupied as of October 1988” (Malleret, 2023). As such, Indigenous peoples who were forcibly displaced during Brazil’s dictatorship from 1964–1985 will not regain access to their ancestral lands (Malleret, 2023). This marks a continuation of the reduced citizenship experienced by Yanomami and other Indigenous peoples in Brazil.

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: ... Activists, particularly “indigenous people and quilombola [descendants of escaped slaves] and members of other traditional communities” continue to be frequently targeted with physical – at times lethal – violence from unidentified, presumably organized non-state, actors (OHCHR, 2024). This included the murder of two indigenous community leaders in March 2024 (OAS, 2024). “Black women human rights defenders, journalists, popular communicators and lawyers, and social and cultural workers” also continue to be frequently subjected to physical attacks, including by local police (OHCHR, 2024).

Indigenous communities, including Yanomami people, continue to be treated as second-class citizens with, for example, substantially reduced access to public health resources relative to non-indigenous communities (Rocha, 2024) Media freedom was also reportedly severely restricted for critics of the federal government (Finan, 2024), though such restrictions do not meet the PMAD coding criteria.

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued two rulings holding Brazil responsible for serious police-related human rights violations in São Paulo and Paraná states, which date back over 20 years. Despite these rulings and previous decisions, Brazil has not fully complied with court mandates to address unlawful police killings. In the Paraná case, police used lethal force against land reform protesters, while in São Paulo, 12 suspects were killed in a staged ambush by police. The court criticized Brazil's police investigations for negligence and impunity and urged reforms to ensure independent investigations. There were also 45 recent deaths during raids in São Paulo (HRW, 2024).

Additionally, there are concerns over the rising police violence in Bahia, Brazil, where more children and adolescents are killed by security forces than anywhere else in the country. In 2023, 289 people under 19 were killed by police, up from 242 in 2022, according to. This surge has intensified scrutiny of President Lula's Workers' Party (PT), which has governed Bahia for 17 years. Bahia, home to Brazil's Black community, now has the most violent police force nationwide, with 94.76% of victims being Black (The Pinnacle Gazette, 2024).

Homophobic rhetoric from the past few years has also fostered fear of harassment for discussing LGBT+ rights. Social media intimidation by troll groups remains a significant issue, with Bolsonaro allies continuing to spread disinformation, even after his presidency. Under Bolsonaro, public servants were monitored and risked job loss for criticizing the government, a practice the Lula administration has not continued (Freedom House, 2024).

Justice Alexandre de Moraes of Brazil's Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the social media platform X for not complying with censorship demands, including a fine and asset freezes. The censorship primarily targets conservative and religious views, such as pro-life messages. Critics, including journalists like Michael Shellenberger, have faced criminal investigations for speaking out. Brazil's severe restrictions on free speech threaten democracy and basic human rights (ADF International, 2024).

Mary Lawlor, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, has called on Brazil to prioritize the demarcation and titling of land, citing it as the root cause of most attacks against human rights defenders in the country. Following an official visit, Lawlor highlighted the extreme threats faced by defenders, particularly Indigenous, Quilombola, and traditional communities, and criticized the government's failure to provide sufficient protection (OHCHR, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Brunei

New for September 2023 release: Human rights of LGBTQI+ individuals are not supported by the Brunei government (U.S. Department of State, 2023). On April 3, 2019, Brunei's Syariah Penal Code (2013) went into effect. The law punishes liwat (any form of anal intercourse) or zina (sex outside of marriage) between partners of any sex, with death by stoning. Musahaqah (sexual conduct between women) is punishable with up to 40 strokes with whips and prison terms of up to 10 years (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The penal code also criminalizes nonconforming gender expression, punishing "any man who dresses and poses as a woman or any woman who dresses and poses as a man in any public place" with prison time and a fine (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Violence against women continues to be a serious problem in Brunei. Spousal rape is not prohibited by law if the wife is not younger than 14 years old. There are no specific domestic violence laws and no law criminalizing FGM/C for any age. Type 4 FGM/C is generally done within 40 days of birth (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Bulgaria

Police abuse in Bulgaria is perceived to disproportionately affect Roma individuals (Amnesty International, 2021). Violence against Roma people and political protestors has been reported in recent years, though victim magnitudes remain unclear (France24, 2020; France24, 2021; Reuters, 2020; Tsoneva, 2020; RFE/RL, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Human rights observers allege that, in the face of perceived upticks in crime, local authorities and politicians routinely “punish” Roma communities for political gain, including through the disproportionate targeting of Roma dwellings for demolition and eviction (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

According to a 2022 report by Human Rights Watch, Bulgarian authorities at the country’s border with Turkey have subjected Afghan migrants and other asylum seekers to systematic ill-treatment, including beatings and other forms of less-lethal violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022). During 2021, Bulgarian border agents reportedly conducted 2,513 pushbacks, involving nearly 45,000 people (Human Rights Watch, 2022). That same year, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the Bulgarian government had violated prohibitions against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment while conducting an earlier pushback in 2016 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Bulgarian authorities continue to deny registration of ethnic Macedonian activist groups, despite prior ECHR rulings that such denials amount to violations of ethnic Macedonians’ rights (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Violence against the LGBTQI+ community continues to be a problem with government officials often condoning and tolerating the violence. Officials refused to press charges against anti-LGBTQI+ protesters that have thrown rocks, smoke bombs, and other objects at those participating in a Pride parade (U.S. Department of State, 2023). LGBTQI+ individuals are not protected by hate crime laws and courts refuse to protect same-sex partners from domestic violence (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: In June 2023, 56 residents of Orlandovtsi neighborhood of Sofia received two-week notices from municipal government officials to vacate their homes for the purpose of demolition (BHC, 2023; ECHR, 2024). The neighborhood was comprised of homes that had been designated by the local government as an “illegal” shantytown (ECHR, 2024). On August 9, the administration demolished all but three houses in the neighborhood, forcibly displacing just over 50 residents into homelessness, and refusing to give any of the affected citizens copies of the demolition orders or alternative accommodations (ECHR, 2024; U.S. State Department, 2024).

Widespread discrimination is common against Romani, ethnic Turk, and other minority groups. While Bulgarian law protects all citizens from discrimination regardless of race, ethnicity, and nationality, instances of societal intolerance ranged from Romani citizens being denied use to public pools in at least five different cities to being denied issuance of identification documents by state officials (Kostova, 2023; U.S. State Department, 2024). Romani women and children also face unique societal discrimination

because of their ethnicity through segregated education systems and restricted access to reproductive and other health services (U.S. State Department, 2024).

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

New for September 2024 release: In August 2024, the Bulgarian parliament passed an amendment to ban LGBT “propaganda” in schools and adopted a definitional change within state law that officially recognizes “nontraditional sexual orientation” as “...different from the generally accepted and established notions in the Bulgarian legal tradition of emotional, romantic, sexual, or sensual attraction between persons of opposite sexes.” (Mitov, 2024). Critics of the changes argue that the amendments make it more difficult to combat the discrimination and harassment LGBT+ citizens already face in Bulgaria, where there is a strong societal bias against LGBT+ people and violence against these citizens goes largely unreported (Freedom House, 2024; Mitov, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Burkina Faso

In recent years, armed Islamist groups in Burkina Faso are perceived to have indiscriminately killed hundreds of civilians per year, with members of state-sponsored militias also singled out for deadly violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The offending groups, aligned with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), have reportedly abducted, raped, and displaced thousands since 2019. In August 2021, gunmen killed 132 people and wounded over 40 during an attack on a village near the country’s border with Niger (Aljazeera, 2021). In May 2022, Islamist fighters reportedly killed 50 civilians who were trying to flee a blockade of their village in eastern Burkina Faso; the following month, 86 people were killed in an attack on a village near the Niger border (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Extremist groups, including ISGS and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, are perceived to have forcibly conscripted children for hostilities (Amnesty International, 2021).

In January 2022, Burkina Faso’s elected government was overthrown in a military coup, which was overturned by a second military coup in September (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Burkinabe security forces, including a special forces unit that operates with complete legal immunity, have since used enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial executions to maintain order. Government-sponsored armed self-defense groups, including the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, have added to the violence in Burkina Faso. They have arbitrarily detained, tortured, and killed suspected armed Islamists and criminals (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In August 2022, more than 50 men were found dead in Centre-Nord region after allegedly being detained by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Actions by both security forces and armed self-defense groups appear to primarily target ethnic Fulani (a.k.a. Peuhl) civilians, which has continued into 2023 (International Crisis Group, 2023). As of 2022, there were nearly two million internally displaced persons in Burkina Faso due to conflict in recent years (IDMC, 2021; Hammerschlag, 2022).

Women in Burkina Faso face several forms of systematic violence. The prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting in Burkina Faso is 18 percent, though rates are substantially higher in certain regions, including the Boucle du Mouhoun region (33.7 percent), Hauts-Bassins region (31.9 percent), and Nord

region (31.7 percent) (U.S. Department of State, 2023a). Women, particularly the elderly and widowed, reportedly face lethal and less-lethal violence stemming from witchcraft accusations, which are often used by male relatives to obtain the accused witch's land and/or inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2023a). In 2022 alone, dozens of women and girls were reportedly raped by Islamist fighters (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

In late December 2022, volunteer militia members aligned with the Burkina Faso army reportedly killed at least 28 civilians in Nouna, a predominately Fulani and Muslim community (Kabore et al., 2023). In January 2023, armed extremists abducted at least 50 women near the village of Arbinda in the Sahel region, in what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said "could be the first such attack deliberately targeting women in Burkina Faso" (United Nations, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2023b). The following week, those abducted—totaling 62 women and four babies—were reportedly rescued in a military operation (France24, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: On April 20, 2023, alleged military forces summarily executed at least 156 civilians in the village of Karma. Human rights watch called it "one of the worst massacres in Burkina Faso since 2015" (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In the first half of 2024, hundreds of Burkinabé civilians were killed in the ongoing internal armed conflict between government forces and the extremist group Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Increased efforts by JNIM to control territory has led to stronger militarized responses by the government, which have disproportionately impacted civilians. Multiple reports described how government armed forces summarily executed around 220 civilians, including 56 children, on February 25 in the Yatenga province (France24, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024). The military unit was reportedly chasing a groups of Islamist extremists when they arrived in the villages of Nondin and Soro and accused the residents of, "...being complicit with the jihadists", executing the villagers present (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Within the first two weeks of May, government forces also killed an estimated 250 civilians in separate incidents near the town of Dori in the Sahel province and around villages in the Komondjari province, even documenting some of the killings through photographs and videos (ACLED, 2024; France 24, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024).

Attacks against civilians by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in early 2024 were equally devastating. On February 25, the group raided a mosque in the south-eastern town of Natiaboani, leaving up to 100 civilians and volunteer soldiers dead, before attacking a Catholic church in the northern town of Essakane, leaving 15 civilians dead (Aljazeera, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024). Civilian targeting continued to be a constant occurrence throughout March and April. 50 civilians were estimated to have been killed in separate attacks across the country in March, and in April, 50 more civilians were reportedly killed in attacks in the northern and Sahel regions of the country (International Crisis Group, 2024).

As JNIM continues to expand its operations within Burkina Faso (now controlling over one third of the country), media coverage of the events has become increasingly hard to obtain due to a temporary ban on select foreign news outlets (Chibelushi, 2024). In April, the country's military transitional regime temporarily banned outlets including: the BBC, Voice of America, Ouest-France, Deutsche Welle, The

Guardian, and African publications APA and Ecofin over coverage of the report that detailed the army's mass killing of civilians on February 25 (Chibelushi, 2024). The crackdown on independent foreign media, coupled with the scale of internal conflict, makes it extremely difficult for outlets and NGOs to document events on the ground.

As of June 2024, the conflict has internally displaced just over 2 million citizens due to civilian targeting from both sides and the absence of basic and essential services in areas where the conflict is spreading or the government no longer controls (IDMC, 2024; NRC, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Burundi

President Nkurunziza's unwillingness to step down from his second term in 2015 triggered a political crisis with ethnic undercurrents. 2015 saw a wave of political protests and failed coup attempts from armed rebellions, leading to mass displacement (UNHCR, 2022). Since then, the military and other government security forces have used violence to suppress armed opposition groups (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019). Freedom House ranked the political and civil rights in Burundi as "not free" with a score of 14/100 in 2021, as Burundian authorities reportedly target real or suspected members of opposition groups with enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and sexual violence (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Civil society and journalists have also been targeted by government security forces in Burundi. They have experienced harassment, attacks, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and murder. Political opposition and government critics continued to face harassment and violence in 2023 (International Crisis Group, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Under Burundi's 2009 law, consensual same-sex acts are a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment. In 2023, Prosecutors in Burundi charged 24 people with engaging in same-sex acts and inciting homosexuality in others, part of a crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights that has been criticized by the United Nations (Africa News, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: The security and human rights situation in Burundi remained poor during the start of 2024 as the ruling party (CNDD-FDD) and the Imbonerakure, the party's militant youth wing, continued to suppress political opposition. Between January and May 2024, at least 140 people were arbitrarily arrested in the country (Ligue ITEKA, 2024), including one event on March 18 where police, intelligence agents (SNR), and Imbonerakure arrested 42 members of the opposition party National Congress for Liberty (CNL) for their support of former CNL leader Agathon Rwaswa (International Crisis Watch, 2024; Ligue ITEKA, 2024). Reports of torture, gender-based violence, and extrajudicial executions by police forces and Imbonerakure were common during the first half of the year, as were deaths resulting from armed rebel group attacks, but based on the coding guidelines, fall short of inclusion as perceived mass atrocities.

Attempts by the CNDD-FDD to consolidate political control also jeopardizes the social climate and human rights for Burundian LGBTQ+ citizens. In a press conference, President Evariste Ndayishimiye stated, "If

you want to attract a curse to the country, accept homosexuality... I even think that these people, if we find them in Burundi, it is better to lead them to a stadium and stone them. And that cannot be a sin.” (France 24, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

Cabo Verde

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. Gender-based violence continues to be a significant issue (U.S. Department of State, 2023). continue to experience gender discrimination including unequal pay and access to education (Freedom House, 2022). LGBTQI+ individuals experience employment discrimination and physical and verbal abuse (Freedom House, 2022).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No significant updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Cambodia

In recent years, Cambodian security forces have reportedly arbitrarily detained political opposition, activists, protesters, and people in violation of austere COVID-19 lockdown policies. The government has restricted internet access and used online surveillance against people critical to the government, including independent media, journalists, and critics of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). In 2021, the government announced a new policy that would limit people from filming or recording interactions with the police (Freedom House, 2021; Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, 2021). Political opposition members, particularly from the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), have been arbitrarily arrested or forced to flee. In a mass trial in 2021, government authorities accused CNRP members of staging a coup in 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Meanwhile, Mother Nature Cambodia environmental activists continue to face arrests and intimidation for documenting Cambodian environmental degradation (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Chbab Srey, a traditional code of conduct for women, along with cultural practices, education level, and household responsibilities limits women’s participation in politics and lowers women to second-class status (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In March, Cambodian military officers and local police forces used tear gas and fired live ammunition to disperse a group of around 130 villagers, who were attempting to stop the forced demolition of their homes in the province of Preah Vihear (Radio Free Asia, 2024; Sea, 2024).

An estimated 40 villagers were arrested for attempting to stop the destruction of their homes, and over 100 more were forcibly evicted by military and police forces for the purpose of developing the village's land into a rubber plantation (Radio Free Asia, 2024). The security forces burned down the homes in the disputed area, displacing the residents into homelessness without due process, compensation or alternative accommodation (Radio Free Asia, 2024b).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Cameroon

Since late 2016, armed separatist groups seeking independence for Cameroon's Anglophone regions have kidnapped, tortured, and killed thousands of anti-separatists; they have also targeted students and educational professionals, as well as hospitals and healthcare professionals (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). The Islamist militant organization Boko Haram has increased its violence in Cameroon since 2020, mostly through indiscriminate kidnappings and suicide bombings. From 2018 to 2021, over 700,000 Cameroonians were internally displaced due to violence (IDMC, 2021; Human Rights Watch 2022). Meanwhile, both government and separatist forces have reportedly restricted public access to humanitarian aid organizations.

As part of their efforts to combat non-state actors and establish authority over the country's Anglophone regions, Cameroonian security forces have allegedly engaged in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, systematic torture, and mass displacement. Suspected perpetrators include the Cameroonian Armed Forces, as well as an irregular security force known as the Rapid Intervention Battalion (*Bataillon d'intervention rapide*, BIR). In April 2022, BIR soldiers reportedly beat and detained more than 30 members of a funeral convoy, who the BIR accused of being separatist fighters (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Victims of arbitrary detention have included at least 100 members of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (*Mouvement pour la renaissance du Cameroun*) who were arrested during political protests in 2020 (Amnesty International, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In accordance with certain traditional practices in Cameroon's West Region, widowed women are sometimes forced to perform widow rites, such as public bathing or movement restrictions (U.S. Embassy in Cameroon, 2023). Under Cameroonian law, same-sex sexual relations are punishable by up to five years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Police are perceived to regularly subject LGBTQI+ individuals to arbitrary detention based solely on their perceived sexual orientation or gender identity (U.S. Embassy in Cameroon, 2023).

New for June 2023 release: According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 15,000 people were displaced in January 2023 due to violence and targeted attacks, particularly in the North-West and South-West regions (OCHA, 2023a). The OCHA also reported that more than 80 teachers and students were abducted by non-state armed groups in 2022 (OCHA, 2023b).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Two separate internal conflicts continued to grip Cameroon in 2024, the largest one being between the government armed forces and the armed Anglophone separatists in the

north and south-west, with the other being the government’s war against Boko Haram in the northern regions (International Crisis Watch, 2024). An estimated 277 civilians were killed between January and June 2024 as a result of civilian targeting from the two conflicts in the country, while at least 188 have been victims of mass forced disappearances (ACLED, 2024). Reports of large-scale torture, gender-based violence, and movement restrictions on civilians by both non-state armed groups and government forces exist since the start of 2024 (Global R2P, 2024; GPC, 2024; International Crisis Watch, 2024; OCHA, 2024), but sufficient evidence for these events to be included as a perceived mass atrocity is not available. Women and children continue to be impacted by violence from internal conflict the most, and humanitarian assistance is becoming increasingly more difficult to send to affected areas. As of the start of 2024, over 500,000 civilians have been displaced by violence in Cameroon as the conflicts continue to worsen (Global R2P, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Canada

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, immigrant rights advocates have accused the Canada Border Services Agency of arbitrary detention of immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022; Amnesty International, 2021). Additionally, indigenous populations in Canada reportedly continue to face discrimination and restricted access to basic needs (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022), although the victim magnitude threshold and definitional criteria for inclusion in PMAD have not been met.

– Ruth Byrnes

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Central African Republic

Intercommunal violence continues between Christian anti-balaka armed groups, Muslim ex-Seleka armed groups, and the Central African Armed Forces, or FACA, which is reportedly supported by the Rwandan military and troops from the Russian mercenary group Wagner (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In December 2021, for instance, anti-balaka fighters carried out a multi-day attack on a village in Ouaka province, killing at least 20 civilians, raping five women and girls, and forcing more than 1,000 villagers to flee (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As of September 2022, some 654,000 Central Africans were internally displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2023). FACA is perceived to have committed numerous human rights abuses—including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and mass displacements—against those suspected of opposition to the government (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In September 2021, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) withdrew its Gabonese military personnel due to a pattern of sexual violence against local civilians, which included 33 reports of sexual abuse by Gabonese troops in 2021 (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Fighting continues between FACA and the Coalition of Patriots for Change (*Coalition des patriotes pour le changement*, CPC), a coalition of the Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC); the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC); the Popular Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic (FPRC); and other armed anti-government groups (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). As a blanket term, CPC factions are often referred to as “ex-Seleka,” as they were formed after the dissolution of the Seleka movement in 2013 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In 2020, the CPC coalition began stoking instability in the lead-up to the 2021 election. Since then, armed groups associated with the CPC have reportedly carried out violent attacks against the CPC’s perceived opponents, including individuals who participated in or were suspected of voting in the presidential election (Human Rights Watch, 2020). CPC fighters have killed, tortured, and displaced civilians en masse (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Many anti-balaka groups, as well as the UPC, FPRC, and MPC rebel groups, are perceived to forcibly conscript child soldiers and subject women to sexual slavery (Olsson, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2020). Additionally, Russian mercenaries, particularly the Wagner Group, have been linked to recent increases in election-related and religious- and ethnic-based violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In February 2022, the U.S. alleged that Wagner fighters had summarily executed 30 people in Haute Kotto province in the preceding month (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Despite a legal prohibition on female genital mutilation/cutting, the practice continues to varying degrees among different regions and ethnicities, with more than 60 percent of women and girls in the central-north region subjected to the practice (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women, particularly those who are most vulnerable (e.g., orphaned girls and widows), are disproportionately affected by accusations of witchcraft, which can entail physical abuse, humiliation, arbitrary detention, and death (U.S. Department of State, 2023). “Public expressions of love” between persons of the same sex are punishable by up to two years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women and girls experience high levels of conflict related sexual violence including sexual slavery by several armed groups (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

New for June 2023 release: According to MINUSCA data, state security forces, FACA, and allied forces such as the Wagner Group were collectively responsible for 58 percent of human rights violations in the last quarter of 2022, accounting for 70 percent of civilian victims (United Nations, 2023). Perceived atrocities in 2023 include arbitrary detention, torture, and summary execution (United Nations, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Widespread human rights abuses against civilians continued to be committed by all parties involved in the ongoing internal conflicts during the first half of 2024. A statement released by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) acknowledged non-state armed groups were responsible for 51 percent of human rights abuses in the country since July 2022, with state and government actors making up the other 49 percent (OHCHR, 2024).

In March, Russian militants with Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group), killed over 60 civilians while attempting to retake mining sites in the Ouham province, the largest case of civilian targeting in over two years in the Central African Republic (ACLED, 2024; Global R2P, 2024). Africa Corps were also deployed as “Russian instructors” by the government in March to train Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and members of Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG), an ethnic armed group who were involved in a series of attacks that killed over 30 civilians in early April (International Crisis Group, 2024; Global R2P, 2024). The integration of AAKG into the FACA has increased ethnic tensions and fighting across the country, since the government’s main armed opponent, the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), is comprised of some Fulani ethnic armed groups, most notably Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) (International Crisis Group, 2024; Global R2P, 2024). According to ACLED, 163 civilians were killed from armed attacks between January and June 2024 (ACLED, 2024b).

Women and children are disproportionately impacted by conflict-related violence in the Central African Republic. Rape and trafficking of women is common in rural areas where conflict exists, and sexual violence is becoming a more common feature of warfare in the country. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has officially raised concern about, “...the disproportionate risk of violence, extrajudicial killings, internal displacement, and forced disappearance by non-State actors for rural and conflict-affected women” (OHCHR, 2024b). Non-state armed groups also continue to forcibly recruit children to serve as soldiers, with the government estimating that around 10,000 children are actively serving as soldiers for armed groups within the country as of February 2024 (AP, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Chad

In the lead-up to presidential elections in early April 2021, Chadian security forces violently cracked down on political protesters and opposition (Human Rights Watch, 2021). From February to April 2021, nongovernmental groups, labor unions, and opposition political parties organized peaceful protests against President Idriss Déby’s sixth presidential run. Police and gendarmes reportedly responded with excessive and lethal force, arbitrary arrests, and torture (Human Rights Watch, 2021a; Human Rights Watch, 2021b; Aljazeera, 2021). After he was officially declared the elected victor, President Déby was killed on April 20 due to clashes with a Chadian armed group based in Libya—the *Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad* (FACT) (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Déby’s son, Mahamat Déby, took over in a Transitional Military Council (*Conseil militaire de transition*, CMT), which is still the ruling head of government in Chad (Aljazeera, 2022). The CMT is perceived to use excessive force, arbitrary arrests, and torture against political protesters and opposition. In April and May 2021, at least 700 protesters were arrested, and dozens injured as a result of excessive force by Chadian security forces (Amnesty International, 2022). A Chad-based NGO reported that in 2018 there were at least 72 political prisoners held in arbitrary detention (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Prior to 2021, Chadian security forces were reportedly using excessive force to break up protests, arbitrary detainment, torture and ill-treatment in detainment, and enforced disappearances. Ethnic intercommunal violence, mostly between herders and farmers over land and resource disputes, has led to an influx of national troops (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Crisis Group, 2019). National armed forces

have used excessive force to quell the intercommunal violence. Tens of thousands of people are displaced due to violence each year in Chad (Amnesty International, 2022; IDMC, 2021).

During this time, Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa continued to use lethal force against civilians and military personnel. However, these acts were not clearly intended to threaten or accomplish group elimination of a particular cultural, ethnic, religious, or social group, and so they have been omitted from PMAD.

In January 2022, state security forces killed at least 13 people and injured over 80 while violently dispersing a protest and a subsequent funeral in Ouaddaï province (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In September, security forces arrested over 200 people in the capital city of N'Djamena; a majority of those arrested were reportedly affiliated with the opposition party *Les Transformateurs* (The Transformers) (Human Rights Watch, 2023). On October 20, the date on which the CMT had initially promised to hand over power to a civilian government, state security forces fired on protests in several cities, killing at least 50 people and injuring dozens (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In the following days, hundreds of people were reportedly subject to arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Under Chadian law, same-sex sexual relations are punishable by fines and up to two years' imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Women also face legal discrimination. In 2022, the government banned young girls from leaving the country without parental consent, and an Islamic High Court in the Mangalmé region ruled that those who refuse a marriage proposal must pay a fine known as *amchilini* (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Despite a law prohibiting it, FGM/C continues to be a widespread problem (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

New for June 2023 release: In February 2023, Chad's national human rights commission reported that a total of 128 people had died during the government's violent repression of protests the previous year (Agence France Presse, 2023). In N'Djamena, the death toll from the crackdown was revised upwards from 50 to 73, with notable violence also taking place in the towns of Moundou, Doba, Koumra, and Sarh (Agence France Presse, 2023). In total, over 900 people were reportedly arrested in connection with the protests (Agence France Presse, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In May, interim president Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby won the country's presidential elections in the midst of increased political repression by his party. Déby consolidated his political power over the elections by denying various civil society organizations the ability to monitor results, denying an estimated 2,900 trained election observers the ability to oversee the process (Human Rights Watch, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024). In February, his leading political opponent, Yaya Dillo, the president of Parti socialiste sans frontières (PSF), was killed by Chadian security forces at the party's headquarters (Human Rights Watch, 2024). During the week of the election, 76 activists of the opposition party *Les Transformateurs* were arrested on charges of forgery, fraud, and complicity, while reports of electoral irregularities emerged after ruling party supporters confiscated ballot boxes in some locations (Agence France-Presse, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024). In the wake of the election, Déby and his prime minister formed a government which is comprised entirely of ruling party officials and none from any opposition party (International Crisis Group, 2024).

Instances of intercommunal and rural violence were commonly reported in Chad during the start of 2024. The deadliest case was in March when 42 civilians were killed in Tileguy following intercommunal violence over a land dispute (ACLED, 2024; Crisis24, 2024). Additionally, conflict in neighboring Sudan has displaced thousands to Chad, including an estimated 201,379 Chadian returnees as of June 2024, who are now living in displacement sites or host communities, where they lack food, water, sanitation, shelter, and health services (IOM, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Chile

In late 2019, protests against a lack of free access to public services, made up of mostly students and civil society, triggered widespread police abuse in Chile. During mass protests in 2019 and 2020, police reportedly used excessive force, arbitrary detention, torture, and sexual violence against protesters and bystanders (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2020; Aljazeera, 2019). The national police, called the Carabineros, used less-lethal projectiles and tear gas. More than 12,500 people required emergency treatment in a public hospital because of incidents that occurred during the protests, some 28,000 had been detained, and more than 350 cases of eye injuries allegedly caused by police from October 2019 through March 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2020; Freedom House, 2020). There were also hundreds of reported cases of sexual violence by security forces in Chile during this time (Amnesty International, 2020). The government decreed a constitutional state of emergency for 10 days in October 2019, and the Armed Forces were deployed as regional law enforcement (Aljazeera, 2019). Additionally, as of April 2021, security forces have deported at least 500 Venezuelan migrants without due process, causing mass displacement (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). The militarization at the Chile-Peru border continues to displace Venezuelan migrants by not allowing them to pass through to return to their home country (AP News, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country from January through at least late June 2024.

Last updated: July 2024.

China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has employed repression as a tool of social control to varying degrees since communist forces seized control of the mainland in 1949. While its methods of control have grown more sophisticated in the intervening decades, today's PRC continues to engage in punitive atrocities

against ethno-religious minorities, political dissidents, and other perceived threats to stability (Deng et al., 2013; Gobel, 2020; O’Brien et al., 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2020).

The Muslim minority Uyghurs of northwest China have been the focus of an intense campaign of repression by Chinese state security forces since at least 2009 (Maizland, 2021; Washington Post, 2020). Over one million Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region have been arbitrarily detained in prison camps that are host to systematic abuses, including torture, rape, and forced sterilization (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2023). Uyghur cultural landmarks have also been destroyed as part of the government’s campaign to “break [the Uyghur’s] lineage, break their roots, break their connections and break their origins” (Bellingcat, 2019; U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In January 2021, then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo formally recognized the PRC as committing an ongoing genocide against the Uyghurs and other ethno-religious minorities in Xinjiang (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

Following the passage of the Hong Kong extradition bill of 2019, massive demonstrations and riots by pro-democracy residents sought to block further encroachment by the central Chinese government (Yueng, 2019). Protesters were met with violence by Hong Kong and mainland security forces, whose response included arbitrary detention, extrajudicial punishment, torture, and fatalities (Amnesty International, 2019; Ramzy et al., 2019). Protests continued into 2020, intensifying after the June imposition of a sweeping new National Security Law (NSL) (Amnesty International, 2020). To date, at least 231 people have been arrested for allegedly violating the NSL, including 47 political activists who were charged with subversion for participating in unofficial democratic elections (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The Falun Gong religious sect, first outlawed in China in 1999, remains a target of state persecution (Rahn, 2002; Freedom House, 2021). In 2021, against a decades-long backdrop of brutality and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners, police reportedly arrested some 5,000 members of the sect (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Enos et al., 2020; The Week, 2020). There have also been recurring accusations concerning the medical torture of Falun Gong prisoners, including allegations of organ harvesting (Elliott, 2019; U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Over the past decades, similarly repressive tactics have reportedly been used against mainstream Christian denominations (albeit to a lesser degree than Falun Gong), with practitioners facing arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial punishment (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Radio Free Asia, 2021).

Chinese state security forces remain complicit in a number of atrocities against North Korean refugees (Aldrich, 2011). After being detained by Chinese security forces, many refugees are neglected and some reportedly sexually assaulted (Garcia, 2019). The PRC continues to forcibly repatriate refugees to North Korea, where they face imprisonment, grave abuse, and potentially execution (U.S. Department of State, 2022c). In July 2021, China forcibly repatriated 50 North Korean refugees, the first repatriation since early 2020 (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Chinese authorities in Tibet continue to restrict freedoms of religion, expression, and assembly, and have implemented coercive assimilationist policies that may amount to a campaign of mass erasure (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke at a national “Ethnic Work” conference, where he “emphasized the subordination of minority identities” (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Despite Chinese government claims to the contrary, many of these human rights abuses appeared to continue through 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). However, estimates of the magnitude of these

perceived mass atrocities remain highly uncertain. For example, initial estimates of the number of Uyghurs imprisoned in Xinjiang was between one and two million; that number may be down to half a million (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

During the so-called White Paper protests of November 2022, thousands of Chinese citizens rallied against the government's restrictive Covid-19 policies (Wong et al., 2023). Though police made few arrests at the time, many demonstrators have since gone missing as part of the government's "quietly deepening crackdown," with one Chinese activist group estimating that there have been more than 100 arrests (Wong et al. 2023).

While no laws criminalize private consensual same-sex conduct between adults, same-sex relationships are not protected under domestic violence laws and there are not laws prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQI+ individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Under President Xi Jinping there has been a crackdown on LGBTQI+ advocacy groups, which has intensified under a 2017 law that increased regulation of international nongovernmental organizations (Gao, 2023).

– *Austin S. Matthews, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Within the last year, the treatment of Uighurs has become more difficult to track due to government misinformation campaigns. Journalists report that mass containment and other atrocities continue, though more subtly (e.g., containment akin to house arrest, with government minders, rather than containment in a correctional facility) (Su and Rennie, 2023).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: Significant human rights abuses continued to be committed against ethnic and religious minorities by the Chinese government in 2024. New religious regulations effective on February 1st restrict the freedoms of Muslim Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang region by "Sinicizing" their religion, aiming to transform Islam to reflect Han Chinese culture as well as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology (Human Rights Watch, 2024a). This policy mirrors past attempts by the CCP to erase the religion and culture of the Uyghur and Turkic Muslim populations through legal mechanisms. Article 11 of the new religious regulations state that all places of worship and religious teachings are required to, "...interpret [them] in line with the requirements of contemporary China's development and progress, and in line with the excellent traditional Chinese culture" (Human Rights Watch, 2024a).

The Xinjiang region is home to an estimated 11 million ethnic Uyghur and Turkic-speaking Muslims (CFR, 2022). Many of the Uyghurs in the region are subject to forced labor by the government through its employment and poverty alleviation program that has forcibly relocated Uyghurs in Xinjiang from rural jobs to ones in urban factories and industrial sites, including aluminum production sites that are vital to foreign and domestic automotive companies (Human Rights Watch, 2024b; Zenz, 2024). In 2023, over 3 million Uyghurs were forcibly transferred for under the regional government's current "14th Five-Year Plan for Employment Promotion" Plan, with state media announcing "...intensified efforts for economic and employment growth in 2024" (Zenz, 2024).

Government efforts to erase Uyghur culture also include changing the names of hundreds of villages in Xinjiang from ones with religious, cultural and historical meaning to names that represent Chinese nationality and the CCP. A joint report released in June 2024 by Human Rights Watch and the organization

Uyghur Hjelp found that between 2009-2023, 630 villages in Xinjiang had their religious, historical, or cultural names changed to names including: Happiness, Unity, and Red Flag (Human Rights Watch, 2024c).

China's continued autonomy over Tibet has also resulted in violations of international humanitarian law. Most notably is the ongoing forced relocation of around 140,000 Tibetans from their villages within Tibet to locations in China that aims to assimilate them into urban Chinese society and make them more productive members of the state (Human Rights Watch, 2024d; Yang, 2024). In February, more than 1,000 Tibetans were arrested by Chinese security forces in the Sichuan province for protesting the construction of a dam that would forcibly relocate two villages and destroy six monasteries (Lodoe & Pema, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Colombia

National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, and paramilitary successor groups continued to cause conflict-related violence through 2022, despite FARC's 2016 peace agreement with the government. Recent violence has mostly targeted human rights defenders, journalists, indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, and activists (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Since 2016, child recruitment and kidnappings have continued, and more than 500 human rights defenders have been killed by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Additionally, there have been over 100 reports of gender-based violence by government security forces. A reported 100,000 or more people are forcibly displaced each year due to conflict related violence in Colombia, particularly affecting Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants (Amnesty International, 2022; IDMC, 2021).

A more acute series of events began with mass protests in 2019, which reached a high-point between April and June of 2021. Law enforcement reportedly used excessive and lethal force, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, and torture against protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Over a thousand protesters were reportedly injured (Amnesty International, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Despite legal protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity, LGBTQI+ individuals continue to face high levels of violence; impunity for such crimes is widespread, particularly when the victim in question is transgender (Human Rights Watch, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2023). Over 100 incidents of police violence toward LGBTQI+ persons were reported in 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

January 2023 marked the first month of a new ceasefire agreement between the Colombian government and four armed groups, among them the Clan del Golfo gang and the Sierra Nevada paramilitaries (Reuters, 2023). According to the country's interior minister, homicides in provinces affected by the ceasefire have fallen by as much as 68 percent (Reuters, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: On August 3rd, 2023, the government and ELN ordered their forces to end offensive activities as sides gradually implemented a ceasefire agreement (Crisis Group, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Increased violence between non-state armed groups has displaced and confined thousands of Colombians in 2024. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 33,100 Colombians were victims of internal mass displacement resulting from conflict or violence between January and June 2024 (OCHA, 2024). During the same time period, just over 56,000 civilians have also been forcibly contained or blocked from leaving their communities, as non-state armed groups increase their control over territories, particularly in the Chocó, Valle de Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño regions along the Pacific coast (Loaiza, 2024; OCHA, 2024).

The primary non-state perpetrator groups include Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), who continue to engage each other for control over drug trafficking and other illicit activities in the country (Loaiza, 2024). Competing ex-FARC factions Estado Mayor General (EMC) and Segundo Marquetalia have also consistently clashed in 2024 for control over coca producing areas and drug trafficking distribution routes (Loaiza, 2024; International Crisis Group, 2024).

The Colombian government has committed itself to ending the widespread internal conflict by bringing the parties together for peace negotiations, yet violence has surged in recent months as internal divisions have splintered the involved armed groups, leading to a suspension of the previous ceasefire in March (ACLEDD, 2024a; International Crisis Group, 2024). Since the end of the ceasefire, the government has deployed the army to directly combat splinter groups, including sending 32,000 troops to the Pacific regions to fight the EMC and conducting airstrikes against AGC elements in Antioquia (ACLEDD, 2024b; International Crisis Group, 2024).

Illegal recruitment of child soldiers also appears to be increasing as tensions between non-state armed groups rise (ACAPS, 2024). The UN Security Council’s “Report on Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia” concluded that between July 2021 and June 2023, recruitment and use of children as soldiers by non-state armed groups increased by 58 percent from the previous reporting period (UNSC, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Evan Montgomery*

Comoros

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, in recent years there have been reports of human trafficking, forced labor, and detention of political prisoners in Comoros (Humanim, 2022; Global Organized Crime Index, 2022; Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2022). These events have occurred at unknown or minimal magnitudes that do not reach the PMAD inclusion threshold of 25 victims. While not actively enforced, consensual same-sex conduct between adults is forbidden by law and LGBTQI+ individuals are not protected under anti-discrimination laws (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: In January 2024, Comoran army forces used tear gas to disperse hundreds of protesters demonstrating against President Azali Assoumani’s re-election, alleging the elections were fraudulent and methods such as ballot stuffing and voting center closures were used by authorities to aid the president’s reelection (Moustoifa, 2024; OHCHR, 2024). At least 25 people were injured and one person was killed after the army dispersed the protests, and a countrywide night-time curfew was enforced as an attempt to stop further demonstrations (Moustoifa, 2024). In the wake of the violence, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk urged Comoran authorities to ensure rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Comoros and acknowledged concerns about reports of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances of those detained (OHCHR, 2024). A de facto ban on peaceful protests and political assemblies has been in place since 2019 in the country (OHCHR, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Congo-Brazzaville

In 2016 and 2017, conflict between the Ninja militia group and the Armed Forces resulted in a campaign of mass lethal and less lethal violence (The New Humanitarian, 2018; Africa Portal, 2021). However, hostilities have declined since a ceasefire agreement was reached in 2018. Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in the Republic of Congo since then. According to Amnesty International, “human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists and students have been the target of legal proceedings, threats, administrative sanctions and torture” (Amnesty International, 2021). Other sources have yet to corroborate that the magnitude of torture has met the inclusion threshold for PMAD.

The law allows for punishment of six months to three years imprisonment for anyone who “commits a shameless act or an act against nature with an individual of the same sex under the age of 21.” While not enforced, the language of this law makes it unclear if it includes same-sex conduct and is used by police to elicit bribes from LGBTQI+ individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Congo-Kinshasa

Of the more than 130 non-state armed groups that are reportedly active in Congo-Kinshasa, also known as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), many are perceived to have carried out widespread

repression and violence against political opponents, activists, journalists, and peaceful protesters (Kivu Security Tracker, 2022; Center for Preventative Action, 2022). These groups include the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), a coalition of ethnic Lendu militias; the largely Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové (NDC-R); the largely Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and allied Congolese Nyatura groups; the Mazembe and Yakutumba Mai Mai groups; and several Burundian armed groups. These groups routinely destroy houses, abduct and forcibly conscript children, and engage in rape and murder, with violence mostly concentrated in the country's eastern regions in recent years (UN Joint Human Rights Office, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In early 2022, violent tensions flared up between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the March 23 Movement (M23), a notable armed rebel group made up primarily of ethnic Tutsis with historical ties to Rwanda (Just Security, 2022). Until this recent surge of violence, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (MONUSCO's) support for the FARDC in its offensive against M23 appeared to have largely been successful (Reliefweb, 2022). In response to rebel violence, the FARDC and Congolese police forces have reportedly used arbitrary detention, mass sexual violence, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial or summary executions, and less-lethal violence (UN Joint Human Rights Office, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022). As of 2021, there were 5.3 million internally displaced persons because of the country's humanitarian crisis and political conflict (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2021).

Gender-based violence is reportedly widespread throughout the DRC, with rape and sexual mutilation common to areas of armed conflict (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Government authorities reportedly subject women and girls to rape and sexual abuse during arrest and detention, and LGBTQI+ persons are reportedly subjected to forms of gender- and sexual-based violence, including so-called "corrective rape" (U.S. Department of State, 2023). During the COVID-19 pandemic, some religious leaders claimed that the pandemic was "God's punishment" for the behavior of LGBTQI+ persons, who are sometimes prosecuted for public displays of affection (e.g., kissing) under public indecency laws (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

New for June 2023 release: In January 2023, a UN spokesperson reported that non-state armed groups had killed more than 200 civilians in Ituri province in the preceding six weeks, resulting in the forced displacement of at least 52,000 people (United Nations, 2023a). The attacks included a CODECO raid that killed at least 24 civilians (ACLED, 2023). January also saw the discovery of mass graves in Ituri province that contained the bodies of 49 people, including 12 women and six children (Reuters, 2023). MONUSCO attributed the killings to CODECO (Reuters, 2023).

January also saw significant violence by the ADF. On January 15, suspected ADF fighters detonated a bomb in a church in North Kivu province, killing at least 14 people and injuring 63 (AFP, 2023). Later that month, an attack by suspected ADF fighters on a village in North Kivu left at least 26 people dead (AFP, 2023; ACLED, 2023). In March, at least 36 people were killed during a raid on a village in eastern DRC; the attackers were perceived to be members of the ADF, as the details of the attack—the attackers wielded machetes and hatchets and burned homes rather than firing bullets—align with the ADF's modus operandi (Al Jazeera, 2023).

In February, further violence between non-state armed groups and government forces forced 300,000 people to flee their homes in North Kivu (United Nations, 2023b). Also in February, Human Rights Watch reported that M23 has committed "summary executions and forced recruitment of civilians" in eastern

DRC, including an attack in North Kivu that left 22 civilians dead and seven abducted (Human Rights Watch, 2023; ACLED, 2023). In March, the Islamic State group issued a statement claiming responsibility for killing more than 35 Christians and wounding dozens in eastern Congo (Mednick, 2023).

Recent violence against women has included the public flogging of women by Mai-Mai fighters in Maniema province. The victims were targeted for wearing pants or skirts and dresses that the fighters deemed too short (ACLED, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for April 2024 release: By the end of 2023, perceived mass atrocities in the DRC were of the greatest scope and scale since any year from 2018 onward, when the PMAD data begin. Mass forced displacements total somewhere between 6.5 and more than 7 million individuals, and there were at least 18,000 victims of rape from January through December 2023 in the North Kivu region alone (Walsh, 2023). Abductions of children increased from 2022 to 2023, with perhaps thousands being forcibly contained or conscripted (UNICEF, 2023).

In November and December 2023, ongoing ethnic violence was compounded by political violence related to President Tshisekedi's reelection campaign. On November 7, for example, supporters of opposition candidate Moise Katumbi reportedly attacked Tshisekedi's supporters, injuring six, raping two, and sexually assaulting three more (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Threats and perpetration of physical violence by Tshisekedi's supporters and state security forces were also reportedly widespread in the lead-up to the December 20 election (Human Rights Watch, 2023). An increase in hate speech and calls for violence from both the incumbent and challenging party supporters followed the election (Agence France-Presse, 2023)

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: In the past six months, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels have used rockets and bombs to target civilians across the Eastern DRC, including a rocket attack on Mugunga and Lac Vert displacement camps that killed 35 Congolese refugees on May 3, another rocket attack in South Kivu which killed seven and injured six on May 7, and bombings of North Kivu civilians months earlier on January 25, killing 19 (Crisis Watch, 2024).

Meanwhile, a series of attacks by Islamic State-affiliated ADF from 3 to 13 May killed and wounded several, at the same time abducting several children. This year, the ADF have reportedly killed dozens of civilians across the Eastern DRC, including through the torching of homes and subsequent displacement of survivors (Crisis Watch, 2024).

In February 2023, 180,000 civilians were displaced by fighting near the city of Sake, and an additional 250,000 people were forcibly displaced from North Kivu in March 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024). Total forced displacement in the DRC now sits at roughly 2.5 million people (OHCHR, 2024).

Amid the fighting, pro-government Wazalendo militia reportedly killed 22 civilians across Goma in April 2024, though some of this appeared to be part of armed robberies that were pecuniary in nature (Crisis Watch, 2024). The UN reports that the Congolese army and other pro-government militias have conducted "extrajudicial killings" and "arbitrary arrest and detention" in recent months (OHCHR, 2024).

Ethnic clashes between Lendu and Hema people also resulted in 7 dead in March 2024). Lendu-comprised CODECO militia members previously killed 27 Hema in February and 8 in January 2024, bringing mass murder of Hema this year to roughly 40 known victims, though actual numbers may be higher.

During this period, conflict-related sexual violence was widespread, according to the UN Joint Human Rights Office, which recorded more than 2,000 human rights violations between October 2023 and March 2024 (OHCHR, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: In late June 2024 M23 took control of the towns of Kanyabayonga and Kirumba, forcibly displacing another 150,000 people (Bashi, 2024; UN, 2024). Over several days in August 2024, the ADF attacked a village in the North-east of the country, killing 16 and kidnapping 20, whose whereabouts remain unknown (Kamale, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Costa Rica

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Côte d'Ivoire

Political violence in Côte d'Ivoire in recent years has targeted political opposition, protesters, and journalists. In 2020, government authorities declared a state of emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This gave the government opportunities to change the electoral system with limited oversight (Freedom House, 2021), all while political opposition leaders were targeted for arbitrary detention (Article19, 2020; Amnesty International, 2019). There were several clashes in 2020 between opposition supporters and pro-government supporters that killed and displaced many (Freedom House, 2021; Amnesty International, 2019; Amnesty International, 2021). Peaceful protesters were reportedly met with excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests, and torture in detention (Amnesty International, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022). 15,000 people were displaced in 2020 due to conflict related violence (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2021). Additionally, thousands of homes were demolished, adding to the internally displaced population, which persisted through 2022 (Amnesty International, 2022).

While forbidden by law, FGM/C continues to be a problem with a national average of 37% of women undergoing FGM/C (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Other societal violence against women that are illegal continued including dowry deaths, widows being forced to marry their dead husband's brother, and forcing women to marry their dead sister's husband. A public indecency law that applies to both public heterosexual and same-sex intimate activity, with penalties of up to two years imprisonment, is often disproportionately applied against LGBTQI+ individuals. Anti-discrimination laws do not protect individuals on the basis of sexual orientation (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Croatia

Since 2016, the Croatian government have reportedly been responsible for violent pushbacks at Croatia’s borders and periodic mass expulsions of asylum seekers and migrants without due process (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022; Council of Europe, 2020; PACE, 2019; OHCHR, 2019). There have also been reports of sexual abuse, beatings, and theft by Croatian border security forces (Guardian, 2021). Aid organizations documented around 10,000 cases of pushbacks and collective expulsions over the past several years (Amnesty International, 2022).

– Ruth Byrnes

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Croatian border police continue to conduct violent pushbacks of migrants at the country’s border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reports from the NGO *Collective Aid* documented multiple incidents of excessive and brutal force against large groups of migrants, primarily from Middle Eastern and African nations, forcing them back into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In January, border police officers near Gejkovac forced a group of 60 to 80 migrants to cross a river along the country’s border back to Bosnia by beating the group members with their hands, feet, batons, tasers and using police dogs (BVMN, 2024). Before the group was forced to cross, there were reports that all members had to give border officers their phones, money, and other possessions or risk further beatings (BVMN, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Evan Montgomery

Cuba

Since 2010, the systematic persecution of government critics continues in Cuba. The targeted activists, journalists, and political opposition include MSI, 27N, Archipiélago, the Ladies in White, and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (Freedom House, 2022). In recent years, security forces have reportedly frequently used excessive force, arbitrarily detention, and torture against journalists, and political opposition, and activist groups such as include MSI, 27N, Archipiélago, the Ladies in White, and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (Freedom House, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022).

In July 2021, over 1,000 protesters and bystanders were detained from a peaceful protest; 700 remain in detention (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Some have reported ill-treatment and torture during detention (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Additionally, the crackdown during the July protests resulted in over 180 enforced disappearances (U.S. Department of

State, 2022). In many cases, people suspected of potentially attending protests were forced to stay in their homes, amounting to arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). More than 200 political prisoners reportedly remain in detention in Cuba (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Antidiscrimination laws do not provide protections on the basis of gender identity and expression, or sex characteristics. LGBTQI+ individuals continue to face discrimination in education, health care, and employment (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Violence against women is a growing trend in Cuba in recent years. In 2023, 89 femicides were reported in Cuba, nearly three times the number reported in the previous two years. This trend continued into 2024, with 23 confirmed femicide victims as of June according to NGOs (Colomé, 2024)

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Caitlin Clemens*

Cyprus

Since 2020, Cyprus Maritime Police have been reported to pushback asylum seekers and refugees back into Lebanon equating to refoulement (UN Committee Against Torture, 2019; Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Council of Europe, 2018). During September 2020, Cypriot coast guard forces summarily pushed back, abandoned, expelled, or returned more than 200 migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers coming from Lebanon without giving them the opportunity to lodge asylum claims (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Between July and August 2022, Maritime Police returned 140 Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian migrants to Lebanon (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In 2023, the United Nations refugee agency expressed concern over the return of 109 Syrian nationals from Cyprus to Lebanon (Sewell, 2023). It is alleged that most of the 109 migrants that were returned from Cyprus were deported to Syria after being investigated by the Lebanese army (Sewell, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Violence against refugees and migrants, long-time residents of Cyprus increased in 2023. In September, a 500-person march against migrants and refugees turned violent, resulting in several assaults of migrants and foreigners, destruction of migrant-owned restaurants and shops, and robberies of other minority bystanders (Al Jazeera, 2023). Days earlier, another protest turned violent, with dozens of clashes between Greek Cypriots and Syrians. Over the year, several isolated incidents of attacks against migrants and asylum seekers occurred, including attacks on women and children (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Updated by Caitlin Clemens*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Czech Republic

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. Yet, thousands of Roma people were unlawfully sterilized by the authorities between 1966 and 2012. Survivors are now eligible to apply for governmental reparations in the form of cash (Amnesty International, 2022). Reports of repression of Roma people persist, although the frequency and magnitude of this repression is unclear and had thus been excluded from PMAD. Roma people are still repressed in the Czech Republic, segregation in schools for instance.

– Ruth Byrnes

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Denmark

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Djibouti

Police in Djibouti have reportedly regularly used excessive force to disperse protests in recent years, with journalists attempting to publicize the protests having been arbitrarily arrested or disappeared (U.S. Department of State, 2022). During a notable protest in June 2020, over 200 people were arrested (Freedom House, 2022; CIVICUS, 2020).

Gender-based violence remains an issue in the country, especially because survivors of rape and domestic violence tend to avoid the formal court system in favor of more traditional settlements between families (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Djibouti law prohibits FGM/C and while rates are declining, FGM/C continues to be a problem. A study done in 2019 reported that FGM/C, for girls at birth through age 10, was performed at a 21.2% rate (U.S. Department of State, 2023). LGBTQI+ individuals face extreme societal discrimination and social shunning. Antidiscrimination laws do not protect LGBTQI+ individuals including in access to employment and housing (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb & Caitlin Clemens

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Dominica

In 2019, political violence broke out due to opposition-led protests leading up to the presidential election (Crisis24, 2019). Police reportedly used excessive force to break up the protests, injuring several (Freedom House, 2020; U.S. Department of State, 2020; UN Rights Committee, 2020). Under indecency statutes

consensual same-sex conduct is illegal. LGBTQI+ individuals are also not protected by any antidiscrimination laws (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In April of this year, Dominica’s High Court decriminalized same-sex relations. LGBTQ+ individuals are still subject to discrimination and prejudice and lack legal protection. The LGBTQ+ community in Dominica is reported to be largely in hiding (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– *Updated by Caitlin Clemens*

Last updated: July 2024.

Dominican Republic

Based on a 2013 law, Dominican government authorities have arbitrarily reduced citizenship and nationality for Dominicans of Haitian descent (IACHR, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2015). This has left many descendants of Haitian migrants stateless (Amnesty International, 2022). In May 2022, civil society organizations raised concerns about arbitrary mass arrests and less-lethal violence stemming from a large-scale operation by Dominican migration agents in the Ciudad Juan Bosch area of Santo Domingo (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Amid allegations of beatings and ill-treatment, over 600 Haitian individuals were reportedly detained, including at least 60 who were determined to be legally present in the country (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Broader unlawful police violence has also been present in the Dominican Republic in recent years. At least 170 people were killed during interactions with police in 2022 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). More recent numbers are lower, at 41 extrajudicial killings by police in 2021 (Freedom House, 2022). Police have reportedly arbitrarily detained, beaten, and raped sex workers (Amnesty International, 2019a). Transgender or Afro-descendent sex workers were particularly targeted (Amnesty International, 2019b). Further gender-based violence is recorded in the Dominican Republic, with at least 60 femicides in 2021 and at least 70 in 2019 (Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). In the Dominican Republic, femicides are recorded only as intimate violence between spouses. Therefore, the number of total femicides, including those outside of spousal violence, may be higher.

New for June 2023 release: As of March 2023, no new mass atrocities are perceived to have occurred in the Dominican Republic during the period of January–March 2023.

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: As violence in Haiti increased in recent years, refugees have been flooding into the Dominican Republic. In response, the Dominican Republic has tightened border security and increased deportations. More than 170,000 people were deported in 2022, most of them Haitian (The Washington Post, 2023). In September of 2023, the border with Haiti was closed due to a dispute over water resources. Since the beginning of the year, Dominican authorities have increased the deportations of Haitians and those of Haitian descent, surpassing 97,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Before being deported, many Haitians, those of Haitian descent, and some Black Dominicans reported being detained for up to a week in poor conditions, being beaten by authorities, and subject to racist hostility.

– Updated by Caitlin Clemens

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Ecuador

Ecuadorian police and military reported used excessive force against demonstrators during October 2019 protests (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Harassment and intimidation of journalists appears to have continued as well (Amnesty International, 2022). Additionally, intercommunal violence in prisons frequently occurs between inmates (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). These events have been excluded from PMAD for failing to meet its inclusion criteria; however, they may merit future inclusion if additional data becomes available.

New for September 2023 release: In June 2022, indigenous organizations called for protests in response to the government's inaction on indigenous issues and unwillingness to meet their demands. The protests turned violent and Ecuadorian police shot tear gas canisters leaving over 300 people injured (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). In addition, more than 150 individuals were arbitrarily arrested during the June protests (U.S. Department of State, 2023). A year later, there was another violent clash between Ecuadorian armed forces and indigenous community members leading to several injuries and one death (Cultural Survival, 2023).

– Ruth Byrnes, updated by Camryn Hoelle

New for June 2024 release: Gang violence and homicide rates increased significantly in Ecuador in 2023, raising it to the third most violent country in Latin America. The homicide rate more than tripled from 2021 (HRW, 2024). Interpersonal and gang related violence does not meet PMAD's inclusion criteria, but it had a significant impact on Ecuador in 2023.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for September 2024 release: The country experienced extreme levels of violence and unrest in January 2024 due to a conflict between gangs, prisoners, and the government in which a state of emergency was declared (Gregory and Grant, 2024).

Farmers in Cotopaxi province protested a proposed mining project in March, after which the mining company called in police and paramilitary troops to end the protests, which resulted in 36 injured protesters and 72 arrests (Gabay, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Egypt

In recent years, Egyptian authorities have maintained their crackdown on political dissent. Security forces are accused of arbitrary detention and arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions. Targeted populations have included human rights defenders, religious minority rights activists, peaceful protesters, journalists, academics, artists, lawyers, opposition politicians, and relatives

of dissidents (Freedom House, 2021). In 2021, for instance, peaceful protests were met with arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and torture in custody by Egyptian police (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Mass trials of the arrested protesters led to death sentences. Meanwhile, Egypt's National Security Agency has carried out extrajudicial executions of real or suspected dissenters.

Security forces are perceived to routinely use torture and other forms of coercion to force confessions, which are then used as bases for death sentences (Swart, 2020; Amnesty International, 2022; CIHRS, 2019; Committee for Justice, 2021). Hundreds of detainees have been forcibly disappeared; many others in custody have experienced restricted rights to due process and have been held in prolonged pretrial detention (Freedom House, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022). As part of the government's suppression of freedoms of religion and expression, religious minorities as well as journalists have been persecuted through threats or arbitrary accusations of terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Under the auspices of a broad anti-terrorism law, the Egyptian army has demolished thousands of buildings in an attempt to displace the armed ISIS affiliate group Wilayat Sina (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Such destruction has contributed to mass displacement (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Human rights observers have raised concerns about the arbitrary detention, physical abuse, and refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers. In December 2021 and January 2022, police allegedly subjected at least 30 Sudanese asylum seekers to arbitrary detention, as well as instances of forced labor and beatings (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In March 2022, authorities deported 31 Eritreans in what some have called a violation of Egypt's commitment to non-refoulement (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Though the prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting has decreased in recent years, 52 percent of girls are still estimated to undergo the illegal procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Egyptian law also permits leniency toward men who "kill their wives upon discovering them in an act of adultery" (U.S. Department of State, 2023). While same-sex sexual activity is not explicitly illegal, LGBTQI+ individuals continue to face up to 10 years in prison due to persecution on charges of "debauchery" and "violating family values," amounting to de facto criminalization (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Arbitrary arrests continued in Egypt along with the systemic torture and physical abuse of prisoners, especially activists, journalists, and LGBTQI+ individuals. From January to October of 2023 at least 2,700 prisoners were victims of torture and intentional medical neglect (U.S. State Department, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: At least 123 protesters in support of Palestine and Palestinian refugees were arbitrarily arrested and subsequently tortured between January and June of 2024, as well as other protesters supporting various causes opposed by the government (Amnesty International, 2024).

Several constitutional clauses contribute to discrimination against minority children, particularly regarding freedom of religion. Articles 3 and 64 of the Constitution recognize only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, excluding other religions like Bahá'ism from official recognition and public worship. At age 16, children must obtain ID cards listing one of the recognized religions, impacting those of unrecognized faiths (Minority Rights Group (MRG) and Egyptian Front for Human Rights).

Although Bahá'ís can now list a dash instead of a religious affiliation on their IDs, this option is limited to those previously identified as Bahá'í or "other." Converts to Bahá'ísm and their children face documentation obstacles. Bahá'í marriages are not recognized, affecting children's access to birth certificates, schooling, and health insurance. This lack of recognition leads to risks of statelessness and other documentation challenges. Sinai Bedouin children face additional hurdles due to remote living conditions, conflict zones, and economic barriers, complicating access to birth certificates and other documentation. The Beja community, stateless due to a territorial dispute, also struggles with citizenship issues, leading to stateless children who lack access to education and healthcare (Minority Rights Group (MRG) and Egyptian Front for Human Rights).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber and Avantika Singh

El Salvador

Gang violence in El Salvador has spurred repressive government security activity since the country's civil war ended in 1992. As of 2021, some 71,500 people were internally displaced in El Salvador, due in large part to gang violence (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Approximately 60,000 gang members operate in the country, some of whom are reported to collaborate with security and elected officials (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2022b; BBC, 2020; Martínez, 2022). The violence consists of extrajudicial killings, mass sexual violence, and forced recruitment of children (Human Rights Watch, 2022b; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Gangs target police, judicial authorities, the business community, journalists, women, and members of vulnerable populations (Human Rights Watch, 2022b; U.S. Department of State, 2022).

National Civilian Police (PNC) and the armed forces reportedly use violence against real or suspected gang members in what is known as the *mano dura* (iron fist) approach (OHCHR, 2022). The Salvadorian security forces are perceived to use extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, enforced disappearances, and mass sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022b; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Police and security forces were accused of excessive force during the COVID-19 lockdown, which resulted in 1,600 complaints of human rights violations, including over 620 reported violations of the right to freedom of movement during the summer of 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). Prisons are overcrowded with many in pretrial detention (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). Most recently, President Nayib Bukele imposed a state of emergency due to spiking murder rates; the measure has restricted the rights of citizens when interacting with law enforcement (Aljazeera, 2022). Local news has reported that the recent murder spikes are attributable to a breach in a supposed peace deal made between the PNC and the gang MS-13 (Martínez, 2022; USIP, 2022). Between March 2022, when the state of emergency was declared, and December 2022, over 60,000 people were detained, many reportedly on the basis of their "appearance or social background" (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Local human rights groups claim that hundreds of those detained under the state of emergency had no affiliation with gang activity (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Note, however, that much of El Salvador's gang violence is not included in PMAD. Actions must be deemed to have "the intent of destroying [a] social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group [or] other cohesive group of individuals with a common, widely recognized identity or intimidating [a] group by creating a

perception of imminent threat to its survival.” If gang violence appears to be indiscriminate (i.e., not targeting a particular group), then, like many terrorist attacks, it is excluded from the dataset.

Salvadorian law bans abortion under all circumstances, raising concerns among human rights observers about the wrongful incarceration of women who suffer pregnancy complications (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In 2022, a woman was sentenced to 30 years in prison for aggravated homicide after she suffered a miscarriage, and another was sentenced to 50 years in prison on the same charge after she suffered an obstetric emergency (U.S. Department of State, 2023). LGBTQI+ individuals are reportedly the victims of homophobic and transphobic violence, including sexual violence, by security forces and gang members (U.S. Department of State, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for June 2023 release: As of March 2023—one year into El Salvador’s state of emergency—more than 66,000 people have been detained amid accusations that authorities have engaged in arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, and enforced disappearances (Amnesty International, 2023). At least 132 people have died in state custody without being found guilty of any crimes (Amnesty International, 2023). February marked the opening of the Terrorism Confinement Center— “the biggest prison in all of the Americas,” according to President Bukele—as human rights observers allege that only a third of detainees have proven ties to gangs (Perez, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Arbitrary arrests continued in 2023 and 2024. Prison conditions deteriorated, with at least 70 prisoners dying from physical abuse or medical neglect in 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: In El Salvador, nearly two years after President Nayib Bukele declared a state of emergency, the gang violence that plagued the country has been replaced by the terror of the security forces. In 2015, El Salvador had one of the highest homicide rates in the world at 103 per 100,000 people, which dropped to 2.4 in 2023. In 2024, the homicide rate could reach 1.6 per 100,000 if the trend continues. Bukele is expected to win the upcoming election with over 80% of the vote (EFE, 2024).

The state of emergency in which suspected gang members can be held without evidence for up to 15 days was extended through at least mid-July (Crisis24, 2024). As of February 2024, 75,000 prisoners were held under the exception (Gellman, 2024), with human rights organizations documenting 3,730 complaints of which over 90% are just arbitrary arrests. The majority of those arrested are men aged 18-35 from impoverished areas. The prisons are described as "torture centers," with over 180 inmate deaths documented. Activists claim that more than 23,000 innocent people have been jailed under the state of emergency (EFE, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber and Avantika Singh*

Equatorial Guinea

From the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, national security forces, including police and gendarmes, were perceived to have cracked down on political opposition, activists, journalists, and civilians who violated

Covid-19 lockdown policies. During this time, police reportedly arbitrarily arrested and tortured political opposition figures to extract information or to force confessions (UN Watch, 2019; U.S. Department of State, 2022). In May 2022, Equatorial Guinea’s vice president, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, launched a national security plan to combat gang violence, referring to it as a “cleaning operation.” The implementation of this operation has reportedly included mass arbitrary arrests of real or suspected gang youth (Amnesty International, 2022). In May 2022, for instance, police arrested more than 450 youths for alleged gang affiliations, though civil society groups maintain that many of those detained had no connection to gang activity (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Equatorial Guinea ranked 161 out of 179 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index because journalists and activists experience government repression and arbitrary arrest (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). Detainees have routinely been denied access to legal representation (Human Rights Watch, 2019). However, many events have been excluded from PMAD given a lack of clear evidence that they have met the inclusion criteria and minimum victim magnitude thresholds.

The law discriminates against women in matters of nationality, property, and inheritance, and in certain rural areas widows are forced to marry their deceased husband’s brother (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Same-sex sexual activity and LGBTQI+ identity are criminalized in the armed forces, and LGBTQI+ individuals—particularly women and transgender men—are reportedly subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence within the military and the prison system (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes and Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: The European Parliament condemned the country for human rights abuses in February 2023 for arbitrarily arresting political opponents and subjecting them to torture. The magnitude of the abuses is uncertain. The resolution came after the arrest, torture, and death in prison of activist Julio Obama Mefuman, a dual Spanish and Equatoguinean citizen (European Parliament, 2023).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: Citizens protesting the government’s use of explosives that harmful to the environment on the island of Annobón have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, and deprivation of rights as internet and cell service was shut down on the island. At least 30 people have been detained without formal charges since the beginning of the crackdown in July 2024 (Ambo Legadu, 2024; Swiss Info, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Eritrea

Eritrea’s government and ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), are perceived to have carried out widespread human rights violations in recent years. Targeted populations have included national service evaders, persons attempting to flee the country without travel documents, and outspoken critics of the government.

The Eritrean military imposes mandatory national service training and conscription for indefinite periods of time, amounting to forced labor and enslavement (GCR2P, 2022). In this instance, the perceived mass

atrocities is not the act of conscription per se, but the fact that service periods are indefinite and often exceed the 18-month time limit established by Eritrean law. During military training and conscription, sexual enslavement and torture have been reported (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The Global Slavery Index reported in 2018 that roughly 93 per 1,000 Eritreans were living in modern slavery (Global Slavery Index, 2018). Forced military service has motivated many young Eritreans to flee; as of 2021, an estimated 580,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers lived abroad (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

The Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), allied with Ethiopian government forces, have been involved in armed conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea's entry to the war has prompted new waves of mass roundups and forced conscription to fill the army's ranks, including reports of child recruitment (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). For more information on mass atrocities perceived to have been committed by the EDF or other combatants in the Tigray War, please reference the country case narrative for Ethiopia.

The Eritrean government's exclusive religious recognition has led to persecution and violence against religious minorities. Those targeted have included Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Muslims (Crux, 2021). They have faced enforced disappearances, raids of religious gatherings, detainment, torture, and in some cases reduction of citizenship (GCR2P, 2022). In March 2022, for instance, 29 Christians were reportedly detained during a prayer meeting (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). In addition to persecution of religious minorities, journalists and political opposition have also been subjected to enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrest (Amnesty International, 2022). Restriction of due process and ill-treatment have been reported in Eritrean detention centers (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Under Eritrean law, same-sex sexual activity is punishable by up to seven years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Despite having the same legal status and rights as men, women continue to face economic and social discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

In February 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that the Eritrean government had in recent months punished the relatives of thousands of alleged draft evaders, including through arbitrary detentions and forced displacements (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). While Eritrean law requires all adults under age 40 to be available for national service, individuals older than 40 have reportedly been called up since mid-September 2022, potentially amounting to forced conscription (Human Rights Watch, 2023b).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: The Eritrean government has a history of discrimination, violence, arbitrary imprisonment, and disenfranchisement of the Afar indigenous ethnic group. Up to 100 Afar fishermen were seized and arbitrarily arrested by the Eritrean military in August and September of 2022. As of May 2023, they remained in prison (UNOHCHR, 2023).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Estonia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, Women experienced discrimination in employment and occupation (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Members of the LGBTQI community experienced societal harassment and discrimination, although attitudes towards LGBTQI peoples are reportedly improving (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Although it did not meet the inclusion criteria for PMAD, at least 4 people, possibly up to 9, were arbitrarily arrested for protesting in support of Palestine (Grossthal, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Last updated: July 2024.

Ethiopia

In November 2020, in retaliation for what he described as an attack on federal security forces, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered the Ethiopian military into action in the northern region of Tigray (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Thus began a two-year conflict which has seen as many as 600,000 civilians killed, with numerous atrocities—including systematic campaigns of mass murder and rape—committed by government forces, their Eritrean allies, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Green, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). The conflict soon spilled into the neighboring regions of Amhara and Afar, where rampant human rights abuses have also been reported (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In mid-2021, with some 350,000 Tigrayans at risk of starvation, the Ethiopian army imposed a blockade on Tigray, choking off the flow of humanitarian aid to the region and earning accusations that the central government was wielding starvation as a weapon of war (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Reports of mass sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery, have been attributed to all parties; in a single three-month period (February–April 2021), Amnesty International documented 1,288 cases of sexual violence attributed to government forces (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In April 2022, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported that Amhara regional forces and Ethiopian federal forces had “displaced Tigrayan civilians in a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign” (Muhumuza, 2022). According to the New York Times (Jackson, 2022), “The U.S. government estimates as many as 500,000 people have been killed. Allegations have surfaced of children being recruited as soldiers. The warring parties have used starvation and rape as weapons of war. And millions who survived were displaced.” The warring parties declared a truce in November 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The Oromia Region of southern Ethiopia remains gripped by violence between state security forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an armed rebel group (BBC News, 2021b; Renouil, 2021). Thousands of civilians suspected of aiding the rebels have been subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial punishment, and lethal violence (BBC News, 2021a; Swart, 2020). Atrocities have even targeted the babies and children of suspects, who are often neglected in “unhygienic and overcrowded” detention facilities after their parents are detained (Reuters, 2021). In mid-2020, the death of a popular singer prompted

political protests in Oromia, to which security forces responded with extrajudicial violence, including lethal force (Al Jazeera, 2020; International Crisis Group, 2020). In total, over 170 people were killed: some by security forces, others by civilians who looted and burned the homes and businesses of ethnic Amharas, resulting in the displacement of more than 9,000 people (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In March 2021, the killing of an imam in Amhara Region triggered inter-communal violence between Amhara and Oromo residents, resulting in hundreds of deaths and over 200,000 displacements (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In June of the following year, gunmen killed some 400 Amhara civilians in Oromia and neighboring Benishangul-Gumuz Region (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Border disputes between Afar and Somali communities have likewise intensified, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of displacements in 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

As of October 2022, nearly 6 million individuals were reportedly in need of services for gender-based violence (U.S. Department of State, 2023). While female genital mutilation/cutting is illegal, roughly 65 percent of girls and women ages 15 to 49—and 16 percent of those age 14 or younger—are estimated to have undergone the procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Marriage by abduction reportedly continues in certain regions, as does impunity for rapists who marry their victims (U.S. Department of State, 2023). According to a 2016 survey, only 53 percent of women in Ethiopia were able to refuse having sex with their partner (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Same-sex sexual relations are punishable by up to 15 years in prison, though there were no known prosecutions under this law in 2022 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Due to fears of violence, ostracism, and legal punishment, LGBTQI+ persons rarely identify themselves as such (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD's Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD's Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

The construction of the Gibe III dam (2006–2015) in the Lower Omo Valley of southwest Ethiopia was accompanied by massive displacement of the local indigenous communities and extrajudicial killings by state security forces (Angelo, 2019; Corey-Boulet, 2019). Though atrocities have declined since the initial onslaught, the government continues to abuse those who remain in the region. Hundreds in the Bodi, Mursi, and Suri communities have been subjected to torture and sexual violence by state security forces, who continue to harass them to force continued displacement (IWGIA, 2020; Solomon, 2019).

New for June 2023 release: As the November 2022 Tigray peace deal continues to hold, Oromia has become the country's "most volatile region," with the OLA expanding its insurgency to take advantage of the security vacuum the Tigray war created (Harter, 2023). The OLA is accused of targeting ethnic Amharas in Oromia, while ethnic militias from Amhara have allegedly killed Oromo civilians in reprisal (Harter, 2023). In February 2023, the OLA reportedly attacked a community of displaced Amharas, killing 50 (Reuters, 2023a).

In January 2023, three Orthodox Church officials in Oromia declared themselves archbishops, sparking a dispute with the central government, whom the Church accuses of "meddling" in its internal affairs (Reuters, 2023b). Since February 4, at least 30 people have been killed in protests over the Church's controversial move (Reuters, 2023b).

In February, residents of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) gathered in front of a local water and sanitation office to protest a lack of drinking water; when individuals began blocking roads and throwing stones at the office building, regional security forces reportedly responded with live fire, killing at least three people and wounding an estimated 30 (ACLEDD, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: In July 2023, the UN human rights office reported mass deportations of Eritrean refugees and several cases of separation, with parents forced back to Eritrea and children left behind in Ethiopia (UN News, 2023). The Human Rights Council condemned reports of targeted arrests and prolonged arbitrary detention of Eritrean refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in Ethiopia (UN News, 2023).

– *Austin S. Matthews, updated by Collin Van Son and Phoebe Cribb*

New for April 2024 release: Despite the Tigray peace agreement in 2022, 2023 saw “systematic and gross human rights violations and abuses” in Ethiopia, sparked by “ethno-culturally charged political polarization, past and present socio-economic and political grievances, and unaddressed legacies of past violence” (OHCHR, 2023: 14). Mid-year, Human Rights Watch (2023) reported the persistence of ethnic cleansing in Tigray. There were also widespread reports of ethnic and religious violence in Oromia, including an aerial strike on a church (Endeshaw, 2023), and “mass killing of Amharas” in the Amhara state (Pearce, 2023).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: Militias in Amhara and Oromia continue to clash with Tigrayan forces and one another. Most recently, Fano (Amharan nationalist militias) have fought Ethiopian government forces in response to reported federal plans to dissolve local Amhara governments (Crisis Watch, 2024). As recently as March 2024, Ethiopian National Defense Forces have been accused of using starvation as a weapon of war, with some raising concerns of potential ethnic cleansing of Amhara (Marks, 2024). This follows the alleged “summary execution” of “several dozen civilians” in Amhara in January 2024 (Al Jazeera, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: Beginning in June 2024, approximately 7,000 Sudanese refugees taking shelter near Awala have been routinely subject to violence by bandits and local militias including Fano, which is currently fighting the Ethiopian armed forces (Nashed, 2024; Sudan Tribune, 2024). Some have fled but thousands remain and are continuously neglected by the government and targeted by the militias.

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Fiji

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

There have been several reports of ill-treatment of detainees that could amount to torture by corrections officers. However, the reports did not meet the qualifications of a perceived mass atrocity according to

the PMAD coding framework. NGOs reported multiple instances of violence against the LGBTQI community, and discrimination against LGBTQI persons in employment, housing, healthcare, and other areas (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country during 2023.

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Finland

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

According to the U.S. Department of State, pregnant women experience discrimination in finding jobs and retaining jobs after giving birth (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Additionally, LGBTQI persons report continued instances of harassment and discrimination in public (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

France

In June of 2022, hundreds of migrants were evicted from tent camps in and near Paris (InfoMigrants, 2022). Police forcibly remove immigrants and individuals seeking asylum from their tents to clear the area in what they call "sheltering operations" (InfoMigrants, 2022).

The French police have a recorded pattern of repressing freedom of expression and assembly. They have reportedly used excessive force to break up peaceful protests that are critical of government policies (Amnesty International, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022), including during anti-government protests in May 2016, November-December 2018, October-December 2019, September-December 2020, and June 2021 (Freedom House, 2020; Amnesty International, 2018; Amnesty International, 2021). There were 1,520 complaints against the security forces' intervention methods in 2018 (U.S. Department of State, 2019). The "Yellow Vest" protestors November-December 2018 were met with police excessive force and arrests, resulting in 2,448 injured demonstrators (U.S. Department of State, 2019; France24, 2018; NPR, 2018). Police also use restriction of movement measures to prevent people from attending demonstrations (Amnesty International, 2018). There has been an increase of complaints against the

police of using excessive force are reported as relating to racial discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: Since January 2023, millions of protesters have peacefully taken to the streets across France, opposing a pension reform plan that increases the retirement age by two years, to 64 (Cossé, 2023). The decision of President Emmanuel Macron to circumvent a parliamentary vote angered protesters and led to violent confrontations between thousands of demonstrators and the police (Cossé, 2023). Amnesty International and the Council of Europe, condemned an “excessive use of force” by French riot police during the protests, which began in January and are still ongoing (Barbero, 2023). Human Rights Watch reported that police carried out 'preventative arrests' of protestors, constituting arbitrary detention (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

On 27 June, the fatal shooting of a 17-year-old boy of north African descent during a police traffic stop in a Paris suburb triggered three consecutive nights of violence and rioting (RFI, 2023). Since the violence began, there have been 3,651 arrests – including 1,366 in Paris and the inner suburbs – according to Interior Ministry figures released (RFI, 2023). However, it should be noted that only clear excessive violence by police and arbitrary arrests of peaceful protestors were included in PMAD code.

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Protests over police violence in France continued into July, in which the average age of the thousands arrested being just 17 with the youngest arrestee being 12 years old (Singh, Zakir-Hussain, & Matt Mathers, 2023).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 Release: Protests in New Caledonia against new local election reforms by France have escalated into violent demonstrations, with looting and arson leading to at least four deaths and hundreds of injuries. The unrest, the worst in 30 years, erupted after the French parliament allowed long-term French residents to vote, a move seen by indigenous Kanak people as undermining their push for independence. In response, France declared a state of emergency, imposed a curfew, and deployed an additional 500 security personnel to the existing 1,800 stationed in the territory. Over 200 people have been arrested, and many protest leaders placed under house arrest, as the government and pro-independence groups seek a resolution amid ongoing tensions (Al Jazeera, 2024).

A police officer and five protesters were injured during a violent demonstration in La Rochelle over the use of reservoirs for large-scale agriculture. Police used teargas, water cannons, and reinforcements to disperse around 4,000 protesters after unrest began in the afternoon, resulting in several smashed shop fronts and at least seven arrests (Trujillo and Pineau, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Avantika Singh*

Gabon

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, women face discrimination in employment and economic matters (Freedom House, 2023). Sexual harassment is not criminalized by law and NGOs report that it is pervasive, especially in the workplace (Freedom House, 2023; U.S. Department of State, 2023). Homosexuality was decriminalized in 2020, however same-sex marriage remains illegal and LGBTQI individuals face widespread discrimination (Freedom House, 2023)

– *Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: On August 30, 2023, a coup d'état resulted in the government being replaced with a Transitional Council. The Council released several political prisoners and increased the freedom of the press. It also instituted a curfew which was enforced by the military and gendarmes and resulted in several documented instances of excessive force, although it did not meet the requirements for inclusion in PMAD. This included the extrajudicial killing of two men who violated the curfew (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Gambia

As of 2020, 76 percent of women and girls between ages 15 and 49 had been victims of FGM/C. In addition, sexual harassment of women is prevalent (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The law criminalizes same-sex consensual sexual conduct and cross-dressing, although it is not effectively enforced (U.S. Department of State, 2023). LGBTQI individuals reported government-perpetrated violence and are subject to societal discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Updated by Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In 2022, the Casamance conflict in Senegal between Senegalese forces and the MFDC, or Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance, saw fighting in the border region of Gambia known as Foni. As a result, an estimated 5,600 Gambians were internally displaced and have since been resettled in other areas (U.S. State Department, 2023).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Georgia

Torture by police and correctional officers was institutional in the early 2000's in Georgia. Since then, major reforms have changed policing practices (Open Democracy, 2016). However, torture and ill-treatment still continue at a lesser rate. There were 133 complaints of ill-treatment by police or prison staff in 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In recent years, anti-government protests have routinely erupted in Georgia's capital city, Tbilisi. Rubber bullets were used on protesters in 2019, and many were arbitrarily arrested (Amnesty International,

2019). Protesters in 2020 alleged election fraud and voter intimidation by government authorities; police reportedly used excessive force to break up the protests. Since then, police have reportedly used arbitrary arrests to silence protesters and political opposition, including members of the United National Movement (UNM) political party (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Meanwhile, illegal mass surveillance of journalists, activists, and opposition by intelligence agencies was uncovered in 2021 (Amnesty International, 2022).

The Council of Europe (2022) reported that as of May 2021 ill-treatment by the police, especially against migrants and Roma civilians, remained frequent, particularly in police facilities since 1 March 2019, when the processing of asylum requests had been suspended.

Additional events included in this dataset involve intercommunal violence broke out in July 2021 when anti-LGBTQ+ rioters violently attacked a Georgian Pride event. Over 50 people were injured during the violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Other perceived mass atrocities may have occurred in non-government-controlled areas. The de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region maintain control of movement restrictions to and from their respective territories (Amnesty International, 2022). Information on perceived mass atrocities in these regions is limited.

New for September 2023 release: On March 7, 2023, police used huge amounts of teargas and water cannons to disperse thousands of peaceful demonstrators who gathered to protest a draft “foreign agents” bill (Gogia, 2023). Police detained dozens of people, who now face various administrative and criminal charges (Gogia, 2023). If adopted, the bill would have required nongovernmental organizations and media outlets to register as “agents of foreign influence” if they receive 20 percent of their funding from abroad (Gogia, 2023). In response to public backlash, the ruling party immediately announced the withdrawal of the bill. However, the bill is indicative of a wider, systemic campaign by Georgian authorities against independent groups, media, and critical voices.

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Georgia was granted candidate status by the European Union in December 2023, with their membership pending improvements in human rights conditions and the status of the de facto Russian controlled territories in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (U.S. State Department, 2024). Both regions still have thousands of Georgian residents who have been restricted from using their former Georgian citizenship and passports, including to cross the borders to leave the area. They have instead been pressured by both Georgia and Russia to seek either Russian citizenship or local citizenship in Abkhazia or South Ossetia (U.S. State Department, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: Georgia passed the ‘foreign agents’ bill and overturned a presidential veto to make it into law, making it even more difficult for violations of human rights in the country to be documented (Demytrie, 2024). The bill has also led to an increase in violent attacks against human rights defenders and journalists (FIDH, 2024a). Before the law passed in May, protests occurred throughout the month of April and were met with excessive police force, arbitrary arrests, and violence against those detained (FIDH, 2024b).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Germany

Germany has generally maintained a positive human rights record since 2018. An exception meriting inclusion in PMAD was the deportation of 137 refugees to Afghanistan in 2020, which reportedly violated the principle of non-refoulement (Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Shortly thereafter, the German government halted further deportations of Afghan refugees (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: In January 2023, police responded with a heavy hand to climate protests in western Germany. According to protest organizers, dozens were injured during clashes with the police (France 24, 2023). The US State Department reported group attacks on participants of LGBTQI pride marches in June and August 2022 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Along with LGBTQI people, women in Germany face discrimination despite enjoying the same legal status and rights as men. Specifically, in terms of employment and pay women do not receive the same treatment as men (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Although it does not meet the inclusion criteria for PMAD, Germany has received criticism for neglecting to address societal and state-based discrimination against Muslims, especially Muslim immigrants (HRW, 2024). Private companies were legally allowed to prevent employees from wearing religious clothing including hijabs, which some did (U.S. State Department, 2024). A rise in ant-Islamic crimes, including discrimination and violence, was observed in 2023 (HRW, 2024).

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for September 2024 release: Protests in support of Palestine since October 2023 have been met with arbitrary detainments, harassment, and excessive force on behalf of German police, with reports of several protesters being sent to the hospital with injuries (Casey, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Ghana

A number of isolated violent outbursts have occurred in Ghana in recent years. However, most of these events are deemed to have met the PMAD inclusion criteria, particularly the requirement that actions be targeted against a specific group with the intention or threat of group elimination.

In June 2022, a property dispute in the capital city of Accra left more than 60 residents displaced when a group of “land guards” armed with guns and machetes vandalized the residents’ makeshift shelters and threatened to burn them down (Mingle, 2022; IDMC, 2022).

In June 2022, an estimated 25 students from the Islamic Senior High School in the southern Ashanti Region were hospitalized after clashes with police (Media Foundation for West Africa, 2022). The students had blocked the road in front of their school as part of a demonstration calling for speed bumps to be installed

in the wake of a series of car accidents (Media Foundation for West Africa, 2022). When police arrived to break up the crowd, students pelted the officers with stones, and the police responded with gunshots and pepper spray, prompting community condemnation and disciplinary measures against three of the officers involved (Gyamfi, 2022).

In 2021 alone, thousands of individuals with mental disabilities were sent to “prayer camps” run by private Christian organizations (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Barriga, 2014). At some of these camps, mental disability is considered a “demonic affliction,” and residents are subjected to abuses that include being chained to trees and deprived of food and water (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Barriga, 2014). While these events could potentially be categorized as mass containment, they are complicated by questions surrounding the individuals’ agency. However, they do appear to clearly qualify as cases of mass less-lethal violence and have been coded as such in PMAD.

Women in Ghana face violence and discrimination in several forms. While female genital mutilation/cutting is prohibited by law, the practice remains common in certain parts of the country, including the Upper East Region, where the prevalence rate is 27.8 percent (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In some rural areas, older women and widows accused of witchcraft are subject to killings, less-lethal violence, forced displacement, and banishment to so-called witch camps (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Under traditional widowhood rites, some women are forced to undergo confinement, starvation, and other forms of ill-treatment, including “wife inheritance,” in which widows are forced to marry a male relative of their deceased husband (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

In June 2022, police reportedly arrested 30 LGBTQI+ individuals on arbitrary charges of unlawful assembly after responding to an attack on a birthday party and learning the party was for members of the LGBTQI+ community (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: In July 2023 Ghana forcibly returned to Burkina Faso hundreds of asylum seekers, which UNHCR stated violated non-refoulement (U.S. Department of State, 2024). The exact number of persons deported is disputed, with the U.S. State Department putting the number at 1,200 and many local news outlets putting it at around 500. Given the number of sources estimating 500 persons, that number was used for PMAD coding.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Greece

Since the start of Europe’s refugee crisis in 2015, tightening border restrictions in the European Union have turned Greece into a “holding pen” for asylum seekers from the Middle East and South and Central Asia (International Rescue Committee, 2022). An estimated 38,000 refugees are currently living on the Greek mainland, while an additional 16,000 remain stuck on Greek islands in the Aegean Sea (International Rescue Committee, 2022). In recent years, the majority of mass atrocities perceived to have occurred in Greece have involved the victimization of asylum seekers by Greek security forces. Alleged abuses include beatings, mass containment, and forcible displacement.

Under the Geneva Convention of 1951, it is illegal for a country to push back refugees without first processing their asylum claims (Psaropoulos, 2022). However, since the start of 2020, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recorded nearly 540 reports of Greek authorities conducting informal refugee pushbacks, including incidents which may constitute mass forced displacements (Deutsche Welle, 2022). The majority of these operations have been reported in the Evros region, where the Evros River (a.k.a. the Maritsa or Meriç) separates Greece from Turkey (Amnesty International, 2021). Amnesty International documented incidents in the Evros region that affected some 1,000 migrants from June to December 2020, with the vast majority of interviewees reporting violence from uniformed Greek officials and men in civilian clothing (2021). Reported abuses included blows with sticks and truncheons, kicks, punches, slaps, and aggressive naked searches, with some instances allegedly amounting to torture (Amnesty International, 2021).

According to Human Rights Watch, Greek security forces have reportedly employed foreign nationals to conduct forcible pushbacks at the border (2022). After detaining migrants—and in some cases stripping them of their clothing and possessions—Greek police have allegedly turned migrants over to masked men of Middle Eastern or South Asian origin, who then force the migrants back through the river to the Turkish side (Human Rights Watch, 2022). By some accounts, these non-Greek actors have been promised immigration documents as a reward for helping Greek security forces conduct refugee pushbacks (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The UNHCR has also received reports of Greek coast guard forces leaving migrants in unsafe conditions, including overcrowded boats, and in some cases allegedly throwing people into the sea (Deutsche Welle, 2022). In January 2022, the Aegean Boat Report documented the pushback of a group of 40 asylum seekers by the Greek coast guard (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2022).

Since 2020, Greece and Turkey have waged “a full-blown information war” about which side is responsible for the grossest human rights violations at their shared border (Psaropoulos, 2022). In October 2022, 92 refugees who had been stripped naked were found on the Greek side of the Evros; both Greece and Turkey have denied responsibility for the ill-treatment (Psaropoulos, 2022). A similar standoff took place in January 2022, when a group of 29 asylum seekers was left stranded—allegedly by Greek authorities—in freezing conditions on a tiny island in the Evros, with both countries refusing to take responsibility for the group (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2022).

Since September 2021, three Closed Controlled Access Centres (CCACs) for asylum seekers have opened on the Greek islands of Samos, Leros, and Kos (Refugees International, 2022). Located in a remote area and surrounded by multiple barbed-wire fences, the Samos CCAC currently houses an estimated 1,000 asylum seekers (Refugees International, 2022). According to Refugees International, the facility’s prison-like structure and stringent entry/exit controls amount to “*de facto* detention” (2022).

Beyond the treatment of asylum seekers, perceived mass atrocities have included the Greek government’s continued restrictions on certain ethnic groups, with authorities denying official recognition to ethnic groups whose association names include the terms “Turkish” or “Macedonian” (Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Police and students have also continued to clash in the wake of the government’s decision to station police officers on college campuses, with officers reportedly using water cannons, tear gas, and batons against protestors (Kitsantonis, 2022). Violent clashes between police and protestors were also reported in Athens in July 2022 after courts refused to parole a high-profile prisoner on hunger strike (Stamatoukou, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: On June 14, 2023, a ship called the Adriana capsized off the coast of Greece, resulting in the death of about 600 migrants who were onboard. Several investigations into the wreck are still ongoing, with many claiming that the Greek Coast Guard who responded to the overcrowded vessel were responsible for the crash because they capsized it in an attempt to pull it further out of Greek territorial waters and then purposefully delayed rescuing the victims (Fallon et al., 2023; HRW, 2023). The Greek government has denied the allegations, which are based on the testimonies of several survivors as well as independent investigations. The United Nations has called for further investigations, but it does not seem likely as in May 2024 Greece dismissed charges against the smugglers responsible for the boat being overcrowded (Beake & Kallergis, 2024).

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for September 2024 release: In January 2024 the Border Violence Monitoring Network published a report on Greece which included documentation of instances of violence and human rights violations within Greek detention centers, prisons, and pre-removal centers in which at least 522 detained migrants were impacted (Border Violence Monitoring Network, 2024).

Greece legalized same-sex marriage in March 2024, but the move was followed by an increase in anti-LGBT violence, including several mob attacks, raising the violence against LGBTQI+ severity level for PMAD to 3 for the year (Antonopoulos, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Grenada

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, in recent years there have been human rights concerns in Grenada regard discrimination of minority groups and subpar prison conditions.

With only one penitentiary in the entire country, overcrowding leads to the inability to provide basic human services like potable water and safety. In 2018, as many as 443 prisoners were held in a prison with a max occupancy of 198 (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Conditions seem to be improving as of 2021 when 365 prisoners were kept in a space meant for 200 individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2021). For some vulnerable groups, the government has successfully refrained from inciting violence or harassment toward them. Persons with disabilities benefit from governmental protections against discrimination. No reports of discrimination against those with disabilities were reported (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

For women, violence remains a serious problem in a localized level but the government criminalizes gender violence and does not perpetrate its existence (U.S. Department of State, 2021). On the other hand, there remains a stigma around HIV/AIDS, which often motivates families to shun relatives afflicted with the virus (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The government has taken steps to encourage testing and treatment. Same-sex relations between men are criminalized with up to 10 years of imprisonment,

however, this law isn't strictly enforced by the government (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Although prosecution isn't as common as the law allows, they still serve to legitimize discrimination and abuses toward the LGBTQ+ community. Reports of verbal abuse and harassment escalating into physical assault have been compiled by Human Rights Watch. Individuals have reported being physically assaulted by neighbors and community members because of their sexuality (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

– Kerent Benjumea

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: May 2024.

Guatemala

In recent years, Guatemala has seen high rates of violence, from discriminatory attacks and killings to the prevalence of excessive force and arbitrary detention by its security forces. Insecurity stemming from criminal and street gangs threatens the lives of vulnerable populations, leading to the high rate of migration from Guatemala into neighboring countries. Prison and detention centers keep prisoners in life-threatening conditions. Overcrowding, sexual abuse, and inadequate safety measures are persistent, even in juvenile detention centers (U.S. Department of State, 2019). LGBTQ+ groups are often abused and a lack of protections for transgender individuals, especially, persists (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Most prisons are run by criminal gangs, contributing to the inability of guards to maintain oversight. While exact numbers have not been compiled, credible reports of arbitrary and extrajudicial arrests are prevalent. Arbitrary arrest and detention are unconstitutional in Guatemala and can be challenged by the suspect in court. However, if these suspects successfully challenged their detention, their release usually took several days (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Police have also been reported to ignore writs of habeas corpus in cases of illegal detention, which was especially witnessed during so-called anti-gang sweeps. By 2021, the Office of Professional Responsibility received 48 complaints of arbitrary or illegal detention by police (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

Forced disappearances affected women disproportionately. To address this issue, the Public Ministry launched the IsabelClaudina alert, which reported 428 missing women in 2018 (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Sexual violence remains a widespread issue despite these advances. Over 40,000 cases of violence against women were reported most recently in 2021, along with 6,000 cases of women falling victim to rape, and around 300 women being killed (U.S. Department of State, 2021). The prevalence of criminal gangs in Guatemala results in the forced recruitment of children for stealing, transporting contraband, and prostitution. Along with gangs, vigilante mobs in local communities have espoused violence, killing and attacking those they believe to be perpetrators of rape, kidnapping, theft, or extortion. In 2020, the NGO Mutual Support Group reported three people as victims of lynching and 45 injured by attempted lynchings (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

Societal discrimination against LGBTQ+ groups persists, leading to police forces' engagement in the extortion, harassment, and abuse of transgender persons accused of being sex workers. Female members of the LGBTQ+ community were victims of targeted discrimination through "corrective rape" and forced pregnancies (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Although prevalent, the number of cases remains underreported due to the severe levels of discrimination experienced. Persons with disabilities were devoid of accessibility to services, education, and transportation.

Indigenous groups are subject to violence and threats due to their activism. In October of 2021, protests against the operation of the Fenix mine and the lack of consultation with indigenous groups took place in El Estor, Izabal (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Over 700 police officers responded by launching tear gas at 120 protestors (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Subsequently, President Giammattei declared a state of siege which led the national police to conduct 26 raids and 15 arbitrary arrests of protestors and journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Human rights defenders lack protections and are often intimidated and threatened by state forces. In 2019, 26 activists were killed and over 300 were attacked or threatened. This number of attacks almost doubled by 2021 (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Between 2012 and 2021, Global Witness reported that at least 80 environmental defenders were killed, and dozens of other dissident voices have fled, been detained, or are facing judicial persecution (Patterson, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: In June 2023, election-related violence spiked, with 15 campaign volunteers killed and 57 incidents of electoral violence (Crisis Watch, 2023).

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Journalists and activists continued to face violence and harassment by the Guatemalan government and political parties. 393 attacks against journalists occurred during the first six months of 2023, and due to this violence as well as threats, harassment, and legal actions of the government 30 journalists were forced to flee the country (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

Indigenous people in Guatemala also continued to face threats from the government and societal discrimination, especially the lack of recognition of their land rights (IWGIA, 2024). However, these issues did not meet the criteria for inclusion in PMAD in 2023.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: In May and June 2024, Guatemala's National Civil Police forcibly displaced over 100 Indigenous Mayas Q'eq'chies from their traditional territory, and 1,500 other indigenous people are currently at risk of forced displacement (Grassroots International, 2024; Santiago, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Guinea

After decades of authoritarian leadership, Guinea had undergone a tumultuous political transition since 2018 when local elections were held. Allegations of electoral fraud, coupled with intercommunal and ethnic conflict led to confrontations between protestors and security forces (Freedom House, 2022). Following these uprisings in 2018 against the controversial election poll, protests continued against a fuel-price increase and teachers' ongoing pay strikes. Citizen rights were stifled by the government which banned all protests and subsequently responded with excessive force, extortion, and torture (U.S. Department of State, 2018). In 2018, 12 individuals were killed in Conakry by security forces as a result of the alleged deliberate targeting of protestors (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Police and gendarmes also participated in the vandalization of homes and cars. Reports of torture were widespread, and in many cases, against minors (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Anti-government protests resulting from alleged electoral fraud against the ruling party, the Guinean People's Assembly, continued into the following year.

Human rights groups reported the prolongation of torture and excessive force during arrests, along with the abuse of children and women (U.S. Department of State, 2019). In addition, the government forcibly displaced four communities in Conakry, alleging these people were squatters and the land was being used for the relocation of ministries. An estimated 20,000 people were evicted despite some having legal ownership of their land (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

By 2020, presidential elections were held at the behest of President Alpha Condé in his attempt to remain in power for a third term. This constitutional violation, which limits the presidency to two terms, triggered violence throughout the country once again. At least 32 people were killed in intercommunal clashes in the southeastern part of the country (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Amidst the political controversy, social media access was heavily limited. Cellou Dalein Diallo, the main opposition candidate, claimed victory despite the supposedly free and fair election results (Freedom House, 2022). Diallo called for demonstrations to protest against electoral fraud. Again, the period following these elections was violent, and police and security forces remained unpunished (Freedom House, 2022).

The following year, officers of the Guinean army staged a coup to overthrow President Condé. Consequently, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, the head of the Guinean special forces, declared the dissolution of the government and ushered in a period of transition (Freedom House, 2022). Guinea suffered international condemnation and experienced targeted sanctions on the leaders of the coup and their families (Freedom House, 2022). As opposition to the new constitution was manifested in demonstrations, Guinean security forces continued using excessive force and indiscriminate murder. The government killed at least 23 demonstrators in 2020 and arbitrarily arrested members of the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Intercommunal clashes escalated in Nzérékoré, Forest Guinea where 32 were murdered, 90 were injured, and dozens of establishments and homes were destroyed (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

Ethnic conflict rose in 2020 with the armed Guerzé force loyal to the opposition confronting the armed ethnic groups of Konianké and Malinké, considered to be supporters of the ruling party (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Over two dozen people died as a result of this conflict. This same year, ahead of FNDC demonstrations, 40 people were arbitrarily arrested and held isolated in eastern Guinea for a month (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Again, security forces did not face any punishment for their violations. In the same year, mass displacement re-occurred with the construction of the Souapiti hydroelectric dam. 16,000 people were displaced without alternatives for living or farming, leaving them unable to access food and basic essentials (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

New for September 2023 release: In February 2023, security forces clashed with opposition protesters, with two protesters shot dead, 58 wounded and 47 detained (Crisis Watch, 2023).

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The current transitional government has maintained a ban on protests and demonstrations since May 2022, and has enforced it with arbitrary arrests, violence, extrajudicial killings, and harassment. During protests on May 10 seven protesters were killed by security forces, and during protests on September 5 four protesters were killed (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Journalists who reported on protests were also targeted by the government, with three journalists assaulted during the May protests and 13 arrested during October protests (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for September 2024 release: In February 2024 the military dissolved the transitional government, saying that a new government will be formed but not providing a timeline (Diallo, 2024). The transitional government was only intended to last until December 2024, and it is expected that a new one will be in place by then. Protests a week later resulted in two deaths at the hands of police (Aljazeera, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Guinea-Bissau

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, in recent years Guinea-Bissau has seen a range of human rights violations: abuse by police, arbitrary arrests, and lack of basic necessities in prisons. The majority of these events are excluded from the PMAD data because of their failure to meet definitional inclusion criteria and/or victim magnitude thresholds.

Along with LGBTQ+ individuals, disabled populations face discrimination in the workforce, although exact numbers are not provided (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Women experience some limitations in their abilities to be productive citizens. The pay gaps experienced by women are significant and they are still discriminated against in the workforce (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Legal restrictions exist to limit women's working hours and against certain types of employment that can be considered dangerous. Media outlets are able to report openly with little influence from the government. However, since 2020 when President Sissoco came into power, the UN has reported intimidation against both the general media and state-owned media (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

– Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: The United Nations has called on the country to reduce the prevalence of FGM, which affects 52% of the women and girls in Guinea-Bissau, with certain regions reaching nearly 100% (UNICEF, 2021). Public support for discontinuing the practice was seen in 2023 (UNFPA, 2023), and the practice is officially illegal, but it has yet to be significantly reduced at the national level, although some areas have experienced significant reductions in recent years.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

New for June 2024 release: The country banned protests in January 2024 (MFWA, 2024), which was followed by increased threats and violence against journalists (CPJ, 2024), although due to the crackdown on the press not enough information is known for it to be included in PMAD.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Guyana

In June 2022, a protest over the police killing of an Afro-Guyanese man turned violent at a market near the capital city of Georgetown (Belgrave, 2022). Amid false reports that the man's killer had been released

from custody, a peaceful march—perceived to have consisted of mainly Afro-Guyanese protestors—grew increasingly tense as the crowd swelled in size (Belgrave, 2022; GSA News, 2022). As the crowd approached the Mon Repos market, the situation deteriorated into rioting and looting: vehicles were burned, vendors’ stalls destroyed, and “scores of people beaten and robbed” (Belgrave, 2022). The majority of the victimized vendors were reportedly Indo-Guyanese (Younge, 2022). Given that Guyana’s politics are largely organized along ethnic lines, responses to the violence have varied widely, with some condemning the rioters’ targeting of Indo-Guyanese, and others criticizing police discrimination against Afro-Guyanese (Freedom House, 2022; GSA News, 2022; Stabroek News, 2022).

Same-sex sexual activity among men is illegal in Guyana and is punishable by up to two years in prison, while anal intercourse between persons of any sex carries a maximum sentence of life in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The U.S. Department of State notes that these laws are rarely enforced, though same-sex marriages and civil unions remain prohibited (Freedom House, 2022). Although the law prohibits gender-based discrimination, it is still widespread and ingrained in the country. Discrimination against women was especially prominent in the workplace and employment prospects (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

The general secretary of the Guyana Rastafari Council has accused authorities of using Guyana’s drug laws as an excuse to publicly harass Rastafarians, who often incorporate marijuana into their religious practices (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In response, Guyana’s National Assembly passed a bill in November 2022 that eliminates jail time for those caught in possession of up to 30 grams of marijuana, though such possession will remain illegal and carry a requirement of mandatory counselling and/or community service (News Room Guyana, 2022).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: Although it did not meet the inclusion criteria for PMAD, indigenous groups faced issues of discrimination in which the government prioritized mining projects over their land rights, and many areas faced economic losses (Coto, 2023; IWGIA, 2023).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: In December 2023 Venezuelan President Maduro announced a plan to take control of the region of Essequibo in Guyana, which was approved in a referendum (Taylor, 2024). Since then, hundreds of people living in the majority Indigenous region have fled out of fear of impending violence (Gabay, 2024; Netto and Montilla, 2024; UNHCR, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Haiti

Since the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gang violence in Haiti has become so extreme that the president of the neighboring Dominican Republic has characterized the situation as a “low-intensity civil war” (Dominican Today, 2022). Backed by political parties and funded by government “contracts,” rival gangs routinely commit mass atrocities against Haitian civilians, particularly in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, 60 percent of which is reportedly under gang control (Mistler-Ferguson, 2022; United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022a).

Haitian police forces are also perceived to have committed atrocities, including excessive force against protestors, illegal pretrial detentions, and torture (U.S. Department of State, 2022). There have been multiple reports of state violence against journalists, including disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and killings (Associated Press, 2021). In September 2022, police injured several dozen demonstrators, with allegations that officers had used live ammunition in their efforts to disperse crowds (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b).

According to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), local populations in Haiti are no longer “collateral victims” of gang violence (2022b). Rather, gangs “deliberately kill, injure and commit acts of sexual violence during coordinated attacks to expand territorial control” (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b). Within a three-week period in April and May 2022, gang violence in northwest Port-au-Prince killed at least 94 residents, wounded more than 120, and forced an estimated 16,000 to flee their homes (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022c). Gang members used rape as a weapon of terror against dozens of women and girls, some as young as 10 years old (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022c). Kidnapping has also remained rampant, with 877 abductions recorded between January and August 2022 (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b). Between July 7 and August 5, 2022, gang violence in the Cité Soleil commune in Port-au-Prince saw 221 killed and 183 wounded (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b). At least 57 women were raped by gang members, with BINUH reporting that sexual violence was being used as a tool to instill fear and “humiliate, control and displace populations” (United Nations, 2022b). Amid the summer violence, more than 3,886 residents fled Cité Soleil (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b).

The situation in Haiti degraded further in September 2022 when Prime Minister Ariel Henry announced an end to government fuel subsidies, triggering a new wave of atrocities that has seen the country’s largest gangs directly challenging the authority of the state (Milfort et al., 2022). Led by former policeman Jimmy “Barbeque” Chérizier, the G9 federation of gangs took control of key infrastructure installations, including Port-au-Prince’s international port (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, 2022b). As of October 2022, the total number of Port-au-Prince residents displaced by gang violence reached an estimated 96,000 (International Organization for Migration, 2022). In mid-October, more than 71 people were killed, a dozen women were raped, and hundreds of residents forced to flee due to gang violence in the Croix-des-Bouquets region of Port-au-Prince (United Nations, 2022a). LGBTQI+ persons are also targeted by armed gangs, who reportedly use “corrective rape” and public sexual violence to humiliate their victims, especially LGBTQI+ women (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

In October 2022, the security situation in Haiti became so dire that Prime Minister Henry authorized a request for a foreign military intervention to open aid corridors through gang-controlled territory (Osborn, 2022). In November 2022, after nearly two months under gang control, Haiti’s largest fuel terminal was finally retaken by state security forces (Karadeglija, 2022). However, the country continues to face severe shortages of fuel and clean water, which have precipitated a resurgence of cholera that has already struck thousands (United Nations, 2022a).

Note that some of the instances of gang violence described above may be excluded from PMAD. Only those that meet the definitional inclusion criteria—particularly that actions must come with the intent of destroying a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, political, or other cohesive group with a common, widely recognized identity, or intimidating said group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival—are coded in the data.

New for June 2023 release: Gang violence continues to intensify, with men, women, and children deliberately targeted by rooftop snipers (United Nations, 2023). In February 2023, the Baz Gran Grif gang killed at least 69 people and injured 83 during the takeover of numerous communities in central Haiti (Associated Press, 2023). Experts note the political dimensions to Haiti’s endemic gang violence: “Since the 1980s, all prior administrations ... as well as rival politicians, tolerated and used the gangs for their purposes, including to intimidate opposition, justify their policies, and collect money and votes” (Felbab-Brown, 2023).

In the Cité Soleil neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, gangs are reportedly using “hunger as an instrument of criminal governance,” with 65 percent of residents experiencing food insecurity and 5 percent on the verge of death from starvation and disease (Nino, 2023). According to some analysts, the gangs, which “obey an overarching criminal structure,” have “facilitated the construction of a criminal federal state” (Nino, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for April 2024 release: Given that several Haitian gangs, including G9 and Gpep coalition, now control substantial territory, we have begun to include their violence against rival social groups and government officials/supporters. This explains much of the spike in PMAD index values from 2022 to 2023. By the end of 2023, thousands of Haitians has been killed, kidnapped, or otherwise victimized by gang violence, largely in and around Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince (UN, 2023). The Bwa Kale movement and other vigilante groups have also extrajudicially executed hundreds of suspected gang members throughout the year (Nkala, 2023). Social violence extended beyond direct participants in the de facto civil conflict in Haiti, with families, especially women and children, being killed and kidnapped (UNICEF, 2023).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for June 2024 release: From January through March 2024, roughly 1,500 civilians have been murdered by gangs, injuring 800 others, and displacing roughly 50,000 people (HRW, 2024). Roughly 100,000 have been forcibly displaced between March and May 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024).

While gang violence is not typically included in PMAD, given that gangs now control regions with a population of roughly 2.7 million people (UN, 2024), they have become de facto political actors. “Self-defense brigades” have targeted the suspected gang members by their social identity, reported lynching more than 500 individuals in 2023 and roughly 60 in the first three months of 2024 (OHCHR, 2024).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: In late June 2024, 400 Kenyan police officers were sent to Haiti to help local police reduce gang violence (Daras, Aradi, and Fletcher, 2024). However, violence has continued, especially outside the capitol, and in July gangs attacked the town of Ganthier, which resulted in the

destruction of a police station and the murder, torture, and displacement of an unknown number of residents (Adams and Paultre, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Holy See

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Honduras

Note that, per the PMAD inclusion criteria, many events have been excluded from the data given that actions by perpetrators have not clearly targeted particular social, cultural, ethnic, political or other groups based on their group status. Transnational gangs like MS-13 and Calle 18 are responsible for the majority of violence and displacement occurring in Honduras during recent years, much of which appears to be indiscriminate rather than targeted at particular groups. These gangs engage in drug trafficking, homicide, and extortion.

Since 2018, more than 150,000 Hondurans have been forcibly displaced due to violence and insecurity stemming from these gangs (UNHCR, 2022). Since this same period, more than ten migrant caravans have left for other parts of Central America to help over 25,000 Hondurans escape (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

Protests erupted after the 2017 national elections and were met with a state of emergency. As a result of these clashes between authorities and protestors, at least 22 civilians were killed and over 1,300 people were arbitrarily detained and held in military detention centers (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Testimonies from those arrested point to the use of torture and ill-treatment by security forces. In 2018, the Public Ministry reported more than 50 cases of arbitrary detention and arrests (U.S. Department of State, 2018). The following year, this number rose to 307 arbitrary or unlawful murder by security forces. 2019 also saw more protests, this time against the approval of regulations to restructure health and education systems (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Although the regulations were repealed in April, the protests continued and resulted in a brutal crackdown between March and July of 2019. At least six people died, 80 were injured, and 48 were arbitrarily arrested (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

LGBTQ+ individuals have suffered severe levels of violence and discrimination in recent years, sometimes forcing individuals to flee their homes due to targeted violence based on their gender identity or sexual orientation. In 2018, the government approved legislation that would reduce the freedoms of same-sex couples by barring them from adopting children (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Widespread discrimination also contributes to the forced internal displacement of LGBTQ+ individuals. During the first half of 2019, at least 26 LGBTQ+ individuals were killed. Women are also targets of gendered and sexual violence (U.S. Department of State, 2019). By August of 2021, 174 femicides had been reported in Honduras. Women suffer disproportionate levels of violence, with Honduras having the second highest level of femicide in Latin America (UNHCR, 2022). Note, however, that non-group-perpetrated actions are

excluded from the PMAD Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic. Instead, violence against women and LGBTQI+ individuals are coded in variables that are separate from the ASSH index.

Indigenous communities are another vulnerable population. Reports of death threats and violence against these groups have been continuous. Many confrontations between indigenous groups and gangs or police forces have occurred from conflicts over land and natural resources. Indigenous peoples and Afro-Honduran communities experience labor, education, housing, and health discrimination (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Instances of forced displacement usually resulted from gang violence and threats. Children are often targets of gang activity, causing high rates of homelessness and displacement for minors. Casa Alianza estimates more than 15,000 children are living on the streets due to death threats for not paying extortion, forced gang recruitment, or family member's involvement in the drug trade (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Most recently in 2022, Honduran president Xiomara Castro declared a 30-day lifting of constitutional rights for citizens in certain parts of Honduras with high levels of gang activity and violence (France24, 2022). The lifting of rights allowed police to arbitrarily arrest individuals suspected of gang activity without the need of a warrant (France24, 2022). The police raids affected 89 districts in the capital city of Tegucigalpa and 73 districts in San Pedro Sula (France24, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: Violence continued, with 957 murders recorded in 2023 and extortion still prevalent (International Crisis Group, 2023). A number of recent reports illustrated that women, LGBT+ people and journalists were particularly targeted: 130 femicides were reported between 6 Dec-30 April, 194 members of the LGBT+ community were killed between 2017-2022, and 97 journalists have been killed since 2001 (International Crisis Group, 2023). In June 2023, gang violence broke out in a women's prison; the Barrio 18 gang attacked the rival MS-13 gang by shooting at them, dousing them with flammable liquid and burning them, and hacking them with machetes, which resulted in at least 46 deaths (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The state of exception enacted by President Castro in which constitutional rights were lifted in some areas of the country continued throughout 2023 (Neau, 2023), as did significant amounts of gang violence, arbitrary arrest, and discrimination. At least 40 LGBT+ people were killed from January to September 2023, and at least 8 indigenous environmental activists were killed throughout the year (CIVICUS, 2023; Freedom House, 2024).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Hungary

In recent years in Hungary, the Roma people have continued to experience discrimination in basic services like housing, health, and education (U.S. Department of State, 2019). For example, a constitutional amendment in 2018 criminalized homelessness, which disproportionately affects Roma and minority communities (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Roma people have experienced additional marginalization on social and economic fronts as a result of deep societal discrimination and negative perceptions of this community. In 2020, 60 Roma students reported being unlawfully segregated in a primary school (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The governmental Ministry of Human Capacities has a history of removing Roma

children from their families and placing them under state care on grounds of child endangerment and family impoverishment; in 2022, a Budapest lower court ruled that such practices amount to ethnic discrimination against Roma (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

Migrants have also been disproportionately affected by discriminatory policies. Hungarian law allows for individuals to seek asylum, but migrants who attempt to enter the country are reportedly afforded little or no opportunity to apply for asylum. Police have been pushing back against migrants on the Serbian borders since 2017, often leaving them to face life-threatening conditions (U.S. Department of State, 2019). In 2019, Hungarian police limited the ability of asylum seekers to enter the country, only giving access to one or two families per week (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The government continued its policies of denying food to asylum seekers on the Hungarian-Serbian border. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 72,000 pushbacks experienced by asylum seekers on the border were illegal, as collective expulsion is prohibited under international law (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Violent pushbacks to Serbia have reportedly continued into 2022, with over 90,000 allegedly unlawful pushbacks registered in the first eight months of the year (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

New for June 2023 release: In 2023, Hungary's Constitutional Court upheld a 2020 law that bans transgender and intersex individuals from legally changing their gender, which human rights observers say places those individuals at risk of discrimination and violence when using identity documents (Human Rights Watch, 2023b).

– *Kerent Benjumea, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Discrimination against LGBT people increased as Prime Minister Viktor Orban banned books and films related to homosexuality in schools. A march in July 2023 to protest the law had a large turnout (Gyori, 2023).

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

New for September 2024 release: On August 21st, a Hungarian law came into effect which revoked the housing support provided to 120 Romani asylees from Ukraine. They are currently homeless, and about 3,000 more Ukrainian refugees are expected to be impacted by the law (ERRC, 2024; Verseck, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Iceland

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Recently, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance reported that there may be a steady increase in anti-Muslim sentiment. However, since 2019, the government has accepted and resettled mostly Syrian and LGBTQ+ refugees, working towards their integration into local communities (U.S. Department of State, 2020). These efforts have been successful, and members of these communities receive services from the government (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

– *Kerent Benjumea*

Last updated: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

India

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, tensions have intensified between India's Hindu majority and Muslim minority (Shih, 2022). In February 2021, after several months of peaceful protest against government measures that are perceived as anti-Muslim, Delhi erupted in Hindu-Muslim violence that left 53 people dead, 40 of them Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Police were criticized for failing to stop the violence, with allegations that some officers actively partook in the clashes (Masih, 2021).

India has for decades stationed more than half a million soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian-controlled portion of the contested Himalayan territory of Kashmir (Al Jazeera, 2021a). In August 2019, the Modi government revoked the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and split the region into two federally governed territories, thereby dissolving India's only Muslim-majority state (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Masih, 2021). A week prior, thousands of Kashmiris were allegedly put in "preventative detention" to help forestall a backlash (Al Jazeera, 2021a). In Kashmir and elsewhere, the Indian government has continued to make sweeping use of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), a vaguely worded anti-terror law that allows the state to detain people indefinitely without trial (Al Jazeera, 2021a).

Within Kashmir, 2022 has also seen reports of the forced displacement and mass containment of Hindus, many of whom returned to the region decades after they were displaced by militants in the 1990s (Kumar, 2022). Hundreds of families fled Kashmir in mid-2022 amid ongoing attacks against Kashmiri Hindus, also known as Pandits (Kumar, 2022). These attacks are widely seen as retaliation for Modi's decision to revoke the region's autonomy (Kumar, 2022). Many Pandits live in residential colonies known as transit camps, and since the Indian government has hailed the return of Kashmir's Hindu minority as a success story, government forces have reportedly locked down camps and barred exits in order to prevent Hindu residents from leaving the region (Kumar, 2022).

In recent years, several states have criminalized "forced" religious conversions as part of a Hindu nationalist campaign against "love jihad," a derogatory term referring to Muslim men who seek to marry Hindu women and convert them to Islam (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Such anti-conversion laws have been criticized both for their Islamophobic tenor and for restricting the agency of women (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Loose interpretations of what constitutes "forced" conversion have also been used to target other religious minorities (Freedom House, 2022). In January 2021, for instance, members of a Hindu nationalist group allegedly beat Christian worshippers in Uttar Pradesh and threatened to kill them if they did not chant Hindu prayers, after which the police arrested the Christian pastor and four others on charges of forced conversion (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Discrimination also continues against the Dalits, or Scheduled Castes, formerly known as Untouchables (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). While Dalits are protected under the law, violence and other forms of discrimination remain widespread (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In some schools, Dalit children were

reportedly denied admission, barred from morning prayers, forced to clean toilets, segregated from upper-caste children, and denied midday meals (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Dalit women are perceived to be disproportionately affected by gender-based violence, and for women in general, marital rape is not illegal when the woman is older than 15 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Roughly 70 to 90 percent of women in the Dawoodi Bohra Muslim community are estimated to undergo female genital mutilation/cutting (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Dowry disputes remain a major source of violence against women, with 6,753 dowry-related deaths reported in 2021 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In one instance, a young woman whose family was unable to afford a dowry died after her husband and in-laws forced her to drink acid (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Young girls from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are vulnerable to exploitation under the *devadasi* system of symbolic marriages to Hindu deities, which reportedly amounts to ritual prostitution and sexual violence at the hands of priests and temple patrons (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In 2021, accusations of witchcraft, which are primarily leveled against women, led to 68 reported deaths (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The government has reportedly engaged in coerced abortions and involuntary sterilizations, particularly when the woman in question is poor or lower-caste; in some regions, authorities allegedly impose quotas for female sterilizations (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Though same-sex relationships were decriminalized in 2018, India's LGBTQI+ community continues to report pervasive discrimination and violence, particularly in rural areas (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The hijra community, which includes transgender and intersex people, occupies a special place in Hinduism, though its members face discrimination and sexual exploitation (Gettleman, 2018). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD's Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD's Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

Since cows are considered sacred in Hinduism, most Indian states have laws that restrict bovine slaughter (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Such laws primarily affect Muslims and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes that traditionally consume beef, and they remain flashpoints for communal violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Amid a rise in so-called cow vigilantism, Muslims accused of slaughtering or smuggling cows have been subject to increasing levels of violence, including beatings and lynchings (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Escalating rhetoric among Hindu nationalist groups has raised concerns that India's Muslim population may be at risk of ethnic cleansing. At a Hindu gathering in 2021, participants drew inspiration from the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, with one saying, "Like Myanmar, the police, politicians, the army and every Hindu in India must pick up weapons and do this cleansing. There is no other option left" (Al Jazeera, 2021b).

New for June 2023 release: Since December 2022, Hindu vigilantes in Chhattisgarh state in eastern India have beaten and forcibly displaced hundreds of Christian converts (Shih et al., 2023). Motivated by the anti-Christian rhetoric of local politicians, Hindu nationalist mobs have damaged and destroyed churches in dozens of indigenous Indian villages (Shih et al., 2023). In addition to attacks on Christian churches, concerns have also been raised about anti-Muslim mass erasure: in mid-January, authorities in Uttar

Pradesh reportedly destroyed a 500-year-old mosque “under the pretext of widening the public road” (Middle East Monitor, 2023).

In early February, authorities in Jammu and Kashmir reportedly demolished homes and properties that had allegedly “encroached” on state land in at least four districts (Amnesty International, 2023; Press Trust of India, 2023). According to an Amnesty International spokesperson: “The ongoing demolitions appear to be an extension of the brutal human rights violations the region of Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim majority region of India, has historically witnessed. These demolitions could amount to forced evictions which constitute a gross violation of human rights” (Amnesty International, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: In July 2023, a video was released documenting two women being paraded naked by a mob in the northeastern state of Manipur, hit by violent ethnic clashes, which sparked international outrage and protests (Mollan, 2023). Although the event did not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion, it spotlights the prevalence of gender-based violence and the failure of the state to convict perpetrators (Mollan, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for April 2024 release: In the second half of 2023, more than 80 people were killed in ethnic clashes in India’s Manipur state (Hussain, 2023). Between May 3 and December 4, some reports are as high as “at least 180” killed, with “tens of thousands of others” displaced following conflicts between “the majority Meitei group and the minority Kuki-Zo community over sharing government benefits and quotas.” (Al Jazeera, 2023). Violence against non-Hindu peoples also appeared to increase in 2023, with hundreds of attacks reported against Christians widespread discriminated and physical violence against Muslims (Kumar, 2023; Sharma, 2023). The developments have occurred alongside an uptick in anti-Muslim hate speech (EFE, 2024) and a soon-to-be-enacted citizenship law that will offer citizenship to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian believers who have sought refuge in India from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, or Pakistan (BBC, 2024). Notably, it excludes Muslim refugees.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for June 2024 release: Ethnic conflict continued in India’s Manipur state, with Kuki militants reportedly killing several and abducting 75 Meitei women, who were later freed by security forces in May. Meitei militants also reportedly killed and abducted several Kuki individuals (Crisis Watch, 2024).

There was also widespread political violence in the lead-up to India’s national election, with “reports of attacks on minorities, media and civil society,” according to the UN (2024). Meanwhile, Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir have been accused of continuing “systematic campaigns of mass arbitrary detention” to stifle political dissent (Kashmir Law & Justice Project, 2024).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: Following the re-election of the BJP to power at the center a wave of anti-Muslim violence has swept across India, resulting in the lynching of several Muslim men, including the brutal killing of Mohammad Fareed. At least three men were beaten to death, and numerous homes were destroyed on suspicion of beef possession (Sharma, 2024). Junaid and Nasir, two Muslim men, were brutally beaten and burned alive by Hindu extremists (Warsi, 2024).

Muslims, who make up over 200 million of the population, have increasingly faced discrimination, hate speech, and violence since the BJP was elected to power. Key incidents include the removal of Kashmir's special autonomy, the passage of a controversial citizenship law excluding Muslims, and the violent Delhi riots in 2019, which disproportionately targeted Muslims. There has been a dramatic increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence, with over 668 cases of anti-Muslim speech documented in 2023 alone. Prominent Hindu nationalist leaders have made inflammatory remarks against Muslims, further fueling tensions. The judiciary and police have been criticized for failing to protect the rights and safety of Muslims, as seen in the ongoing legal battle over the Gyanvapi Mosque in Varanasi, which Hindu nationalists are attempting to reclaim (Mogul, Iyer, Sehgal, Ripley).

An 18-year-old schoolboy named Aryan Mishra was chased for 30 kilometers and shot dead by cow protection vigilantes in Faridabad, Haryana, on 23 August. The vigilantes, suspecting him of cattle smuggling, pursued his car and opened fire, killing him after mistaking him and his friends for smugglers (Singh, 2024). A migrant worker from West Bengal, Sabir Malik, was allegedly beaten to death by cow vigilantes in Haryana's Charkhi Dadri district on August 27, 2023, over suspicions that he had eaten beef. Seven people, including two minors, have been arrested in connection with the incident. The accused lured Malik to a shop under false pretenses, assaulted him, and later took him to another location where the beating continued, resulting in his death (De, 2024).

A 72-year-old man named Haji Ashraf Munyar was assaulted by a group of over a dozen men on the Dhule-CSMT Express in Maharashtra after they accused him of carrying beef. The incident came to public attention when a video of the physical and verbal assault went viral on social. A preliminary investigation revealed that Munyar was carrying buffalo meat, which is not banned in the state. The Government Railway Police (GRP) in Thane registered an FIR against the attackers following the video's circulation (Sah, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Indonesia

Recent years have seen an intensification of armed conflict in the region of West Papua, which Indonesia annexed via a disputed referendum in 1969 (Condon, 2022). Due to migration from other parts of the country, non-Papuan now “dominate the local economy and politics,” while indigenous West Papuans bear the brunt of the ill effects from mining and deforestation activities (Condon, 2022).

In December 2018, West Papuan separatists killed 19 employees of a state-owned construction firm, touching off a wave of violence between state security forces and pro-independence groups that has displaced an estimated 40,000 people (Attwell, 2018; United Nations, 2022). According to Genocide Watch, the Indonesian army has committed systematic atrocities against West Papuans that “amount to genocide,” with security forces reportedly responsible for the illegal killings of at least 84 civilians between 2018 and March 2021 (Condon, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Between April and November 2021, UN Special Rapporteurs “received allegations indicating several instances of extrajudicial killings, including of young children, enforced disappearance, torture and inhuman treatment and the forced displacement of at least 5,000 indigenous Papuans by security forces” (United Nations, 2022). The former chief of Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency has gone so far as to suggest that “two million Papuans should be resettled away from their homeland so that they would be ‘racially separate from the Papuans in Papua

New Guinea’ and feel more Indonesian” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Human rights abuses have also been attributed to separatist forces (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In October 2022, local media reported that as many as 6,000 residents had evacuated from parts of Southwest Papua due to separatist attacks (West Papua Daily News, 2022).

Indonesian police have conducted a number of mass arrests in recent years. In March 2021, police arrested 46 persons at a protest in Bali Province against the Indonesian government’s extension and revision of Papua’s special autonomy—a measure widely criticized by West Papuans who see it as furthering the region’s militarization and marginalization (U.S. Department of State, 2022; CIVICUS, 2021). In May 2021, 146 were arrested in West Papua at another protest against the revision of Papua’s special autonomy (U.S. Department of State, 2022). As with the March protest, authorities maintained that the arrests were for violations of Covid-19 protocols (U.S. Department of State, 2022) In August 2021, at yet another protest against the revision of Papua’s special autonomy, police arrested 48 and reportedly opened fire on demonstrators (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

In March 2021, an armed group injured 28 residents in Jakarta while conducting a forcible eviction; the land in question was subject to a dispute between residents and a state-owned enterprise, and police allegedly did nothing to stop the violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In February 2022, 67 villagers, including 13 children, were arrested in Central Java after clashing with police over a proposed mining project; rights groups have alleged that the police used excessive force, causing some villagers to reportedly flee their homes (Jong, 2022). In May 2022, security personnel from an agricultural company injured dozens of residents in North Sumatra during clashes over the company’s plan to plant eucalyptus trees on the local indigenous community’s customary land (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In November 2022, at least 26 students were reportedly arrested in Lombok for demonstrating against the G20 summit held in neighboring Bali (Muthiariny, 2022).

Indonesia is predominantly Sunni Muslim, and the country’s religious minorities, including Ahmadiyah and Shia Muslims, continue to endure discriminatory regulations that make it difficult for them to build houses of worship (Freedom House, 2022). In Aceh Province, which has special authority to implement Sharia law, consensual same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by lashes or imprisonment (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In January 2021, two men were caned 77 times each after a vigilante mob raided their apartment and allegedly caught them having sex (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In addition to LGBTI+ groups, women also face reduced citizenship and discrimination. Indonesian law “states that women’s work outside the home must not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and educating the younger generation,” and women must obtain their husband’s permission in order to obtain any form of birth control beyond condoms (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In Aceh Province in October 2021, a woman was caned 100 times for sexual relations outside of marriage (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In June 2021, the army officially ended the abusive and invasive practice of “virginity tests” for female police and military recruits (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Female students and teachers have reportedly been pressured or forced to withdraw from school for failing to wear the jilbab (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

In January 2021, hundreds of Rohingya refugees disappeared from a refugee camp in Aceh Province, leading to concerns that they had been smuggled or trafficked to neighboring Malaysia (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

On February 23, 2023, in the Wamena highlands of Papua, two non-Papuan Indonesians were stabbed to death, 10 indigenous Papuans shot dead by security forces, and 20 local residents injured (Brook, 2023). The violence followed allegations that the two non-Papuans had tried to kidnap an indigenous Papuan child; this prompted riots and the burning of shops belonging to non-Papuans, to which the Indonesian Mobile Brigades Corp, a paramilitary force, responded with live gunfire (Brook, 2023).

In March, the United Nations reported “alarming accounts of alleged human rights violations committed by police and military forces” in the region surrounding the Mandalika urban development and tourism project in Lombok, “including excessive use of force to evict and restrict the right to freedom of expression of the Sasak Indigenous Peoples” (United Nations, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Harassment, arrests, and violence against protesters continued. Protesters against illegal deforestation, indigenous erasure, water rights, and elections were targeted. The most significant crackdown was in April 2024 when peaceful protesters gathered to protest militarization in the largely indigenous West Papua region and 77 were arbitrarily arrested with police reportedly using excessive force (Human Rights Monitor, 2024).

In August 2024, thousands of people across the country protested potential changes, which resulted in the arbitrary arrest of over one hundred people, including 78 children (Amnesty International, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Iran

In September 2022, 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini died in the custody of Iran’s morality police after being arrested for violating the country’s strict dress code for women (McGrath, 2022; France 24, 2022). Amini’s death sparked widespread protests that initially focused on women’s rights but have since evolved into broader calls to oust the Shiite clerics that rule the country, including supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Associated Press, 2022; France 24, 2022). Iran’s security forces have responded to the ongoing unrest with mass killings, grossly disproportionate force, mass arrests, and torture.

Since Amini’s death, at least 458 people have been killed nationwide (Bubola, 2022). On September 30, security forces killed more than 90 people during protests in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchistan province (France 24, 2022). On November 4, security forces killed at least 18 people during protests in the city of Khash, also in Sistan-Baluchistan (Amnesty International, 2022a). As of mid-November, it was estimated that roughly a third of those killed in the nationwide protests had been killed in Sistan-Baluchistan, reflecting the government’s longstanding repression of Iran’s ethnic Baluchi minority (France 24, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022a). In February 2021, security forces killed 10 people in Sistan-Baluchistan who had been protesting border restrictions; later that month, the Islamic Revolutionary

Guard Corps, or IRGC—a branch of the Iranian military and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization—killed two more protesters and injured many (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Iran’s ethnic Kurdish minority, which mainly practices Sunni Islam, has also been disproportionately affected by the anti-protest crackdown (OHCHR, 2022; Berger et al., 2022). Amini was herself a Kurd, and the protests sparked by her death first gained momentum in the Kurdistan region (Berger et al., 2022). Much like the Baluchis, the Kurds have long been subjected to repression by Iran’s Shiite government. In early 2021, the IRGC arrested 96 Kurds in the span of less than a month; at least 40 of those arrested were subjected to forced disappearances (U.S. Department of State, 2022). UN experts have also raised concerns about the targeting of women by authorities, given that women and girls have been at the vanguard of the current protest movement since its inception (OHCHR, 2022).

More than 14,000 people have been arrested since the start of unrest in September (Tabrizy et al., 2022). In November, Iran’s parliament urged the judiciary to invoke the death penalty for arrested protesters (OHCHR, 2022). This coincided with a marked uptick in state executions: in the first half of 2022, Iranian authorities executed at least 251 prisoners (Amnesty International, 2022b). At least 26 percent of those executed in this period were Baluchi, despite the fact that the group accounts for only 5 percent of Iran’s population (Amnesty International, 2022b). According to a UN special rapporteur, almost all executions in Iran constitute “an arbitrary deprivation of life” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Iranian authorities have a history of charging political dissidents with vaguely worded crimes that carry the death penalty, including “corruption on earth” and “siding with global arrogance” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Physical, mental, and sexual torture is prevalent within Iranian detention facilities, with recently jailed protesters reporting beatings and rampant ill-treatment (U.S. Department of State, 2022; BBC, 2022).

On October 26, 2022, gunmen attacked the Shia shrine of Shah Cheragh, the country’s second holiest site, killing at least 15 people and wounding dozens more (Associated Press, 2022; The Guardian, 2022). The government blamed the attack on Sunni extremists, and the Islamic State later claimed responsibility (Associated Press, 2022). The attack appears to have been unrelated to the ongoing protest movement (Associated Press, 2022).

In 2021, several protests over water shortages were met with excessive force and mass detentions. In mid-July, protestors in Khuzestan and Lorestan provinces, which both have large ethnic Arab minority populations, protested their lack of clean water; security forces responded with live fire, killing 11, and arrested more than 361 people (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022). In November, similar demonstrations took place in Isfahan province, where security forces responded with tear gas and birdshot and arrested at least 214 people (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Iranian security forces continuously denied the principle of non-refoulement in 2022 by returning Afghan migrants trying to cross the Iran-Afghanistan border, (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Violent pushbacks and unlawful deportations impacted thousands of Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban regime, with an estimated 65% of Afghan migrants being returned (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Women, LGBTQI+ persons, and members of ethnic and religious minorities face widespread discrimination, including lethal violence. “Honor killings” of women remain prevalent, with an estimated 375–450 women killed by male relatives every year, and crimes such as indecency and adultery carry the death penalty (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Same-sex sexual activity is also punishable by death, and LGBTQI+ persons were reportedly pressured into gender-reassignment surgeries by clerics who believed

they were trapped in bodies of the wrong sex (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Ethnic minorities, particularly the Ahwazis, Azeris, and Lors, frequently undergo forced displacement due to government diversion of water resources (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Members of the Baha'i faith are denied religious freedom, regularly detained, and barred from higher education (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In March 2023, the UN released a statement on the “deliberate poisoning of more than 1200 schoolgirls in Iran’s major cities” (United Nations, 2023). The first known poisoning occurred in November 2022; since then, attacks have been reported in 91 schools across 20 provinces, with hundreds of schoolgirls reportedly hospitalized (United Nations, 2023). Though the government has since arrested more than 100 people in connection with the attacks, authorities have tended to downplay their severity; the interior minister, for instance, has dismissed the majority of the poisonings as attributable to “stress” (Tawfeeq et al., 2023; United Nations, 2023). The timing of the attacks has raised concerns that they are intended to punish women for their involvement in the Women, Life, Freedom movement (United Nations, 2023). March also saw Amnesty International release a report on the detention and torture of children—including flogging, electric shocks, and rape—for their involvement in the protest movement (Amnesty International, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Iran executed 853 people in 2023, and at least 249 in the first half of 2024, with victims including those arrested on drug charges, political dissidents, protesters, and members of minority communities (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Iraq

In recent years, the Iraqi government has continued to repress journalists and activists through arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. The government entities involved in violence include the Federal Police, Emergency Response Units, and provincial police called Al Sadma force (or Shock Forces). From October 2019-April 2020, Iraqi security forces violently clashed with political protesters, killing approximately 500 and injuring approximately 6,900 protesters (OHCHR, 2020; BBC, 2019). Security forces have continued targeted violence against activists as protests maintain intermittently (U.S. Department of State, 2021), though many events do not meet the PMAD victim magnitude inclusion threshold. Iraqi Federal Police, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and certain units of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Asayish internal security services reportedly torture detainees and denied them their right to due process (U.S. Department of State, 2021; UN, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Iraqi security forces conduct anti-ISIS operations in which they kill suspected and confirmed ISIS members (International Crisis Group, 2023). In the first half of 2023, over 40 people were killed as a part of a coordinated campaign targeting ISIS (International Crisis Group, 2023). In August 2022, fighting broke out in Baghdad between supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, a prominent political figure leading the Sadrist

Movement, and the Iraqi security forces leaving 30 people dead (Human Rights Watch, 2023). It is also reported that Iran-aligned PMF militia groups engaged in both politically and ethnically motivated violence throughout the country including killing, kidnapping, and extortion (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

ISIS committed acts of genocide and crimes against humanity against women and girls from the Yezidi, Turkman, Christian, and Shabaks minorities in August 2014 (Human Rights Council, 2016). The violence mainly included systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, pregnancy, and abortion of Yezidi women and girls (Human Rights Watch, 2015). As of 2021, over 2,700 Yazidi women remained missing, either by trafficking or death (Freedom House, 2022).

Iraq's penal code enables impunity for male violence against women, including provisions that allow the husband to punish his wife, parents to discipline their children, and mitigated sentences for violent acts including murder for so-called honorable motives (Human Rights Watch, 2023). LGBTQ individuals experience systematic violent targeting because of their sexual orientation. This violence includes killings, abductions, torture, and sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: On May 21, 2023, protesters demanding higher public-sector salaries clashed with security forces in Dhi Qar governorate, leaving 32 injured (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Since the conflict in Gaza, tensions in Iraq have escalated between Iran and ISIS-backed militants, US forces, and expected American supporters. Several US-headquartered businesses were targeted for attacks by people associated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (Zeyad and Chehayeb, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Ireland

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Israel-Palestine

In May 2021, the potential eviction of Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem—which, along with the West Bank, has been occupied by Israel since 1967—led to protests and violence that escalated into widespread intercommunal clashes across Israeli cities with mixed Jewish and Arab populations (Freedom House, 2022a). At the same time, rocket attacks by militant groups in the Gaza Strip—a Palestinian exclave controlled by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization—elicited retaliatory air strikes by the Israeli military (Freedom House, 2022a). During the May 10–21 conflict, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched 1,500 air strikes against targets in Gaza, destroying 1,800 homes, injuring more than 2,200 Palestinians, and killing at least 130 Palestinian civilians (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In Israel, rockets launched

from Gaza killed 13 people and injured 710 (U.S. Department of State, 2022). At its height, the fighting displaced over 113,000 people (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Human rights groups condemned the targeting of Israeli civilians by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as the targeting of civilian infrastructure by the IDF (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In the weeks after a ceasefire was announced, Israeli police made 2,142 arrests as part of a broad operation against those suspected of inciting unrest (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Ninety-one percent of those arrested in the operation were reportedly Arab/Palestinian, and leaders within Israel’s Arab/Palestinian community criticized the operation as an attempt to intimidate the country’s non-Jewish citizens (U.S. Department of State, 2022). From the start of unrest in May to the end of 2021, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition injured more than 5,700 Palestinians in Beita and Beit Dajan in the West Bank (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

According to Freedom House, legal arrangements within the West Bank are “fundamentally discriminatory,” given that Israelis and Palestinians who reside or commit crimes in the West Bank are subject to different courts and laws (2022b). Indeed, a number of NGOs, including B’Tselem and Human Rights Watch, have asserted that conditions within the West Bank amount to apartheid—i.e., the use of systematic oppression to maintain the dominance of Jews over Arabs (Freedom House, 2022b). In 2018, Israel’s legislature passed the Nation-State Law, which, in addition to promoting Jewish settlement, recognized the right to national self-determination as “unique to the Jewish people” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). One NGO claimed that the law “enshrined Jewish supremacy and racial segregation,” while another accused it of relegating Arabs/Palestinians to second-class citizenship (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

In recent years, the Israeli state has stepped up its promotion of Jewish settlement in the West Bank, accompanied by seizures of Palestinian land and the demolition of Palestinian homes (Freedom House, 2022b). In 2021, Israeli authorities demolished 902 Palestinian structures in the West Bank, resulting in the displacement of 1,203 people (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In May 2022, Israel’s highest court gave the military permission to permanently evict more than 1,000 Palestinians from Al-Markaz village in the West Bank (Hendrix et al., 2022). Israeli authorities maintain roughly 600 permanent obstacles in the West Bank, and while Israeli settlers are often allowed to move about unhindered, Palestinians are routinely delayed or turned away at military checkpoints (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In September 2021, 40 Israeli settlers attacked the Palestinian village of Um Faggarah in the West Bank (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Eight Palestinians were injured, including a three-year-old boy who was sleeping when an Israeli settler dropped a rock on his head and fractured his skull (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The IDF responded to the violence with tear gas and rubber bullets, injuring an additional 20 Palestinians (U.S. Department of State, 2022). 2022 was reportedly the deadliest year on record for Palestinians in the West Bank, with 147 Palestinians killed as of December 21 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In a single three-month reporting period, 32 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces and 311 injured during demonstrations and clashes (Associated Press, 2022). During the same period, 25 Israeli civilians were injured by Palestinians (Associated Press, 2022). The current surge of violence began in spring 2022 when a series of Palestinian attacks killed 19 people in Israel (Associated Press, 2022).

Israel’s de facto blockade of the Gaza Strip—which restricts the movement of over 2 million Palestinians—continues to impose serious hardship on Gazan civilians, and Israeli forces frequently use violent methods to disperse demonstrations at the Gaza-Israel border (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Freedom House, 2022c). In 2021, Israeli forces killed at least four Gazans and injured some 140 during demonstrations at

the border (Freedom House, 2022c). During a three-day period in August 2022, Israeli forces conducted a series of airstrikes against targets in Gaza, killing 49 Palestinians, while Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired hundreds of rockets at Israeli population centers (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In total, 360 Palestinians and 70 Israelis were injured during the escalation (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Within Gaza, Hamas criminalizes sexual acts that are “against the order of nature,” and LGBTQI+ persons are reportedly harassed and detained (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

In February 2023, Palestinian officials reported that at least 10 Palestinians were killed at more than 100 injured during a raid by Israeli security forces in the West Bank (Brader, 2023). Days later, a Palestinian gunman reportedly killed two Israeli settlers, after which Israeli settlers set fire to Palestinian cars and homes, resulting in dozens of injuries and the death of one Israeli American (Brader, 2023).

In April, Israeli authorities entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex (also known as the Temple Mount) and forcibly removed a number of Palestinians who were barricaded inside, injuring 50 Palestinians and arresting 350 in the process (Ott, 2023); militants in Gaza and Lebanon retaliated by firing rockets into Israel, to which the IDF responded with airstrikes in Gaza (United Nations, 2023). This touched off several weeks of violence that saw 17 Palestinians killed and over 200 injured in the West Bank by Israeli security forces and settlers, while four Israeli civilians were killed and 31 injured by Palestinians (United Nations, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: During June and July 2023, violence between the Israeli forces and Palestinian militants intensified in the West Bank (International Crisis Group, 2023). Israeli forces conducted over 500 raids that killed at least 19 Palestinians (bringing total killed in 2023 to at least 165). Notably, rare house demolition by Israeli forces in Ramallah 7-8 June triggered clashes that injured at least 35 (International Crisis Group, 2023). During July, violence continued across West Bank and Israel, killing at least 27 Palestinians and one Israeli (International Crisis Group, 2023). Israeli forces raided Jenin, claiming to target “terrorist infrastructure”, killing 12 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier (by friendly fire), injuring over 140, and displacing 500 families (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Hamas’s raid into southern Israel killed about 1,200 civilians, primarily Israeli Jews as well as migrant workers, taking more than 200 hostage (BBC, 2024). Since then, Israeli Defense Forces have embarked on an extensive counter-campaign into Gaza. With tens of thousands of Gazan women and children dead since – including in attacks that have included an airstrike that included more than 100 civilian deaths for one Hamas high-value target (HRW, 2024) – experts have warned of possible ethnic cleansing of Palestinians (UN, 2023). These claims have supported by disproportionate civilian casualties in Gaza as well as Israeli government plans to take cleared land in Gaza, where 70 percent of buildings have reportedly be destroyed, and transform it into what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls the “Gaza-Arish-Sderot Free Trade Zone” (Roche, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: The war continues between Israel and Hamas, with an estimated death toll of 250 per day (Oxfam International, 2024). Israel has been accused of war crimes and genocide by several countries and international agencies due to issues of civilian casualties, famine, closing of borders, restriction of aid, and the targeting of hospitals for airstrikes. Reports have also shown abuse of the over

9,000 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons, including starvation, lack of medical treatment, torture, and severe psychological harm (CNN, 2024).

A press release from the United Nations detailed severe human rights abuses against Palestinian women and girls in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. UN experts reported credible claims of arbitrary executions, including those of family members and children, as well as concerns over arbitrary detention, inhumane treatment, and sexual assault. They also noted the disappearance of women and children, potential forced transfers, and family separations. The UN urged independent investigations, emphasizing that these actions may have violated international humanitarian law, potentially constituting war crimes under the Rome Statute (OHCHR, 2024).

Civil defense workers recovered at least 60 bodies in Shujayea, a neighborhood in northern Gaza City, after a two-week Israeli assault left the area uninhabitable, with 85% of homes destroyed (AlJazeera, 2024). More than 1.9 million people have been displaced to date in Palestine (UNRWA, 2024). Following the Israeli military's relocation orders on July 1, approximately 250,000 people fled Khan Younis, primarily moving to overcrowded western areas and Deir al-Balah (ReliefWeb, 2024). On July 6, 2024, airstrikes in Nuseirat camp killed and injured several IDPs, including children. Since the war began, 453 incidents have impacted UNRWA premises, causing at least 524 deaths and 1,606 injuries (UNRWA, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024

– Updated by Emma Loeber and Avantika Singh

Italy

Muslim faith leaders in Italy have reported difficulties in obtaining government permission to construct mosques, which some attribute to religious discrimination; at the same time, local governments continue to rent out public land “at discounted rates” to non-Muslim groups with plans to construct houses of worship (U.S. Department of State, 2022). However, these events are presently omitted from the PMAD dataset given the lack of clear information that the government’s actions have amounted to reduced citizenship.

Roma people were regularly subjected to discrimination and forced evictions. In May of 2022, local authorities in Rome announced plans to close three informal Roma camps, and several far-right politicians endorsing violence against Roma (Saric, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Camryn Hoelle

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country in 2023. While discrimination against Romani people continued, the number of forced (and apparently arbitrary) evictions fell below the PMAD victim count inclusion threshold for the first time since at least 2018.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: In May 2024, the European Committee of Social Rights, part of the Council of Europe, ruled that Italy had violated the rights of Roma people by discriminating against them and routinely arbitrarily evicting them (ECSR, 2024).

In addition, increasing migration to Italy, especially of asylees, has raised tensions in the country. Thousands of migrants have been placed into detention facilities in Italy with allegedly inhumane conditions, and when in February 20 year old asylee Ousmane Sylla committed suicide in one of the centers, protests occurred that resulted in six other suicide attempts by detainees and 14 arrests (Legorano, 2024; Santos, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Jamaica

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, Jamaica has been host to ongoing discrimination against women and LGBTQI+ persons. Under Jamaican law, marriage implies that there is always sexual consent between husband and wife; consequently, spousal rape is only criminalized under a narrow set of circumstances (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The statute outlawing rape is narrowly restricted to vaginal rape and does not account for other forms of rape (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The government inconsistently enforced the law (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Consensual sexual conduct between men is illegal and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison with hard labor, though enforcement of this law is minimal (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Physical intimacy among men, whether in public or private, is punishable by up to two years in prison under the country's gross indecency laws (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Camryn Hoelle

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Although it did not meet the inclusion criteria for PMAD, Jamaica has experienced an increase in violent crime including homicide, armed robbery, and sexual assault in the past year (Romo, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Japan

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Yet, Japanese law requires that transgender persons be without reproductive capacity, meaning that most transgender persons who wish to have their gender identity legally recognized must undergo surgical sterilization (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Other obstacles to the legal recognition of gender identity for transgender persons include a mandatory diagnosis of “gender identity disorder,” being unmarried, and not having any children younger than 20 (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Jordan

In July 2020, the Jordanian government abruptly suspended the country’s largest teachers’ union, the Jordanian Teachers’ Syndicate (U.S. Department of State, 2021). On July 29, hundreds of teachers and supporters came out in protest in the capital city Amman; in response, police used batons to beat back protestors and made over 600 arrests (U.S. Department of State, 2021). In the years since, mass detentions of Teachers’ Syndicate members and supporters have continued. In August 2021, police arrested about 30 teachers for continuing protest activities (Freedom House, 2022). On March 29, 2022, authorities arrested 132 activists who had been participating in a sit-in at the Ministry of Education Building (DAWN, 2022). Just two days prior, another 31 protestors were arrested for orchestrating a separate sit-in (DAWN, 2022). According to analysts, the ongoing crackdown against the Teachers’ Syndicate is a reflection of government concerns that protests by teachers over wages could exacerbate underlying economic and political frustrations within Jordanian society (Nusairat, 2022).

Jordanian women face various forms of state- and non-state-sanctioned discrimination. Women must obtain the permission of a male guardian in order to marry for the first time, and women cannot travel abroad with their children without the permission of a husband, male guardian, or judge (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Under Jordan’s penal code, a man who has killed or attacked his wife or a female relative is eligible for reduced sentencing if the victim was committing adultery at the time of the attack (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Given the threat posed to women by these so-called honor crimes, Jordanian authorities continue to place at-risk women in “protective” detention until a family member can guarantee their safety (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Societal discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons is also prevalent, with transgender persons particularly vulnerable to violence and sexual assault (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In July 2021, an NGO reported that police had detained 30 visitors under suspicion of “Satan worship,” a claim which is often used to harass LGBTQI+ persons—indeed, authorities later clarified that the group had been conducting “public LGBTQI+ activities” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The government also continues to deny official recognition to certain religious groups, namely Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Large protests have occurred in Jordan since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, with over 1,500 arrested since October 2023- these included arbitrary arrests, a lack of due

process, harassment and violence against the protesters, and selective targeting of protesters based on their membership in opposition parties (Davis, 2024).

Tens of thousands of Palestinians live in Jordan but, depending on when they arrived, are deprived of citizenship and equal rights to those of Jordanians (Vicente Perez, 2024). In 2016, this number was already at 634,182 (Amnesty, 2024).

In August 2023 a new law was enacted to punish citizens who criticized the government online. At least 15 arrests have been made under the new law, and excessive force and arbitrary arrest has been used against those individuals (Amnesty International, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Kazakhstan

In January 2022, demonstrations against rising energy prices escalated into nationwide anti-government protests, with Kazakhstan's largest city, Almaty, emerging as the epicenter of the unrest (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Protesters shouted "*Shal, ket!*" ("Old man, out!") in reference to the country's former leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been succeeded by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019 but was perceived to still be running the country from behind the scenes (Kim, 2023). Within days, police began using tear gas and stun grenades to break up the protests, while unknown individuals began attacking police officers and government buildings (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Approximately 10,000 people were arbitrarily detained during these protests (Human Rights watch, 2023).

Amid widespread confusion over the identities and motives of the violent actors in Almaty, Tokayev declared a state of emergency and requested foreign military assistance in the form of a 2,500-strong Russian peacekeeping force (Kim, 2023). As Tokayev ordered Kazakh troops to "shoot to kill without warning," the use of force against protesters grew increasingly disproportionate (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In total, 238 people were killed in what has since become known as Bloody January, including 19 police officers and six people in police custody (Kim, 2023). Hundreds of people who were detained in relation to the unrest have alleged ill-treatment or torture at the hands of police (Human Rights Watch, 2023). During the chaos, Tokayev replaced Nazarbayev as the head of the country's Security Council, thereby cementing his position as Kazakhstan's undisputed leader (Kim, 2023). "Practically everything else," however, "remains shrouded in secrecy, including who was responsible for the violence and why so many ended up dead" (Kim, 2023).

Kazakh state authorities continue to wage a years-long campaign of non-lethal repression against anti-regime protestors, banned party activists, and other members of civil society (RFE/RL, 2019). The main campaign of extrajudicial punishment, arbitrary detention, torture, and willful neglect has targeted banned opposition party activists, who in recent years have continued to organize rallies aimed at pressuring the Kazakh government to allow more representative political freedoms (Freedom House, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Kazakh police continue to detain activists associated with the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) party, with many being fined or issued short sentences for associating with "unregistered groups" (Amnesty International, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2021; Freedom House, 2022). In 2021, at least 47

people who had criticized the government or supported DVK activities were convicted of so-called “extremist” activity (Amnesty International, 2022). The previous year, the Coalition Against Torture registered 225 complaints of extrajudicial violence from Kazakh citizens who had been arrested and incarcerated for crimes associated with DVK-planned protests and other political activities (Grishin, 2021). Amnesty International has reported that “torture and other ill-treatment” are widespread in Kazakh prisons, and that demonstrators against the regime are routinely subjected to legal and physical punishments while in custody (Amnesty International, 2020). Kazakh police are also known to practice a crowd-control tactic known as “kettling,” in which officers encircle protesters for prolonged periods, sometimes in harsh conditions without food, water, or shelter; human rights observers argue that such tactics amount to arbitrary detention, and possibly even torture in extreme cases (Amnesty International, 2022).

DVK-associated protestors have been routinely abused by police and prison officials, including through neglect and the denial of medical care (U.S. Department of State, 2020). It has been reported that a DVK-linked detainee died in prison due to injuries sustained before and after their arrest, suggesting both torture and intentional neglect (Freedom House, 2020). Along with DVK supporters, journalists covering political rallies have also been arbitrarily detained by police and subjected to abuses, including denial of medical care (Grishin, 2021). As a result, international observers have classified Kazakhstan as a regime with severely limited rights to assembly and expression, focusing in particular on limits to press freedom and retaliatory actions against anyone exercising political dissent directed at the regime of President Tokayev (U.S. Department of State, 2020; Freedom House, 2020). Local officials also continue to harass “nontraditional” religious groups, including Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims who do not follow the government-approved form of Islam (Freedom House, 2022).

The practice of kidnapping women and girls for forced marriage continued in remote areas (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women are not legally protected from sexual harassment and sexual harassment remains a problem (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Also, discrimination against women remains a problem in education, employment, land, and property rights (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Kazakhstan laws do not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families (U.S. Department of State). LGBTQI individuals often faced discrimination, and the lack of legal recognition created obstacles for accessing social support services (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Austin S. Matthews, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Kazakhstan has a history of suppressing protests and opposition. This year the government banned a protest for women’s rights on International Women’s Day (Front Line Defenders, 2024). It also arrested protesters in May who called for a better response to extensive damage caused by floods throughout the country (Rickleton, Trotsenko, and Saparova, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Kenya

Kenya is home to 45 separate ethnic groups, and while none hold a majority, political life in the country has long been dominated by the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Freedom House, 2022). Ethnic conflict in the forms of banditry, land disputes, and cattle rustling are common, particularly in the country's northern, eastern, and Rift Valley regions (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In recent years, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab has continued to target non-Muslims in northeastern Kenya (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Kenyan counterterrorism operations in the region reportedly target Muslims, particularly ethnic Somalis (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In 2021, NGOs reported 168 police killings and 33 enforced disappearances, and alleged that Kenyan forces routinely subjected Muslims and ethnic Somalis to arbitrary detention (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In northern Kenya, settlements for displaced Somalis were targeted by clan violence and involved in resource disputes (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In February 2021, the governmental Kenya Railways Corporation forcibly evicted about 3,500 members of the Muslim Nubian community in Kisumu County (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Despite a court order to halt the evictions, authorities used tear gas to force out the residents; in the process, a child was trapped and killed by debris when a bulldozer brought down their home (Human Rights Watch, 2022). A Kenyan court later ruled the evictions illegal, and activists have described the incident as a case of religious discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has identified multiple instances of violent mass displacement in 2022, including: 728 displacements due to ethnic clashes in Saku; 302 displacements due to communal violence in West Pokot; 146 displacements due to police violence in Marakwet; and 200 displacements in Turkana due to militia violence (2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in various forms. While female genital mutilation/cutting is outlawed in Kenya, the practice remains prevalent in a number of ethnic communities, including the Maasai (78 percent of women ages 15–49), Samburu (86 percent), and Somali (94 percent) (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Consensual same-sex sexual conduct is illegal and carries a maximum prison sentence of 14 years (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

March 2023 saw a series of violent clashes during demonstrations against President William Ruto; the protestors, many of them supporters of the opposition leader Raila Odinga, accused Ruto of stealing the previous year's election and criticized his perceived failure to stem a cost-of-living crisis (Rédaction Africanews et al., 2023). Protesters reportedly threw rocks, burned tires, and set fire to a political office; security forces allegedly responded with tear gas, water cannons, and occasional live fire (Rédaction Africanews et al., 2023; Mersie, 2023). At least two civilians were killed, 85 civilians and 51 police officers injured, and more than 200 people arrested, including opposition politicians (Rédaction Africanews et al., 2023; Schulze, 2023). Amid concerns that the protests could devolve into ethnic violence, an Odinga spokesperson has accused the president's party of engaging in "ethnic profiling" by assuming that certain rioters are naturally Odinga supporters because of shared ethnicity (Rédaction Africanews et al., 2023; Mersie, 2023).

In late April, more than 100 bodies, most of them children, were discovered in mass graves in a southeast Kenyan forest that serves as the home of the Good News International Church, a millennial cult (Miriri, 2023). The cult's leader allegedly ordered his adherents to starve themselves and their children to death

in preparation for the impending end of the world (Miriri, 2023). Over 400 people remain missing in the surrounding area (Miriri, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Protests led by the opposition and supporters of Raila Odinga continued in July 2023 after the government raised fuel and energy taxes in late June. Police responded with a heavy hand, leaving over 20 people dead and amounting to over 300 arrests (International Crisis Group, 2023). In western counties, inter-communal violence broke out when supporters of Ruto Kalenjin and supporters of Raila Odinga violently clashed, killing three and injuring dozens (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In late June protests erupted over proposed tax increases and the government cracked down, resulting in 39 deaths, 361 injured, 32 forced disappearances, and 627 arrests (The Guardian, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Emma Loeber*

Kiribati

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, women and LGBTQI+ persons face various forms of legal discrimination in Kiribati. Laws pertaining to land inheritance and citizenship often discriminate against women; for instance, only fathers can confer nationality to their children (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Consensual same-sex sexual conduct between men is illegal and carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, though the law in question has not been enforced for many years (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– *Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Korea, Republic of

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Yet, South Korea's military criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduct among servicemen, with a maximum punishment of up to two years' imprisonment (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Given that the country requires young men to complete mandatory military service, NGOs have criticized the relevant clause of the Military Criminal Act as provoking widespread discrimination and violence against LGBTQI+ persons (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In April 2022, the supreme court reversed the prior convictions

of two servicemen who had engaged in consensual sexual activity while off-duty; the court's decision has raised hopes that the government may do away with the military's "indecent acts" clause altogether (Amnesty International, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Discrimination against migrants and refugees in South Korea has resulted in their illegal arrest. Park Jin-jae, member of the far-right Liberty Unification Party, led a private group, called the Citizen's Protection Solidarity group, in illegally harassing, detaining, and bringing in for arrest dozens of migrants (Gyu-hyun, 2024). He is currently under investigation for making illegal arrests.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Kosovo

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, ethnic and religious tensions persist between Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, which is predominately Muslim, and the country's ethnic Serb minority, which is predominantly Serbian Orthodox (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Visoki Decani, a Serbian Orthodox monastery located in Deçan/Decani municipality, is a particular source of tension: in a 2016 ruling by Kosovo's constitutional court, Visoki Decani was awarded ownership of a plot of land that was confiscated from the monastery by Yugoslav-era authorities, yet local Kosovar authorities have yet to return the land (Haxhijaj, 2022). In June 2021, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) reported that Kosovar police had stopped a bus of Serb pilgrims and forced the bus to return to Serbia without explanation, an incident which the SOC said amounted to religious discrimination (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In December 2022, tensions flared up in the country's north, where Serb protesters blocked roads and exchanged gunfire with Kosovar police in the wake of the arrest of a Serb former policeman (Kennedy, 2022). While no injuries were reported, the incident has raised concerns over the potential for more widespread ethnic violence.

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Kuwait

Kuwait is home to the Bidoon, a stateless Arab group that numbers an estimated 100,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Though the Bidoon were present in Kuwait at the time of the state's founding in 1961, the government regards them as illegal residents (Human Rights Watch, 2022). As a result, the Bidoon face widespread discrimination, including travel restrictions, a prohibition on peaceful demonstration, and a ban on real estate ownership (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Bidoon

detainees frequently report torture and abuse at the hands of state authorities (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons are also subject to violence and discrimination in various forms. The country's personal status laws discriminate against women in matters of marriage, divorce, and child custody; for example, women must obtain a male relative's permission in order to marry (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The law also permits men to commit violence against women with near-impunity (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Under Kuwait's penal code, a man who kills a female relative whom he caught in "an unsavory sexual act" (e.g., extramarital sex) can be punished by no more than three years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Similarly, a man who attempts to kill, rape, or otherwise harm a woman can avoid punishment if he marries the victim (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Same-sex sexual conduct between men is illegal, and transgender persons report arbitrary detention and abuse, including blackmail and rape, by police (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD's Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD's Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

Migrant workers, most of whom come from South Asia and other Arab countries, make up about 70 percent of Kuwait's population (Freedom House, 2022). These workers are highly vulnerable to abuse via the kafala system of sponsored employment, in which workers need their employers' permission in order to change jobs or leave the country (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Robinson, 2022). In certain cases, kafala may facilitate atrocities such as mass containment; many experts consider the system to be a form of modern-day slavery (Fanous, 2022). Foreign male workers also face forced evictions to make room for citizen families, with authorities blaming ills such as crime and traffic on unmarried foreign workers (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Shiite Muslims make up a third of Kuwait's citizen population, yet they are underrepresented in the political system and are often treated less preferably than Sunnis (Freedom House, 2022). For instance, the government does not allow Shiite clerics to be trained within the country (Freedom House, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: The new emir of Kuwait dissolved the parliament in 2024 and suspended parts of the constitution for at least the next four years (AP News, 2024). Several critics of the move have already been jailed, although numbers are uncertain. Sheikh Meshal has reversed the previous emir's reforms of releasing political prisoners and returning citizenship to opposition members who had had it revoked (Mahmoud Saleh, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Emma Loeber

Kyrgyzstan

Ethnic tensions remain an issue between Kyrgyzstan's ethnic Kyrgyz majority (72 percent of the population) and its ethnic Uzbek minority (14.5 percent) (World Population Review, 2022). Human rights

organizations report that Uzbeks are unfairly targeted and arbitrarily arrested for membership in banned religious organizations—which the government regards as “extremist activity”—and for distributing associated “extremist material” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The first eight months of 2021 saw 77 allegations of police torture; according to one human rights NGO, ethnic Uzbeks are the victims in 51 percent of torture cases—a highly disproportionate figure given their share of the overall population (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In October 2022, Kyrgyzstani law enforcement conducted a mass arrest of nearly 30 people—among them activists, journalists, bloggers, and politicians—on charges of “preparing for riots” (Dzhumashova, 2022; IPHR, 2022). The arrests were aimed at individuals who had publicly disagreed with the government’s upcoming deal to transfer a water reservoir to neighboring Uzbekistan (Sultanalieva, 2022). Those detained were reportedly released after 48 hours (Sultanalieva, 2022).

The traditional practice of bride-kidnapping, though illegal, continues in Kyrgyzstan (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In early April 2021, 27-year-old Aizada Kanatbekova was abducted and later murdered in a highly publicized instance of bride-kidnapping, sparking substantial public outrage (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Later that month, a demonstration by about 30 women’s rights activists in the capital city Bishkek was violently broken up by several dozen men belonging to so-called “national-patriotic” groups (Imanaliyeva, 2021). These counter-protestors falsely claimed that the demonstration was promoting LGBT rights, when the activists had in fact gathered outside the Ministry of Internal Affairs to criticize the government response to Kanatbekova’s killing (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Imanaliyeva, 2021).

LGBTQI+ persons in Kyrgyzstan face violence and discrimination in various forms. Police will reportedly extort gay men by threatening them with violence, arrest, or to out them to their families if they do not pay bribes to the officers (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). There have also been reports of lesbians and bisexual women being forced to marry men, as well as reports of “corrective rape” of lesbians in order to “cure” them of their homosexuality (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). State and societal discrimination also extends to religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses. In March 2021, state security officials raided a Jehovah’s Witnesses office in Bishkek amid allegations that the group was “hypnotizing” people against their will (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Later that year, the UN Human Rights Committee concluded that the government violated the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious rights by denying requests to register congregations in the country’s south (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

New for September 2023 release: In January 2023, police detained dozens of relatives of the 26 politicians and activists who were detained in October 2022 for protesting the border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group, 2023). The relatives were arrested while protesting for the release of jailed politicians and activists at a demonstration in Bishkek (International Crisis Group, 2023). Those detained were released the same day so it was not included in the PMAD dataset (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Camryn Hoelle*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Laos

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, decades-old ethnic tensions continue to simmer in the country. Presently, events do not appear to have met the PMAD inclusion criteria and victim magnitude thresholds; however, this coding is subject to revision as further information becomes available.

During the Vietnam War, Laos's ethnic Hmong minority aligned itself with the United States; under U.S. government direction, Hmong recruits fought a "secret war" against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, the armed branch of what would become today's ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) (Hmong American Center, 2018). After the communist victory in 1975, the Hmong were "hunted down, taken to concentration camps, and persecuted" in a wave of retribution that is estimated to have killed more than 10 percent (35,000) of Laos's Hmong population (Hmong American Center, 2018). Today, the Hmong continue to endure state-sanctioned discrimination, violence, and forced displacement, in part because many Hmong communities occupy areas that are rich in natural resources (UNPO, 2021). The environmental ravages of mining, dam building, and illegal logging have forced many Hmong communities to relocate, as has government persecution (UNPO, 2021). In 2020, a report by ten UN Special Rapporteurs described a pattern of violence against Hmong living in the Phou Bia region, including "indiscriminate attacks . . . enforced and involuntary disappearances, denying access to food . . . and drinking water" (UNPO, 2020). In March 2021, after the government labeled Phou Bia Mountain a "sustainable development tourism site," the Lao People's Army (LPA) launched a renewed campaign against Hmong living in the Phou Bia jungle (UNPO, 2021). The LPA has restricted all civilian access to the region, making it difficult to determine the extent of this most recent campaign against the Hmong (UNPO, 2021). However, the U.S. Department of State maintains that the Lao government's goal is to "remove the Hmong from areas targeted for development and foreign investment projects" (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In 2007, the Lao government granted Chinese casino kingpin Zhao Wei a 99-year lease over the 11.6 square mile Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ), located in northwest Laos near the borders with Thailand and Myanmar (Strangio, 2022; Whong, 2022). The GTSEZ has been described as a "de-facto Chinese colony," with Lao authorities requiring the permission of Wei's casino company in order to operate within the zone (Whong, 2022). In 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Wei as the leader of a transnational criminal organization, stating that his business "exploits this region by engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery and wildlife trafficking" (Whong, 2022). Multiple mass atrocities are perceived to have occurred within the GTSEZ in recent years, including the mass containment and abuse of women and migrant workers. The GTSEZ is a hub for a cyber-scam industry run by Chinese criminal syndicates that "rely on what are essentially bands of indentured slaves"; workers who fail to meet sales targets are "beaten, electrocuted, starved of food and water, and sold to other companies," including brothels in the case of women (Strangio, 2022; Gerin, 2022a). In the year leading up to May 2022, Lao police rescued nearly 500 workers who had been trapped in the GTSEZ, including about 200 women who were victims of human trafficking (Gerin, 2022b). In October 2022, Radio Free Asia reported that around 700 Malaysian migrant workers are being held for ransom by GTSEZ resort managers (Strangio, 2022).

While the Lao constitution provides for religious freedom, Christians reportedly face discrimination and reduced citizenship. All citizens must apply for government permission in order to travel for religious purposes (e.g., to minister or to visit other churches), and Christian groups in particular have reported difficulties in the approval process (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). There have also been reports of rural villagers barring Christians from public cemeteries and threatening Christians or even destroying their homes for refusing to renounce their faith (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). According to church leaders, Christians in Laos need to hide their religion in order to join the LPRP, the government, or the military (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In the area of LGBTQI+ rights, civil society appears to be moving in the direction of widespread acceptance, though a recent government order banning LGBTQI+ beauty pageants has raised concerns that the LPRP may be moving in the opposite direction (Nemeh, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Human rights defenders in Laos are facing severe mistreatment, including summary executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and intimidation, as highlighted by recent UN reports. In a September 2023 press release, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders expressed concern over persistent serious human rights violations in Laos, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, unfair trials, and intimidation of human rights workers. Anousa "Jack" Luangsouphom, a vocal critic of the government, was shot and severely injured in Vientiane. Authorities suggested the attack was linked to personal disputes but provided no investigation details. Other incidents included the murder of Bounsuan Kitiyano, a UNHCR-recognized refugee, in Thailand. Lao and Thai governments were urged to investigate and prevent further violence. Chinese dissidents in Laos faced deportation and subsequent human rights abuses. Yang Zewei, an anti-censorship advocate, was detained in China after disappearing in Vientiane. Similarly, human rights lawyer Lu Siwei was detained in Laos and returned to China despite international calls for his release (Amnesty, 2023; Civicus Monitor, 2023),

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Latvia

Government treatment of migrants has garnered attention from human rights organizations. In August 2021, the Latvian government declared a state of emergency in response to an extraordinary influx of migrants from across the country's border with Belarus (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Along with Lithuania and Poland, which were struggling with similar surges from Belarus, Latvia accused Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko of using the migrants, primarily Iraqis and Afghans, as part of a campaign of "hybrid warfare" meant to pressure the European Union into lifting sanctions it had previously imposed on Belarus (Henley et al., 2021). In declaring a state of emergency, Latvia authorized its security forces to conduct pushbacks at the border, via force if necessary (Henley et al., 2021).

Between August 11 and the end of 2021, Latvian border guards detained 445 persons and prevented more than 3,400 from crossing in from Belarus (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Amnesty International has since released a report alleging numerous human rights abuses by Latvian border guards, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and torture (BBC, 2022). The Amnesty report accuses Latvia of contravening the principle of non-refoulement by suspending the rights of asylum seekers, though Latvia

maintains that its state of emergency gave it the explicit right to do so (Amnesty International, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Latvian officials have rejected Amnesty’s claims of migrant mistreatment as “bogus” and “absurd” (Tanner, 2022). In April 2022, the emergency order was amended to allow asylum applications at one Latvian detention center and at certain border crossings, though the rest of the border with Belarus remains closed to asylum seekers (Amnesty International, 2022b).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Lebanon

In August 2020, a neglected stockpile of ammonium nitrate exploded in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, killing more than 200 people, wounding an estimated 7,000, and destroying some 77,000 apartments (OHCHR, 2022). In the months and years since, the Lebanese government has failed to conduct a satisfactory investigation into the blast; amid the country’s ongoing economic collapse, the Beirut port explosion has become a focal point for public anger at government corruption and incompetence.

In July 2021, protesters gathered outside the residence of the interior minister after he prevented port explosion investigators from questioning of the head of the Directorate of General Security (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Police used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators and allegedly beat some with batons (Chehayeb, 2021). In August 2021, on the one-year anniversary of the blast, protesters in Beirut tried to storm a parliament building; police responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons, injuring dozens (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Al Jazeera, 2021). Less than two weeks later, a fuel tank exploded in northern Lebanon, killing at least 28 people and injuring 79 (Reuters, 2021). Later that day, as protesters gathered outside the prime minister’s residence in Beirut, many blamed the government for the casualties from the fuel tank explosion, arguing that the country’s severe fuel shortage was the reason why so many had been in close vicinity to the tank (Reuters, 2021). As protesters threw stones and reportedly breached the property, police responded with tear gas and allegedly beat some protesters with batons (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Williamson, 2021).

In October 2021, Shia members of Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, and the Amal Movement clashed with Christian supporters of the Lebanese Forces party (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The violence began during a protest by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement against the recent dismissal of the judge in charge of the Beirut port explosion investigation; as the Shia demonstrators marched through Beirut, they came under fire from snipers on rooftops (Qiblawi, 2021). The clash quickly escalated, with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s reportedly used in a neighborhood that includes both Shia and Christian residents (Qiblawi, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022b). By the time the violence subsided, six people were dead and over 30 wounded, with reports that all of those killed were Shias (Perry et al. 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

In January 2021, demonstrators took to the streets of Tripoli to protest the extension of Covid-19 restrictions, resulting in violent clashes with state security forces (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Freedom House, 2022). Authorities allegedly used excessive force, including live ammunition, resulting in the death of one protestor and the injury of 226 (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In the wake of the

violence, authorities arrested 35 individuals on charges ranging from vandalism to terrorism, though all were later released (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Several groups face discrimination in Lebanon, among them women, LGBTQI+ persons, and Syrian refugees. All of Lebanon's recognized religious groups have their own personal status courts for matters pertaining to marriage, child custody, and inheritance, and the majority of these courts favor men; for example, Shia courts automatically give full child custody to the father in the case of divorce, and Sharia courts regard the testimony of one man as equal to the testimonies of two women (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Lebanese law prohibits "sexual intercourse against nature," and LGBTQI+ refugees reportedly suffer abuse from local gangs (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In 2021, a human rights NGO reported 139 instances of arbitrary arrest against Syrian refugees, some of whom reported having their identification documents confiscated by police (Beirut Today, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

New for June 2023 release: In April 2023, Lebanese security forces reportedly arrested dozens of Syrian refugees and drove them directly to the Syrian border, where they were promptly handed over to the Syrian army (Amnesty International, 2023). Since April 2023, there have been allegedly over 100 raids, 2,200 arrests, and 1,800 deportations of Syrian refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2023). According to Amnesty International, such actions violate the principle of non-refoulement by placing the returnees at risk of torture, arbitrary detention, and forced conscription (Amnesty International, 2023; Gebeily, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Since the surge of conflict between Israel and its neighbors in October of 2023, civilians in both Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon have been threatened by the violence. Israeli airstrikes have struck along the border, impacting thousands of civilians. Since October 8th, 2023 more than 83 civilians have been killed, including several children (OCHA, 2024). On May 7th, an Israeli airstrike hit an emergency relief center, killing seven emergency volunteers (Human Rights Watch, 2024). As of May 14th, 2024, more than 90,000 civilians have been displaced within southern Lebanon.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Caitlin Clemens

Lesotho

In May 2022, police officers and members of the Lesotho Defense Forces beat 35 people who had been protesting against power cuts in the district of Thaba-Tseka (Amnesty International, 2022). Meanwhile, women in Lesotho face various forms of discrimination and violence. In rural areas of the country, the government frequently defers to customary laws that disadvantage women in areas pertaining to inheritance, succession, and property rights (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Women are also at risk of forced elopement, a customary practice in which men abduct and rape girls or women with the goal of forcing the victim into marriage (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country in 2023.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Liberia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country from 2018 through 2022.

However, thirty-eight percent of Liberian women ages 15 to 49 are estimated to have undergone female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), with the procedure most prevalent in the country's northern regions (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The primary practitioners of FGM/C are secret societies, including the Sande Society, which incorporate FGM/C into their indoctrination ceremonies (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Liberian law discriminates based on race and sexual orientation. The constitution restricts citizenship and land ownership to persons of "Negro descent," thereby disenfranchising the country's Lebanese and Asian residents, many of whom have lived in the country their entire lives (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Consensual same-sex sexual activity is illegal, with "voluntary sodomy" punishable by up to a year in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In January 2022, armed men attacked a Christian prayer gathering in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, causing a panicked stampede that killed at least 29 people (Timsit et al., 2022). It is unclear whether the attack was religiously motivated: according to a police spokesman, the attackers were attempting to "hijack [the worshippers'] personal effects" (Timsit et al., 2022). As such, this event has been excluded from the PMAD data.

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: While largely peaceful, Liberia's 2023 election saw sporadic violence. For example, Freedom House (2024) reports that "in September, before the first round was held, 2 people died and 20 were injured when CDC (Coalition for Democratic Change) and UP (Unity Party) supporters clashed in Lofa County."

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Libya

Following the NATO-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libyan governance instability intensified into armed conflict, with competition for legitimacy and territorial control leading to a split between eastern and western Libya by 2014 (Geneva Academy, 2022). The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) maintains control over much of western Libya, including Tripoli, while the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, maintains control over much of eastern Libya, including Benghazi (Aljazeera, 2022). A 2019 LNA-aligned offensive to capture Tripoli triggered countermeasures by

the GNA, leading to perceived atrocities and war crimes by both sides. Airstrikes reportedly targeted areas with high civilian concentrations. The armed conflict resulted in over 1,000 civilian deaths and 215,000 internal displacements (Human Rights Watch, 2021; IDMC, 2021).

Despite an October 2020 ceasefire and withdrawal agreement between the GNA and LNA, as well as the creation of a new interim authority, the Government of National Unity (GNU), various armed groups, including foreign mercenaries, remain active in Libya (Freedom House, 2022). GNU- and LNA-aligned armed groups continue to employ arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, mass displacement, unlawful killings, and destruction of property (Amnesty International, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Militias and armed groups target people on the basis of their actual or perceived political, regional, or tribal affiliation and nationality. Migrants, refugees, and other foreign nationals are especially vulnerable to forced disappearances. Journalists and activists are specifically targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In early 2022, political talks collapsed and the LAF sponsored the creation of a Government of National Stability (GNS), which is opposed to the GNU and now controls much of eastern and southern Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2023). GNS forces launched a failed attempt to capture Tripoli, during which 159 people, including civilians, were wounded and 64 families forced to evacuate (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In the town of Qasr Bouhadi, LAF forces reportedly subjected an unspecified number of residents to arbitrary detention, and at least 50 people in the eastern city of Derna were reportedly arrested for their alleged, but largely unsubstantiated, ties to the escape of five prisoners (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Over 200 bodies have been extracted from mass graves in Tarhouna, which was under control of the Al-Kani militia from 2014 to 2020 (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Tabu and Tuareg ethnic minorities face barriers in accessing identity documents to prove Libyan citizenship, which is necessary to access the free public health system, education, and jobs (Amnesty International, 2020). Some Tabu people have also been subjected to forced evictions, arbitrary arrest and detentions (Amnesty International, 2020).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons in Libya face violence and discrimination in various forms. Men who kill or injure a female relative are granted reduced sentences if they suspected the victim of engaging in extramarital sexual relations (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Rapists are also allowed to avoid prosecution if they marry their victims (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Libya's family code discriminates against women in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and any sexual acts outside of marriage, including among members of the same sex, are punishable by flogging and up to five years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

In March 2023, a UN-mandated fact-finding mission on Libya released its final report, in which it concluded that "a 'wide array' of war crimes and crimes against humanity" have likely been perpetrated by state security forces and armed militia groups since 2016 (GCR2P, 2023). Perceived mass atrocities include arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, and enforced disappearance (GCR2P, 2023). The report judged migrants to be particularly targeted for sexual slavery and systematic torture in "secret prisons" (GCR2P, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Over the past year, the Tripoli-based Internal Security Agency (ISA) in Libya has subjected dozens to abuses, including enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, and torture under the guise of "guarding virtue." This crackdown follows a May 2023 decree from the General Authority for Endowments and Islamic Affairs aimed at combating "religious, intellectual, and moral deviations." There are documented reports of ISA's intensified actions against Libyan youths, especially from the Amazigh community, and foreign nationals, often leading to charges punishable by death. The Libyan government's inaction has emboldened ISA's campaign, which has included forced confessions, torture, and targeting individuals for their beliefs (Amnesty, 2024).

Many migrants who fled their home countries seeking better lives, found themselves trapped in Libya's brutal detention centers. They often face beatings, torture, forced labor, and inhumane conditions in places likened to torture chambers, including official facilities managed by the Interior Ministries in both eastern and western Libya, as well as in camps run by smugglers and traffickers. They also face arbitrary and indefinite detentions in centers plagued by severe overcrowding, lack of basic necessities, and inadequate medical care. Despite multiple attempts to escape via the Mediterranean, they are often intercepted and returned to the horrifying conditions in Libya. People have described a cycle of cruelty, with detainees being sold, moved around, and exploited by various militias and gangs. Additionally, many detainees are subjected to forced labor without compensation, enduring harsh and dangerous conditions (Fares, 2024; HRW, 2024).

In the east, similar repressive measures, such as an Anti-Cybercrime Law, restrict free expression and privacy. Many prisons are effectively controlled by militias, which operate with impunity and subject detainees to ill-treatment and torture. Migrants and asylum seekers, especially women and children, face a high risk of sexual violence. The UN independent fact-finding mission on Libya has found crimes against humanity committed against both Libyans and migrants, yet accountability remains elusive, perpetuating the cycle of abuse (HRW, 2024).

Continuous fighting between rival factions has also forced many Libyans to flee their homes, seeking safety in less conflict-prone areas or attempting dangerous crossings to Europe (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Liechtenstein

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Because of a lack of detention facilities and psychiatric and social welfare institutions, individuals convicted of crimes in Liechtenstein serve their sentences in facilities in Austria, where there is concern for potential maltreatment (OMCT, 2024)

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Lithuania

In July 2021, the Lithuanian government declared a nationwide emergency in response to an extraordinary influx of migrants from across the country's border with Belarus (U.S. Department of State, 2022). By the end of 2021, over 4,300 irregular migrants arrived in the country, compared to only 74 in the preceding year (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Along with Latvia and Poland, which were struggling with similar surges from Belarus, Lithuania accused Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko of using the migrants, primarily Iraqis, as part of a campaign of "hybrid warfare" meant to pressure the European Union into lifting sanctions it had previously imposed on Belarus (Henley et al., 2021). In August, the government established a "pushback policy" at the border, and in November, parliament gave the military additional powers to address the crisis, including authorizations to restrict the movement of migrants and to use force if necessary (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Between August and December 2021, Lithuanian border guards prevented 8,000 people from entering the country (Freedom House, 2022). Those who successfully crossed the border were housed in various facilities, including tent camps, winterized containers, and a vacant prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022). As of November, only 1 percent of asylum applications had been approved (Freedom House, 2022). In June 2022, Amnesty International released a report alleging that Lithuania's border policies amounted to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement (2022a). The report, which included accounts of migrant abuse at the hands of border guards, compared the government's policies to arbitrary detention (Amnesty International, 2022a). That same month, the European Union's Court of Justice found Lithuania's border policy to be incompatible with EU law (Amnesty International, 2022b). According to Doctors Without Borders, more than 2,500 migrants remained detained in "inhumane conditions" as of May 2022 (MSF International, 2022).

New for June 2023 release: In April 2023, Lithuania's Parliament voted in favor of an amendment to the country's Law on the State Border and its Protection (Amnesty International, 2023). According to Amnesty International, the amendment will "effectively enshrine in domestic legislation the ongoing practice of border pushbacks," which the human rights group characterizes as "illegal and abusive" (2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: At least 2,599 people were forcibly pushed back to Belarus (Amnesty International, 2023). Thousands of asylum seekers were held in prolonged detention between 2021 and 2023, with 38 asylum seekers still detained by the end of 2023 (Amnesty International, 2023).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: Starting March 1, 2024, four of Lithuania's six border crossings with Belarus are closed (Crisis 24, 2024). In 2024, at least one case has been opened against Lithuanian officials who rejected the entry of a migrant from Belarus in freezing temperatures (Human Rights Monitoring Institute, 2024). Another case was brought to courts by a Somali national who applied for asylum and subsequently endured a month-long restriction of his freedom of movement, which is a potential violation of the Lithuanian constitution and European Union law (Human Rights Monitoring Institute, 2024). Individuals affiliated with Group 24, a Tajik group focused on democratic reforms designated as a terrorist organization in Tajikistan, have experienced extraditions from countries in the European Union (Human Rights Watch News, 2024). Extradited affiliates of Group 24 are at high risk of torture in Tajikistan. Lithuanian security forces detained a former associate of Group 24, Sulaimon Dalvatov, on April 5, 2024

(Human Rights Watch News, 2024). Dalvatov was granted asylum in Lithuania in 2015 and now faces extradition after being accused of being a threat to Lithuania’s national security. If Dalvatov is extradited, Lithuania’s decision could fall under nonrefoulement. This data was excluded from PMAD as the number of persons affected did not meet the threshold for inclusion.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Luxembourg

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Madagascar

Along with a number of other sub-Saharan African countries, Madagascar in recent years has witnessed an uptick in violence against people with albinism, particularly in the country’s southern region (U.S. State Department, 2022; AFP, 2022a). The attacks, which include kidnappings, killings, and mutilations, are driven by beliefs that the body parts of albinos “can be used in rituals to bring good fortune and protection” (OHCHR, 2022). In August 2022, the kidnapping of an albino child prompted around 500 protesters to attack a police station in the town of Ikongo (AFP, 2022a). Armed with machetes, the crowd eventually breached the station’s security perimeter, at which point the police resorted to live fire, killing 19 people and injuring 21 (AFP, 2022a). This event has been excluded from the PMAD data given the fact that most protestors were armed.

Gangs of cattle rustlers known as *dahalos* are a source of violence and instability in much of Madagascar. In July 2022, *dahalos* attacked a village in Ankazobe district, setting fire to homes and killing at least 32 people (Deutsche Welle, 2022). The remainder of the village has since fled for fear of further violence (AFP, 2022b). This event was not included in the PMAD dataset as it is unclear whether this attack was targeted and/or politically motivated.

Members of Madagascar’s minority Muslim community blame discriminatory citizenship practices as the reason why up to 15,000 Muslims in the country are stateless, despite many living in the country for generations (U.S. Department of State, 2022). According to some reports, simply having a “Muslim-sounding name” is enough to delay a citizenship application “indefinitely” (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

LGBTQI+ persons face legal and societal discrimination in various forms. The age of consent for same-sex relations (21) is seven years older than that for heterosexual relations (14), placing LGBTQI+ persons at a much higher risk of arrest for “corruption of a minor” (Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). In July 2021, authorities cancelled a Pride Month celebration in the capital, Antananarivo, on the basis that it was “an incitement to debauchery and offense to morals” (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: In 2023, violence committed by government agents continued. From January to September, there were 200 reported deaths from security force operations (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Security forces were also accused of arbitrarily arresting political opponents, demonstrators, and activists (U.S. Department of State, 2023). There were at least 12 political detainees and numerous reports of journalists facing arbitrary arrests, threats, and harassment in the months leading up to the election, which took place in mid-November (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

The South Asian Karana community and stateless persons faced discrimination. Persons from the Karana community—around 20,000 people—were not eligible for citizenship. Stateless persons faced difficulties “buying land and accessing education, healthcare, and employment” (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: Protests in the Androy district followed Madagascar’s May elections (Crisis Group, 2024). One electoral office was set on fire during demonstrations by the opposition of IRMAR, and one member of parliament was arrested after filing a complaint about election irregularities (Crisis Group, 2024). The Madagascar Parliament and Senate approved a law that would allow chemical (temporary blockage of hormones) and surgical castration (permanent procedure) as punishments for statutory rape (Tetaud, 2024). Individuals accused of raping children under the age of 10 will face surgical castration (Tetaud, 2024). Individuals accused of raping children between the ages of 10 and 13 will face either surgical or chemical castration and individuals who rape children between the ages of 14 and 17 will face chemical castration (Tetaud, 2024). The law is seen as a deterrent in a country with a strong rape culture. Still, some human rights groups view it as cruel and unusual punishment that violates Madagascar’s constitution (Tetaud, 2024). This could impact the LGBTQI+ community due to the higher age of consent for homosexual relations.

Karanas and Muslims continue to face statelessness and consequent limitation of resources and opportunities (Hierro, 2023).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Malawi

In October 2022, the bodies of 30 Ethiopian migrants were discovered in a mass grave in northern Malawi (Masina, 2022). Malawi is a key staging point on the southern migration route from Ethiopia to South Africa, and it is believed that the migrants died of suffocation, possibly due to transportation in a sealed shipping container (Burke et al., 2022). Five suspects have since been arrested on charges of murder and human trafficking, including the former president’s stepson (Masina, 2022). In May 2022, the UN reported that 90 victims of human trafficking, most of them Ethiopian, had been rescued from forced labor and sexual exploitation in the Dzaleka refugee camp (UNODC, 2022). These events have been excluded from the PMAD data given their apparent pecuniary rather than prejudice-based motivations.

Women and LGBTQI+ persons in Malawi face violence and discrimination in various forms. In some parts of the country, widows are “inherited” by male in-laws with whom they are forced to have sex as part of a practice of “widow cleansing” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). According to one 2018 study, more than 20 percent of secondary school-age girls were raped by men as part of their “initiation” into womanhood

(U.S. Department of State, 2022). Consensual same-sex sexual activity is illegal and punishable by up to 14 years in prison, and the government continues to ban the registration of LGBTQI+ asylum seekers (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: On May 26, 2023, Malawi's homeland security ministry stated that it had detained 902 refugees and asylum seekers since May 17 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The police, aided by the military, arrested men, women, and children living in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital, and other districts, shut down their businesses, temporarily detained them in prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Violence against LGBTQ+ individuals increased in 2023, with 5,000 demonstrators staging an anti-LGBTQ protest (France24, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In 2023, Malawi faced a cholera outbreak and Severe Tropical Cyclone Freddy, which had deadly implications (Human Rights Watch, 2024). As of August, there were 58,982 cases of cholera with 1,768 deaths, and 500,000 people displaced from the cyclone with over 1,000 dead or missing (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Displaced women and girls faced sexual harassment and gender-based violence (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

The Malawi government ordered all refugees and asylum seekers to the Dzaleka refugee camp by April 15 (Human Rights Watch News, 2024). As of May, over 50,6000 inhabited the Dzaleka refugee camp, which was meant to host 12,000 people (Human Rights Watch News, 2024). Refugees were prohibited from employment and education outside of the refugee camp (Human Rights Watch News, 2024).

2023 saw an increase in violence against elderly people accused of witchcraft (Human Rights Watch, 2024). At least 22 people were killed in 2023 for allegations of witchcraft (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

New for September 2024 release: Political tension and violence against opposition parties are increasing in 2024 as the country prepares for its 2025 general elections. On February 24, 2024, a group attacked a parade held by supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), injuring at least 20 DPP supporters (Global State of Democracy, 2024). On May 17, several members of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) were attacked and beaten as they were preparing for a rally on May 19th (Malawi Voice, 2024). The Democratic Progressive Party blames the governing Mawali Congress Party (MCP) for the attacks, though MCP denies involvement (Global State of Democracy, 2024; Malawi Voice, 2024).

In January 2024, investigative journalist Gregory Gondwe published a report detailing the Malawi military's financial connections to companies owned by a person being investigated for corruption (Nassah, 2024). Shortly after the report was published, Gondwe went into hiding following alleged threats of arrests from Malawi government officials (Nassah, 2024). In February, the Malawi Police Service confiscated devices from 14 journalists working for the Mawali Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) (Masina, 2024). In April, another journalist, Macmillian Mhone, was arrested after publishing an article detailing another corruption-accused businessman's financial connections to government contracts; and a sports journalist was assaulted by soccer fans while covering a match (Kunchezera, 2024; Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024). The number of targeted journalists currently does not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

On June 28, 2024, the Constitutional Court maintained the criminalization of same-sex conduct (Kojoué, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Malaysia

The Covid-19 pandemic coincided with rising xenophobia and a government crackdown on migrants, particularly Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, who were placed in detention centers as part of a “quarantine” campaign (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Wee, 2022). In April 2022, over 500 detainees escaped from one such facility in the northern state of Penang (Wee, 2022).

In February 2021, days after the Myanmar military seized power in a coup, Malaysian authorities defied a court-ordered stay on deportation and sent nearly 1,100 Myanmar nationals back to their country (Reuters, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Between April and October 2022, Malaysian authorities coordinated with Myanmar’s military junta and returned over 2,000 Myanmar nationals, including members of the persecuted Chin and Kachin minorities, without processing their asylum claims (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2022). In December 2022, a Malaysian court lifted a stay on the deportation of 114 Myanmar nationals, raising concerns that they too would soon be sent back to Myanmar without being evaluated for asylum (Reuters, 2022). Given the Myanmar junta’s widespread human rights violations—including the military’s 2017 campaign against the Rohingya, which the U.S. said amounted to genocide—the UN has said that Malaysia’s recent deportations were in violation of the principle of non-refoulement (Reuters, 2022; Wee, 2022).

Malaysian law tightly restricts religious freedom. All non-Sunni forms of Islam are banned, and ethnic Malays are not entitled to renounce their Muslim faith (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Government programs are often designed to give preferential treatment to ethnic Malays, thereby limiting the opportunities available to ethnic Chinese and Indians (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Anti-Semitism is also prevalent, with the government banning the screening of films in Hebrew or Yiddish (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in various forms. All same-sex sexual conduct is illegal, with “carnal knowledge against the order of nature” punishable by whipping and up to 20 years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022b). LGBTQI+ persons are reportedly forced by religious authorities to participate in “conversion therapy” or “rehabilitation” programs; as of June 2021, the prime minister reported that over 1,700 individuals had been sent to a government-run rehabilitation camp (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Female genital mutilation/cutting is widespread in Malaysia; in one 2012 study, more than 93 percent of Muslim women surveyed reported having undergone the procedure (U.S. Department of State). The Ministry of Health endorses the practice, provided it takes place at government healthcare facilities, and a 2009 fatwa by the National Council of Islamic Religious Affairs declared the practice obligatory (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: Throughout 2023, Malaysia saw restricted freedoms of media and speech. In March, an individual was charged with a crime after posting a call for a demonstration against the king; in July an opposition politician was charged with a crime following remarks against the country’s sultans; and in September, a political activist was arrested after posting a video on Tiktok that criticized the prime minister (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Speech that was critical of the government was censored online (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

In April in Penang State, around 50 Rohingya refugees were forcibly evicted from their homes (U.S. Department of State, 2023). On July 4, a Myanmar refugee activist, Thuzar Maung, was abducted along with her family (Human Rights Watch, 2024). In August and September 2023, immigration officers conducted raids, arresting 425 undocumented migrants (Free Malaysia Today, 2023). Among the arrested were Rohingya refugees with UNHCR cards and valid work permits (Free Malaysia Today, 2023). Authorities did not always recognize the validity of UNHCR cards (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Pregnant migrant workers could be immediately deported under the law, and stateless persons faced increased difficulties due to discrimination in nationality laws, procedural problems, and birth registration issues (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: Malaysia’s crackdown on undocumented migrants continued into 2024. Within the first three weeks of 2024, Malaysia’s Immigration Department arrested over 4,000 migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Immigration detention centers are overcrowded and do not provide adequate access to food, water, and healthcare (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Instances of physical violence and fatal beatings of detainees have been reported (Human Rights Watch, 2024). A Human Rights Watch report claimed that approximately 80 percent of “undocumented” detainees are properly documented, which was later confirmed by the Home minister (Lemière, 2024).

The Bajau Laut community, which is mostly stateless sea-faring residents of Malaysia’s Sabah state, has also faced the consequences of Malaysia’s crackdown on undocumented migrants (Latiff, 2024). In June 2024, over 500 people from the Bajau Laut community were evicted from their homes (Latiff, 2024).

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, through the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), has begun what he claims is a crackdown on corruption; though, some say he is using the MACC to attack political opposition (Azhar, 2024). Opposition members have been arrested and charged with crimes like bribery since PR Anwar Ibrahim took office (Azhar, 2024).

Last Updated: July 2024

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Maldives

Maldivian law requires all citizens to be followers of Sunni Islam, “explicitly excluding adherents of minority religions” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Freedom House, 2022). While citizen men are allowed to marry non-Muslim foreigners, provided their intended spouse is Christian or Jewish, citizen women are barred from marrying non-Muslim foreigners altogether (Freedom House, 2022). According to the U.S. Department of State, a citizen’s conversion to Christianity “could easily result in being reported to Muslim leaders or authorities” (2022a).

Women in the Maldives face varied forms of legal discrimination. For instance, when a man is put on trial for rape, testimonies from male witnesses are given twice as much weight as testimonies from female witnesses (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). LGBTQI+ persons also face violence and discrimination. Maldivian law prohibits same-sex sexual conduct, which is punishable by up to eight years in prison or, under Islamic law, 100 lashes (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Freedom of the media in the Maldives sharply deteriorated in 2023, with Journalists and media outlets facing rising police violence and harassment (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Police assaulted journalists covering political opposition protests in February; assaulted and arrested a journalist covering a rally in March; used excessive force against protestors and opposition party members at rallies in June; and assaulted a media worker and a journalist covering an opposition protest in July; and arrested four protestors against President Solih in August (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

The Human Rights Commission of Maldives (HRCM) reported 119 complaints of torture from January to October 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Some alleged perpetrators of torture were police officers (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

New for September 2024 release: LGBTQI+ persons face discrimination and violence from the public and state. One individual was arrested in May 2024 after a journalist exposed their identity on X, alongside a video of them wearing women’s clothes (International Federation for Human Rights & Maldivian Democracy Network, 2024).

Two ministers were arrested in June on allegations of performing black magic on President Mohamed Muizzu (Times of India, 2024).

The Maldives joined 12 other countries in banning Israeli passports (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

Mali

In 2015, three years after a military coup, constitutional rule was restored in Mali, and a peace accord was signed with armed rebels in the country’s north (Freedom House, 2022). However, continued instability led to a military coup in August 2020, followed shortly by a second in May 2021 (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Meanwhile, as armed extremist groups and ethnic militias have continued to brutalize civilian populations in northern and central Mali, there have also been reports of mass atrocities perpetrated by Malian security forces and Russian mercenaries (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2022a).

In March 2022, Malian armed forces (FAMA) and members of the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, reportedly massacred some 300 civilians in the town of Moura in central Mali (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; Doxsee et al., 2022). The vast majority of those killed were members of the Peuhl, or Fulani, ethnic group (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). According to Human Rights Watch, the Moura massacre ranks

as the “worst single atrocity” in Mali since conflict began in 2012 (2022a). Earlier that month, Malian security forces allegedly executed 35 people for their suspected involvement in Islamist extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). As in Moura, the majority of the victims were reportedly ethnic Peuhl (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). Armed extremists in the region are known to focus their recruitment efforts on pastoral Peuhl communities; as a result, ethnic Peuhl are often the primary targets of counterterrorism operations and related abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). Ethnic Tuaregs and Arabs are also frequently targeted by Malian security forces due to their perceived associations with armed groups (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Since the start of 2022, armed groups aligned with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have “attacked dozens of villages and massacred scores of civilians” in northeast Mali (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). The attacks have reportedly targeted ethnic Dawsahak, a Tuareg ethnic group, following a clash between ISGS and a former rebel Tuareg group (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). During an attack in Gao region in August, armed Islamists killed an estimated 50 ethnic Songhai (Human Rights Watch, 2022d). In September, another attack in Gao region left at least 42 civilians dead, contributing to the nearly 500 who were reportedly killed in the region between March and June (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). Since March, tens of thousands have been forced to flee from the “terrifying and seemingly coordinated attacks on villages” (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). In the year leading up to September 2021, roughly 115,000 internally displaced persons were registered in the country (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In June, an armed group aligned with Al-Qaeda killed 132 people during an attack on villages in the central region of Mopti (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). In December, an armed Islamist group killed 32 ethnic Dogon traders in an attack on a bus in Mopti (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). In addition to extremist activity, tensions between Peuhls and Dogons have given rise to “ethnic self-defense groups” that have driven thousands from their homes and further exacerbated communal violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). For instance, after a terrorist attack killed 32 persons in December 2021, a Dogon self-defense militia called for retaliatory violence to be directed against Peuhls (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Black Tuaregs suffer reduced citizenship at the hands of some Tuareg groups who subject them to hereditary servitude (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). People with albinism are at risk of abduction, murder, and dismemberment due to traditional beliefs that the body parts of albinos possess special powers (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Women and LGBTQI+ persons also face violence and discrimination in various forms. Female genital mutilation/cutting is legal and widely practiced, with nearly 90 percent of women undergoing the procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Women are “legally obligated to obey their husbands” and often face unequal treatment in cases of divorce, child custody, and inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct is actively enforced, and LGBTQI+ persons reportedly face physical, mental, and sexual abuse as a form of “corrective” punishment (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In March 2023, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) reported that, excluding the above-mentioned massacre in Moura, 1,277 people were killed in Mali in 2022, more than double the previous year’s total of 584 (France 24, 2023). MINUSMA also attributed 35 percent of human rights violations to Malian security forces, which were occasionally supported by Wagner Group mercenaries (France 24, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Violence remains high due to a government-sustained offensive against suspected jihadists; however, these atrocities were not included in the code as it could not be proven that victims were non-state armed combatants or targeted for political reasons (International Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Throughout 2023, nonstate armed groups (including terrorist groups and ethnic militias), Russia’s Wagner Group forces, and Malian Armed Forces committed human rights abuses (U.S. Department of State, 2023). On March 8, the terrorist group ISIS-Shael killed at least 12 persons (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Between April 1 and May 31, extremist groups and self-defense ethnic militias killed at least 89 persons (U.S. Department of State, 2023). On April 22, an attack committed by the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) killed at least 10 civilians, injured 60 and destroyed more than 20 buildings (U.S. Department of State, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2024). JNIM led an attack in August in Bodio that killed at least 15 persons and destroyed at least 10 homes (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) killed at least 77 persons from January to September 6 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). On September 7, an attack suspected to have been committed by JNIM on a passenger boat in the Gao region killed at least 120 persons (Human Rights Watch, 2024). At least 34 civilians were killed throughout the year by unidentified armed individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Violence committed by armed groups in northeast Mali forced thousands of people to flee, with the number of internally displaced persons reaching 375,539 people by May 2023 (Human Rights Watch News, 2023).

There were several instances of abductions and forced disappearances committed by government security forces and terrorist groups in 2023. Around 100 people are suspected to be detained by the National Agency for State Security (ANSE) (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The Bamako Central Prison, with a capacity of 400, held 4,594 prisoners as of August 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). At least 23 children and one political prisoner were detained by security forces in 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2023). An unknown number of children were conscripted into security forces (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Last updated: May 2024

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

New for September 2024 release: In January 2024, the Malian government announced that Mali is joining Burkina Faso and Niger in leaving the West African regional bloc (ECOWAS) (Crisis Group, 2024). Also in January, the Malian junta ended the Algiers Accord, a 2015 peace deal with Tuareg separatists (Diallo, 2024).

On January 6, 2024, the predominately Fulani village Kalala was attacked by a Dozo armed group that killed 13 people and abducted 24 others (Al Jazeera, 2024a). Three days later, the government and Wagner Group forces abducted and killed at least ten civilians after burning encampments for internally displaced persons in the Timbuktu region (Crisis Group, 2024). Later in January, around 25 people were allegedly executed by Malian forces and “foreign military personnel” in the Nara region, and an estimated 30 civilians were killed in the Bandiagara region around the same time (Al Jazeera, 2024c). On March 8, 2024, the Dozo militia abducted and killed an estimated 30 Fulani in the Segou region (Crisis Group, 2024).

In late May, more than 20 civilians were killed in an attack on the Mopti region (Northern-central Mali) (Reuters, 2024). In late June, Malian governmental and Wagner forces reportedly killed 46 civilians in northern Mali (Associated Press, 2024). On July 1, around 40 people were killed in a village in the Mopti region by an unidentified armed group (Al Jazeera, 2024b). Malian forces and Wagner forces killed at least 23 Tuareg civilians between July 9th and 12th (Bridger, 2024).

Political tension increased in April as the government continued to suspend civil society conduct and elections (Crisis Group, 2024). On April 11, Mali's High Authority for Communication asked the media to stop publishing and releasing political news, including all political activities (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024). On May 21, a university professor accused of defamation after criticizing the government was sentenced to two years imprisonment (Crisis Group, 2024). On May 31, the former head of state security and a former colonel were abducted from the cells where they were detained (Crisis Group, 2024). Arrests of government critics and political actors continued into June, including the arrest of a union leader and the arrests of 11 political leaders (Crisis Group, 2024). The number of detainees does not currently meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Last updated: July 2024

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Malta

In their report on a 2020 visit to Malta, the Council of Europe's (CoE's) Committee for the Prevention of Torture stated that the country's migration system "verged on institutional mass neglect," with living conditions "so questionable and severe that they may well have amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment" (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In 2021, 832 migrants arrived in Malta by sea, most of them Syrian, Sudanese, and Eritrean nationals (Amnesty International, 2022). The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights criticized Malta for "ignoring or slowly responding" to distress calls from migrants at sea, and for instructing private vessels to return rescued migrants to Libya, where they faced potentially life-threatening abuse (Amnesty International, 2022).

In December 2022, Human Rights Watch released a report on the EU border agency Frontex's use of a Malta-operated drone to coordinate migrant pushbacks with the Libyan Coast Guard (Taylor, 2022). Of the 32,400 people who were captured by Libyan authorities and forcibly returned to the country in 2021, it is reported that "a third of these interceptions" incorporated intelligence that was collected from a ground-control station in Malta (Taylor, 2022). According to Human Rights Watch, the provision of Malta-based aerial intelligence, made with full awareness that many migrants face systematic violence upon their return to Libya, "makes Frontex complicit in the abuse" (Taylor, 2022). Some of these cases have resulted in clear violations of the principle of non-refoulement and have been coded as such (mass displacement) in the PMAD data.

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: A group of non-governmental organizations accused Maltese authorities of violating international maritime law by returning 500 migrants and refugees to Benghazi Libya, which was coded as mass displacement (AP News, 2023). This may have been done in collusion with Libyan forces (AP News, 2023).

In March 2019, a boat carrying 108 asylum-seekers across the Mediterranean was rescued by an oil tanker, El Hiblu, which intended to return the asylum-seekers to Libya (Times of Malta, 2020). Three West African teenagers (aged 15 Amara, 16 Kader, and 19 Abdalla) translated and mediated between the asylum seekers (who protested the push-back to Libya) and the ship's crew, and the ship turned around to Europe (Times of Malta, 2020). When the ship reached Maltese waters, members of the Armed Forces of Malta boarded it and arrested the three teenagers, alleging hijacking and terrorist activity (Times of Malta, 2020). In November 2023, the Maltese Attorney General formally charged Amara, Kader, and Abdalla with nine crimes that could lead to life sentences (University of Oxford, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: On February 23, 2024, a boat in the Mediterranean carrying migrants capsized during a rescue mission by the Armed Forces of Malta, leading to the deaths of five people and the hospitalizations of eight others (Reuters, 2024). The Armed Forces' role in the capsizing is unclear (ECRE, 2024b). On April 8, 83 migrants were forcibly returned from the Maltese search and rescue zone to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard, a European Union proxy force (ECRE, 2024a). These events were not coded as it was unclear whether Maltese authorities were culpable.

Meanwhile, rates of domestic violence appear to be increasing (Times of Malta, 2024). However, these interpersonal crimes are included in the PMAD data.

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Marshall Islands

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Mauritania

Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981, becoming the last country in the world to do so (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In 2018, the Global Slavery Index estimated that some 90,000 Mauritians remain under “modern slavery” (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Historically, the country's ethnic Beydane population (“White Moors”) enslaved ethnic Haratines (“Black Moors”); to this day, Beydanes continue to dominate in politics and society, while Haratines and sub-Saharan ethnic groups face governmental discrimination, including difficulties in obtaining identity documents (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). There have been several reports of torture of anti-slavery activists and human rights defenders over the past 7 years, and since 2014 Amnesty International has documented 168 arrests of human rights defenders and at least 20 groups whose peaceful protests were broken up by force (Aljazeera, 2016; Peyton, 2018). However, these atrocities did not reach the PMAD threshold for any given year and therefore were not included in the code.

Women, LGBTQI+ persons, and non-Muslims face discrimination in various forms. Though female genital mutilation/cutting is illegal, enforcement remains rare, with a 2015 study finding that 67 percent of women ages 15 to 49 had undergone the procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In some Beydane

families, adolescent girls who are approaching marriage are force-fed by their families, sometimes up to 16,000 calories a day, as part of a practice known as *gavage*, though the U.S. Department of State reports that such practices continue to decline (2022a). Under Sharia law, legal testimonies by women carry half the weight of testimonies by men, and female victims receive half the compensation of male victims (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Consensual same-sex sexual activity among men is punishable by death, though this penalty has not been imposed in over 30 years (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Public expression of any religion other than Islam is banned, and Muslims who convert to another religion lose their citizenship (U.S. Department of State, 2022b; Freedom House, 2022).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In February 2023, human rights activist Soufi Ould Cheine was killed by physical abuse and torture while detained at Nouakchott’s Dar Naim 2 police station (US State Report, 2024). Cheine was a member of the Haratine community, which faced exploitation and slavery in the country (US State Report, 2024). On May 30, 2023, another member of the Haratine community was shot and killed by police while protesting the death of a member of the sub-Saharan Peul community (Oumar Diop) who died while in police custody (US State Report, 2024).

There were several allegations of torture throughout 2023, including a video on May 8 of police officers assaulting a youth in Nouakchott (US State Report, 2024). There were also allegations of violations of labor laws, particularly in the mining, fishing, industrial, and construction sectors (US State Report, 2021).

The Mauritanian government blocked mobile internet service in response to the escape of detained individuals allegedly affiliated with militant Islamist groups (March 6 to 12, 2023) and protests following the death of Oumar Diop (May 31, 2023) (Freedom House, 2024).

Prisons were severely overcrowded and had inadequate sanitary conditions (US State Report, 2024). Protestors, human rights activists, political critics and opponents, and journalists were arbitrarily arrested and detained by Mauritanian authorities, including antislavery human rights activist Youba Ould El Ghoth, who was sentenced to four years for “harming national unity and social cohesion” (US State Report, 2024). Nineteen individuals were detained on May 24, 2023, while peacefully protesting the arrest of an NGO organizer (US State Report, 2024). In July 2023, a student was arrested and charged with blasphemy after writing a paper that was deemed insulting to Prophet Muhammad (Freedom House, 2024).

Afro-Mauritanians experience difficulties registering to vote, enrolling in the census, and obtaining documents needed for basic social services (Freedom House, 2024). Haratine and Afro-Mauritanians faced difficulties obtaining birth certificates (US Trafficking Persons Report, 2023) Some several hundred thousand people, mainly sub-Saharans, who returned to Mauritania after facing mass expulsion, are currently stateless, though the Mauritania government launched a campaign lasting from July 2023 to December 31, 2023, to register these individuals (US State Report, 2024). At least 320,000 individuals were registered and given civil status papers during the campaign (US State Report, 2024). Women and LGBTQI+ individuals face difficulties participating in political life due to traditional and cultural factors (US State Report, 2024). LGBTQI+ individuals particularly experienced discrimination in education, employment, health care, and housing (US State Report, 2024). Individuals with albinism also faced discrimination in employment (US State Report, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: Mauritanian police officers physically assaulted a reporter and cameraman at a student protest in March, and in May, physically prevented three reporters from covering a doctors’ protest in Nouakchott (Reporters Without Borders, 2024). This does not reach the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Protests in late June and early July followed the 2024 reelection of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani after his main political opponent—an anti-slavery activist—claimed electoral irregularities (Reuters, 2024). Mauritanian security forces detained an unknown number of protesters, three of whom died (Reuters, 2024). This was not included in the PMAD dataset because it is unclear how many people were detained.

An estimated 3 percent of Mauritania’s total population is enslaved, totaling around 149,000 people (BBC, 2024; InDepthNews, 2024).

Migration from Mauritania, or through Mauritanian waters, is increasing as migrants travel toward the Canary Islands (Lespiaut & Kaledzi, 2024). Mauritanian forces have used European-funded personnel and equipment to push migrants to remote areas and Mali forcibly (Faiola et. al., 2024). Investigative journalists observed a detention center in Nouakchott that

Spanish police frequently visited. They recorded migrants arriving at the center in a large truck and later recorded migrants taken in a bus to the Mali border (Lighthouse Reports, 2024). One impacted migrant reported that after they reached Mali, the migrants were chased away from the Mauritanian border (Lighthouse Reports, 2024). Spanish and Mauritanian forces collaborate to detain and interrogate migrants, with hundreds of migrants expelled to the Malian border, a conflict zone, weekly (Lighthouse Reports, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Mauritius

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Mexico

Since taking office in December 2018, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has increased the authority of the armed forces, deploying them for law enforcement and customs enforcement, including drug control and organized crime control (Felbab-Brown, 2021). The country’s National Human Rights Commission has received complaints of military abuse and violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022). These allegations include torture, enforced disappearance, abuses against migrants, extrajudicial killings, gender-based violence, and attacks on independent journalists and human rights defenders (Amnesty International, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022a). From 2007 to 2022, the army reportedly killed 5,335 civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As of the end of 2021, there have

been 379,000 total internal displacements due to violence; however, most of these displacements were indiscriminate and did not meet the PMAD criteria for inclusion (IDMC, 2021).

New for September 2023 release: As U.S. President Joe Biden restricts access to asylum at the U.S. southern border, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has heavily regulate travel to and within Mexico to prevent non-Mexican migrants from reaching the U.S. (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). As a result, migrants face serious abuses and delays, and are often forced to wait for months in inhumane conditions near Mexico’s southern border while struggling to find work or housing (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). African and Haitian migrants often face frequent acts of discrimination and racism by immigration authorities, police, and other government officials in Tapachula (Morley, 2021). On January 27, 2023, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that Mexico’s legal framework on detentions violates human rights due to an overuse of prolonged pretrial detention (Brewer, 2023).

Gender-based violence, including femicides, sexual violence, and disappearances, is a widespread, long-standing problem in Mexico (Kloppe-Santamaria, 2023). In 2022, a total of 3,754 women and girls were murdered, and 2,481 women and girls were officially reported as “missing” (Kloppe-Santamaria, 2023; OHCHR, 2023). On average, 10 women or girls are killed daily nationwide (Sanchez, 2022). Legal loopholes, negligence, and social norms allow a vast majority of violent attacks against women to go unpunished (OHCHR, 2023).

– *Ruth Byrnes, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Violence committed between non-state armed groups (numbering over 70) and Mexican forces increased in 2023, with 872 armed interactions in 2023 (ACLEDD, 2024). Violence committed against civilians decreased by 13% in 2023 but remained high (ACLEDD, 2024). Migrants face particularly high risks of violence perpetrated by organized crime groups and instances of violence against migrants are underreported (ACLEDD, 2024).

Between January 1, 2018, and March 31, 2023, Mexican authorities received at least 15,094 complaints of torture (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Unlawful killings remained prevalent in 2023 (US State Report, 2024). On February 26, individuals in the Secretariat of National Defense’s (SEDENA) 16th Motorized Calvary Regiment shot and killed five civilians and injured another and on May 18, soldiers extrajudicially killed five civilians (US State Report, 2024). At least 1,290 women were killed between January and June 2023 (US State Report, 2024). An approximate 3,000 women are killed each year, with 24%-50% of them potential femicides (El País, 2023).

Reports of poor detention facility conditions and maltreatment of detained persons were made throughout 2023. Instances of arbitrary detention and lengthy pretrial detention (sometimes more than 17 years) were common (US State Report, 2024). The National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH) and the National Mechanism reported human rights abuses of women in a Morelos prison; the CNDH reported many prisons offered insufficient care for elderly persons, women and minors, Indigenous persons, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons, persons with disabilities, and persons with HIV or AIDS (US State Report, 2024). In January, Mexican authorities arrested Indigenous leader David Hernández Salazar and indicted 17 Indigenous members of the Binniza community who opposed megaprojects (including the Isthmus of Tehuantepec Interoceanic Corridor) in Oaxaca (US State Report, 2024). In January, a prison break took place during

which criminal gunmen opened fire, killing seven prisoners, ten guards, and two gunmen (US State Report, 2024).

By July 2023, Mexican authorities had detained over 240,000 migrants and asylum seekers, with some detentions extending past the constitutional limit of 36 hours (UN Human Rights Office, 2023). Migrants in detention sometimes faced threats and maltreatment, sensory deprivation, and deprivation of necessities (US State Report, 2024). On March 27 in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, a migrant detention center caught fire, causing the deaths of 40 migrants and injuries of 27 detained in a holding cell that was left locked during the fire (US State Report, 2024). There was a lack of medical care, services, privacy, clothing, and unhygienic conditions in institutions and care facilities for persons with disabilities (US State Report, 2024). In psychiatric institutions, physical and chemical restraints were used and instances of physical and sexual abuse, human trafficking, forced labor, enforced disappearance, and illegal adoptions of institutionalized children occurred (US State Report, 2024).

The number of missing and disappeared persons amounted to more than 110,000 in 2023 (Human Rights Watch, 2024). There were at least 12,031 reports of missing or forcibly displaced individuals in 2023 (Amnesty International, 2024). In May 2023, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) found that Mexico had not fulfilled its international legal obligations to investigate the 2013 enforced disappearance of a young man by armed men in police uniforms (Human Rights Watch, 2024). On January 15, two human rights defenders, Ricardo Lagunes and Antonio Díaz, disappeared in Colima; on March 29, activist Esthela Guadalupe Estrada Ávila disappeared during a search for her brother who disappeared in 2020; and on April 21, Indigenous human rights defender Alejandro Ortiz was kidnapped by four armed men in Guerrero (US State Report, 2024). While authorities enforce laws prohibiting the sex trafficking of children, an estimated 21,000 children are kidnapped annually for sexual exploitation (US State Report, 2024). Migrants face a particular risk of kidnapping by cartels (AP News, 2023).

At least eight journalists were killed in 2023, and there were at least 272 threats, attacks, or aggression reported against journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2024). At least 86 attacks were committed by organized crime groups (US State Report, 2024). Protestors also faced persecution—on August 21 government forces forcibly and violently removed protestors who demanded government services be used to search for disappeared persons (US State Report, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: Journalists continue to face violence. In early 2024, President López Obrador released the phone number of a New York Times reporter in response to a question about his connections to drug trafficking groups (Romero, 2024). Personal information, including identity codes, of at least 324 other media workers was leaked in early 2024 in a government leak (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024a). In late April, journalist Roberto Carlos Figueroa was abducted and killed in Coajomulco (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024b). In May, unidentified individuals yelled death threats at reporter Alberto Amaro Jordán, his family, and his bodyguards (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024c). On June 28, journalist Víctor Alfonso Culebro Morales was found dead in Chiapas (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024d). Crime reporter Alejandro Martín Noguez was killed in early August (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024e). The number of impacted journalists does not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

In January 2024, armed men abducted an activist and killed two of her family members during their search for the activist's disappeared son (Crisis Watch, 2024). Two trans activists were also killed in January (Crisis Watch, 2024). An Indigenous rights activist and his family were killed in July (CBS News, 2024f). The number of impacted activists does not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Political violence increased in the months leading up to the June elections (Crisis Watch, 2024). During the campaign period, at least 37 political candidates and two voters were killed (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 77 people received death threats and 11 were kidnapped (Camhaji, 2024). Affiliates of political officials and candidates were also targeted, with at least 27 killed (Camhaji, 2024). Three mayors were assassinated in the weeks following the election (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 749 people were affected by political violence between September 2023 and May 2024 (Vasquez, 2024).

The Mexican army executed ten alleged members of the Jalisco Cartel on May 9 (Crisis Watch, 2024). On June 9, a massacre possibly committed by the Mexican army or National Guard killed six people (Crisis Watch, 2024).

Mexican law enforcement has been a target of violence by organized criminal groups. In February, three forest rangers were killed and one injured by alleged illegal loggers in central Mexico (AP News, 2024d). Armed individuals killed four police officers on a highway in Guanajuato in January (AFP News, 2024). In February, a police officer and her 8-year-old daughter were killed by cartel members (Stevenson, 2024a). Three members of the Civil Guard, including a police commander, were killed in Michoacan in March (Associated Press, 2024). In April, the head of traffic police in Acapulco was killed (CBS News, 2024c). Following a fatal attack on a taxi driver in Zacatelco, outraged residents of the area attacked the assailants and police who attempted to stop the violence (Buschschlüter, 2024a). One officer was killed and another was hospitalized (Buschschlüter, 2024a). The police chief of San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, was shot and killed and another officer was hospitalized in June (Rodriquez et. al., 2024). The police operations chief in Mexico City was killed in July (CBS News, 2024f). In July in San Luis, two police officers were killed and another injured by cartel members (Retana & Fuhrman, 2024). The number of impacted law enforcement has not yet reached the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Around one-third of Mexico is controlled by cartels (Center for Preventive Action, 2024). In June, drug cartels set several homes on fire in the southern state of Chiapas, causing thousands of people to flee (Verza et.al., 2024). On June 4, in Tila, Chiapas, armed individuals began shooting at homes and setting buildings afire, causing thousands of people to flee (Sanabria & Diaz, 2024). In July, around 580 people fled cartel violence in Chiapas (AP News, 2024f). In late July, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, the co-founder of the Sinaloa Cartel, was arrested in El Paso, Texas in an alleged betrayal by the son of his cofounder, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán (Bustamante, 2024). The Mexican military has deployed around 400 troops to Sinaloa in anticipation of increased cartel violence in response to Zambada's arrest (Bustamante, 2024).

Mexican authorities have cracked down on migrants by forcibly pushing them to southern Mexico, particularly to the cities of Villahermosa and Tapachula (Janetsky & Márquez, 2024). In March, 95 Ecuadorian migrants were kidnapped by criminals who attempted to extort their families for their safe release (Vaquero Simancas, 2024). Criminal groups, Mexican migration officials, and law enforcement extort migrants by forcing them to pay to continue or be pushed back to southern Mexico (Janetsky & Márquez, 2024). In mid-June, Chihuahua state police and U.S. Homeland Security Investigations uncovered 13 migrants held, tortured, and extorted in a stash house in Juárez (Borunda, 2024). At least two migrants may have been killed in the stash house (Borunda, 2024). Another operation in June freed

28 kidnapped migrants in Chihuahua (TeleSUR, 2024). Mexican federal immigration authorities forcibly cleared an encampment of 432 migrants (predominantly Haitian) in Mexico City in early June (AP News, 2024e). Over 600,000 migrants are thought to be detained in Mexico (Gooding, 2024).

Bus and taxi drivers in Taxco, Guerrero, held strikes in January against cartel threats after a driver was killed (AP News, 2024a). The violence is likely perpetrated by the Guerrero Federation, or the Tlacos, who accused drivers of working with the Familia Michoacana cartel (AP News, 2024a). In early February, four drivers were killed in coordinated attacks in Chilpancingo, Guerrero (AP News, 2024c). In April, a taxi driver was killed after resisting robbery (Morales, 2024).

The administration of outgoing President López Obrador amended the Amnesty Law to allow the President to grant amnesty for any crime (Crisis Watch, 2024).

Over 100,000 people are missing in Mexico (Stevenson, 2024b). Protests took place in Mexico City in mid-May, advocating for justice for disappeared persons (Stevenson, 2024b). One protest against the release of eight soldiers suspected of forcibly disappearing 43 students in 2014 injured 26 police officers through firecrackers (Buschschlüter, 2024b). Mass graves span across Mexico, and forensic experts estimate the remains of over 52,000 people are yet to be identified (Reed-Sandoval, 2024). In January, a truck with a banner reading “Guatemalans, stop believing in Grupo Sombra, and stay in your hometowns” was found with human remains in coolers in the vehicle and a truck beside it (AP News, 2024b). Five bodies were found in an SUV in Jalisco in March, and seven bodies (including one identified as a Sinaloa cartel faction leader) were found near the Arizona border (CBS News, 2024a). Seven bodies with notes explaining why they were killed were found in a car in Puebla in April (CBS News, 2024b). In May, ten bodies were found in Acapulco, and 18 bodies were found in Zacatecas (CBS News, 2024e; CBS News, 2024d). On May 16, 21 bodies were found buried in Guanato State (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 19 bodies, including Guatemalan migrants, were found in a truck in Chiapas in early July in what President López Obrador claims was cartel violence (Alvarado, 2024). This data was not included in the PMAD dataset because the perpetration of the violence is unknown.

The administration of outgoing President López Obrador amended the Amnesty Law to allow the President to grant amnesty for any crime (Crisis Watch, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Micronesia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Moldova

In the breakaway region of Transnistria—which is internationally recognized as part of Moldova but has operated with de facto independence since 1992—women, LGBTQI+ persons, and religious minorities face discrimination in various forms (Freedom House, 2022). Women are banned from over 300 occupation that are deemed “too dangerous or demanding” for women, including welding and snow blowing (U.S.

Department of State, 2022a). Same-sex sexual conduct is illegal in Transnistria, relegating LGBTQI+ residents to reduced citizenship (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Jehovah’s Witnesses report that Transnistrian authorities have refused to register two of their congregations and have forced their members to serve in the region’s “Ministry of Defense” in an alleged violation of their religious beliefs (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The Muslim community in Transnistria has also reported intimidation by regional authorities and continues to face obstruction in their attempts to establish a mosque in the regional capital of Tiraspol (Freedom House, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, human rights conditions in the separatist enclave of Transnistria have been deteriorating (Rosca, 2023). Under the Russian-backed regime of Transnistria, public information and self-expression are tightly controlled, and the regime’s security services and police have cracked down on any form of dissent (Rosca, 2023). Kidnappings, violence, and arbitrary imprisonment have increased over the past two years (Rosca, 2023).

In May 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that Moldovan authorities were housing Romani refugees from Ukraine in a manner that constituted “unequal and discriminatory treatment” (2022). Allegedly there is “an agreed policy to segregate Romani refugees in designated state-run reception centers,” some of which were reportedly inferior to the accommodations provided to non-Romani refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: There were several reports of torture in detention facilities in Moldova throughout 2023 (US State Report, 2024). Conditions in the detention facilities were poor, with Transnistria pretrial detention facilities lacking beds and toilet facilities—and pretrial detention in Transnistria was often lengthy (US State Report, 2024). There were no investigations or prosecutions for torture or maltreatment committed by Transnistrian “security forces” (US State Report, 2024). The high rates of domestic violence and sexual violence continued into 2023, with 7,643 domestic violence cases reported from January 1, 2023, to September 30, 2023 (US State Report, 2024). Women were banned from more than 300 professions in Transnistria, and women with disabilities, Romani women, and LGBTQI+ women faced discrimination (US State Report, 2024). The Roma and the Jewish community faced high levels of discrimination, including hate-based crime (US State Report, 2024). Roma communities also faced limited access to healthcare, unfair treatment by health practitioners, and lower health insurance coverage rates (US State Report, 2024).

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

New for September 2024 release: Transnistria’s Ministry of State Security detained two journalists in late January 2024 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024a). A Russian journalist was detained in Transnistria in June (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024b)

Gagauzia, an autonomous unit in Moldova, may join Transnistria as a breakaway region (Ibragimova, 2024). Gagauzia claims that the Moldovan ban on Russian television channels and the enforcement of the Romanian state language infringe on the region’s autonomy and freedom (Ibragimova, 2024).

A Norwegian Refugee Council (2024) survey conducted in Poland and Moldova found that the majority of Ukrainian refugees rely on humanitarian aid, and many refugees do not have the resources to meet basic needs.

The Moldovan parliament passed a law in May that enabled the revocation of citizenship from individuals who are under international sanctions, those who have enrolled in non-Moldovan armed forces, and citizens who have caused substantial damage to Moldova (Necsutu, 2024b). A month later, President Maia Sandu amended the criminal code to expand the definition of treason (Tanas, 2024).

According to a recent report from the Partnership for Development Centre in Chisinau, 70% of Moldovans are unwilling to accept LGBTQI+ individuals as neighbors (Necsutu, 2024). The study also found that 50% of Moldovans would similarly reject neighbors living with HIV/AIDS.

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Monaco

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Mongolia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

New for September 2024 release: Under PMAD criteria and definitions, a mass atrocity has not occurred in Mongolia since at least 2018. However, journalists in Mongolia have faced intimidation and defamation cases from politicians since at least 2019 (Scott, 2024). Disseminating “misinformation” and “illegally” investigating the state are crimes under Mongolia’s criminal code. At least two journalists were detained between December 2023 and June 2024. The colleague of one of the detained journalists was found dead just over a week before the journalist was arrested.

An undetermined number of individuals were detained after protesting the Belarusian president’s visit to Mongolia (CIVICUS Monitor, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Montenegro

In September 2021, the enthronement of a new Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) church leader sparked protests and clashes with police in Cetinje, the former royal capital of Montenegro (Freedom House, 2022). Though Montenegro declared its independence from Serbia in 2006, the SOC remains the nation’s largest religious institution; to the protesters in Cetinje, the September enthronement ceremony served as further evidence of “creeping Serbian influence” (Al Jazeera, 2021). Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović, who supported the protest, called the enthronement “just one of a series of events in which the state of Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox Church as an instrument of Greater Serbian nationalism is trying to humiliate and appropriate Montenegro” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The SOC criticized

Đukanović and the protesters as trying to undermine its religious rights (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Protesters set up roadblocks in an attempt to prevent the ceremony from taking place, and police responded with what the U.S. Department of State has characterized as disproportionate force, including tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and, allegedly, rubber bullets (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2022b). An estimated 50–60 people were injured, including 20–30 police (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Child marriage remains prevalent among Montenegro’s Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities, with underage girls reportedly bought and sold as virgin brides (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Brides who are found to not be virgins are reportedly subjected to violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Morocco

In June 2022, at least 23 African migrants died at the border between Morocco and the Spanish exclave of Melilla (Human Rights Watch, 2022). As many as 2,000 migrants, most of them Sudanese and South Sudanese, attempted to scale a series of border fences and thus gain entry to Spanish territory (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Moroccan authorities blamed the ensuing deaths on a stampede, which they claim was caused by armed and violent members of the migrant crowd (Human Rights Watch, 2022). However, video evidence shows that there was also excessive force on the part of Moroccan security forces, including “a Moroccan security agent beating obviously injured men prone on the ground and another agent throwing a limp body onto a pile of people” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In addition to those killed, dozens were reportedly injured (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In the wake of the violence, Moroccan authorities allegedly organized “hasty mass burials,” and 65 migrants were charged with igniting fires, attacking security forces, and facilitating illegal border crossings (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Eljechtimi, 2022). The previous year, Moroccan authorities allegedly burned down migrant shelters in forests outside the city of Nador, where roughly 2,000 migrants were camping in hopes of gaining entry to Melilla (Ahmed, 2021).

In April 2021, Moroccan police reportedly arrested 33 teachers who were peacefully protesting in the capital city of Rabat (Amnesty International, 2022). Twenty-two of the demonstrators later claimed to have been sexually assaulted by police during the protest (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Women, LGBTQI+ persons, and religious minorities in Morocco face legal discrimination. The law favors men over women in cases of property and inheritance, and spousal rape is not a crime (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Consensual same-sex activity is punishable by up to three years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The government does not recognize Christian marriages (Freedom House, 2022a).

Since 1975, Morocco has claimed authority over Western Sahara, which the United Nations considers a “non-self-governing territory” (Freedom House, 2022b). For mass atrocities that are perceived to have

occurred within Western Sahara, including those regions under Moroccan administration, please reference the country case narrative for Western Sahara.

New for September 2023 release: On 19 January 2023, the European Parliament adopted the first resolution in 25 years criticizing the fundamental rights and freedoms situation in Morocco (González, 2023). Among the various concerns expressed, the text refers to the repression in the northern region of Rif, traditionally marginalized by the state (González, 2023). In March 2023, more than 50 students were injured as a result of excessive force by Moroccan security to prevent a student activity at Hassan II University of Casablanca (Euro Med Monitor, 2023). Students were forcibly removed from the auditorium, Union activists were detained for several hours, and they were severely abused (Euro Med Monitor, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Within the first half of 2023, Morocco’s Public Prosecutor’s Office received six allegations of torture and 47 allegations of excessive violence; this violence was largely committed against detained individuals, though there were complaints of violence committed by security officials against Western Sahara pro-independence protesters (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

Insulting or criticizing state institutions, the police and military, the king, the government, and Islam, are criminalized (U.S. Department of State, 2024). At least 778 individuals faced prosecution from the government for statements made, mainly with claims of defamation, contempt, or dissemination of false information (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Saïd Boukioud, a Moroccan internet user, was sentenced on July 31, 2023, to five years of jail time after posting interpreted criticism on Facebook of the king at the end of 2020 (The Guardian, 2023).

LGBTQI+ persons continue to face discrimination in Morocco. The penal code criminalizes same-sex relations, and authorities reportedly detained and imprisoned men who were suspected of engaging in same-sex acts or suspected of being homosexual (Human Rights Watch, 2024). At least 87 persons suspected of homosexuality were detained or convicted in 2023 (Human Dignity Trust, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: An investigation by Lighthouse Reports (2024) found that Moroccan forces target people with darker skin, arresting them and dumping them hundreds of miles south of the capital. These “desert dumps” occur every day. At least seven dumping sites were identified.

In July 2024, King Mohammed VI pardoned 2,476 people, including journalists and human rights defenders (Farge, 2024). However, violence against protestors, activists, and opposition continued in 2024.

In March, a pro-Palestinian activist was arrested after criticizing Morocco’s ties to Israel online and was sentenced in April to five years in prison (Rédaction Africanews & AP, 2024). Moroccan security forces met a nurses’ and doctors’ protest in July with water cannons and arrests (Middle East Monitor, 2024). A former human rights minister was convicted to five years in prison on alleged corruption charges in July (Metz, 2024).

In March 2024, an anonymous Instagram account released a “death list” of 22 Moroccan feminists and LGBTQI+ activists (El Atti, 2024). On August 7, 2024, Moroccan intelligence services arbitrarily detained and abused several families of defected soldiers across the country (Saada, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Mozambique

Since late 2017, the province of Cabo Delgado in northeastern Mozambique has been the epicenter of a violent conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and the central government based in Maputo (Amnesty International, 2021b). The fundamentalist insurgents are primarily led by Al-Shabab (also known as Ansar al-Sunna or Al Sunna wa-Jama'a), a designated terrorist organization with ties to the Islamic State (Human Rights Watch, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2021). The actions by Al-Shabab, Mozambican security forces, and foreign mercenaries have led to a deepening humanitarian crisis (ACLED, 2021; Eick, 2021).

Al-Shabab continues to commit numerous atrocities against civilians in Cabo Delgado, which is home to the Makonde, Makua, and Mwani ethnic groups (Lister, 2021; West, 2018; Estelle et al., 2021). As of August 2022, some 946,000 people were displaced in northern Mozambique due to violence in Cabo Delgado (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In 2021, an attack by Al-Shabab on the town of Palma forced more than 88,000 people to flee to the nearby village of Quitunda, where they were subjected to ill-treatment and mass containment by government soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2022). As part of its campaign of mass violence, Al-Shabab is known to use child soldiers and to force kidnapped women and girls into sexual slavery (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Since launching a counter-offensive in 2018, Mozambican security forces have been implicated in abuses against civilians, including the alleged targeting of suspected Al-Shabab sympathizers and agents for extrajudicial punishment (International Crisis Group, 2021). Civilians have reported sexual violence, torture, and arbitrary detention by state forces (AfricaNews, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2021). The international community has criticized Mozambican forces for indiscriminate killings in the north and has called for independent investigations into torture and other atrocities attributed to their agents (Amnesty International, 2020; Campbell, 2020). In recent years, Mozambique's counter-insurgency efforts have been bolstered by troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community, allowing government forces to make inroads into insurgent-held territory (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As a result, much of the fighting has shifted to the southern areas of Cabo Delgado and the northern areas of Nampula province, which had not experienced attacks before (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Outside of Cabo Delgado, state security forces have employed disproportionate force and arbitrary detentions against peaceful protesters. August 2022 saw two such incidents: In Manica province, police used live fire to disperse hundreds of protesting traders, injuring three and arresting 21 in the process (Human Rights Watch, 2023). At a Maputo fish market, police used tear gas to disperse a protest led mainly by women (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

In 2020, the Mozambican government contracted the Dyck Advisory Group, a private military contractor, to support its counter-insurgency campaign (CNN, 2021). The Dyck Advisory Group has been accused of lethal violence against civilians in the targeted region (Al Jazeera, 2021; Vice World News, 2021). More than 50 civilians have been killed, and the actions of the Dyck Advisory Group have been described as potential war crimes (Amnesty International, 2021a). The Group's counter-insurgency contract ended in 2021, and it is reported that they have since left Mozambique (AFP, 2021).

Gender-based violence, particularly against internally displaced women, is reportedly widespread in Mozambique; perceived perpetrators include ISIS-Mozambique and certain individuals involved in humanitarian assistance programs, with the latter allegedly engaging in the sexual exploitation of displaced women in exchange for food and shelter (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In certain rural areas, widowed women are reportedly forced to have sex with a member of their deceased husband’s family as part of a so-called “purification” practice (U.S. Department of State, 2023). There have also been reports of LGBTQI+ women being subjected to “corrective rape” (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMDA), the country’s largest LGBTQI+ organization, has had a pending registration request since 2008, and while the country’s Constitutional Court has since ruled that LAMDA’s registration cannot be blocked on grounds of “morality,” it stopped short of directing the government to grant LAMDA’s request (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In addition to gender-based violence, women are perceived to face legal discrimination under customary law, including an inability to inherit land (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

New for June 2023 release: In January 2023, a video began circulating showing soldiers throwing dead bodies onto a pile of burning furniture in Cabo Delgado (Amnesty International, 2023). The incident, which is believed to have taken place in November 2022, reportedly involved members of the South African National Defense Force, which has been operating in the region alongside Mozambique government forces since 2021 (Amnesty International, 2023). While the exact identities of the victims are unknown, some of the bodies were reportedly dressed in civilian clothes (Aineah, 2023).

– *Austin S. Matthews, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for April 2024 release: While the annual total of victims of perceived mass atrocities appeared to decrease modestly in 2023 relative to 2022, targeted violence against civilians increased in December 2023. Apparent ethnic and politically motivated clashes in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province reportedly displaced nearly 2,000 people and killed many other, though the exact count is uncertain (OCHA, 2024). In December, Islamic State Mozambique Provinces and other violent non-state actor groups reportedly “continued to move toward Cabo Delgado’s southern districts...in an apparent attempt to avoid” patrols by Rwandan military and Southern African Development Community forces in the north (Crisis Group, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: The Islamic State Mozambique Province continues to attack civilians in Cabo Delgado – including through the use of child soldiers (Crisis Watch, 2024; HRW, 2024) – forcibly displacing several thousand in May 2024 alone. More than 100,000 have reportedly been forcibly displaced by Islamic State violence since December 2023 (IOM, 2024).

Since October 2023, attacks against and arbitrary arrests of human rights activists have reportedly seen an uptick, allegedly due to increase police pressure (FIDH, 2024). According to BeterlsmannStiftung, “The

FRELIMO Party dominates all spheres of life, with space for opposing voices progressively shrinking” (BTI, 2024).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: Estimates indicate a 2.7 percent risk of a new mass killing occurring in Mozambique between 2023 and 2024. The country has consistently ranked as high-risk for genocides in recent years, driven by an extremist insurgency in the northern region (Cowling, 2024). As of January 2024, there were some 76,000 people living in Macomia who had been displaced over the past years. In February, around 3,600 people were newly displaced following multiple attacks in the district. In Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, recent attacks by an ISIS-linked armed group, Al-Shabab, have forced over 80,000 people to flee their homes (MSF, 2024). The group killed at least four civilians in Chiure district and 25 Mozambican soldiers in Macomia district. The violence has also led to the destruction of houses, churches, schools, and health centers, worsening the region's already strained public services. Despite government claims of control with support from regional forces, the situation remains dire, with displaced people needing urgent assistance and protection (Machado, 2024).

Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants continue to pose a significant threat in northern Mozambique. On 19 June, reports of ISMP presence caused panic in Macomia town, which had suffered a large-scale assault in May. The same day, ISMP attacked Mbau town in Mocimboa da Praia, where Rwandan and local militia troops are stationed, reportedly killing four civilians. Additionally, at least one soldier was killed in Nambala village, Macomia, after triggering an explosive device set by insurgents. ISMP also increased activity in southern Cabo Delgado districts, including Chiúre, Mecufi, and Metuge, raising concerns about potential attacks near the provincial capital, Pemba. The threat of insurgent spillover into neighboring Nampula province remained prevalent, with militants spotted there on 18 June. Despite ongoing violence, the government continued to downplay the severity of the situation, with President Nyusi stating on 16 June that militants had been expelled from district capitals and all permanent bases destroyed (CrisisWatch, 2024a & 2024b).

On 30 May, Nyusi vetoed a revision to the electoral law that would have allowed district courts to order recounts, fueling concerns over potential restrictions on a free and fair vote. On 10 June, the electoral commission admitted to inadvertently registering over 800,000 non-existent voters, primarily in ruling FRELIMO party strongholds. Additionally, thousands of voters in Cabo Delgado were unable to register or collect voting cards due to insecurity (CrisisWatch, 2024b).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Myanmar

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, overthrew the country's democratically elected government (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). This spawned a widespread protest movement, to which the military junta has responded with mass killings, arbitrary arrests, forced displacements, torture, and sexual violence.

Mass killings that are perceived to have been carried out by the Tatmadaw include, but are not limited to, the following. On February 28, 2021, security forces killed some 26 people across eight cities during

nationwide demonstrations (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). On March 3, security forces shot and killed at least 38 protesters; on March 14, at least 66 people were killed in Yangon Region (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). Two weeks later, on a national holiday known as Armed Forces Day, some 140 people were killed by security forces (Al Jazeera, 2022). On April 9, security forces killed an estimated 82 people in Bago Region during an attack on protestors' barricades and encampments (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). In July, 40 people were reportedly killed in Sagaing Region (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). On December 24, in what has been dubbed the Christmas Eve Massacre, 40 civilians were burned alive by security forces in Kayah State (Freedom House, 2022). In October 2022, at least 80 people were killed when military jets bombed an outdoor concert in Kachin State (Paddock, 2022). The concert was celebrating the Kachin Independence Organization, an ethnic armed organization (EAO) that has long opposed the Tatmadaw, and which recently began training soldiers from the pro-democracy People's Defense Force, or PDF (Paddock, 2022).

Groups that oppose the Tatmadaw, including the PDF and multiple EAOs, are also perceived to have committed mass atrocities, including extrajudicial killings. For instance, in June 2021, commanders of the Karen National Defense Army, an EAO, announced that they had killed 25 people who they alleged were spies of the Tatmadaw (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In the early days of the junta, hundreds of members of parliament and the National League for Democracy party were arbitrarily detained, including former civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). More than 98 journalists were arrested in the first nine months after the coup (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). Healthcare workers have also been targeted by the military for their central role in the country's civil disobedience movement: 260 healthcare workers were attacked between February and October 2021, and as many as 600 have outstanding arrest warrants against them (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). At the end of 2021, more than 100 politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, and protesters remained detained in undisclosed locations (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). The torture of prisoners has been widely reported, including accounts of sexual assault and gender-based violence against female detainees (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). At least 100 political prisoners were reportedly tortured to death between February and September 2021 (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

By the end of 2021, more than 296,000 people were reportedly displaced since the coup, particularly in the ethnic communities of Kayah, Karen, Chin, and Shan States (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Escalating violence between the Tatmadaw and regional EAOs reportedly displaced an estimated 150,000 Karenni Christians (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Since the coup, the military has continued to perpetrate mass atrocities—including mass detention, mass erasure, and reduced citizenship—against the country's ethnic Rohingya, the majority of whom are Muslim. In 2017, the military launched a campaign of terror against the Rohingya of northern Rakhine State; amid reports of indiscriminate killings, burning villages, and mass rape, some 740,000 Rohingya were forced to flee to neighboring Bangladesh (Freedom House, 2022). The United States government has since determined that these atrocities amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2022b). At present, an estimated 130,000 Rohingya remain confined in "open-air detention camps" in central Rakhine State (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). Local authorities prohibit Rohingya families from having more than two children, and the junta continues to deny the Rohingya recognition as a "national ethnic group" (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Spousal rape is not considered a crime in Myanmar, provided the wife is of legally marriageable age; married women are thus exposed to increased risk of intimate partner violence (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In many communities around the country, statutory law is eclipsed by customary law, which often discriminates against women in matters of marriage, property, and inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Though rarely enforced, the law also discriminates against Buddhist women by requiring them to notify the public of any intent to marry a non-Buddhist man, at which point objections to the marriage can be raised in court (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

LGBTQI+ persons in Myanmar face violence and discrimination in various forms. Sexual activity “against the order of nature” is punishable by up to 20 years in prison, and LGBTQI+ persons are often detained or threatened with arrest for “disguising” their faces (U.S. Department of State, 2023). At least seven LGBTQI+ persons were killed and another 37 arrested in 2022 for peacefully protesting against the military regime; among pro-democracy demonstrators who are arrested by police, LGBTQI+ persons are perceived to be disproportionately targeted for humiliation and physical abuse (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

New for June 2023 release: In January 2023, the military destroyed a Catholic church and set fire to a nearby convent in Sagaing Region, known to be a PDF stronghold (Lubov, 2023). Some 3,000 people were forced to flee as the military destroyed their village of 500 homes (Lubov, 2023). In total, January saw some 4,700 civilian homes were burned down in Sagaing (The Irrawaddy, 2023a). During a series of raids that also took place in Sagaing Region from late February to early March, soldiers under the Myanmar military’s Division 99 reportedly killed and beheaded 20 resistance members and massacred 16 civilians, including three women who were raped before being killed (The Irrawaddy, 2023b).

February 2023 marked two years of military rule, which has seen an estimated 17,000 protesters and activists arrested and some 2,900 killed (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The junta has reportedly blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of displaced persons, including through new movement and aid restrictions that have worsened food and water shortages, disease, and malnutrition among the Rohingya of Rakhine State (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Myanmar’s military coup leaders have been accused of murdering dozens of political prisoners and in some cases disguising their deaths as escape attempts (Chau, 2023). On June 27, the military removed political prisoners from Kyaiksakaw Prison, in Bago Region’s Daik-U township, under the pretense of transferring them, but a total of 37 have since gone missing (Chau, 2023).

– Collin Van Son, updated Phoebe Cribb

New for April 2024 release: Human security in Myanmar further deteriorated in late 2023. Heightened conflict in Shan State, which borders China’s Yunnan province and provinces in Northern Laos and Thailand, has resulted in territorial losses by Myanmar’s ruling junta. UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews observes, “The junta has responded to military losses in the same way it always has: by attacking civilians and obstructing humanitarian relief” (OHCHR, 2023). Al Jazeera reports that the military has also intentionally targeted civilians far from the front lines of the conflict, including an “air attack on Waylu

village in the Matupi township[, which] killed 11 civilians including eight children” (Fishbein and Awng, 2023).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: Attacks on civilian targets have reportedly become more frequent, as the military reacts to territorial losses (AP, 2024; OHCHR, 2024). To reconstitute forces, forcible conscription, including of children, is reportedly widespread in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, with inducements including threats of physical violence (Chaudhuri, 2024). Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has allegedly been systematically attacking Rohingya to consolidate their political control and ethnic domination in Rakhine (Chaudhuri, 2024).

The UN estimates that nearly 20,000 political prisoners remain in captivity, many of whom are tortured (OHCHR, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: In a massacre in Let Htoke Taw village, Myanmar, over 30 civilians were killed. Eyewitnesses report that 33 people, including three 17-year-old boys and three carpenters, were killed in an army raid involving 100-200 soldiers searching for resistance fighters. Survivors described being held captive, interrogated, and then shot en masse. The soldiers also burned 170-200 homes and destroyed water pumps. This attack followed two other mass killings: at least 15 people were killed in an airstrike on a monastery in Magway region, and 32 died in fighting in Mandalay region, all part of Myanmar’s ongoing civil war (Peck, 2024).

Rohingya civilians are caught in conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA), with the military using aerial attacks that have killed civilians and destroyed homes. The AA has also been accused of atrocities, including a large-scale arson on May 17, displacing thousands. Nearly one million Rohingya remain in refugee camps in Bangladesh, facing poor conditions and food insecurity (Amnesty, 2024a).

Myanmar continues to receive jet fuel shipments despite global sanctions, facilitating military air strikes against civilians. Amnesty documented at least two shipments from Vietnam to Myanmar in 2024 via the Chinese tanker HUITONG78. On May 9, a military airstrike on a monastery in Magway Region killed 12 civilians and injured 26 others. The strike destroyed the 100-year-old monastery, and survivors reported a fighter jet firing at people fleeing the scene (Amnesty, 2024b).

On August 5, nearly 200 people were killed by drone strikes and shelling as civilians fled fighting in Maungdaw (Wright, Coren, Ripon and Phillips, 2024). Since November 2023, over 320,000 people have been displaced in Rakhine and Chin States. About 630,000 Rohingya remain in Myanmar under apartheid-like conditions. In Bangladesh, about 1 million Rohingya refugees face increasing violence. Since January 2023, over 5,000 Rohingya have attempted dangerous boat journeys to Indonesia and Malaysia, with 520 dying or missing (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– *Updated by Avantika Singh*

Namibia

Same-sex sexual relations between men are illegal in Namibia, and while the law is not directly enforced, it does have “discrimination repercussions” that may amount to reduced citizenship for LGBTQI+ persons (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In July 2023, Namibia's upper house of parliament on Wednesday passed a law banning same-sex marriage and punishing their supporters, seen as an unconstitutional attack by the LGBTQ community (AfricaNews, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Following months of increased violence against women and LGBTQI+ individuals, the Namibian high court overturned the criminalization of same-sex intercourse (Markowitz, 2024; Savage, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

Nepal

In recent years, Nepali authorities have imposed increasingly tight restrictions on Tibetan communities living within Nepal. Nepali authorities have prevented public celebration of the Dalai Lama’s birthday, and police officers have been dispatched to monitor other Tibetan cultural events (U.S. Department of State, 2022). For more than 25 years, the Nepali government has refrained from issuing personal identification documents to Tibetan refugees (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The difficulties that Tibetans face when pursuing formal refugee status are reportedly the result of Chinese pressure on the Nepali government (Freedom House, 2022). Asylum seekers from other countries, including Pakistan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, are also denied recognition as refugees (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Nepali women face violence and discrimination in the form of traditional beliefs and practices. Rural women—particularly widows, the elderly, and members of the Dalit caste—are at risk of violence due to traditional beliefs about witchcraft (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Within a one-year span, police registered 61 cases of witchcraft accusations and subsequent torture (U.S. Department of State, 2022). According to the U.S. Department of State, the traditional practice of *chhaupadi*, in which women and girls are expelled from their homes during menstruation, remains “a serious problem,” particularly in rural western districts (2022). Women and girls sometimes die from exposure after being forced to reside in livestock sheds, animal pens, and caves, including during the winter and monsoon seasons (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Reports of excessive force by security personnel are common. For instance, in October 2021, police in Rupandehi district allegedly used excessive force against demonstrators who were protesting an eviction drive, resulting in the deaths of four protesters and the injury of dozens more (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

– *Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Between January 2023 and October 2023, at least 19 cases of torture were committed by police officers in pretrial detention facilities (U.S. Department of State, 2024). In the first

six and a half months of 2023, 117 arbitrary arrests were documented (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Journalists and press workers focused on corruption faced threats and abuses (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

On June 28, 2023, Nepal's Supreme Court ordered the government to legally register same-sex marriages (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Approximately 6.7 million individuals eligible for citizenship in Nepal do not have the citizenship documentation necessary to vote; register births, deaths, and marriages; own permanent property; access higher education; and receive state social benefits (U.S. Department of State, 2024). In June 2023, the government implemented the Nepal Citizenship First Amendment Act, which would officially register 1.2 million people as citizens (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

Nepal's citizenship laws create difficulties for single Nepali mothers and prioritize Nepali fathers (Human Rights Watch, 2024). A child born to a single Nepali mother can only be granted citizenship if the father is not identifiable (Human Rights Watch, 2024). If the mother is Nepali but the father is foreign, children receive a lower citizenship status than they would have had with two Nepali parents (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The Tibetan community, particularly refugees, has been unable to obtain identification documents since 1995, leaving an estimated 9,000 Tibetan refugees undocumented (U.S. Department of State). The lack of documentation inhibited Tibetan refugees' abilities to own property, bank accounts, business, or driver's licenses; and practice professional licensing in fields like medicine (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: After years of restrictions, a celebration in honor of the Dalai Lama's 89th birthday was successfully held in Kathmandu (Tibetan Review, 2024).

The caste system continues to be pervasive in Nepal, and Dalits face violence and discrimination (Nepali Times, 2024). In June, a Muslim mob threw stones at predominately Dalit Hindu homes (OpIndia, 2024). Dalit women in intercaste marriages face high rates of physical and psychological violence (Sunar, 2024).

Journalists and protestors continue to face violence and threats (Civicus Monitor, 2024). Nepali police met pro-monarchy protestors with water cannons and tear gas in April, injuring several protestors (The Kathmandu Post, 2024). The number of persons targeted does not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Juvenile detention centers are reportedly overpopulated, violent, and lack necessities (Ghimire, 2024b). Instances of torture have been reported in detention centers, and though the government has compensated some victims, it has not investigated any complaints (Ghimire, 2024a).

The Kamal Pokhari pond in Kathmandu, a site of Indigenous Pradhan Newar rituals, has been significantly damaged by the development of a shopping outlet center (Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2024). Activists against the shopping center have received threats and court cases (Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 2024). The Indigenous Chepang and Tamang community faces displacement from mining companies (Chepang, 2024).

In June 2023, Nepal's Supreme Court ruled that all courts in Nepal must recognize same-sex marriages (Human Rights Watch, 2024a).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Netherlands

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, full-face coverings, including niqabs and burqas, are banned in schools, hospitals, public transportation, and government buildings (U.S. Department of State, 2022). While the law is rarely enforced, it may nonetheless constitute reduced citizenship for Muslim citizens of the Netherlands, although it is not presently coded as such in the PMAD data.

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Demolitions for urban developments occur in low-income areas, mainly displacing older persons and non-Dutch residents (Human Rights Council, 2024). The state also does not provide adequate support to non-Dutch homeless persons, and in some cities, sleeping in the street is criminalized (Human Rights Council, 2024). Roma and Sinti communities face discrimination in education, the justice system, and caravan housing (Human Rights Council, 2024). Migrant workers are exploited for their labor under 12,000 employment agencies (Human Rights Council, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New Zealand

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Nicaragua

In 2018, President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosaria Murillo, oversaw a violent government crackdown against a mass anti-government movement (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Freedom House, 2022). By the end of 2018, Ortega’s policy of “exile, jail, or death” toward the opposition had left at least 355 people dead, injured more than 2,000, saw hundreds illegally detained, tortured, or raped, and forced more than 130,000 to flee the country (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In the years since, state forces have continued to detain people who participated in the protests of 2018 and 2019, often without a warrant or court order (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In the lead-up to Ortega’s rigged re-election in 2021, authorities arbitrarily arrested 39 opposition figures and detained them in undisclosed locations (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2022). As of September 2021, more than 150 political prisoners reportedly remained imprisoned (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

In addition to the military and police, the Ortega-Murillo regime also relies on parapolice: “nonuniformed, armed, and masked units . . . under the direct control of the government” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Within the country’s north-central regions and North Caribbean Autonomous Region (RACN), the parapolice have allegedly continued a “campaign of terror,” including targeted killings, against those opposed to Ortega’s ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Indigenous groups and ethnic minorities, including persons of African descent, are reportedly subject to discrimination and violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In August 2021, for instance, 12 members of the Miskito and Mayangna indigenous groups were tortured and killed by armed gold miners, who also raped two women and dismembered several of the victims’ bodies (Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a). LGBTQI+ persons also remain a frequent target of violence by government forces and FSLN supporters (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Forty-three attacks against LGBTQI+ persons were reported in the first half of 2021, with transgender women suffering the highest proportion of abuse (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

The Ortega-Murillo regime continues to intensify its harassment and persecution of Catholic worshippers and clergy, with the latter labeled as “terrorists” and “coup-plotters” (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). As the FSLN tightened its grip over Nicaragua, Catholic churches became “the only places in the country where citizens could speak their minds and listen to speakers who were not appointed by the state” (Bermúdez et al., 2022). As part of a campaign of intimidation, police and parapolice have reportedly disrupted religious services, taken photographs of priests and churchgoers, and even flown drones over churches (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In a three-month span in 2022 (June–August), police reportedly arrested eight priests and forced a ninth into hiding (Bermúdez et al., 2022).

In February 2023, the Nicaraguan government stripped 222 political prisoners of their citizenship before promptly deporting them (Peralta, 2023). The following week, an additional 94 dissidents, including human rights activists and journalists, were declared “traitors to the homeland” and stripped by the government of their citizenship and assets (Peralta, 2023; United Nations, 2023). On May 3, 2023, 40 political opponents of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega were arrested and charged with crimes including conspiracy and treason (Reuters, 2023). The opposition figures were detained, charged, then transferred to be placed under house arrest and conditional release (Reuters, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Indigenous persons in Nicaragua faced a heightened risk of violence. In March of 2023, five Mayangna Indigenous persons were killed and two were injured by affiliates of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Around 28 families were displaced by this violence (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

At least 59 detained persons experienced degrading treatment in 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Female detainees experienced strip searches, threats, and gender-based violence committed by parapolice forces, prison staff, and police officers (U.S. Department of State, 2024). Political opponents faced a high risk of arbitrary arrest and detainment. Within the first six days of April 2023, at least 15 persons affiliated with the political opposition were arrested; and by November 2023, there were a suspected 91 political prisoners held in detention (U.S. Department of State, 2024). In April, between 600

and 900 individuals were either fired from the Supreme Court or arrested (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

The Nicaraguan government routinely stripped political opponents and suspected threats (including journalists) of their citizenship (U.S. Department of State, 2024). An estimated 317 persons were stripped of their citizenship in 2023 (U.S. Department of State, 2024).

At least 36 femicides occurred in 2023 (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

New for September 2024 release: NGO Monitoreo Azul y Blanco found 11,350 human rights violations in Nicaragua since 2018 (Crisis Watch, 2024). In February 2024, United Nations human rights experts quantified the level of human rights abuse in Nicaragua as equal to crimes against humanity (Janetsky & Selser, 2024).

In late February, the United Nations accused the Nicaraguan government of grievous human rights violations as the government continued to crack down on religious and civil society organizations (Crisis Watch, 2024). In May 2024, the government banned public processions held in honor of Catholic saints (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 55 religious leaders have been detained and 44 exiled since 2018 (Crisis Watch, 2024). Eleven pastors were convicted in March 2024, and at least seven people were detained after engaging in religious services during the Holy Week (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 26 Catholic priests have been exiled to Rome in 2024 (Genocide Watch, 2024; Vatican News, 2024). At least twelve Catholic priests were forcibly disappeared in August 2024 (Catholic Vote, 2024). At least 30 people have been arrested during the 2024 crackdown on civil space, with at least 131 people detained as of June 2024 (Relief Web, 2024).

Many NGOs have been disbanded or closed by the government. At least 46 legal statuses have been canceled, and 69 NGOs—including eight religious—have been closed in the first seven months of 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024).

On January 10, 2024, exiled opposition leader Joao Ismael Maldonado Bermúdez survived an assassination attempt in Costa Rica (Crisis Watch, 2024). As of July 2024, at least 147 political prisoners are detained in Nicaragua (Crisis Watch, 2024). Before the 2024 elections, the Nicaraguan government canceled the legal status of an indigenous Afro-descendant political party and detained one of its members (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2024).

At least 643 cases of less lethal violence and forced displacement against Indigenous peoples were documented in the first half of 2024 (Radwin, 2024). Nearly 60 of the cases included gender-based violence (Radwin, 2024). The government also targets indigenous forest rangers—defenders of indigenous land against mining operations and developments (Redacción Confidencial, 2024). Four forest rangers were convicted to 22 years in prison in early 2024, bringing the detained Indigenous population to ten (Redacción Confidencial, 2024). At least 25 other Indigenous people are wanted by the National Police (Redacción Confidencial, 2024). Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua also face violence from ‘colonos’, non-Indigenous Nicaraguans who encroach on Indigenous territory (Mosaico CSI, 2024). Indigenous activists and leaders claim that the government’s use of Indigenous territory to extract resources and the persecution of Indigenous peoples is colonization equivalent to ethnocide (Agencia EFE, 2024).

Journalists continue to be targeted by the state, with at least 17 journalists exiled in 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024). At least 34 media workers fled Nicaragua within the first half of 2024 (AFP, 2024).

Prison conditions are poor, and many detainees are not tried in court (Aburto, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Niger

Note that much of the violence experienced in Niger in recent years has been the result of terrorism, which is largely excluded from PMAD coding. In the PMAD data, only events with clear group-based motivations have been included.

Through 2022, armed terrorist groups continued to carry out attacks with apparent ethnic dimensions. ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) conduct regular attacks in Niger's western regions, while in the southeast region of Diffa, ongoing violence is largely attributed to ISIS in West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Haram (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Between January and August 2021, more than 420 civilians were killed by armed Islamist groups in the western regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua, near the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Human Rights Watch, 2021; News24, 2022). In January 2021, over 100 civilians, nearly all of them ethnic Zarma, were killed by Islamist fighters in Tillabéri (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Less than four months later, an estimated 170 ethnic Tuaregs were killed in Tahoua in what Human Rights Watch has called "the deadliest attack on civilians in Niger's recent history" (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In a two-month period in 2022 (April–May), more than 34,000 people were reportedly displaced by violence in Tillabéri (News24, 2022). In Diffa, where Boko Haram and ISIS-WA have targeted refugees for the recruitment of child soldiers, more than 16,000 people were reportedly displaced by violence in August 2022 (U.S. Department of State, 2022b; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022).

Nigerien security forces are perceived to target and abuse ethnic minorities during counterterrorism operations, particularly ethnic Fulani (Tillabéri Region) and ethnic Boudouma (Diffa Region) (2022b). In early 2021, security forces reportedly killed 26 detainees in Tillabéri (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In what may amount to arbitrary detention, the Nigerien government has reportedly detained suspected terrorists on nothing more than circumstantial evidence (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Women in Niger face discrimination in the law and in harmful traditional practices. Under family law, men are considered to be head of household, and women are disadvantaged in matters such as inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The law against female genital mutilation/cutting is poorly enforced, with 8.5 percent of girls and women estimated to have undergone the procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The practice of *wahaya*, a form of hereditary slavery in which young girls are sold into forced marriages, is likewise illegal, though enforcement remains weak in rural areas (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Among Tuareg, Zarma, Fulani, Toubou, and Arab minorities, particularly in the country's northern and western regions, traditional forms of caste-based servitude continue; according to some estimates, as many as 800,000 people remain enslaved under such practices (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

New for September 2023 release: In Tillabery department, clashes erupted in late early May between sedentary Djerma and nomadic Fulani communities in Dessa, Kandadji and Ayorou communes, leaving at least ten people dead and up to 18,000 displaced, however this event was not included in the PMAD dataset as those displaced returned shortly afterwards (Crisis Group, 2023). On 28 July, Head of Presidential Guard, Gen. Abderrahmane Tchiani appeared on state TV and declared himself head of new ruling junta, National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (Crisis Group, 2023). Thousands of pro-junta protesters marched in Niamey waving Russian flags and stormed French embassy, resulting in tear gas used by French security (Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Niger remained under a military government in 2024, and the government began prosecuting the over-thrown president for high treason and undermining national security (Al Jazeera, 2024). As victim magnitudes and other details become clearer, this politically-motivation containment and potential less-lethal violence may be added to the PMAD data.

In March 2024, Niger ended the military agreement between Niger and the United States and requested the withdrawal of United States forces (Africa News, 2024). The United States troop withdrawal is expected by mid-September (Crisis Group, 2024).

Journalists and media workers reported they faced arbitrary arrests and detentions by Nigerien authorities in 2024, though the number of impacted journalists in 2024 did not meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion (Amnesty International, 2024). At least 29 Nigerien soldiers were targeted by jihadist groups in the first four months of 2024, including Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (The Defense Post, 2024a). Jihadist groups were also suspected of being behind a January attack in Motogatta that killed at least 22 civilians and a February attack in the Tillaberi region that killed nine people (The Defense Post, 2024c). In response to jihadist violence, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso cooperated to produce a joint force to mitigate violence (The Defense Post, 2024b).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk*

Nigeria

Nigeria's Northeast Zone remains the focal point of terrorist activity by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Both groups continue to perpetrate gender-based atrocities against women, including mass rape, forced marriages, and sexual slavery, and to forcibly recruit children into their ranks (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Note, however, that terrorist attacks which are not clearly based on the targeted group's identity are excluded from PMAD.

As part of their campaign against Boko Haram, Nigerian security forces have reportedly carried out forced abortions on women and girls impregnated by Boko Haram fighters (Human Rights Watch, 2022). According to a 2022 Reuters investigation, Nigerian security forces have "slaughtered" at least 60—and possibly up to thousands—of children for allegedly collaborating with militants or for having "inherited the tainted blood of insurgent fathers" (Carsten et al., 2022). Since 2013, government forces have carried

out an estimated 10,000 forced or coerced abortions on women and girls formerly held captive by Boko Haram (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Other alleged abuses by Nigerian security forces have included the arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of suspected insurgents, including members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement (Amnesty International, 2021). In May 2021, the government of Imo State arrested at least 400 people for alleged ties to the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the armed wing of the IPOB (Amnesty International, 2021). According to an investigation by Amnesty International, most of those arrested were “randomly picked up in their homes and off the street and had nothing to do with the ESN” (2021). In September 2021, 57 people were arrested in the capital city of Abuja when security forces clashed with members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite Muslim group (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

As part of their insurgencies against the Nigerian government, Boko Haram and ISIS-WA have carried out targeted attacks against moderate Muslims and Christians (Freedom House, 2022). In June 2022, at least 40 Christian worshippers were killed in an attack on a Catholic church in Ondo State, a hitherto peaceful region in the country’s southwest (Obiezu, 2022; NPR, 2022). Authorities later blamed the massacre on ISIS-WA (Obiezu, 2022).

In 2021, communal violence between predominately Muslim herders and predominately Christian farmers resulted in an estimated 1,112 deaths (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Degraded grasslands continue to drive the Fulani, a semi-nomadic Muslim ethnic group, to migrate further south with their herds, bringing them into increasing conflict with Christian farmers (Freedom House, 2022). In September 2021, Muslim herders killed at least 49 people and abducted 27 in attacks on local communities in Kaduna State; the majority of the victims were reportedly Christian (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). The following month, a land dispute saw the Kaduna State government demolish over 260 buildings, including six churches, within a predominately Christian community (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in various forms. Spousal rape is not criminalized, and under the cultural practice of *purdah*, which continues in spite of federal law, widows are subjected to rituals of confinement and “inheritance” by their late husband’s family (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; U.S. Department of State, 2023). In some of the 12 northern states that have adopted sharia law, women are segregated from men in areas such as transportation and health care (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In so-called “baby factories,” which are often disguised as orphanages or maternity homes, the newborn children of unmarried girls are sold into adoption, child trafficking, or sacrificial rituals (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Same-sex marriage is punishable by up to 14 years in prison, and in the 12 states that have adopted sharia, same-sex sexual conduct can carry a sentence of death by stoning (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In 2021, of 520 recorded abuses that were based on sexual orientation or gender identity, 10 percent were perceived to have involved state actors (U.S. Department of State, 2022). A 2021 survey found that roughly half of LGBTQI+ respondents had been subjected to “conversion therapy,” including programs run by Christian and Muslim organizations, with 20 percent reporting physical abuse during such programs (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, neither women nor LGBTQI+ persons are considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against Women and Violence Against LGBTQI severity indices. As a result, violence against women and LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

New for June 2023 release: The Presidential Election was held on February 25 (IFES, 2023). In the 12 months preceding the election, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded over 200 violent events involving party members and supporters, resulting in nearly 100 deaths (Carboni et al., 2023). Roughly 10 percent of these events took place in the battleground state of Osun, where two of Nigeria’s main political parties—the Peoples Democratic Party and the All Progressives Congress—accused one another of inciting violence (Carboni et al., 2023). Half of the violence involving party supporters reportedly involved direct, organized attacks against civilians; mob violence and abductions constituted the second- and third-most common forms of violence (Carboni et al., 2023).

In late January, at least 27 Fulani herders were killed by a military air strike that was allegedly targeted at insurgents in North Central Nasarawa state (Momoh, 2023). In the wake of the bombing, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide stated that “These dynamics of targeting communities along identity lines, if unaddressed, risk further fueling intercommunal tensions” (United Nations, 2023). In May 2023, there was a series of attacks in villages of Mangu area which left at least 125 residents dead and forced over 20,000 to flee (Crisis Group, 2023). Local authorities blamed the violence on Herders, but the intention and perpetrator are unclear, so the event was not included in the PMAD code (Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for April 2024 release: Year-over-year, lethal and less lethal atrocities in Nigeria increased substantially in 2023 relative to 2022. Examples of recent violence include attacks in late October and November 2023, Biafra separatists were both suspected perpetrators and victims in various apparently politically motivated murders (Crisis Group, 2023). More severe were the so-called “Plateau State massacres” or “Black Christmas” massacres, where nearly 200 Plateau State residents were killed in ethnic clashes, with several hundred more injured (RFI, 2023). This marked a continuation of ethnic clashes in the Plateau region that left roughly 100 dead in May 2023 (Al Jazeera, 2023). The clashes and others reportedly displaced more than 10,000 people across 2023, adding to the tens of thousands already forcibly displaced due to the threat of violence (Sarafa and Sunmola, 2023).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for June 2024 release: Since March 2024, more than 500 women and children have been abducted across Nigeria’s Borno, Kaduna, and Sokoto states (OHCHR, 2024). Similar events have occurred throughout the year, with 150 kidnappings reported in January by Nigeria’s National Human Rights Council, for example (Vanguard News, 2024).

Meanwhile, violence between herders and farmers continued in recent months, with 13 farmers and two herders killed in Ogbaulu and Bassa in May 2024 alone (Crisis Watch, 2024). Fulani herders have subsequently claimed they are the targets of erasure; at least one bishop has claimed the Fulani have sought to erase Christians from Nigeria (Pinedo, 2024).

– *Updated by Collin Meisel*

New for September 2024 release: On 1 September, a Boko Haram attack on Mafa village in Yobe State, northeastern Nigeria, resulted in at least 81 confirmed deaths, though the death toll could exceed 100 as some bodies were buried before soldiers arrived. The attack occurred with approximately 150 Boko

Haram fighters using rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and burning shops and houses. More bodies are expected to be found as several villagers remain missing. Additionally, the route to the village was rigged with explosives, which the military managed to defuse. The violence appears to have been a retaliation for the earlier killing of two Boko Haram members by local vigilantes (Al Jazeera, 2024). Suspected Boko Haram militants stormed a northeastern Nigerian village on motorcycles, firing on a market and setting shops and homes ablaze, killing at least 37 people at first (Kingimi, 2024).

In June, gunmen from criminal gangs killed 26 people, including four policemen, and kidnapped dozens more in a raid on Gidan Boka village in northwestern Nigeria. The attack, which took place in Katsina state, occurred on Sunday night when bandits on motorcycles entered the village, shooting and abducting residents, mostly women and children. The victims included local vigilantes who attempted to confront the attackers. The criminals also killed five residents fleeing from nearby Nakwabo village (The Defense Post, 2024). In a different set of events, at least 18 people were killed and over 19 seriously injured in 3 separate bomb blasts carried out by suspected female suicide bombers in Nigeria's northeastern Borno State. The reported casualties include children, men, women, and pregnant women (Al Jazeera, 2024b).

Since January 2024, at least 580 civilians have been kidnapped, mostly women and girls, particularly in states like Borno and Kaduna. Additionally, farmer-herder clashes have resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people in states such as Plateau, Kogi, and Katsina. One of the deadliest incidents occurred in June, when 32 people were killed in a suicide bombing in Gwoza, Borno State. An estimated 3.6 million people, particularly from the northeast, have been displaced as of mid-2024, with a significant portion living in camps under poor conditions. Sexual violence has escalated, especially targeting women and girls in conflict areas. Kidnappings for ransom, sexual slavery, and forced marriages are rampant, particularly among abductees of Boko Haram and bandit groups (Early Warning Project, Global R2P, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

North Korea

Under authoritarian leader Kim Jong Un, the North Korean state operates a system of political prison camps known as *kwanliso* (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). As many as 120,000 political prisoners are believed to be held in the country's *kwanliso*, where they are subjected to abuses such as torture, rape, enforced disappearance, starvation, and extrajudicial execution (Amnesty International, 2022; Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Under North Korean law, leaving the country without permission is punishable by death (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Would-be defectors, as well as those who are forcibly repatriated after fleeing to China, are frequently tortured, sometimes fatally (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Female defectors are reportedly subjected to "widespread, systemic sexual violence" following their repatriation (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Under a caste-like social system known as *songbun*, all North Korean citizens are classified as "loyal," "wavering," or "hostile" in accordance with their family's level of loyalty and proximity to state leadership (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022). Those who fall into the "wavering" or "hostile" classes face government-sanctioned discrimination in employment, housing, and education (Freedom House, 2022).

The government encourages its citizens to report on anyone engaged in religious activity (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Christians, who are automatically placed in the “hostile” *songbun* class, are regarded as a “serious threat to loyalty to the state” (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). According to one estimate, as many as 70,000 Christians are in prison because of their faith (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Typical sentences for Christians range from 15 years to life in prison and are sometimes imposed “on up to three generations of the immediate family of the person found guilty” (i.e., the parents and children of the accused can also be imprisoned) (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Individuals found in possession of Bibles have reportedly been executed (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Followers of Shamanism also face religious persecution, albeit to a lesser degree than Christians, the typical punishment for “superstitious” acts being seven years’ imprisonment (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). Shamanism is reportedly the most widespread religious practice in the country; the United Nations places the Christian population at between 200,000 and 400,000 (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

Authorities reportedly commit infanticide and perform forced abortions on women who are found pregnant after returning from China (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). An inquiry by the International Bar Association and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea found such practices to be “commonplace” in detention centers, where authorities purposefully target “impure” half-Chinese babies to “protect” North Korea’s racial purity (Ochab, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

The government denies that LGBTQI+ people exist in North Korea (Freedom House, 2022). Defectors have also reported that persons with disabilities face widespread abuse, including detention, exile, forced sterilization, experimentation, and execution (Freedom House, 2022).

New for June 2023 release: In March 2023, the NGO Korea Future released a report on the North Korean prison system in which it documented some 1,000 instances of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; hundreds of instances of rape and sexual violence; and more than 100 instances of denial to the right to life (Seo et al., 2023). Also in March, a UN special rapporteur for North Korea reported that women in North Korean detention centers are “subjected to torture and ill-treatment, forced labor and gender-based violence, including sexual violence by State officials” (United Nations, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In early 2024, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) ordered boot camps to halt beatings and violence committed against recruits that have resulted in injuries and deaths in the past (Jang, 2024).

Citizens faced persecution for consuming certain foreign material under the 2020 “Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture” (O’Carroll & Bremer, 2024). Political prison camps remained functional into 2024. Arbitrary killings, extermination, torture, sexual violence, and persecution committed by North Korean authorities on the grounds of politics, religion, or gender were common in political prison camps (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Systematic gender-based violence, including rape, sexual slavery, forced abortions, and sexual violence is also common in political prison camps (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024). There are at least 27 detention facilities in the DPRK holding thousands of people (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024; CIVICUS Monitor, 2024). The Committee for Human

Rights in North Korea found a potential correlation between nuclear facilities and forced labor in prison camps (2024).

At least 92 North Koreans seeking asylum in China were repatriated in the first five months of 2024 (Lina Yoon, 2024). In April 2024, around 200 defectors from North Korea were repatriated and subsequently detained in Ministry of State Security detention centers where they underwent three-month investigations that included maltreatment, torture, forced labor, and sexual violence (CIVICUS Monitor, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

North Macedonia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Norway

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Oman

In May 2021, demonstrators took to the streets of several Omani cities, including Sohar and Salalah, to protest unemployment (Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Despite the protests being peaceful, security forces used tear gas to disperse the crowds and arrested “dozens” of demonstrators, most of whom were later released after signing pledges to refrain from future demonstrations (Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Under the *kafala* system of sponsored immigrant labor, more than 140,000 domestic migrant workers—who come from countries across Asia and Africa, including the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone—are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Rosen, 2022). In August 2022, Liberia repatriated 27 Liberian women from Oman after they were reportedly “trafficked” and physically and sexually abused under the *kafala* system (Yates, 2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons in Oman face legal discrimination in various forms. In certain personal status cases (e.g., divorce), a woman’s testimony carries half the weight of a man’s; men are also favored in matters of inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2022). To get married, a woman must have a male guardian “contract her into marriage,” and women who are married to non-citizens cannot transmit citizenship to their children (Freedom House, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, though the law is rarely enforced (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Men who dress in women’s clothing can be punished by up to a year in prison, as well as a fine (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for June 2024 release: In 2023, Oman reformed its labor laws to provide more rights to migrants working under kafala system (Migrant Rights, 2023). However, some reports claim that the reforms do not adequately protect migrants (Fanack, 2023).

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Pakistan

Sectarian violence against Shia Muslims, particularly by Sunni Muslim hardliners, “has erupted in fits and bursts for decades in Pakistan,” and recent years are no exception (Al Jazeera, 2021). In August 2021, three people were killed and 59 injured in a grenade attack on a Shia procession in Punjab province (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In March 2022, at least 56 people were killed and more than 194 injured in an attack on a Shia mosque in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province; the Islamic State later claimed responsibility (Khan et al., 2022). The Hazara ethnic minority, which is predominately Shia, is regularly targeted by sectarian militants, including Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In Quetta, Balochistan, the threat of violence is reportedly so severe that Hazaras are confined to two ethnic enclaves within the city (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

State security forces are perceived to have committed mass atrocities against Pashtun, Sindhi, and Baloch communities, including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). More than 50 Sindhi activists reportedly disappeared in 2021, and between January and August, more than 9,000 terrorist suspects were reportedly arrested or killed in Sindh (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). According to several NGOs, 37 individuals disappeared and 25 were killed in Balochistan in June 2021, with another 27 killed that August (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Baloch advocates have accused the government of operating “death squads” to suppress separatist sympathies among Balochis (Freedom House, 2022). Pashtun activists have also reported being targeted by security forces due to their political beliefs and criticism of the government (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

State security forces are perceived to have engaged in the arbitrary arrest of protesters. In March 2021, Sindh police charged 60 people for protesting against the extrajudicial killing of a Sindh University student (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In June, police in Karachi arrested more than 120 for protesting a housing development (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In July, Sindh police arrested more than 150 Hindus after a reportedly peaceful protest over the murder of a Hindu worker (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In November 2022, hundreds of Afghan migrants were reportedly subjected to arbitrary detention for supposedly lacking proper documentation (Siddique, 2022). In January 2023, it was reported that police had arrested over 100 people for protesting Chinese development projects in the port town of Gwadar (Aamir, 2023).

The Ahmadiyya community is subject to widespread religious discrimination. While Ahmadis considers themselves Muslims, the Pakistani constitution holds that Ahmadis are non-Muslims (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In order to vote, Ahmadis must either denounce the founder of their movement or declare themselves non-Muslims; since many refuse to do either, the end result is that Ahmadis are widely disenfranchised (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The government generally prohibits Ahmadis from

holding gatherings, and Ahmadis risk being charged with blasphemy, which can carry the death penalty in extreme cases (U.S. Department of State, 2022a; Amnesty International, 2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in various forms. The law discriminates against women in matters of inheritance, with female children entitled to half the inheritance of male children (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Female genital mutilation/cutting is reportedly common among Dawoodi Bohra Muslims, as well as among rural communities in Sindh and Balochistan provinces (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Under certain traditional justice practices, female victims of rape are sometimes forced to marry their attackers, while young girls are sometimes forced into marriage to compensate for the crimes of their relatives (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). According to some estimates, as many as 1,000 women are killed in “honor killings” every year (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by up to life in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

New for September 2023 release: Pakistani police have carried out mass arrests and detained more than 4,000 people in the wake of protests over the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, including members of the political opposition (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). Police have arbitrarily detained many oppositions political party members as well as people appropriately arrested for engaging in violence (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur district, Islamic State suicide bomber detonated explosives at political rally of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, killing at least 54 people and wounding 200 (Crisis Group, 2023). In August, a Muslim mob attacked a Christian area in eastern Pakistan, burning a church and several Christian homes (NPR, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Increased violence preceded Pakistan’s February 8th, 2024 elections. Between January 29th and February 7th, at least 37 civilians were killed and 78 civilians were injured by election-related violence (Relief Web, 2024). At least 30 people were killed and 40 people were wounded by two IED attacks on election offices on February 7 (Relief Web, 2024). From January 1st to March 31, an estimated 432 people were killed and 370 were injured by violence from terror attacks and counter-terror operations (Times of India, 2024).

Individuals accused of blasphemy faced state-sanctioned and mob violence. In February 2024, a mob surrounded a woman wearing a dress with Arabic calligraphy that was mistaken for Quran verses—the woman was unharmed after being escorted by police (Al Jazeera, 2024). In March 2024, a Pakistani court in the Punjab Province sentenced a 22-year-old to death and a 17-year-old to life imprisonment, both of whom were accused of sharing blasphemous images (Shami, 2024). Later the same month, a woman accused of burning pages of the Quran was sentenced to life imprisonment (Banerjee, 2024). On June 20, a 36-year-old tourist was killed and burned by a mob after he was accused of desecrating the Quran (Hussain, 2024). The number of individuals targeted by violence following blasphemy charges does not currently meet the PMAD threshold for inclusion.

Protestors continued to face arrests and violent pushback by police and security officials: on January 14, 2024, around 65 individuals participating in a rally for solidarity with the Baloch Yakjehti Council were detained (Monitor CIVICUS, 2024b). In May 2024, protests broke out in Azad Jammu and Kashmir over increased prices of flour and electricity (Crisis Watch, May 2024). Over three days, clashes between

protestors and security forces killed five individuals and injured more than 100 (Crisis Watch, May 2024). Around 70 protestors were arrested (Monitor CIVICUS, 2024a). After the Pakistani government decided not to buy domestic farmers' wheat, tens of thousands of farmers protested throughout Punjab (Hussain, 3 May 2024). At least 250 farmers were arrested (Monitor CIVICUS, 2024a). On April 19th, 2024, a Baloch activist and another individual were forcibly disappeared (Monitor CIVICUS, 2024a). Journalists continued to face threats and violence, including Muhammad Siddique Mengal who was killed by a bomb placed on his vehicle on May 3rd, 2024 (Monitor CIVICUS, 2024a).

The government continued to enforce the British-created Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, which enables the government to acquire land by forcibly evicting the inhabitants (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Many of these forcible evictions are done through "anti-encroachment" operations that largely target low-income urban areas, impacting small shops and street vendors (Human Rights Watch, 2024). On April 25, 2024, an anti-encroachment operation occurred on pavements in Karachi (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Pakistani authorities fail to ensure resettlement, compensation, and adequate notice to forcibly evicted persons (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Ethnic minorities continued to face state-sanctioned discrimination and arbitrary arrests. The Ahmadiyya community faced increased violence leading up to and during Eid ul-Azha (Amnesty International, 2024). At least 36 Ahmadis were arrested between June 10th and June 19th, 2024 (Amnesty International, 2024). On June 8th, two Ahmadi men were killed, and on June 12th, 17 graves of the Ahmadiyya community were desecrated (Amnesty International, 2024).

The Hazara community in Quetta, which numbers around 500,000, faces discrimination that inhibits their access to public services, education, employment, and social and religious discrimination and isolation (Zahra, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Palau

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Panama

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. Despite failing to meet PMAD inclusion criteria – particularly group-perpetrated acts targeting specific cultural, ethnic, political, religious, or social groups – Panama has been the scene of much human tragedy in recent years.

Recent years have seen an extraordinary influx of migrants through the Darién Gap, a dangerous stretch of jungle along Panama's border with Colombia (Freedom House, 2022). In 2021, over 126,000 migrants crossed into Panama via the Gap; in the first nine months of 2022, that figure exceeded 151,000 (Freedom House, 2022; Reuters, 2022). The vast majority of those traversing the Gap are Venezuelans, with Haitians

representing the second-largest group (Reuters, 2022). The Gap itself is controlled by criminal gangs, whose members reportedly commit physical and sexual violence against the vulnerable migrant population (Freedom House, 2022). Between April 2021 and May 2022, Doctors Without Borders assisted more than 400 women who had suffered sexual violence while crossing through the Gap (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: . More than 510,000 migrants passed through the Darién Gap in 2023 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). The Human Rights Watch published a report on April 3, 2024, that concluded that Panamanian authorities are failing to protect and aid migrants and are slow to investigate potential crimes. In March 2024, the Panamanian government halted cooperation with Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), a key organization providing aid to migrants and asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Papua New Guinea

Communal violence remains prevalent among Papua New Guinea's more than 600 tribes, however none of the instances of displacement, murder, and less lethal violence indicated intentional targeting of communities or disaggregated data of how many members of each tribe were victims of violence (Yayboke et al., 2022).

Accusations of sorcery, which frequently incite gender-based violence against women, are reported to be increasing (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). By some estimates, claims of sorcery result in as many as 500 deadly attack per year, mostly against young women, widows, and the elderly (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). LGBTQI+ persons also face widespread discrimination. Same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by up to 14 years in prison, and there have been reports of officials using the threat of legal action to extort money from LGBTQI+ persons (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

– Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: On January 10th and 11th, 2024, riots broke out in Port Moresby that killed at least 25 people (ACLEd, 2024). Public sector employees, including police, went on strike after seeing pay errors that stated they would receive 50% of their usual pay (ACLEd, 2024). Following the riots, around 5,000 Papua New Guineans became unemployed (ACLEd, 2024). The riots were not included in the code as the violence was neither state-backed nor targeted.

Tribal violence intensified in February 2024, when at least 64 people were killed in the highlands of the Enga province (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Paraguay

Indigenous persons in Paraguay face violence and discrimination in various forms. The Paraguayan People’s Army, a Marxist-Leninist guerilla group, reportedly targets indigenous communities for the recruitment of child soldiers (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Civil society organizations have criticized the government for its land-rights policies and eviction operations, which primarily affect indigenous communities and are reportedly “marred by violence and have sometimes taken place without a court order” (CIVICUS, 2022a). For instance, in May 2022, authorities evicted some 40 families in the indigenous Cerrito de Minga Porã community, “with police officers allegedly destroying the families’ homes, farms, and a temple” (CIVICUS, 2022b). LGBTQI+ persons also report diminished rights, including an inability to change their birth names to anything that could “cause confusion over the person’s sex” (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: On February 14, 2024, Senator Kattya González was dismissed from office for “misuse of influence” after criticizing government corruption and the influence of organized crime (The Guardian, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

Peru

In December 2022, then President Pedro Castillo declared he was disbanding Peru’s congress, and that henceforth he would rule by decree (Turkewitz, 2022). Amid widespread condemnation of this “attempted coup,” Castillo was promptly arrested and replaced by his vice president, Dina Boluarte (Turkewitz, 2022). In the month since, Peru has been wracked by protests as Castillo supporters have taken to the streets to demand new general elections (Taj et al., 2023). State security forces have been widely criticized for the use of excessive and deadly force against protesters. On December 15, eight people were killed in the city of Ayacucho during clashes between demonstrators and the military (Taj, 2022). On January 9, 17 civilians and one police officer were killed in the city of Juliaca, with human rights groups reporting “extrajudicial killings” on the part of security forces (Taj et al., 2023). At least 531 people have been injured—355 civilians and 176 police officers—and over 300 have been arrested in connection to the unrest (Garzon, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: The provinces of Trujillo and Patatzen entered a 60-day State of Emergency on February 12, 2024, after 30,000 crimes were documented in the region (US Embassy, 2024). On May 10, 2024, the Peruvian government issued a decree that designated trans identities as mental health conditions (González Cabrera, 2024a). Protests followed, and in June, the Ministry of Health stated that trans identities are not mental health conditions, but the decree was necessary to provide healthcare to trans individuals (González Cabrera, 2024b).

At least 45 environmentalists have been killed in Peru in the last ten years, with most victims indigenous to the Amazon Basin (Chaparro, 2024). Indigenous children in Peru face a high risk of sexual violence and abuse in public schools, with 524 cases of rape and abuse since 2010 (Perez & Hoetmer, 2024).

Violence from illegal mining gangs (parqueros) has increased, particularly in La Libertad province (Newell, 2024). The gangs target gold mines and have reportedly killed (as of January 2024) at least seven affiliated employees and contractors (Newell, 2024).

On June 25, 2024, two human rights groups asked the International Criminal Court (ICC) to examine Peruvian President Dina Boluarte and other government officials for crimes against humanity during the protest movement in 2022 and 2023 (Rebaza, 2024). A bill introduced to the Peruvian Congress in 2024 would form a statute of limitations on atrocity crimes in contravention of international humanitarian law and international conventions Peru has ratified (including the Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance) (United Nations, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Philippines

When then-President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016, he initiated a “war on drugs” that has since killed over 12,000 Filipinos, most of them members of the country’s urban poor (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Duterte left office in mid-2022 and was succeeded by Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who has largely continued his predecessor’s drug war policies (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As part of anti-drug operations, state security forces are perceived to routinely commit extrajudicial killings. Since 2016, the government has reported over 6,250 killings by the country’s national police and drug enforcement agency (Human Rights Watch, 2023). It is widely suspected that state authorities have also been involved in an unknown number of killings by unidentified gunmen (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Domestic observers have estimated that the real number of drug war killings may total 20,000 or more (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The New People’s Army, an armed communist insurgency, has been active in Philippines for over 50 years (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Under the Duterte and Marcos administrations, government officials have practiced what is commonly known as “red-tagging,” in which individuals are labeled by authorities as being “left-leaning, subversives, communists, or terrorists” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). These red-tagging efforts are typically targeted at leftist activists, peasant leaders, environmentalists, human rights lawyers, and indigenous leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2022). By naming their targets through public announcements and social media, the government puts red-tagged individuals at serious risk of violence, including intimidation and killings (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The Lumad group of indigenous communities in Mindanao is frequently subjected to red-tagging, and in February 2021, a police raid on a Lumad school resulted in the arrest of 26 students and teachers (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Regarding communist rebels, then-President Duterte told state security forces that, “If there’s an encounter and you see them armed, kill, kill them, don’t mind human rights” (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Additional instances of arbitrary detention are perceived to have occurred in recent years. In May 2021, police cited social-distancing protocols as the justification for arresting 34 people who were on their way

to a protest (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). In June 2022, police in Tarlac province detained 92 peasants and activists over a land dispute, in what observers alleged were arbitrary arrests (IBON International, 2022).

In the country's rural south, where the population is primarily Muslim, inter-clan feuds known as *rido* often give rise to ethno-religious conflicts and communal violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). For instance, in April 2021, over 3,500 people in Maguindanao were displaced by *rido*-related violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022b).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: On May 8, 2024, the Philippine Supreme Court declared “red-tagging” a threat to life, liberty, and security as a monumental move against the government practice (Human Rights Watch, 2024b).

Violence between security and rebel forces, particularly the New People's Army, persisted in 2024 (Crisis Watch, 2024). In June, violence between security forces and rebel groups killed 17 people and injured four (Crisis Watch, 2024).

The son of former President Rodrigo Duterte, Mayor Sebastian Duterte, declared a new “war on drugs” in Davao City on March 22, 2024 (Human Rights Watch, 2024a). Local authorities killed at least seven people in the days following the declaration (Human Rights Watch, 2024a). At least 75 individuals suspected of using or selling substances were extrajudicially killed in the Philippines in the first three months of 2024 (Feng, 2024). Within two weeks of the declaration, at least 51 individuals suspected of using or selling substances were arrested in Davao City (The Philippine Star, 2024).

On May 1, 2024, the Philippine National Police violently arrested and detained six students protesting the increased United States presence (Abella, 2024).

The Center for Prevention and Treatment of Child Sexual Abuse reported that around one-third of Filipinos experience abuse or sexual violence before turning 18 years old (Baron, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Poland

In September 2021, the Polish government declared a state of emergency in two border provinces in response to an extraordinary influx of migrants from across the country's border with Belarus (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Between August and early October, Polish authorities reported 16,000 attempted border crossings, an unprecedented surge (Kennedy et al., 2021). Along with Latvia and Lithuania, which were struggling with similar border crises, Poland accused Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko of using the migrants as part of a campaign of “hybrid warfare” meant to pressure the European Union into lifting sanctions it had previously imposed on Belarus (Henley et al., 2021). Those attempting to gain entry to Poland included Iraqis, Syrians, Iranians, Yemenis, Afghanis, and Cubans (Human Rights Watch, 2022a).

Under the Polish state of emergency, which lasted until July 2022, journalist, activists, and aid workers were banned from accessing the border (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2022b). In what the UN and other bodies have called a violation of international law, the state of emergency also authorized Poland’s border guards to forcibly expel migrants through so-called “pushbacks” (Freedom House, 2022). Witnesses have alleged that Polish authorities sometimes conducted these pushbacks violently and without processing migrants’ asylum claims, thereby exposing them to serious abuses—including beatings and rape—at the hands of Belarusian security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). Migrants trapped between the countries’ border fences were stranded in forests and swamps in freezing temperatures without food or clean water (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). In June and September 2022, two courts in Poland ruled the practice of pushbacks unlawful (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Under the governing Law and Justice Party, LGBTQI+ persons face an increasingly hostile atmosphere. As of 2022, more than 90 regions and municipalities had declared themselves “LGBT Ideology-Free Zones” or adopted “charters of family rights” that take aim at so-called “LGBT ideologies” (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: On June 13, 2024, Poland announced 90-day border restrictions on 37 miles of the land border between Poland and Belarus (AP News, 2024). The government cited the safety of asylum seekers and border security officers, and the limitation of human smuggling as reasons for the restrictions (AP News, 2024). Pushbacks have continued, with an estimated 4,000 having occurred in the first half of 2024 (Ciobanu, 2024). Around 200-300 migrants attempted to enter Poland from Belarus per day in May 2024 (Ciobanu, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Portugal

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, Portuguese authorities report that female genital mutilation/cutting is practiced on young girls in certain immigrant communities, particularly those from Guinea-Bissau; precise statistics on the prevalence of the practice are unavailable (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Qatar

In December 2010, Qatar was awarded the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Over the next 10 years, The Guardian estimates that some 6,500 migrant workers died in Qatar, including many who were working on World Cup–related infrastructure projects (Freedom House, 2022). Migrant workers account for roughly 90 percent of Qatar’s population; the majority come from South Asia, particularly India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (Grothe, 2022; Saul, 2022). Under the country’s kafala system of worker sponsorship, migrant laborers are highly vulnerable to exploitation, with many unable to travel or change jobs without their employer’s permission (Grothe, 2022). Though Qatar announced major reforms to the kafala system in 2020, implementation of these reforms has reportedly been far from consistent (Grothe, 2022). Qatari officials have disputed the death toll reported by The Guardian, declaring instead that the number of workers who died on World Cup–related projects was “between 400 and 500” (Reuters, 2022a). Other perceived abuses include the August 2022 arrest of more than 60 workers who were protesting months of unpaid wages (Saul, 2022). In October 2022, thousands of migrant workers were reportedly evicted from their living quarters in the capital city of Doha, sometimes with fewer than two hours’ notice (Mills, 2022). A Human Rights Watch report released in June 2023, outlines that six months after the World Cup, migrant workers are still not being compensated for their work, resulting in wage theft and the denial of end-of-service benefits (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Qatari law discriminates against women and LGBTQI+ persons. It is illegal to have children out of wedlock, and unmarried women who report pregnancies risk prosecution for extramarital sexual relations (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). The form of sharia law practiced in the country discriminates against women in matters of marriage, child custody, freedom of movement, and inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Same-sex sexual conduct among men is illegal and is technically punishable by death under sharia law, though the death penalty is not invoked in practice (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Men who “entice” other men into committing acts of “sodomy or immorality” face up to three years in prison, and state security forces reportedly subject LGBTQI+ persons to arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment, including beatings and sexual harassment (Human Rights Watch, 2022a; Human Rights Watch, 2022b).

While the Qatari constitution provides for freedom of religion, non-Muslims are banned from proselytizing or worshipping in public (Freedom House, 2022). There have also been reports of the government making “systematic attempts” to blacklist and deport members of the Baha’i faith (U.S. Department of State, 2022b). In 2021, security forces arrested “dozens” of al-Murra tribesmen who had staged a peaceful protest against the country’s elections law (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). As of year’s end, the location of the detainees remained unknown (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

Qatar is home to some 2,500 members of the Bidoon, a stateless minority whose members were born in the country but not included as citizens at the time of the modern state’s founding (U.S. Department of State, 2022a). Under Qatari law, the Bidoon are unable to own property and must obtain a visa in order to travel to other Gulf Cooperation Council countries (U.S. Department of State, 2022a).

– Collin Van Son

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Although Qatar has begun instituting reforms (e.g., higher minimum age) in its kafala system after heightened scrutiny following the FIFA World Cup, labor conditions remain extremely poor (McQue, 2024).

Manuel Guerrero Aviña, a British-Mexican 44-year-old man, was arrested in Qatar for possessing illegal substances, though his family claims he was arrested through a Grindr “sting” operation (Parry, 2024). Guerrero Aviña planned to meet a man through the dating app Grindr but was instead met with police and subsequently arrested (Parry, 2024). He spent 42 days in a detention center before relinquishing his passport and submitting a confession in Arabic without the aid of a translator (Parry, 2024). He was given a six-month suspended sentence and will be deported from Qatar (Parry, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Zoe Evans-Funk

Romania

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, according to NGOs, several incidents of harassment, discrimination, abuses against refugees and migrants, pushbacks, and deviations from asylum procedures at border areas have occurred, although most incidents were not reported because of fear, lack of information, inadequate support services, and inefficient redress mechanisms (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

– Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Russia

The Russian Federation has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Recent years have seen an increase in domestic repression, including the 2020 poisoning of opposition activist Alexei Navalny. Though Navalny survived, he was arrested upon his return to Russia in January 2021, triggering mass protests and a subsequent crackdown that imprisoned over 12,000 people (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Perceived atrocities have also included police violence against protestors, the systematic abuse of prisoners, and reduced citizenship for religious and ethnic minorities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Roma, respectively (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022a).

In 2014, Russia invaded and occupied the Crimean Peninsula in neighboring Ukraine, and Russian forces began supporting an armed separatist movement in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Approximately eight years later, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine amid Putin’s unfounded claims that the Ukrainian regime was perpetrating genocide against ethnic Russians (Fisher, 2022). For perceived mass atrocities perpetrated within Ukraine, including Crimea, by suspected Russian actors, please reference the country case narrative for Ukraine.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, domestic repression inside Russia has intensified. Russian police and internal security forces are perceived to have committed multiple atrocities against anti-war protestors, including mass detentions and physical abuse. Between February 24 and February 28, authorities detained nearly 6,000 anti-war protestors (Human Rights Watch,

2022b). On March 6, an estimated 5,000 people were detained across 69 cities, with reports of at least 34 protestors being beaten by police (Human Rights Watch, 2022c; OVD-Info, 2022a). One week later, another 850 demonstrators were detained at peaceful anti-war protests (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). Some protestors have recounted torture at the hands of police, including beatings, electric shocks, waterboarding, and threats of sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2022c). As of August 17, OVD-Info estimated that there had been 16,347 detentions of anti-war protestors since February 24 (OVD-Info, 2022b). Between September 21 and September 27, over 2,300 demonstrators were reportedly arrested after Putin announced the “partial mobilization” of some 300,000 reservists (OHCHR, 2022; Troianovski, 2022).

Since September 2022, reports have indicated that Russia’s conscription campaign is disproportionately targeting marginalized groups, including ethnic minorities in Siberia and the Caucasus; this has raised concerns about abusive conscription practices, reduced citizenship, and possibly even a campaign of mass erasure (Seddon et al., 2022). An anti-war advocacy group has declared that the draft is “basically a genocide” against the Buryats, a Mongolic ethnic group, while an Oxford-based Russia expert has suggested that the mobilization could “constitute ethnic cleansing” (Seddon et al., 2022; Saveliev, 2022). Since the announcement of the mobilization, some villages in Kalmykia—a predominately Buddhist region north of the Caucasus—have reportedly been depopulated by roughly 20 percent (Saveliev, 2022).

Allegations of mass containment, forced displacement, and cultural/ethnic erasure have also accompanied the non-consensual deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In March, Russia acknowledged the presence of more than 1,000 Ukrainian children in Russia; Ukrainian officials have since claimed the number of forcibly deported children is nearly 8,000 (Shvets et al., 2022). Perceptions of a mass erasure campaign can be traced to a new Russian law which makes it easier for Russia to adopt and give citizenship to unaccompanied Ukrainian children; Russia has also held “patriotic education” classes for Ukrainian orphans (Shvets et al., 2022). One Russian official even recounted how 30 children brought to Russia from Ukraine initially sang the Ukrainian national anthem but have since seen their defiance “transformed into a love for Russia” (Shvets et al., 2022).

Women, LGBTQI+ persons, and religious minorities face discrimination in various forms. “Honor killings” of women reportedly persist in Chechnya, Dagestan, and other parts of the North Caucasus, as do practices of bride kidnapping, forced marriage, and virginity testing (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Following divorce or the death of their husband, women in the North Caucasus often lose custody of their children due to traditional laws that ban women from living in a house without a man (U.S. Department of State, 2023). In December 2022, Putin signed a law that bans the distribution of “propaganda” regarding “nontraditional sexual relations” through the media, Internet, advertising, literature, and cinema (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The new law effectively blocks LGBTQI+ persons and activists from publicly expressing the opinion that homosexuality is normal, and it has been used to pressure and shutter LGBTQI+ rights organizations (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

In 2017, Russian authorities banned Jehovah’s Witnesses as an “extremist organization,” placing them in a similar category as terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and Al-Qaeda (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Since this act, it is estimated that hundreds have been arrested and imprisoned. Their homes and places of worship have been raided, and the national headquarters seized. In 2022, at least 84 Jehovah’s Witnesses were sentenced to prison for “extremist” activities; an additional 68 remained in pre-trial detention (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Russia's oldest human rights group, the Moscow Helsinki Group, was shut down in January 2023 as part of Putin's ongoing crackdown against Russian civil society (Litvinova et al., 2023). In April, the Sova Center, a Russian NGO that monitors racism, xenophobia, and the implementation of anti-extremism laws, was likewise ordered to close by a Moscow court (Litvinova et al., 2023). While these closures do not appear in PMAD, they are indicative of the government's tightening grip on civil society, which leaves government critics and dissidents increasingly vulnerable to abuse.

For perceived mass atrocities reported to have perpetrated by Russian forces on de jure Ukrainian territory, see the Ukraine country case narrative.

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates. For perceived mass atrocities reported to have perpetrated by Russian forces on de jure Ukrainian territory, see the Ukraine country case narrative.

Last updated: August 2024.

Rwanda

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by President Paul Kagame, has ruled Rwanda since its 1994 victory in the Rwandan Civil War, when it defeated the Hutu-led forces that had orchestrated that year's genocide against the country's Tutsi minority (Freedom House, 2022). In an effort to address the ethnic tensions that precipitated the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government has since removed all references to ethnicity in official discourse, with the exception of references to the genocide itself (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

In the 28 years since it came to power, the RPF has regularly employed repressive measures to quell internal dissent. In recent years, police and state security forces have reportedly committed numerous human rights abuses, including disappearances, assaults, arbitrary detentions, and assassinations targeting journalists, opposition members, and other regime critics (Freedom House, 2022). Reports of ill-treatment and torture in official detention facilities and unofficial "safe houses" are commonplace (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In 2020, Rwandan police detained scores of citizens for alleged violations of Covid-19 directives; many of the detainees were reportedly kept for hours in outdoor stadiums that exposed them to harsh elements without food or water (Human Rights Watch, 2021). 2022 has seen unverified reports of Rwandans being forcibly vaccinated by authorities, and more than 100 Rwandans are reported to have fled the country to escape vaccination (Kigali et al., 2022).

For over a decade, Gikondo Transit Center in Kigali has served as an unofficial detention facility where street children, street vendors, sex workers, homeless people, and beggars are arbitrarily detained (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Since 2017, the government has introduced a new legal framework and policies to reintegrate people accused of exhibiting "deviant behaviors," including children living on the streets, as part of its strategy to "eradicate delinquency" (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In 2020, Human Rights Watch published a report criticizing the alleged abuse that detainees have experiences at the center.

For mass atrocities that have allegedly been committed with Rwandan support in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), please reference the country case narrative for the DRC.

– *Collin Van Son, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Saint Lucia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, Saint Lucia criminalizes same-sex sexual activity, with a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). There is no evidence of the law being enforced in recent years, yet LGBT people are subjected to discrimination and violence (Human Dignity Trust, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines criminalizes same-sex sexual activity, with a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). In a 58-page report released in July 2023, the Human Rights Watch documents physical and verbal assaults, family violence, homelessness, workplace harassment, bullying, and sexual violence that sexual and gender minorities face under the shadow of discriminatory laws (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Samoa

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. Samoa criminalizes same-sex sexual activity between men, with a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). The law also prohibits renting, leasing, occupying, or managing any premises used for the commission of "indecent acts" between males, with a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment. There is no evidence of the law being enforced in recent years, however LGBT people are subjected to discrimination and violence (Human Dignity Trust, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

San Marino

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Sao Tome and Principe

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Saudi Arabia

Despite a number of legal reforms in recent years, Saudi authorities have reportedly continued their longstanding campaign of repression against peaceful dissidents, activists, public intellectuals, and human and women's rights advocates (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). As part of their suppression of freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, Saudi authorities are perceived to engage in arbitrary arrests, detainment, disappearances, and torture (Amnesty International, 2022; U.S. Department of State, 2022). Women human rights activists have reportedly been tortured with electric shocks, beatings, and sexual harassment, and have faced restrictive travel bans upon their release (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022). The state applies capital punishment to a wide range of crimes, including protest-related offenses, and defendants facing the death penalty are reportedly forced to confess under torture (Freedom House, 2022). In March 2022, authorities executed 81 people in the country's largest mass execution in decades (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Forty-one of those executed were members of the country's Shia minority, yet only three of the 41 had been convicted of murder (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

Migrants, particularly Ethiopians, are perceived to be the subject of human rights abuses. In 2020, for instance, Saudi border guards reportedly killed dozens of Ethiopian migrants who were trying to flee

targeted violence in neighboring Yemen (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Thousands of ethnic Tigrayans from Ethiopia have reportedly been detained in unsanitary Saudi detention centers where they have faced physical abuse from Saudi guards before being deported back to Ethiopia, where they have allegedly faced arbitrary arrest, mistreatment, and forcible disappearance (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Despite recent reforms to the *kafala* system of visa sponsorship, migrant workers remain highly vulnerable to exploitation, including nearly 3.6 million domestic workers who require their employer's permission to leave the country or take another job (Freedom House, 2022). As part of the government's plan to construct NEOM, a \$500 billion mega-city, communities like the Howeitat tribe have reportedly faced forcible evictions and the arbitrary arrest of at least 150 people (Rasool, 2022).

Though Saudi women have seen some gains in education and economic rights in recent years, women are still subject to extensive legal discrimination, particularly through the male guardianship system (Freedom House, 2022). Under this system, women must obtain the permission of a male relative to engage in basic activities, including those pertaining to marriage, education, and sexual and reproductive healthcare (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023a). The law states that a husband's financial support is contingent on his wife's "obedience," and that she can lose her right to such support if she refuses to have sex with her husband without a "legitimate excuse" (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Religious minorities and LGBTQI+ persons also face legal discrimination. All Saudi citizens are required by law to be Muslim, and atheism is punishable by up to 20 years in prison (Freedom House, 2022). Sunni Islam is the dominant branch of Islam in the country, and the practices of Shia and Sufi Muslims are curtailed by the state (Freedom House, 2022). Under sharia law, same-sex sexual activity is generally understood to be illegal; consequently, LGBTQI+ persons face harassment, discrimination, criminal punishment, and violence (Freedom House, 2022).

There have been a number of crackdowns in 2023 by Saudi authorities against alleged violators of the country's residency, labor, and border security laws. Over a one-week period in late January, authorities arrested over 16,000 "illegal expatriates" (Al Sherbini, 2023). During another weeklong crackdown in April–May, authorities arrested over 11,000 people for similar alleged crimes (Tolentino, 2023). At present, it is unclear whether these mass arrests were targeted at a particular social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; as such, they may not be coded in PMAD until such evidence becomes available.

New for September 2023 release: According to the Human Rights Watch, Saudi border guards have killed at least hundreds of Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who tried to cross the Yemen-Saudi border between March 2022 and June 2023 (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). Saudi border guards have used explosive weapons and shot people at close range, including women and children, in a pattern that is widespread and systematic (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). It is alleged that these killings are continuing, and if committed as part of a Saudi government policy to murder migrants, these killings could amount to a crime against humanity.

– Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: According to various announcements by Saudi authorities, the country has executed 170 people in 2023, which is an increase compared to 2022, with the highest tally being 187 in 2019 (IDEA). This also includes the first death penalty passed to an individual, based on their social media activity, in July 2023. There have been various isolated incidents where authorities have referenced the

state's counterterrorism and cybercrime laws to detain, torture or provide unfair trials to individuals over the year. The criticism follows the state against various international bodies recommendations, which have not drawn the cybercrime, counter terrorism, Immigration and Gender equality laws towards international standards (US State, 2023). There has been consistent patterns of arrests and detention over social media posts and views, especially the platform of Twitter. Over the months, state authorities have arrested close to 51000 illegal expats, out of which 13,441 cases of labor law violations against the criticized Kafala employment and immigration system have been codified. Saudi Arabia continues to ignore various requests by the special rapporteurs of UN, while organizations such as HRW and ESHOR continue to believe that the state has been whitewashing its Human rights record through sports. There have also been incidents surrounding forced evictions and prosecutions against members of the Huwaitait tribe to make way for the NEOM megacity planned project (ALQST,2023) which has not been codified due to the threshold numbers for entry of the codebook.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

New for September 2024 release: Saudi Arabia continued its executions through capital punishments, with estimates around 100 people until July 15 (Middle East Eye, 2024). Even though reforms against punishment for minors had occurred, minor defendants are at risk of execution along with similar cases awaiting judgement (HRW, 2024). The organization Shia Rights Watch reported various cases through 2024, which involved arbitrary detention, arrests and executions. Migrant abuses continue to persist through 2024, with 'giga-projects' such as the upcoming NEOM megacity project and the country's bid for 2034 world cup, through the abusive 'Kafala' system and climate change severely affecting the quality of lives of migrant workers (HRW,2024). 12 football fans were arrested and fined in January for peacefully chanting a Shia religious song, which exacerbates Saudi Arabia's human rights record while bidding for the 2034 FIFA world cup (HRW,2024). A few isolated incidents involving the arrests and detentions of activists/government critics have been recorded.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

Senegal

In recent years, human rights abuses in Senegal have reportedly included arbitrary killings and excessive force by state security forces at protests (U.S. Department of State, 2021; Amnesty International, 2021). In 2020 there were two reports of government agents arbitrarily or unlawfully killing individuals (U.S. Department of State, 2021). During nationwide protests in March 2020, police responded violently, attacking protestors and shooting live ammunition into the crowds (Amnesty International, 2021). Over 400 people were injured, and 14 people were killed, including three children (Amnesty International, 2021).

In May 2023, one teenager was killed and some 30 people injured when protesters—reportedly ethnic Lebu—were confronted by police after taking to the streets in the Ngor neighborhood of Senegal's capital, Dakar, to demand that a new high school be built instead of a new police station (Al Jazeera, 2023; Kiennemann, 2023). Residents of Ngor have alleged that police used live ammunition and "stormed their homes while they were sleeping to arrest and beat dozens of people" (Aljazeera, 2023a; Kiennemann, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: On June 1 2023, protests broke out following the sentencing of popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. Police used excessive force on protestors, which left 23 dead and over 500 arrested (Amnesty International, 2023). On July 31, Senegal's interior minister announced the dissolution of the opposition party Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Fraternity (PASTEF) for rallying its supporters during the June protests (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The announcement marked the first time a political party had been banned in Senegal since it gained its independence in 1960 (Aljazeera, 2023b). The announcement triggered a second wave of protests, which left 2 dead.

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Collin Van Son & Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: At the beginning of the year, there was clash between the Senegalese Military and the separatist rebels of the group 'Movement of Democratic forces of Casamance (MFDC)', which resulted in the death of a Senegalese soldier while four others were wounded (Africa News, 2023). With the arrest of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko on July 28th, 2023, the Senegalese government blocked Internet services and motorcycle traffic to control protests, with two casualties on Monday, 31st of July, and a Molotov attack on Tuesday, August 1st, claiming two lives and injuring five people (New York Times, 2023). In another incident, two people were shot dead by the police during violent protests in the locality of Khossanto in Saraya, Kedogou region (Amnesty). The protests were against the government decisions to replace the local chiefs with administrative authorities, who would then be in charge of recruiting unskilled labor for the gold mines.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: President Macky Sall and the parliament voted to postpone the Presidential elections to December 2024, which resulted in demonstrations in the country's capital Dakar, resulting in the death of 3, 60 were injured and 271 were arrested (HRW,2024). An amnesty law was passed on March 6, releasing the opposition leader Ousmane Sonko and presidential candidate Bassirou Faye (News24, 2024), and due to the pressure from opposition and the protests, the authorities held the elections, resulting in the victory of Opposition presidential candidate Bassirou Faye on March 24th.

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Serbia

Since Aleksander Vucic took his position as prime minister from 2014 and later as president from 2017, he has worked to limit freedom of expression, especially for media outlets that are critical of the government (O'Toole, 2017). Politicians and other public officials have openly threatened journalists, referring to them as 'enemies of the state' and 'traitors' (Article 19, 2021). The government uses the Serbian security forces to silence critical media and protestors (Article 19, 2021). Serbian security forces committed atrocities against journalists, activists, and protestors resulting in over 321 political victims (Article 19, 2021 & Reuters Staff, 2020).

Throughout 2020 there were 28 physical attacks and 33 threats against journalists reported (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In July 2020, protests erupted over the government's response to the Covid-19 pandemic and other concerns with the government's decisions (Kingsley, 2020). State security forces beat protestors with batons and threw tear gas at the large crowds (Kingsley, 2020 & Reuters Staff, 2020). It is

estimated that 23 protestors were arrested during the protests, and over 60 people were injured (Reuters Staff, 2020). In October 2020, the government updated environmental laws regulating noise levels, requiring 20 days of advanced notice for holding assemblies (Amnesty International [AI], 2021). Later in November, environmental protests erupted, which were also met with excessive force by the state security forces (AI, 2021). Some reported that protestors became violent and began attacking security forces but that the security force's violent response was disproportionate to the violence of the protestors (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2021).

In 2022, similar events and trends continued, but at a lower threshold that did not meet the PMAD inclusion criteria. As more information for events in 2022 becomes available, the PMAD data may be revised.

– *Alexandra Brodsky*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Seychelles

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Sierra Leone

Despite the reputation for relative stability that Sierra Leone has enjoyed since the conclusion of its 1991–2002 civil war, state authorities are perceived to have carried out a series of lethal and non-lethal atrocities against political opponents in 2022 (France 24, 2022). In August, multi-city protests over the cost of living descended into violence between demonstrators and security forces, resulting in the deaths of 27 civilians (France 24, 2022; AfricaNews, 2022). In a number of instances, the families of those killed disputed the police accounts of their deaths (France 24, 2022). In October, security forces arrested over 60 foreigners, including Guineans, Malians, Liberians, and Ivorians, on charges of “unlawful assembly, conspiracy and illegal businesses” (Hashim, 2022; Thomas, 2022). Opposition critics alleged that the arrests were part of a government attempt to create false instability in the country to justify a potential power grab by the sitting president (Thomas, 2022).

In January 2019, members of a traditional secret society known as the Poro Society attacked an Ahmadiyya Muslim community in a village in the Kenema District (U.S. Department of State, 2020). The Ahmadi Muslims reportedly rejected membership in the Society, at which point Poro members kidnapped five men, severely beat another, and subjected the others to initiation by force, which included physical mutilation and cutting (U.S. Department of State, 2020). As Poro members seized the community’s livestock and set fire to eight houses, some 90 Ahmadi Muslims were forced to flee the village (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

Secret societies like the Poro Society are perceived to be responsible for the prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting in Sierra Leone, as such societies often regard FGM/C as a rite of passage into womanhood (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Women face legal discrimination through the application of customary law, which frequently disadvantages women in matters of marriage, divorce, property, and inheritance (U.S. Department of State, 2022). LGBTQI+ persons also face legal discrimination, with same-sex sexual activity between men considered a criminal offense (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: On June 21, security forces clashed with opposition All People’s Congress (APC) supporters in capital Freetown as they gathered to protest “discrepancies in the electoral process” (Crisis Watch, 2023). Aljazeera reported that police fired tear gas at opposition protestors and arrested 66 people (Aljazeera, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Prior to the June 24th elections, 35 APC supporters were released, who were arrested in a prior protest of the Electoral Commission. Police clashed with APC supporters on June 25th and 26th resulting in the deaths of five APC party volunteers. While the reforms and preparations prior to election on June 24th went smoothly, the results presented with statistical inconsistencies which were observed by the European Union Election Observation Mission in Sierra Leone. The electoral tensions and inconsistencies resulted in two coup attempts, one in August which led to the arrest of few soldiers, and another one on November 26th, where militants attacked the Military Armory and barracks in Freetown near the presidential palace, releasing all of the inmates in the prison. The counter operations to restore peace resulted in a few arrests and about 14 soldiers of the government were killed. The above events for 2023 do not meet the threshold for codification into PMAD database but nevertheless are important to understand the political landscape of Sierra Leone.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Singapore

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Slovakia

The Roma people of Slovakia, who account for roughly 7.5 percent of the country’s population, are reportedly segregated from the rest of Slovakian society, with particularly severe segregation occurring at primary schools (Macejova et al., 2020; Amnesty International, 2017). Slovakian government forces and the Ministry of Education are perceived to have committed atrocities against the Roma, including reduced citizenship (Amnesty International, 2017; Chudzikova, 2020). Systematic discrimination in Slovakia leaves over 85 percent of the Roma population living in slums without proper education, and over 62 percent of Roma children are segregated both in classrooms and schools (Strickland, 2017; Sirotnikova, 2019). Often Roma children undergo assessments where they are determined to have a mild mental disability, resulting

in them being sent to “special” schools with inferior education (Amnesty International, 2017). Experts have determined these assessments to be incorrect and to feed into biases against the Roma (Chudzikova, 2020).

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Collin Van Son*

New for June 2024 release: Various reports from UN and EU have persistently recommended the Slovakian government to provide equitable justice and take necessary measures to address the discrimination of Roma people and their children. In December 2023, Slovakia was brought to the European Court of Justice for violating its commitment to Race Equality Directive which makes it the first EU Member state to appear before the above specific court. Following various corruption charges against government officials over the years, Prime minister Robert Fico’s government planned to fast-track criminal charges, which included the removal of a special prosecutor’s office which deals with high-profile financial criminal cases and punishments (Reuters,2023). This move invited protests across the capital, with the estimated gathering to be about 15,000-18,000. This law was moved to be passed in 2024. Slovakia, like many other European countries, finds itself in the midst of an Illegal Migration displacement, with local sources reporting the detainment of 27,000 foreigners, out of which few were granted asylum.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024

Slovenia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Yet, major concerns in Slovenia are related to the denial of asylum seekers and the deterioration of freedom of expression (Amnesty International [AI], 2021). Journalists and media workers risk criminal charges for libel and slander (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor [DRL], 2021). Additionally, journalists face threats of violence from nongovernmental actors (DRL, 2021). Individuals seeking asylum in Slovenia have been denied access to forcibly deported to Croatia (AI, 2021).

– *Alexandra Brodsky*

New for June 2024 release: The European commission in its Rule of Law report, 2023 has stated how the situation of Media freedom faces various challenges, although the country has presented with positive developments (European Commission,2023). By the end of 2023, Slovakia was able to record the entries of 60,587 refugees and immigrants, which has resulted in overcrowding, which the Ombudsman has deemed as violation of people’s right to personal dignity, privacy, and security (Amnesty,2023). The local NGO’s have reiterated a wide bias of double standards of refugee acceptance in European countries where Ukrainian refugees have been treated comparatively better than non-European refugees.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024

Solomon Islands

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Somalia

Somalia has been wracked by violence since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991 (Inwood, 2021). The terrorist group Al-Shabaab emerged in Somalia in 2006 and has since contributed to the country's violent destabilization (Center for Preventive Action, 2022). Both Somali security forces and Al-Shabaab fighters are perceived to have perpetrated mass atrocities against Somali civilians (Amnesty International, 2022). Both sides have reportedly engaged in indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In 2021, the United Nations reported 536 civilian casualties (241 deaths and 295 injuries) in a six-month window (February–July), 68 percent of which it attributed to Al-Shabaab, and the remainder to state security forces, clan militias, and international and regional forces such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amnesty International, 2022).

Al-Shabaab often targets civilian infrastructure and carries out summary killings of individuals suspected of collaborating with the government (Center for Preventive Action, 2022; Amnesty International, 2020). Al-Shabaab fighters are also known to use sexual violence as a means of control (Secretary-General to the Security Council, 2021). For their part, Somali security forces are perceived to have carried out extrajudicial executions; arbitrarily detained journalists, government critics, and those suspected of Al-Shabaab alignment; sexually assaulted women and girls; and committed politically motivated disappearances during counter-terrorism operations (Amnesty International, 2021; Center for Preventive Action, 2022). In 2018, state security forces arrested a former leader of Al-Shabaab who was running for president, prompting protests by individuals who claimed the arrest violated democracy (Amnesty International, 2018; BBC, 2018). State security forces allegedly responded with excessive force, resulting in at least 15 people killed and dozens injured (Viner, 2019).

In the self-declared breakaway Republic of Somaliland, authorities are reported to engage in the arbitrary arrest and forced displacement of perceived opponents. In June 2021, 42 individuals were arrested in the town of Borama in Somaliland for wearing outfits made from the Somali flag (Amnesty International, 2022). That October, Somaliland authorities reportedly carried out forcible evictions against more than 7,000 people; despite the fact that many of those evicted had lived in the area for decades, authorities claimed they were “non-locals” and a threat to Somaliland security (Amnesty International, 2022). In August 2022, Somaliland security forces reportedly used excessive force against demonstrators who were protesting perceived plans to delay presidential elections; five people were reportedly killed and 100 were detained (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Clan rivalries over agricultural land ownership, pasture, and water resources remain a focal point of violence (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Revenge clan killings and atrocities are reportedly so serious that “military interventions and clan elder interventions [are] required to separate fighting parties and defuse tensions” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Oftentimes the dominant clan in a given area will

exclude members of other groups from participating in local government and public services; these local minority groups, which often lack armed militias, are vulnerable to killings, torture, rape, kidnapping, and looting at the hands of majority clan members (U.S. Department of State, 2022). As a result of such discriminatory dynamics, ethnic Bantus are considered particularly vulnerable to recruitment by Al-Shabaab (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in various forms. Under male-administered sharia law, women are disenfranchised in matters of inheritance and property ownership (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Despite a constitutional provision that equates female genital mutilation/cutting to torture, the practice is “almost universally practiced” in the country, with an estimated 99 percent of women and girls undergoing the procedure (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The law criminalizes same-sex sexual activity, which carries a punishment of up to three years’ imprisonment, and in the past decade, Al-Shabaab has allegedly executed men for participating in same-sex sexual activity (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: According to the ACLED, 2022 was the deadliest year in Somalia since at least 2018, with over 6,500 reported fatalities, compared to fewer than 3,500 reported fatalities in 2021 (ACLED, 2023a). The most recent political violence is centered in the Lower Shabelle, Banadir, and Lower Juba regions, where Al-Shabaab has targeted Somali security forces and civilians with violent attacks. Political violence heightened in June 2023 as the Somalian parliament debated constitutional changes from an indirect election to a one-person-one-vote system, which would weaken the political dominance of clans (ACLED, 2023b). During the debate, a clash between Somalian security forces and opposition loyalists left at least 26 people dead.

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The ACLED data set was able to record 8346 reported fatalities which makes it the highest reported numbers through the years of the conflict, out of which approximately 2000 were civilian casualties according to UN. Attacks persisted from the government side against Al-Shabaab through the year, with president Mohamud launching the second phase of offensive attacks backed by the AU mission forces, which made slow progress at the beginning of the year. With the attack of the AU mission in May 2023, a month before they started withdrawing in phases, Al-Shabaab stalled the government offensive over various events for the rest of the year. President Mohamud has set the deadline to December 2024, to expel the Al-Shabaab group, given it also marks the period by when there would be a complete withdrawal of the African Union peacekeeping forces (Reuters,2023). The AU force withdrew 2000 troops out of 20,000 in June and another 3000 in December as well. Due to the conflict and various climatic events, close to 3.9 million have been displaced, out of which 673,000 have been displaced due to the conflict. Puntland, the semi-autonomous region of Somalia conducted its first regional elections since 1967, making it a historic moment for the democratic sphere of Puntland. The region of Somaliland had various clashes with the Clan of Dhulbahante in Las Anod, resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people, 600 injured while close to the displacement of 154,000 to 203,000 people to the neighboring towns and villages (Amnesty,2023). The rule of the law in Somalia has been quite controversial in 2023, with the lower and upper chambers of the parliament passing an Anti-terrorism bill and the bill of the National Intelligence and Security Agency which has resulted in criticism from organizations such as Human rights Watch. Various isolated incidents of journalists being arrested along

with isolated cases of sexual violence against women has persisted in Somalia throughout the year of 2023.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

New for September 2024 release: Political tensions persisted over a constitutional review and the Somaliland-Ethiopia Port deal, while Al-Shabaab continued its attacks through the year, with clan attacks further undermining regional stability in Somalia (CrisisGroup,2024). International News organizations such as Reuters, Aljazeera and New York Times were able to report several incidents involving the mass murder attacks, blasts of Al-Shabaab and clan attacks in Somalia for the year 2024. While they include several attacks surrounding the capital city, Mogadishu, a suicide bomber detonating outside a hotel in Mogadishu, has claimed 32 lives and wounded 60 more, with Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility (New York Times, 2024). UNHCR was able to record 150,000 conflict/insecurity displacements from the period January-July 2024, while also recording another 127,000 displacements due to climate related events (Operational Data Portal UNHCR, 2024), with the PMAD database codifying the conflict related displacements. Somalia Police and Security forces were involved in the arbitrary detention and violence against journalists covering various protests or sensitive news (Horn Observer, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

South Africa

Since 2008 in South Africa, there have been numerous outbreaks of violence against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Amnesty International [AI], 2019). The 2008 attacks resulted in over 60 deaths, and the attacks in 2015 resulted in thousands of foreign nationals being displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The government continues to deploy troops to areas with increased xenophobic crime, marking the violence as a security concern instead of criminal law-breaking (Messner & Skinner, 2015). No one has ever been convicted for any of the xenophobic violence (Human Rights Watch, 2019). From 2018 to 2020, government security forces, including the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), South African Police Service (SAPS), and South African National Defense Force (SANDF), perpetrated systematic, planned, lethal, and directly lethal atrocities against foreign national resulting in over 1,500 victims (DRL, 2021).

A new outbreak of violence erupted in 2018 after the minister of Health accused foreign nationals of “burdening” South Africa’s health system (AI, 2019). Users on social media also blamed immigrants for increased crime and the loss of jobs and housing across the country (DRL, 2021). In 2018 in Soweto, mobs beat foreign nationals and looted their shops resulting in at least four foreign nationals dying (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Protestors accused foreign nationals of selling fake and expired food products (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Similar instances of looting shops and beatings of foreign nationals occurred throughout the country (Human Right Watch, 2020). South African truck drivers threw gasoline bombs, shot at, stoned, stabbed, and harassed foreign truck drivers resulting in over 200 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Xenophobic violence continued to increase as police and immigration officials physically abused refugees and asylum seekers (DRL, 2021). Government forces participated in the xenophobic attacks, mainly by raiding foreign-owned shops citing the suspicion of counterfeit goods, then proceeding to beat, and fire tear gas and rubber bullets at the owners (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Government forces also initiated

documentation raids into immigrant communities by forcefully entering homes to verify documents and legal status while also beating those inside (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

New for September 2023 release: South African police evicted more than 100 asylum seekers camping for over three years outside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offices in Pretoria (Aljazeera, 2023).

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: Increasing attitudes of xenophobia persist, with Operation Dudala, a xenophobic organization with various affiliations to conservative organizations, turning to contest the elections in 2024. The organization is responsible for violence against foreign nationals and preventing healthcare and employment access for Immigrants in Africa (HRW,2024).

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

South Sudan

In 2013, South Sudan descended into a civil war that divided the country along ethnic lines, with the main factions comprising ethnic Dinka on the one hand, ethnic Nuer on the other (Center for Preventative Action, 2022). While the civil war officially ended in 2018 with the signing of a power-sharing agreement, government security forces, armed insurgent groups, and ethnic militias continue to perpetrate mass atrocities against the civilian population (Center for Preventative Action, 2022).

As the government continues its counter-insurgency campaign against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army–In Opposition (SPLA-IO), the National Salvation Front (NAS), and allied groups, all sides stand accused of engaging in war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and the forced conscription of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Government forces reportedly engage in targeted attacks against non-Dinka civilians, as well as the arbitrary arrest of government critics (Freedom House, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). According to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), at least 52 people were extrajudicially executed in 2021, with state security forces either present at, or directly responsible for, nearly all the executions (Amnesty International, 2022). That same year saw government forces and the SPLA-IO wage a “campaign of terror” against the civilians of Tambura County in Western Equatoria State: roughly 300 people were killed and some 80,000 displaced as fighters from both sides burned homes, looted schools, and abducted civilians (Amnesty International, 2022). Between February and May 2022, government-supported youth forces reportedly attacked civilians in SPLA-IO-held territory, resulting in 173 civilians killed, 131 women raped, 12 people injured, and some 44,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

According to UNMISS, more than 60 percent of recent civilian deaths in South Sudan can be attributed to intercommunal violence by community-based militias (UNMISS, 2022). In a single three-month window (April–June 2022), UNMISS recorded 117 civilian deaths and 35 injuries due to conflict among and between Dinka and Nuer communities (UNMISS, 2022). In Eastern Equatoria, for instance, tensions between Dinka Bor cattle keepers and their host communities culminated in an armed attack by Madi youth that saw 20 Dinka Bor civilians killed and 10 injured (UNMISS, 2022). In a series of retaliatory attacks

by the Dinka Bor against the Madi and other Equatorian communities, 18 civilians were killed, five injured, three boys abducted, and four women raped (UNMISS, 2022). The previous year, some 68 people were killed, 27 injured, and 20,000 displaced when allied Nuer and Dinka marched into the Greater Pibor Administrative Area to recover cattle that had been raided by members of the Murle ethnic group (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

LGBTQI+ persons in South Sudan face legal discrimination, with consensual “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” carrying up to 10 years in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Facing harassment, arrest, and torture at the hands of security forces, most openly LGBTQI+ persons have reportedly fled the country (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: With an influx of refugees from neighboring Sudan, the humanitarian situation in Upper Nile has deteriorated amid a lack of food and clean water, raising ethnic and inter-communal tensions in the region (Crisis Group, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The humanitarian crisis worsens in South Sudan with various reports estimating 76% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reported the states of Warrap and Jonglei states to bore the majority of the violence, with the leading cause of harm affecting civilians being armed violence involving community-based militia and/or civil-defense groups (UNMISS,2023). Border disputes, inter-ethnic violence and cattle-related violence have propagated conflictual violence, with the catalyzation of Government officials and the impunity fueled in these facets of violence. Various IGO’s have reiterated the framework of the 2018 Revitalized peace agreement, though the progress has been very limited as South Sudan prepares for elections in 2024. The refugee crisis has been very devastating for resource allocation from IGO’s, with hundreds of thousands being internally displaced every year and the approximate inflow of 500,000 Sudanese refugees into the country in 2023. Victims attributed to the conventional parties in the civil war had reduced drastically by 79% compared to 2022 (UNMISS,2023), though there has been continuous suppression of freedom of expression with various isolated incidents of abductions, arbitrary detentions of journalists and critics being detained or tortured. The transitional government postponed the special Rapporteur’s visit to the country citing various critical reports that the UN had published.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: UNMISS was able to document 713 civilian deaths, 252 abductions and 272 arbitrarily arrested, with seventy six percent incidents related to community-based militias/Civil defense groups and twenty eight percent of the incidents attributed to government security forces and other armed groups (UN, 2024). Reuters was able to document several interethnic clashes over land and cattle which have been prominent in the oil rich region of Abyei and other bordering districts as well. The security situation in the neighboring country Sudan has affected several displacements, with 560,000 returnees of the 720,000 people entering being South Sudanese (OCHA,2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Spain

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: August 2024.

Sri Lanka

On April 21, 2019, more than 260 people were killed in the Easter Sunday bombings of three Christian churches and three tourist hotels in Sri Lanka's capital city, Colombo (Francis, 2020). The attacks were attributed to Islamist militants inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS) (Francis, 2020). Following the bombings, anti-Muslim mobs killed one person, caused extensive damage to homes and businesses, and forced about 1,100 Muslims to seek shelter from mob harassment and threats (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Under the country's draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), state security forces arbitrarily arrested hundreds of individuals for suspected ties to the bombings (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In 2022, an economic crisis sparked widespread protests against the government of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In April, authorities arrested over 600 people for violating a 36-hour state of emergency that the government had implemented to forestall a planned protest (NDTV, 2022). In May, with violence escalating against protesters and Rajapaksa loyalists alike, nearly 150 people were wounded after a pro-government mob attacked peaceful protesters with sticks and clubs (Al Jazeera, 2022). In July, Rajapaksa fled the country and resigned after protesters stormed the presidential residence; his successor, Ranil Wickremesinghe, promptly launched a harsh crackdown against civil unrest (Human Rights Watch, 2023). With the authorization of the newly appointed president, the military forcibly cleared a protest camp and retook an occupied government building, resulting in the injury of over 50 people, including lawyers and journalists (Wipulasena et al., 2022). As part of the crackdown, authorities made ample use of the PTA, which allows the government to detain anyone for up to a year without charge (Human Rights Watch, 2023). More than 100 people have since been arrested in what human rights observers describe as a systematic campaign against prominent protest figures (Wipulasena et al., 2022).

According to Human Rights Watch, the Sri Lankan government has pursued discriminatory policies against ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Tamils and Muslims (2022). State security and intelligence agencies have reportedly monitored and harassed Tamil community members in the country's north and east (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The Rajapaksa administration allegedly used the PTA to target political opponents within Tamil and Muslim communities (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Women and LGBTQI+ persons also face violence and discrimination. For instance, Muslim women are significantly disadvantaged by the country's Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Same-sex sexual conduct is illegal, and police reportedly use the threat of arrest to assault, harass, and extort LGBTQI+ persons (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: A year after the 2022 protests, the new President Ranil Wickremesinghe has continued to use the police and military to crack down on opposition protests (Amnesty International, 2023; Ganguly, 2023). President Wickremesinghe utilized the Prevention of Terrorism Act to detain student protest leaders, and his administration has proposed a new law that would give enhanced powers to the police, the military, and the president to further suppress free speech (Ganguly, 2023). The

government also continues to pursue abusive policies against minorities, such as “land grabs” in the north and east, targeting Tamil and Muslim-owned land, including places of worship (Ganguly, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The fragility of the government persisted among the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka. The country received two IMF bailout tranches, to help with the crisis and debt. Local elections were delayed citing funding difficulties, with general elections coming up in 2024. The highly criticized Prevention of Terrorism act (PTA) which the government tried to replace with a draft bill of Anti-terrorism bill (ATB), contained vague definitions and powers of detention which were eventually scrapped. The year presented with isolated incidents of police brutality through arbitrary arrests, detentions and incidents of torture using the PTA bill or the ICCPR act. The police launched an anti-drug operation ‘Yukthiya’ which brought it criticism and open letters from various IGO’s to suspend and review the program (UN,2024). External media also have viewed this program as a way to garner support for the upcoming elections in 2024 (Diplomat,2024), though the average ration of 1000 arrests per day and using the mechanism of arrest to instill fear, compulsory rehabilitation, and incidents of torture brought the operation under various criticism from human rights organizations. The use of forced rehabilitation is against a harm reduction perspective, along with various rights to refuse medication, as well the autonomy and consent of the drug users (UN, 2024).

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: UN has highlighted the various abuses as recorded by the Sri Lankan Human Rights commission in Sri Lanka over various arbitrary detention, arrests, incidents of torture recorded over the months in 2023 and 2024. These arrests follow the various laws introduced which grant the security forces to make arrests over legislation concerning counter terrorism, online safety and civil society (The Print, 2024). United Kingdom and other countries have raised issues of arbitrary arrests and torture at the 57th Human rights council, over various incidents surrounding the ‘Yukthiya’ operation, Minority abuses and families of Tamils who were part of the enforced disappearances during the civil war.

Last updated: August 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Sudan

In April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted after 30 years in power, much of which was marked by political oppression (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Following the ousting, a transition of political power began, but protests and atrocities continued (Amnesty International, 2021). From 2018 to 2020, the Sudanese Armed forces (SAF) began a crackdown on pro-democracy protestors. An unknown number of government-official security forces perpetrated systematic, planned, directly lethal atrocities resulting in over 2,100 victims (Human Rights Watch, 2019 & Walsh, 2019). Additionally, throughout 2020 an unknown number of the government's rapid support forces (RSF) perpetrated systematic, planned, and directly lethal atrocities against members of the Mahamid Arab tribe resulting in over 122 political victims (Human Rights Watch, 2021a).

In 2018, government security forces began a crackdown on protestors that continues to this day (Human Rights Watch, 2019). After months of protests, in April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted (Human

Rights Watch, 2020). Government security forces responded to demonstrations with excessive force, firing live ammunition, firing tear gas, and beating and killing protestors (Human Rights Watch, 2020). On June 3rd, 2019, an unknown number of government security forces perpetrated systematic, planned, and directly lethal attacks against political protestors resulting in over 240 victims (Aljazeera, 2020). State security forces shot live ammunition at protestors, beat them with batons, and raped protestors (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Following the June 3rd bloody attack, protests continued to erupt, calling for accountability for the attack and protesting price hikes, poor transportation, and other issues within Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Throughout 2020 an unknown number of the government's rapid support forces perpetrated systematic, planned, and directly lethal atrocities against members of the Mahamid Arab tribe resulting in over 122 political victims (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In December 2022, Sudanese political parties and the military signed a deal to transition to elections and civilian leadership and reduce military-perpetrated violence. However, the deal faced resistance from protest groups opposed to negotiations with the military, which resulted in more violent crackdowns on protestors (Reuters, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: In April 2023, fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) erupted, triggering a humanitarian crisis, and raising fears of a return to full-scale civil war (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). As fighting intensifies, the human rights situation in Sudan, particularly in West Darfur, continues to dramatically deteriorate. There have been reports of ethnically motivated targeted killings, sexual violence, widespread burning of homes, and mass displacement of non-Arab residents (Amnesty International, 2023; Agence France-Presse, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2023). In West Darfur, RSF and allied Arab militias have targeted and executed members of the ethnic Massalit community, which Human Rights Watch and tribal leaders have said amounts to war crimes (Formanek, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2023b). As of July 2023, between 3,000 to 10,000 people had been killed, 6,000 to 8,000 others injured, and more than 3 million people had been displaced (Formanek, 2023; UNHCR, 2023).

Same-sex sexual activity is prohibited under the Penal Code 1991, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). There is some evidence of the law being enforced in recent years, and LGBT+ people are regularly subjected to discrimination and violence (Human Dignity Trust, 2023).

– Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Conflict in Sudan has escalated in the areas of Khartoum and West Darfur, with ACLED data placing it at 13000 casualties, with various sources such as UN having similar estimates. Multiple reports have emerged of the targeted ethnic killings of the Massalit community by the RSF in El Geneina, with huge tolls taking place during the month of June and the Ardamata massacre in November, 2023. Internally about 5 million have been displaced due to the conflict, with 1.2 million people affected by the violence escaping to the neighboring countries. Targets of violence have included medical facilities, water treatment plants, refugee camps, with systematic looting of aid warehouses and humanitarian goods (HRW, 2023). The conflict has resulted in the need of immediate humanitarian assistance for 20 million Sudanese people, which has been accommodated with a small cholera/water diarrhea outbreak in the city of Gedaref. The UN human rights council adopted to set up an independent mechanism fact finding mission for Sudan (HRW, 2023).

– Updated by Hari Raavi

New for September 2024 release: The conflict in Sudan has created severe conditions, with nearly 26 million people—half the population—facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 14 famine warnings issued, and over 750,000 people are already in famine conditions. Over 70% of the healthcare system has collapsed, leading to frequent disease outbreaks. With more than 19 million children out of school and a conservative estimate of over 75,000 deaths due to violence and hunger, the crisis is dire and escalating (Operation Broken Silence, 2024).

Since fighting began between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15 last year, there have been 5,550 instances of political violence and over 15,550 fatalities in Sudan. The highest levels of violence occurred in Khartoum state, with over 3,660 events and more than 7,050 fatalities. Across the country, over 1,400 violent events targeting civilians have been reported, with Khartoum state experiencing more than 650 incidents and at least 1,470 fatalities. In Darfur, targeted violence against civilians is twice as likely to be deadly compared to other regions, accounting for 32% of all reported civilian deaths (ACLED, 2024). More than 8.6 million people have been displaced, including 6.8 million internally and over 1.8 million as refugees in neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2024).

In Sudan, the conflict has led to a humanitarian catastrophe with up to 12 million people displaced in the past few years. Gender-based violence has surged, with an estimated 6.7 million people at risk. The crisis continues to deepen, with widespread destruction of health centers and shortages of staff and supplies (UNFPA, 2024). The violence has also caused a mass exodus, with over 570,000 Massalit and other non-Arab people now in refugee camps in Chad (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Suriname

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018. However, the country continues to reckon with past human rights abuses. Most prominently, former President Desi Bouterse was convicted in 2019 for the extrajudicial execution of 15 of his opponents in 1982, receiving a 20-year prison sentence (Freedom House, 2020).

– Alexandra Brodsky

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: September 2024.

Swaziland

In 2018, armed police and the Mbabane High Court Deputy Sheriff forcibly displaced over 200 people in Nokwane and Malkerns without proper notice or compensation (Amnesty International, 2018; Amnesty International, 2019). Evictions took place because of conflicts, accusations of criminal activity, and for opposing the local chief (U.S. Department of State, 2019). A majority of the families evicted were

subsistence farmers, who were left with no way to provide income for their families and were rendered homeless (Amnesty International, 2019).

In May 2021, the death of a 25-year-old law student under dubious circumstances prompted protests against police brutality that quickly grew into nationwide pro-democracy and anti-government demonstrations (Amnesty International, 2021; Freedom House, 2022). State security forces responded with a heavy-handed crackdown, killing more than 80 people, injuring more than 200, and arresting more than 1,000 (Freedom House, 2022). Civil unrest continued into 2022, with authorities allegedly abducting and torturing student activists (CIVICUS, 2022). The Operation Support Service Unit, a militarized police unit that answers to the king, has reportedly fired live ammunition into crowds at anti-monarchy rallies organized by the Communist Party of Swaziland (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face legal discrimination in Swaziland. Under civil and customary law, women are treated as dependents of their fathers or husbands, which places them at a disadvantage in matters of marriage, divorce, and child custody (Freedom House, 2022). Though rarely enforced, a ban on same-sex sexual activity is in place and was invoked by the country's High Court in 2022 in its decision to block the registration of an LGBT organization (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky*

New for June 2024 release: Elections were conducted in September which consisted of parties loyal to the King Mswati III, while other parties were usually banned. Public dissent or critique has actively been met with force, detention on pro-democracy protestors, though the numbers do reach the limits to be codified under the PMAD database. At the beginning of the year, human rights lawyer and activist Thulani Maseko was killed, which happened after attacks on several human rights lawyers. This killing invited criticism from the UN, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which have been actively monitoring the democracy facet in Swaziland.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

New for September 2024 release: In Eswatini, authorities have acted with impunity, particularly in the assassination of human rights lawyer Thulani Maseko, with no accountability for his death or other activists' killings. Freedom of expression, assembly, and association are heavily restricted, with opposition activists, unions, and protesters facing arbitrary detention, torture, and unfair trials. Despite public protests, healthcare services remain under-resourced, and hundreds of people face forced evictions due to the government's failure to reform land governance. The government also refuses to register an LGBTI rights group, despite a Supreme Court ruling. The government continues to suppress dissent, arresting critics and resisting calls for democratic reforms. Violence against women is widespread, with significant sexual violence and workplace harassment (HRW; Masiko-Mpaka; Amnesty, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– *Updated by Avantika Singh*

Sweden

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: September 2024.

Switzerland

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: September 2024.

Syria

In 2011, protests against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime prompted a deadly government response that quickly escalated into a full-scale civil war (Center for Preventative Action, 2023). Three primary campaigns continue to drive the violence: (1) violence between the Syrian government (backed by Russia and Iran) and anti-government rebel groups (backed by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey); (2) military operations by Turkish forces against Syrian Kurds; and (3) coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) (Center for Preventative Action, 2023). The United Nations estimates that over 306,000 civilians— “a staggering 1.5 percent of the total population”—were killed in the first 10 years of the conflict (United Nations, 2022). As of January 2019, more than 5.6 million people had fled the country, and more than 6 million had been internally displaced (Center for Preventative Action, 2023). All parties to the conflict are perceived to have perpetrated mass atrocities, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement, and mass containment (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

The Syrian-Russian military alliance stands accused of war crimes pertaining to its indiscriminate aerial bombings of civilian targets, including schools, hospitals, and markets (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since 2015, the Russian air force is estimated to have conducted some 39,000 airstrikes that have collectively killed almost 25,000 Syrian civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023a). These attacks continued into 2022, particularly in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates in northwest Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Within the government-controlled regions of the country—i.e., central, west, and southwest Syria—government security forces and affiliated militias are widely perceived to engage in systematic disappearances, detention, and torture (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), some 111,000 people remained disappeared as of mid-2022, with the vast majority attributed to the Syrian government (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Between January and April 2021, some 400 individuals were arbitrarily arrested for criticizing the government’s economic policies (Amnesty International, 2022). Torture and sexual violence—including rape, assault, and sexual humiliation—are reportedly endemic to government detention facilities (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since 2015, SNHR estimates that nearly 15,000 people have died due to torture (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

In October 2019, Turkey launched a military incursion into northeast Syria, its fourth since 2016 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The operation, aimed at driving out the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was accompanied by summary killings, forced displacements, arbitrary arrests, and sexual violence by Turkish-backed forces (Kajjo, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2020). In the parts of northern Syria where Turkey remains in control—including the northwest city of Afrin and the northeast city of Ras al-Ayn—Syrian Kurds are reportedly subjected to arbitrary detention, forced displacement, abduction, and

torture at the hands of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of pro-Turkey armed groups (Amnesty International, 2022).

The SDF has also been accused of human rights abuses, including mass arrest campaigns targeted at activists, journalists, and teachers (Human Rights Watch, 2023). According to SNHR, the SDF arbitrarily detained 369 people in the first half of 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, the SDF has detained some 66,000 people suspected of having ties to ISIS, which observers say constitutes arbitrary containment in life-threatening conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). These detainees include nearly 43,000 foreigners, more than half of whom are children (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). In January 2022, ISIS launched an attack on al-Sina'a prison in the city of Hasakeh, resulting in more than 500 people killed and 45,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). As part of their operations to re-capture escaped detainees, SDF forces reportedly destroyed the homes of more than 140 families (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

The al-Qaeda affiliate group Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) remains in control in parts of Idlib governorate, where it continues to subject civilians to arbitrary arrest, torture, and summary execution (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In the first half of 2021, HTS arbitrarily arrested 57 activists, humanitarian workers, and journalists (Amnesty International, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face legal discrimination in various forms. For instance, adultery carries a longer prison sentence for women than it does for men, and individuals who engage in “unnatural sexual intercourse” can face up to three years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

New for September 2023 release: On February 6, 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake and 7.5 magnitude aftershock struck southeast Turkey and northwest Syria, representing one of the worst natural disasters of this century (Center for Preventative Action, 2023). The earthquake has made effective governance nearly impossible, as opposition forces have scrambled to meet the needs of citizens amid territorial divisions (Center for Preventative Action, 2023). Despite this major disaster, Turkish-backed militants continued to target asylum seekers and migrants trying to cross into Turkey with excessive force and torture (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). Since the beginning of 2023, there have been 11 deaths and 20 injuries along the Syrian/Turkish border caused by Turkish border guards, although the number is suspected to be higher (Human Rights Watch, 2023b).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: The year 2023 was marked by an increase in military hostilities within the conflictual northern regions. Since the beginning of 2023, there have been 11 deaths and 20 injuries along the Syrian/Turkish border caused by Turkish border guards, although the number is suspected to be higher (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). Various international actors and locally backed regimes appeared to have used arbitrary detention, disappearances, torture, bombings, and various attacks on civilian facilities (SNHR, 2023). Canada and the Netherlands brought the case of Syria and systematic torture into the International Court of Justice, which has ruled in November towards the prevention of torture of detainees (Aljazeera,2023). Gross human rights violations exist within the various detention facilities run by different perpetrators, with Amnesty recording 56,000 detainees in 27 camps within the Syrian Democratic forces (SDF) facilities. These facilities perpetuate torture, forced disappearances, ill-treatment such as beating, shocks (Amnesty,2023). Close to 175,000-195,000 people have been displaced due to the

conflict in 2023. Followed by visits of Iranian president, Syria was reinstated to the Arab league without any necessary of a reform and conditionality.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

New for September 2024 release: In the first half of 2024, Syria saw severe violence resulting in the deaths of 429 civilians, including 65 children and 38 women, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). Additionally, 53 individuals died from torture. Among those responsible, the Syrian regime killed 62 civilians, including 8 children and 4 women, while Russian forces were responsible for 5 deaths. ISIS and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) killed a combined 22 civilians, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) killed 35 civilians. Massacres were reported, with nine incidents documented, alongside 57 attacks on vital civilian facilities. Most deaths occurred in Daraa and Deir Ez-Zour. The use of landmines added 68 more fatalities, including 10 children and 14 women (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2024).

In north-east Syria, over 56,000 people, including 11,500 men, 14,500 women, and 30,000 children, are held in a system of arbitrary and indefinite detention across 27 facilities and two camps (Al-Hol and Roj). Victims of detention include hundreds of Yazidi victims. Many detainees are victims of Islamic State (IS) crimes, including forced marriages and boys recruited as child soldiers. Torture is rampant, involving beatings, electric shocks, stress positions, and sexual violence. The camps are overcrowded, with 94% of the population being women and children, who face gender-based violence and inhumane conditions. Approximately 1,000 boys are detained, enduring the same abuses as adults (Amnesty, 2024).

Hundreds of thousands have died, including civilians, and the nation's infrastructure—such as roads, schools, and hospitals—has been severely damaged. Economically, the war has led to high unemployment, widespread poverty, and food insecurity, with nearly 13 million people lacking access to sufficient food. Over 6.4 million Syrians have become refugees, primarily in neighboring countries, contributing to a major humanitarian crisis. As of 2024, an estimated 16.7 million people in Syria require emergency aid, and 7.2 million remain displaced within the country (WorldVision, 2024).

Syrian children and women, especially those in vulnerable communities such as IDPs and refugee camps, are at high risk of forced labor and sexual exploitation. Armed groups, including ISIS and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), exploit children as soldiers, human shields, and in forced marriages. The February 2023 earthquakes further exacerbated vulnerabilities, displacing 43,000 more people. Child recruitment for military purposes remains widespread, with several groups recruiting children as young as 6 for combat (US State Department, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

– Updated by Avantika Singh

Taiwan

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: September 2024.

Tajikistan

One year after declaring independence in 1991, Tajikistan broke out into a civil war that lasted five years and ended in 1997 (BBC Monitoring, 2018). Ever since, the country has faced issues of instability, corruption, and poverty (International Crisis Group, 2009). Tajikistan is a repressive authoritarian state ruled by President Emomali Rahmon since 1992 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor [DRL], 2021). The regime has a history of enforcing a campaign of severe restrictions on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House [FH], 2021).

Since 2015, state security forces have arbitrarily detained over 150 individuals under false and inflated charges (DRL, 2021). On the 2nd of January 2020, the regime introduced a Law on Countering Extremism, furthering the government's ability to restrict freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Since the introduction of this law, the national security forces of Tajikistan have systematically targeted more than 133 activists, journalists, relatives of peaceful dissidents, and others who criticize the government (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

In accordance with the Law on Countering Extremism, the government banned the Muslim Brotherhood and continued arresting those alleged of affiliation (FH, 2021). The Muslim Brotherhood's apparent goal is to establish an Islamic State and overthrow the current government (DRL, 2021). The group is accused of being a violent terrorist organization, while leaders of the movement claim to be against violence and use peaceful means to pursue its Islamist vision (Reuters Staff, 2020). Within January 2020, security forces detained 113 individuals under suspicion that they were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (DRL, 2021). Those arrested included university staff, students, entrepreneurs, and public sector employees (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Of these arrests, approximately 30 people were released after a month of arbitrary detainment, and as of August 2020, 20 individuals received prison sentences (FH, 2021). Individuals received a sentence of a range of 5 to 7 years in prison (Morton, 2020). Prison conditions are reported to be appalling, and there are regular reports of torture (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

– Alexandra Brodsky

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: September 2024.

Tanzania

In 2019, a government crackdown on media and civil society groups intensified, and authorities began detaining human rights workers, journalists, and other media officials on charges of organized crime, tax evasion, and cybercrime (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Leading up to the 2020 elections, about 10,000 security forces were deployed to islands in Zanzibar, where they harassed and beat citizens, broke into homes, and fired tear gas and live ammunition indiscriminately (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Candidates running as the opposition were often arrested, harassed, and disqualified from running (U.S. Department of State, 2021). On July 18, 2021, police arrested 38 members and supporters of the country's main opposition party, Chadema (U.S. Department of State, 2022). One week later, police arrested another 54 Chadema members for demonstrating against the arrest of the party's chairman (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

2022 saw an increase in tensions between the government and ethnic Maasai herders in Ngorongoro District, near the border of Serengeti National Park (United Nations, 2022). In June, game wardens cordoned off roughly 580 square miles of land, prompting a violent confrontation with local Maasai residents (Al Jazeera, 2022). Tanzanian security forces allegedly fired live ammunition and tear gas; the ensuing violence left one police officer dead and roughly 30 people injured (United Nations, 2022). Hundreds of Maasai herders were reportedly displaced, and at least 20 people have allegedly been arrested and held incommunicado (Al Jazeera, 2022).

Roughly 10 percent of women in Tanzania are estimated to have undergone female genital mutilation/cutting, though figures are significantly higher in certain areas of the country, including Manyara (58 percent), Dodoma (47 percent), and Arusha (41 percent) (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Individuals who engage in same-sex sexual activity can face up to 30 years in prison for “carnal knowledge of another against the order of nature,” and police reportedly engage in harassment of those they perceive to be LGBTQI+ (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: In 2023, the Tanzanian government allegedly cut off vital health services in Ngorongoro district as part of a resettlement plan for area residents who were forcibly displaced in 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). On August 25, Amnesty International accused the Tanzanian authorities of arresting and detaining 39 members of the Maasai community (Amnesty International, 2023).

– Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: During the first half of 2024, there were a few isolated incidents, involving the eviction of the Maasai community, journalists arrested, and police killings in a gold mine. These do not meet the threshold but are important, given how the EU joined the world bank in cutting funding for the Tanzania’s wildlife conservation programs (Ghana web, 2024) over the human right crimes committed against the Maasai community. Due to floods in January and April, the casualties reached close to 200 and the displacement of 200,000, which also prompted IMF to approve \$900million for Tanzania’s fight against climate change.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

Thailand

A 2017 military-drafted constitution brought hope for democratic gains in Thailand, resulting in general elections in 2019 (BBC Monitoring, 2019b). However, on February 21st, 2020, the Constitutional Court accused the opposition Future Forward Party of acquiring an illegal loan from its leader and dissolved the party (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In response, pro-democratic youth-led protests erupted throughout 2020 (Freedom House, 2021). In 2020, an unknown number of state security forces, police, and military utilized arbitrary detention and torture against political protestors and government critics, resulting in over 270 victims (Amnesty International, 2021).

In February 2020, following the dissolution of the Future Forward Party, large protests led by pro-democratic youth erupted (Freedom House, 2021). The protests were temporarily diminished by the

COVID-19 pandemic restrictions (Freedom House, 2021). In July, protests began to intensify, with tens of thousands of people regularly attending demonstrations (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Throughout 2020 at least 1,545 protests occurred across the country (Amnesty International, 2021). Protestors had three major demands; dissolve parliament and hold new elections, reform the military-drafted constitution, and stop harassment and intimidation of government critics (Amnesty International, 2020). Protestors were met with excessive force by State security forces, who randomly fired rubber bullets and canisters of tear gas at close range (Amnesty International, 2021). During protests in November, about 55 protestors, including elementary school students and kindergarteners, were injured by the State security forces, 6 of them injured by gunshot wounds (Amnesty International, 2020). The government continued to use the COVID-19 emergency decree to arrest and charge protestors to discourage these peaceful demonstrations (U.S. Department of State, 2021). State security forces also increased arrests under lese-majeste laws, which outlaw criticism of the monarchy (Amnesty International, 2021). Over 270 people were detained during protests, and about 1,460 people had civil or criminal charges against them for criticizing the government (Amnesty International, 2021). At the end of 2020, at least 23 people were awaiting trial or in prison for breaking lese-majeste laws (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

– *Alexandra Brodsky*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: The Move Forward Party, which won most of the votes in the 2023 elections was not able to form a government, due to which conservative institutions such as the Pheu Thai Party led the government at the center. While mass atrocities had reduced in the first half of the year of 2024, with the Thailand government and Muslim separatist rebels agreeing “in principle” upon an updated roadmap towards peace (Al Jazeera, 2024), there were still numerous isolated incidents where royal-defamation laws were misused against the general public. The government led by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin has continued to support laws that the Move Forward Party seeks to reform. As of April 2024, 1,954 people have faced political prosecution in 1,295 cases (TLHR, 2024). Human rights activists are calling for reform of several laws, including Article 112, Article 116, the Emergency Decree, the Computer Crime Act, and the Public Assembly Act. Thailand has also become the first country in southeast Asia and the second in Asia to recognize same-sex marriage due to a bill being passed in June 2024.

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Timor-Leste

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Togo

New for September 2023 release: The law criminalizes rape of women and men and sexual harassment, but according to the U.S. Department of State, authorities did not generally enforce it effectively (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women experience discrimination in education, pay, pension benefits,

inheritance, and transmission of citizenship (U.S. Department of State, 2023). The law prohibits same-sex sexual conduct and the “promotion of same-sex conduct,” understood to restrict, and in some circumstances criminalize sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, as well as advocacy for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Tonga

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Trinidad and Tobago

There are no laws explicitly protecting LGBTIQ people from discrimination or hate crimes, and Trinidad and Tobago’s anti-discrimination law, the Equal Opportunity Act, explicitly excludes “sexual preference or orientation” as a protected status (Outright International, 2022). Discrimination against the LGBTIQ community is widespread, affecting their ability to fully engage in political and electoral processes (Freedom House, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: On 4 July 2023, the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago ruled that obligations under the Refugee Convention and the principle of non-refoulement do not apply to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago because the Government had failed to incorporate the international law provisions into domestic legislation (UNHCR, 2023). The following month, it was reported that 98 Venezuelan nationals were deported, violating the principle of non-refoulement (Amnesty International, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: July 2024.

Tunisia

In 2015, Tunisia’s then-president, Beji Caid Essebsi, declared a nationwide state of emergency in the wake of a suicide attack on the presidential guard; as of this writing, over seven years later, the state of emergency remains in effect (Amara, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023). Under the state of emergency, state security forces are empowered to ban strikes and demonstrations, prohibit gatherings, and impose house arrests and travel bans on anyone deemed a threat to state security (U.S. Department of State,

2021; Human Rights Watch, 2019). The government's capacity to restrict civil liberties grew greater in 2021, when President Kais Saied suspended parliament, expanded the country's curfew, and enacted a ban on public demonstrations (Freedom House, 2022).

Government critics and political opposition figures, including activists, journalists, and social media users, are reportedly subject to beatings, torture, and mass containment at the hands of state security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2023; Middle East Monitor, 2019). In January 2021, protests erupted in response to police repression and were promptly met by further police repression: protesters were allegedly beaten, one was killed by a tear gas canister, and hundreds were arbitrarily arrested (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). Since President Saied granted himself extraordinary powers in mid-2021, at least 50 Tunisians, including a judge and three lawmakers, have been imprisoned in "assigned residences," while dozens more have faced arbitrary travel bans (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In January 2022, security forces reportedly used excessive force to disperse demonstrators on two separate occasions (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination by the Tunisian state. Same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by up to three years in prison, and state actors have reportedly taken to harassing and outing LGBTQI+ persons online (Human Rights Watch, 2023). During the unrest of 2021, police officers allegedly targeted LGBTQI+ activists with physical assault and threats of rape and murder (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

New for September 2023 release: On February 21, 2023, President Kais Saied made discriminatory and hateful remarks towards Black African migrants in speech during a National Security Council meeting (Amnesty International, 2023). The speech triggered an upsurge in anti-Black racist violence, with mobs attacking Black migrants, students and asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch, 2023). There was also an increase in arbitrary arrests, forced evictions, and deportations of Black African migrants (Amnesty International, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2023). Since February 21, at least 44 African students had been arrested, and more than 40 students reported violent attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: President Saied's government introduced an NGO draft law in November 2023, which human rights organizations deem to threaten the independent working of civil society organizations, given how the government would have greater interference with registration and regulation of NGO's. Within the first half of 2024, several arrests and detentions were made towards immigrants camped near the Tunis offices of the IOM and UNHCR during the month of May (HRW, 2024). In the larger migration sphere, EU's partnership with Tunisia has been fostered through a One-billion-dollar accord, to prevent migrations into the European continent, which has essentially left many immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers stranded in Tunisia, and within the rising xenophobic racist lens propagated by President Saied since 2023, this has left the immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in a vulnerable situation (US News, 2024). With the weakening of opposition party spheres through the arrests of the opposition leaders with an upcoming election, several arrests and detentions have been targeted towards lawyers and human rights activists, weakening the civil society sphere in Tunisia. There have been several peaceful demonstrations through the year, but essentially the arrests have been surrounded decree 54, which was issued by President Saied in September 2022. The curbing of civic space happens

through the application of decree 54, which is a cybercrime law levied against the critique of the civic space against the regime.

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

Turkey

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has ruled Turkey since 2002, the Turkish government has escalated its suppression of perceived critics, including journalists, media workers, activists, protesters, lawyers, and political opposition figures (Freedom House, 2022). The government’s repressive efforts are largely focused on: (1) members of the country’s second-largest opposition party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP); (2) so-called Gülenists, who are individuals with alleged ties to the movement led by United States–based cleric Fethullah Gülen; and (3) ethnic Kurds with alleged ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization engaged in a decades-long conflict with Turkish security forces (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Authorities have reportedly engaged in mass violence, torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances as part of their campaign against the above-mentioned groups and other perceived opponents (Freedom House, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the government detained over 500 social media users on allegations that they were spreading “fake news” (Amnesty International, 2020). As of January 2023, at least 65 journalists and media workers remained detained for alleged terrorism offenses (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In 2021, police reportedly used excessive force while detaining hundreds of peaceful protesters at Boğaziçi University (Amnesty International, 2022). Police have also continued to break up and arrest participants at the weekly vigil of the “Saturday Mothers,” a group that protests the forced disappearances associated with the country’s 1980 coup (Freedom House, 2022). Authorities are regularly accused of torturing prisoners, particularly Kurds, Gülenists, and leftists (Freedom House, 2022).

In 2015, a ceasefire between Turkish security forces and the PKK broke down, initiating a new period of violence that peaked in the country’s southeast during the first half of 2016 (Crisis Group, 2023). Since 2015, more than 6,500 people have been killed in clashes or terrorist attacks, including over 600 civilians (Crisis Group, 2023). The Turkish government has since accused the HDP of functioning as a PKK proxy, prompting regular attacks on HDP offices by far-right, anti-Kurdish mobs (Freedom House, 2022). The ongoing war with the PKK has also been used to justify discriminatory measures against Kurdish citizens, including the prohibition of Kurdish festivals and other efforts to prevent the promotion of Kurdish language and culture (Freedom House, 2022). From June to October 2022, at least 25 Kurdish journalists were arrested on the “widely abused charge” of membership in a terrorist organization (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). Ahead of the 2023 election, Turkish police detained at least 126 people suspected of links to the PKK, which included lawyers, journalists and politicians (Kirby, 2023).

Syrian refugees, women, and LGBTQI+ persons in Turkey face violence and discrimination in various forms. Turkey continues to host some 3.6 million Syrian refugees, and amid escalating anti-Syrian sentiment, the Turkish government has been accused of unlawfully deporting hundreds of Syrian men and boys back to northern Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). In 2021, 45 Syrian refugees were arrested for taking part in a “provocative” social media trend that authorities said was insulting to Turks (Amnesty International, 2022). From January to April 2023, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has recorded 11 deaths and

20 injuries along the Syrian/Turkish border caused by Turkish border guards (Human Rights Watch, 2023b).

2021 also saw President Erdogan withdraw Turkey from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty to combat gender-based violence, claiming the Convention served to “normalize homosexuality” (Freedom House, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022). In the first 10 months of the following year, at least 275 women in Turkey were killed by men; the most common motivation was the woman’s refusal to marry or have a relationship with their killer (Stockholm Center for Freedom, 2022). According to government critics, AKP policies effectively grant impunity to violent and abusive men (Stockholm Center for Freedom, 2022). 2022 also saw the eighth successive ban on Istanbul Pride week, with over 370 people arrested for participating in pro-LGBTQI+ events (Human Rights Watch, 2023a). For the past 2 years, the government has banned the Women’s Day, citing that the march could “provoke” segments of Turkish society (Guzel, 2023). During the 2023 event, Police used tear gas to disperse Women who demonstrated against the ban, and at least 30 people were arrested (Guzel, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: On June 25, 2023, Istanbul police violently intervened and detained 113 pro-LGBTQ protestors, activists, and journalists at the Istanbul Pride March (Human Rights Watch, 2023c). The march was banned for the ninth consecutive year, as were all other pride events in the city.

– Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: The starting of the year persisted with airstrikes against the Kurdish militants in Syria and Iraq, after 9 Turkish soldiers were killed during an attack on a Turkish Military base in Iraq (AP News, 2024). The airstrikes with its civilian casualties, were also targeted towards civilian infrastructure continuously such as electricity, water and gas stations (Nes Ngo, 2024). Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), a human rights and conflict tracker organization in the Kurdistan region estimated around 800 attacks and airstrikes during the first half of the year 2024 (RUDAW, 2024). Turkish police detained 217 people during the annual protests on May Day, marking International Labor Day, which has been the pattern by President Erdogan towards public meetings and demonstrations. Various isolated incidents of torture in prisons and the arrests of journalists have been recorded by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. The same organization through their annual report for 2023, received 739 cases of torture in 2023. Femicide rates remain high. According to Bianet’s male violence monitor, which collects data from various local and national newspapers, 40 women were killed in May, bringing the total number of femicides to nearly 160 by the end of the month (Bianet, 2024). In the month of May, 24 Kurdish politicians were convicted on bogus charges, following an unjust and political trial, according to Human Rights Watch, which has essentially weakened people elected opposition politicians from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HRW, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

Turkmenistan

The government of Turkmenistan does not allow human rights organizations or any international monitoring in the country (Amnesty International, 2021). Yet, open-source reporting has demonstrated a

long history of repressive policies and human rights abuses in Turkmenistan (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Being critical of the government is not allowed, and any opposition to the government is legally considered treason in Turkmenistan (U.S. Department of State, 2019). From 2018 through 2020, an unknown number of Turkmenistan security forces continued to carry out systematic and planned targeting of journalists, activists, protesters, and all other government critics through forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and torture (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

In recent years, crackdowns against media and government critics have led to over 121 disappeared arbitrarily detained prisoners (U.S. Department of State, 2019). Government critics in prison are often held in complete isolation for years, with no contact with family or legal representation (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Family members of arbitrarily detained people are denied all information about their family members, not even informed if they are alive or not (Human Rights Watch, 2020). State security forces continue to torture those in detention, often to extract confessions (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Turkmenistan continues to be one of the most isolated countries heavily controlled by the repressive authoritative government (Freedom House, 2021).

Consensual same-sex conduct between men is illegal (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Women face denial of obtaining and renewing drivers' licenses along with refusal to sell women cars (Rickleton, 2023). Since the inauguration of Serdar Berdymukhamedov, restrictions on women have continually increased (Rickleton, 2023).

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Parliamentary reforms took place in January 2023, centralizing greater power within an 'upper council' and the president, making Turkmenistan, a repressive authoritarian state according to Freedom house country report. Citizens are persecuted for visiting websites of independent publications and sharing any information critiquing the government (Radio Azatlyk, 2024), which has left very few independent sources covering the ground reality. Citizens dissatisfied or found to be critiquing of the government are deemed "Unreliable citizens", who are then harassed or put in arbitrary detention by the Ministry of National security. Similar authoritative practices are conducted on Religious Muslims, who are detained or interrogated for attending mosques. Security services forcibly shave the beards of practicing Muslims, break their fast or raid religious shops and literature. State security deems certain practicing Muslims to be "too religious" and they are interrogated or put under surveillance, with the suspicion of extremist links (USCIRF, 2024). Various protests against the government corruption and shortage of food have resulted in the detention of 45 people in the months of March and April. Turkmenistan also ranks among the top five countries actively carrying out transnational repression (Freedom House, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Tuvalu

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Uganda

Under President Museveni's rule, severe violations of freedom of association, expression, assembly, and abuses by security forces continued (Human Rights Watch, 2019). From 2018 to 2020, an unknown number of Uganda police, the local defense unit (LDU), and the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) perpetrated planned, systematic, and lethal atrocities against political oppositionists, civil society groups, journalists, and people in violation of the COVID-19 curfew. These atrocities resulted in over 175 victims (U.S. Department of State, 2021).

Throughout 2018, several protests erupted during the by-elections in Arua (Human Rights Watch, 2019). State security forces responded violently, beating, throwing tear gas, and firing bullets at protestors (Kagumire, 2018). At least six civilians were shot and killed by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Authorities arrested 34 protestors, including Bobi Wine, an opposition politician, and charged them with treason (Amnesty International, 2018). Those detained were subject to torture and abuse, including Bobi Wine, whose torture was so severe that he was unable to walk or talk (Kagumire, 2018). Throughout 2019, the government continued to introduce repressive laws, blocked political assemblies, and arrested and detained those that spoke out against the government (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In November 2020, election campaigns began to launch, resulting in the Ugandan state security forces intensifying a crackdown on political opposition and critics (Human Rights Watch, 2021a). The government used the Covid-19 pandemic to further silence critics and oppositionists. State security forces arrested politicians for giving out food to those in need (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). Those who allegedly did not comply with the Covid-19 restrictions and curfews were beaten, arrested, and shot at by state security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). Political oppositionists reported that over 450 of their followers were disappeared by state security forces, while the government only confirmed that 171 of these individuals were in detention centers (Amnesty International, 2021). State security forces unlawfully killed at least 54 people during political protests in November within 48 hours (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Authorities continued to repress the media and often shot at and beat journalists for reporting on anything supporting political opposition (Human Rights Watch, 2021a). On January 16th, 2021, President Yoweri Museveni was announced as the election winner for his sixth presidential term (Mutiga, 2021). Those living in the Appa community face harassment, violence, evictions, and homes burned down by security forces. Residents of this area were also excluded from participating in the 2021 elections (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: In March 2023, Parliament passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2023, which is of the toughest anti-LGBTQ laws in the world (Madowo, 2023). The act outlaws gay marriage, punishes same-sex acts with life imprisonment, and allows the state to convict individuals for “promoting homosexuality” (Madowo, 2023). Since the act was passed, at least 300 human rights violations against LGBTQ individuals have been reported, including forced evictions, termination from employment, blackmail, threats of violence, and incidents of mob justice (Madowo, 2023).

– Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: Most inter-ethnic conflicts can be traced through the reasons of land and cattle through the year of 2024, with several incidents of Karamojong pastoralists killing Boda Boda drivers or raiding over cattle. Another case of the disputed land of Apaa, between the two tribes of Madi and Acholi, resulted in several casualties in the month of February, where the lack of security personnel in the region of Apaa has resulted in widespread violence (TND News, 2024). Land conflict was also the reason for 500 people being displaced, since their houses were torched by the rival clan over a dispute of a 6-acre land (Monitor, 2024). Environmental and human activists were arrested and detained in the months of May and June over their protests against the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project, over Chinese president Xi Jinping’s support for the project (FIDH, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

Ukraine

In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine (Bigg, 2022). That same year, Russian-backed separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk declared their independence, touching off a war between the Ukrainian government and the self-styled People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which function as Russian proxies (Bigg, 2022; Crisis Group, 2022). Between 2014 and early 2022, over 14,000 people were killed in the armed conflict between Ukrainian state forces and Russian-backed separatists (Crisis Group, 2022). Within Crimea, which the international community continues to recognize as part of Ukraine, Russian authorities and their proxies have conducted a campaign of persecution against the Crimean Tatars, a Muslim ethnic minority that is indigenous to the Peninsula (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Members of the Tatar community have reportedly been subject to physical abuse, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Since 2015, Russian authorities in Crimea have arrested at least 26 people for allegedly associating with the Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in Russia but permitted in Ukraine and much of Europe (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The resulting war remains ongoing, with Russia controlling about 18 percent of Ukraine as of November 2022 (Reinhard, 2022). Over the course of the conflict, Russian forces are perceived to have committed a litany of human rights abuses and war crimes, including indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilian areas and infrastructure; torture; summary executions; sexual violence; mass containment; and forced displacement (Human Rights Watch, 2023). A number of observers, including United States President Joe Biden, have described Russia’s war as a “genocide” against the Ukrainian people, with Biden accusing Russian President Vladimir Putin of attempting to “wipe out the idea of even being a Ukrainian” (Knickmeyer, 2022). Putin has long denied the legitimacy of Ukrainian sovereignty and Ukrainian identity, raising concerns that Russian actions in Ukraine may constitute a campaign of mass erasure (Knickmeyer, 2022).

As of August 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) had verified at least 9,444 civilian deaths and more than 16,940 wounded since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion (HRMMU, 2023). Russian forces have reportedly targeted schools, churches, cultural centers, hospitals,

food facilities, and electrical infrastructure, with the War Crimes Watch Ukraine database confirming more than 200 direct attacks on civilians in a 10-month period (Biesecker, 2022). Russian forces are also perceived to have employed cluster munitions, which are notoriously indiscriminate, against residential neighborhoods and civilian housing complexes (Biesecker, 2022). More than 14 million civilians have been displaced: 6.5 million internally, 5 million to European countries, and 2.8 million to Russia and Belarus (Human Rights Watch, 2023). An unknown number of Ukrainian civilians have reportedly been transported to Russia or Russian-controlled areas against their will (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

To observers in the West, the word *Bucha* has become synonymous with Russian atrocities against Ukrainian civilians. Bucha is a town to the northwest of Kyiv that was occupied by Russian forces for most of March 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Following the Russian withdrawal, 458 dead bodies were discovered throughout the town, the vast majority of them civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2023). About 50 of the bodies had their hands tied and showed signs of torture, indicating they were likely victims of summary executions by Russian forces (Human Rights Watch, 2023). All but 3,000 to 4,000 of Bucha’s residents had fled before the town was occupied, meaning that approximately one in 10 of those who remained were killed by Russian forces (Gettleman, 2022).

The use of sexual violence, torture, and mass containment against Ukrainian civilians has been widely reported. In an eight-month period (February–October), HRMMU documented 86 cases of sexual violence, most by Russian forces, including rape and gang rape (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Between March and July, Human Rights Watch recorded 42 instances of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in the occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, with some detainees reportedly tortured with prolonged beatings and electric shocks (2023). In the northeastern town of Yahidne, Russian forces allegedly held over 350 villagers in a school basement for 28 days (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have been accused of mistreating, torturing, and summarily executing prisoners of war (POWs) (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In November 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that it had identified “patterns of torture and ill-treatment” of Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The OHCHR also documented the torture and ill-treatment of Russian POWs by Ukrainian forces, as well as two allegations of extrajudicial executions (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) released a report identifying 43 facilities involved in holding children from Ukraine since Russia’s 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine (HRL, 2023). Russia’s federal government has systematically relocated at least 6,000 children from Ukraine to a network of re-education and adoption facilities in Russia-occupied Crimea and mainland Russia (HRL, 2023). These findings indicate the majority of camps have engaged in pro-Russia re-education efforts and some camps have provided military training to children or suspended the children’s return to their parents in Ukraine (HRL, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: In 2023, the pattern of intentional attacks against civilians by Russian forces continued since the September 2023 update. In October 2023, the United Nations “found continued evidence of war crimes and human rights violations committed by Russian authorities in Ukraine, including torture, rape and the deportation of children. Roughly three-quarters of a million Ukrainian children were reportedly sent through re-education camps since the Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022,

including being relocated outside Ukraine by Russian forces and forced to wear clothes with Russian flags (Starcevic, 2024).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: Ukraine has estimated around 20,000 children to be abducted into Russia or Russia-occupied territory since the start of the war (Reuters, 2024), with several of them recounting the forceful imposition of the Russian identity and the suppression of their own. On ground, an NGO 'Save Ukraine' claims to be the only organization which brings back abducted children from Russia and the occupied territories. Russian Attacks have persisted on civilian buildings, important infrastructure such as hospitals and energy structures, such as the Kyiv hospital attack where Russian missile attack caused the death of at least 41 children (Reuters, 2024). Other missile attacks have claimed half of Ukraine's energy production (NPR, 2024), with UN estimating devastating effects for the civilian population's survival. OHCHR was able to document the use of torture, including sexual violence, that several Prisoners of War and civilians had to go through in Russian occupied territory (OHCHR, 2024). UNHCR estimates as updated until May 2024 have recorded the displacement of 6 million refugees and 3.5 million internal displacements, with a 93% majority recorded refugees in Europe. Several arrests and detention persisted against the Crimean Tatars activists and Jehovah's Witnesses, with 133 cases of Crimean Tatars arrested as of April 30th (Crimea Platform, 2024). The European Court of Human Rights has found Russia responsible for several systematic Human Right violations in Crimea such the widespread use of Russian legislations and the practice of forced change/imposition of Citizenship (Crimea Platform, 2024). President Zelenskyy has been able to foster continuous funding for Ukraine, with the 2024 NATO summit, where Ukraine is on the path towards a NATO membership as well as 43billion dollars in annual support (AP news, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– Updated by Hari Raavi

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has a long history of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture of detained individuals, and incommunicado detention (U.S. Department of State, 2021). The UAE continues to be accused of suppressing freedom of expression, violating individuals' right to privacy, and inhumanely treating individuals in detention (Amnesty International, 2021a). From 2018 to present day, an unknown number of UAE State security forces perpetrated systematic and planned abuses against political opposition, resulting in over 200 victims. These events also resulted in forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and torture of victims (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In March 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that the UAE were arbitrarily detaining at least 2,400 Afghan asylum seekers, following the Taliban takeover in August 2021 (Gritten, 2023).

The UAE continues to use repressive laws, such as the cybercrime law and the counter-terrorism law, to jail activists and repress freedoms (Gulf Center for Human Rights, 2016; Amnesty International, 2021b). In 2011, 94 activists were arbitrarily detained by the UAE government because of a petition they sent around demanding the government make reform (Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain, 2018). As of 2021, 60 of these individuals continue to be arbitrarily detained after an unfair trial took place in 2013 (Amnesty International, 2021b). Political prisoners are often detained in a separate area from the rest of the prison population and, due to UAE laws, are held after their sentencing is complete (U.S.

Department of State, 2021). Some current detainees have been held for over three years past their sentencing completion, and the UAE government has not provided a legal basis for this (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Political prisoners are denied access to legal assistance, their legal paperwork, and access to visitors and family communication (ADHRB, 2018). Before trial, detainees are denied access to review the evidence against them (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Political prisoners and their families are often stripped of their UAE citizenship (Amnesty International, 2021b).

During interrogation, detainees are often subjected to torture at detention centers to get signed confessions (U.S. Department of State, 2021). These forced confessions are used as evidence in court (Human Rights Watch, 2020). There are reports of beatings, forced standing, and threats to rape or kill detainees (U.S. Department of State, 2021). Some political prisoners are put into solitary confinement for years and denied adequate bedding, only provided thin, dirty blankets and adequate hygiene items (Amnesty International, 2021a). The UAU continues to receive a score of 17 out of 100 for political rights and civil liberties, equating to not free (Freedom House, 2021).

New for September 2023 release: The UAE criminalizes same-sex sexual activity between men and between women, and the gender expression of trans individuals (Human Dignity Trust). Sentences include a maximum penalty of death; there is evidence of the law being enforced in recent years, and LGBT people are subjected to discrimination and violence (Human Dignity Trust). The UAE follows a strict interpretation of Sharia law causing women to face legal and economic discrimination including a wife needing a lawful excuse to refuse sexual relations with her husband and having to apply for a court order to divorce (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: More than 80 activists associated with the “UAE 84” were put on trial, resulting in life sentences for 43 people, while 10 other defendants were given an additional 10-15 years in prison (BBC, 2024). International human rights organizations have been appealing to UAE authorities the past years, over the extended detention of the same group, and the July 10th verdict has led to greater criticism against the UAE Justice and civil society space. Several Emirati nationals and foreigners were put through arbitrary detention over social media posts criticizing Israeli crimes (Euro-Med MONITOR, 2024), though this source could not be verified with other supporting materials due to which it has not been coded into the Dataset. With UAE hosting COP28 in December 2023, organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (ECDHR) have reiterated the various labor abuses that follow at the intersection between climate change and migrant workers, who make up 88 percent of the UAE population.

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

United Kingdom

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Uruguay

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

Last updated: July 2024.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is an authoritarian regime with a history of torture, abuse, and repressive political and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2020). Following Uzbekistan's independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Present Islam Karimov, in power until his death, from 1989 to 2016, had a history of "ruthless repression" and serious human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The current president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has made small efforts to improve the repressive systems, but atrocities continue (BBC, 2018). Reports of mass forced labor and abuses by State Security forces, including torture, persist (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Child and forced labor are common practices in Uzbekistan, particularly in the cotton industry. Uzbekistan is the world's sixth-leading cotton producer and uses state-imposed forced labor during the harvest season to pick cotton (Reyes, 2015). Under President Karimov, about one million people were forced to take a break from their day-to-day jobs and pick cotton every year (Reyes, 2015). In 2017, the government formally banned the forced mobilization of public sector workers for the cotton harvest and increased volunteer incentives, but forced labor continued (Freedom House, 2020). Since 2017, State security forces and private agricultural companies have participated in planned, systematic abuses to force over 300,000 victims to work in the cotton fields (Human Rights Watch, 2019b). The government-imposed quotas on cotton production pressures local officials, who fear government punishment, to continue using forced labor to meet quotas (Cotton Campaign, 2018). While official numbers indicate a reduction in forced labor use and increased volunteers, voluntary workers claim they are not volunteering. People are forced to sign contracts with the government or private companies, stating they are volunteering their time for 10 cents per kilogram. The meals the workers receive are deducted from their small pay, forcing many into debt during the harvest season (Synovitz, 2020). Authorities use threats such as loss of employment and welfare benefits, expulsion, and other academic penalties to force people, including children, to pick cotton (Evans & Gill, 2017).

Uzbekistan also has a long history of torture in prisons and other detention centers (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 2020). Since 2018, State security forces have continued to participate in harassment, detainment, and torture of activists, journalists, and government critics, resulting in thousands of victims (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2019). There are reports of beatings, electric shock, hangings by wrists and ankles, rape and sexual humiliation, use of plastic bags and gas masks to suffocate, refusal of food and water, and threats of harm to relatives (Human Rights Watch, 2019a). Since the 2016 change in Presidency, many political prisoners have been released, but security forces have retained immense power and continue to arrest political and religious oppositionists on false charges (Human Rights Watch, 2020). While the government has introduced additional laws to limit torture, independent observers report it is only to improve their public image as reports of torture continue to increase (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, 2020).

New for September 2023 release: Uzbekistan criminalizes same-sex sexual activity between men, with a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that LGBTQ individuals face arbitrary detention, prosecution, and imprisonment as well as homophobia, threats, and extortion (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

– *Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: A report published by the Uzbek Forum described isolated incidents of forced labor during the Annual cotton harvest in 2023 (Cotton Campaign, 2024). Various other isolated incidents involve the arrests and extended detention of bloggers who were critical of President Mirziyoyev as reported by Radio Ozodlik. 10 Muslims were detained and forced to shave off their beards, which follows the practice of raids by the Tashkent police at the Malika market (Radio Ozodlik, 2024). The above isolated incidents do not meet the threshold to be coded into the PMAD dataset. The Members of Parliament in Uzbekistan have passed a law deeming foreign citizens, who criticize the government or its sovereignty to be 'undesirable', which can lead to entry bans or deportation, which has been viewed as Tashkent wanting fewer critical eyes (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2024).

Last updated: July 2024.

– *Updated by Hari Raavi*

Vanuatu

New for June 2024 release: Gender-based violence is widespread across the country, with slightly higher rates in rural areas. More than 60% of the country's women experienced gender-based violence, with underreporting likely due to stigma and shame (U.S. State Department, 2023). Women are subject to discrimination barring them from land ownership, property inheritance, and employment, particularly in receiving promotions.

– *Updated by Caitlin Clemens*

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024

Venezuela

Since the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2013, the single-party autocracy he built on personality has persisted under his hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro (Brewer-Carias, 2010; Hellinger, 2011; Corrales, 2020). Without the personalism of his predecessor, Maduro has instead relied on repressive tactics to protect his regime's political survival, targeting opposition political forces of varying types (Jimenez, 2021). In 2022, a UN fact-finding mission to Venezuela reported that high-level authorities, including Maduro, have been directly involved in crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

According to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the Maduro regime's campaign of repression includes the use of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detention, and torture against political protestors and opponents (2019). Between 2016 and 2019, government security forces killed more than 19,000

people for allegedly engaging in “resistance against authority” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Between 2014 and June 2022, some 15,770 civilians were reportedly subjected to arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The UNHRC also notes that detainees are commonly subjected to sexual and gender-based violence (2019).

During a single anti-regime protest in 2019, four people were killed and more than 200 injured and arrested by Venezuelan security forces; this came in the wake of a failed uprising led by National Assembly President Juan Guaidó (Amnesty International, 2019; Chin et al., 2021). Pro-Guaidó protestors continued to launch resistance efforts into 2020, including the storming of the Venezuelan parliament (Phillips, 2020). Venezuelan security forces, including the Special Action Forces of the Bolivarian National Police (FAES), implemented retaliatory and preventative atrocities against tens of thousands of civilians to quell the movement (Amnesty International, 2020).

Official Venezuelan security forces are not the only actors to have committed atrocities against political opposition. Armed gangs affiliated with the Maduro regime, known as *colectivos* and which act as unofficial state forces, also participate in the repression of political opposition, inflicting extrajudicial violence against civilians (Wallis, 2014). These groups continue to act as enforcers for the regime, especially in more vulnerable communities (Venezuela Investigation Unit, 2021).

Apure State, on Venezuela’s border with Colombia, is the site of ongoing violence by Venezuelan security forces and armed militant groups, several of which emerged from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Beginning in March 2021, Venezuelan security forces committed numerous abuses against Apure residents as part of an operation against a FARC dissident group; this included arbitrary arrests, torture of suspected collaborators, and the execution of at least four peasants (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Hundred were forcibly displaced within Venezuela, and more than 5,000 fled to Colombia (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

An additional series of atrocities committed by the Maduro regime has been a campaign aimed at supposed “criminal” elements amongst low-income Venezuelans and immigrants, who are blamed by the regime for rising crime in the country. According to Amnesty International, the Maduro regime’s strategy of “fighting violence with more violence” disproportionately targets immigrants and the poor in specific neighborhoods (2018). As part of their so-called “Operations to Liberate the People,” agents of the FAES have perpetrated extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, neglect, and other abuses within low-income communities (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023). According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, government killings in marginalized neighborhoods diminished significantly in 2022, though the overall pattern of violence continues (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

New for September 2023 release: Women in Venezuela face gender-based violence on a daily basis, during the first nine months of 2022, there was one femicide every 37 hours (IRC, 2022). Although homosexuality is legal, LGBTQ discrimination is widespread. On July 23, 2023, 33 men were arbitrarily arrested at a gay nightclub and charged with “lewd conduct” and “sound pollution” (Kessler, 2023). Over the past year, the government has restricted civic space and limited the work of human rights defenders, independent media and civil society, including through harassment and persecution (GlobalR2P, 2023).

– Austin S. Matthews, updated by Collin Van Son and Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: Indigenous peoples faced invasion and intimidation by nonstate armed groups attempting to use their land for drug trafficking and mining operations. Media reports indicate that military and police forces were often complicit in the violence (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Indigenous groups in Venezuela are subject to increasing environmental degradation, violence, and disease due to the expansion of mining operations.

– Updated by Caitlin Clemens

New for September 2024 release: After the presidential election on July 28th, spontaneous protests erupted across the country. Maduro’s announced win has been disputed by the opposition, and the government has yet to release any tallies to support Maduro’s claim. As of early August, two dozen individuals were killed, and hundreds were arrested. In the following days the arrests continued, with nearly 2,000 detainees by the end of the week, in both indiscriminate and targeted roundups. Human rights activists, members of the opposition party, and journalists have been arrested, and had their passports annulled, keeping them within Venezuela (The New York Times, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Caitlin Clemens

Vietnam

Vietnam has a history of human rights abuses and heavy restrictions on fundamental civil and political rights (Human Rights Watch, 2019). For years the Vietnamese government arrested and convicted critics, journalists, and human rights advocates (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In 2017 restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, association, and movement (Human Rights Watch, 2018) continued to intensify as the government began a new crackdown on its zero-tolerance policy for criticism and dissents (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2019). The crackdown included increased arrests for openly disagreeing with the government.

In 2018 the Vietnamese government continued to intensify this zero-tolerance policy by introducing two bills. The week before the government began voting on the bills, over 50,000 individuals protested against them. Government official and State police members participated in systematic and planned harassment, detainment, and assault of protestors resulting in over 500 victims (Ngu, 2018). Police also posted outside known activists’ homes, harassing them, and trapping them inside to keep them from attending any protests (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Police used long-range acoustic devices that can cause extreme pain and permanent hearing damage to protestors, along with tear gas and water cannons (Ngu, 2018). Hundreds of protestors were detained, beaten, and interrogated for hours (Human Rights Watch, 2019); some were detained for days without informing their families of where they were (United Nations Committee Against Torture, 2018).

Some protestors fought against police abuse, throwing stones and bricks and occupying government buildings. However, by the 12th of June, the government regained control of the situation (Ngu, 2018). The bills were passed and introduced into law, allowing increased restrictions on fundamental civil and political rights (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The Vietnamese government intensified its crackdown on both domestic and international nongovernmental organizations in Vietnam during 2022.

– Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Western Sahara

Morocco controls over 75% of Western Sahara and the Polisario Front, an Ethnic Sahrawi nationalist movement, holds the other 25%. The Polisario Front territory is mainly a refugee camp, and there is little to no economic activity in the area (Freedom House, 2020). Moroccan authorities have a history of suppressing the Western Saharan people and do not allow Sahrawi self-determination gatherings. Throughout 2019, the government of Morocco targeted, prosecuted, detained, and harassed critics and human rights activists while enforcing repressive laws in Western Sahara (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In July of 2019, after Algeria's football team won the Africa Cup, the people of Western Sahara took to the street to celebrate. The celebration led to people peacefully protesting and chanting for Saharawi's self-determination (Amnesty International, 2019). During the celebration/protest, an unknown number of the Moroccan State security force perpetrated systematic attacks on protestors, resulting in one recorded death, over 80 people injured, and 13 arrests (Amnesty International, 2019). Moroccan security forces used tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and batons to beat protestors. Security forces also used police cars to hit multiple protestors, resulting in a young woman's death (Amnesty International, 2019).

While rape is outlawed, sexual assault survivors have reported that police officers have denied them the ability to file a police report and threatening to charge the assault survivor with consensual sex outside marriage, which is a crime punishable with imprisonment up to one year (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Consensual same-sex activity is criminalized with punishment of up to three years imprisonment. Violence against members of the LBGTQI+ community is widespread but is not reported as LBGTQI+ activity is illegal (Equaldex, 2023). There are reports of police officers attempting to coerce LBGTQI+ individuals by speaking with their parents. Parents have also reportedly forced their lesbian or bisexual daughters to marry men.

– Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: In late 2020, the Polisario Front announced that it would no longer abide by the ceasefire agreement signed in 1991 (UN Security Council, 2024). Since then, hostilities in the Western Sahara have increased, notably with the use of drone strikes by the Moroccan security forces. Since 2021, 86 civilians have been killed, with more than 150 others severely injured (SMACO, 2024).

Last updated: August 2024.

– Updated by Caitlin Clemens

Yemen

Yemen's ongoing civil war began in 2014, when Houthi insurgents took control of the capital city Sanaa (Center for Preventative Action, 2022). The Iranian-backed Houthi movement (officially known as Ansar Allah) is based among the Zaydi Shiites of northern Yemen, which is an otherwise Sunni-majority country (Robinson, 2022). In 2015, a coalition of Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia began an ongoing campaign of

airstrikes and naval blockades against the Houthis (Center for Preventative Action, 2022). Since then, the conflict has directly killed more than 150,000 Yemenis, including over 14,500 civilians, and internally displaced some 4 million people (Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2022). All parties to the conflict are perceived to have committed mass atrocities, including indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians; mass containment; torture; forced displacement; and the conscription of children (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In 2021, United States President Joe Biden ended U.S. intelligence and logistical support to Saudi-led offensive operations in Yemen, stating that the conflict had become a “humanitarian and strategic catastrophe” (Knickmeyer, 2021). In 2022, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire which lasted six months (April–September), resulting in a relative decline in violence, though human rights abuses persisted both during and after the truce (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

As part of their air campaign against the Houthis, the Saudi-led coalition, which includes the United Arab Emirates, is widely perceived to have carried out indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets and infrastructure, including the use of internationally banned cluster munitions (Human Rights Watch, 2023). According to some observers, Saudi-led bombings have killed over 17,000 people—more than 4,000 of them children—and injured close to 30,000 since the conflict began (Peoples Dispatch, 2023). In 2022 alone, the Saudi-led coalition allegedly destroyed over 14,000 homes, 12 hospitals, 64 schools, and 22 power stations, thereby inflicting disproportionate suffering on Yemeni civilians (Peoples Dispatch, 2023). In January 2022, a series of Saudi- and UAE-led attacks resulted in an estimated 80 civilian deaths and more than 150 injuries (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The coalition’s naval blockade of Yemen has been widely criticized for exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis, which has seen roughly one in three Yemenis—some 19 million people—afflicted by food insecurity (World Organisation Against Torture, 2022). The Saudi-backed Yemeni government, as well as other Saudi-backed groups within the country, also stand accused of subjecting Yemeni civilians to arbitrary arrests, forcible disappearances, and torture (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

In early 2021, the Houthis launched an offensive in Marib governorate, the last stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in the northern part of the country (Center for Preventative Action, 2022). The Houthi assault included indiscriminate artillery and missile fire against heavily populated areas, resulting in the killing and wounding of civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Since 2015, the Houthis have closed the main roads in and out of Taizz, Yemen’s third-largest city, effectively trapping the city’s residents and exacerbating their humanitarian suffering by impeding the flow of food, medicine, and other essential goods (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Such restrictions have given rise to concerns that the Houthis are deploying starvation as a weapon of war (Human Rights Watch, 2022). The Houthis are also perceived to have recruited close to 3,500 children as soldiers, further contributing to the 11,000 children who have been killed or maimed since 2015 (United Nations, 2022; UNICEF, 2022). The use of antipersonnel landmines by Houthi forces has likewise been condemned; in a three-year period, 426 civilians are estimated to have been killed by mines, improvised explosive devices, and unexploded ordnance (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As with the Yemeni government and Saudi-backed armed groups, the Houthis are perceived to have engaged in the forcible disappearance and torture of hundreds of Yemenis (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

Women and LGBTQI+ persons face violence and discrimination in Houthi- and government-controlled regions of the country. In areas under Houthi control, women are barred from traveling without a male relative or written proof of a male relative’s approval (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Under the Yemeni penal code, unmarried individuals who participate in anal sex face a punishment of 100 lashes and a year

in prison, while married individuals can face death by stoning (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Sex between women carries up to three years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

– *Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Zambia

Based on the coding guidelines, definitions, and inclusion criteria for perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD codebook, there appear to have been no known, recorded perceived mass atrocities in this country since at least the year 2018.

However, gender-based violence continues to be an increasingly widespread problem. Consensual same-sex sexual conduct is criminalized with punishment of 15 years to life in prison for “acts against the order of nature” and up to 14 years imprisonment for “gross indecency” (U.S. Department of State, 2023). LGBTQI+ individuals face societal violence and discrimination by health care providers in public health institutions (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

– *Phoebe Cribb*

New for June 2024 release: No substantial updates.

New for September 2024 release: No substantial updates.

Last updated: August 2024.

Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which has dominated Zimbabwean politics since 1980, continues to suppress political opposition and other forms of dissent (Freedom House, 2022). In 2018, Emmerson Mnangagwa was declared the winner of a disputed presidential election, the first in 30 years that did not have former President Robert Mugabe on the ballot (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The disputed results sparked a wave of post-election unrest; this prompted a military crackdown in which state security forces killed six people and wounded 35 at opposition protests (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2023a).

In January 2019, Mnangagwa’s announcement of a sudden hike in fuel prices prompted nationwide protests and a widespread breakdown in public order (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Burke, 2019). The government responded with a crackdown that saw state security forces kill 17 people, rape at least 17 women, injure at least 81 people, and arrest more than 1,000 suspected protesters during door-to-door raids (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In the months that followed, human rights observers continued to accuse security forces of engaging in the arbitrary arrest, abduction, beating, and torture of government critics (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In 2020, the Zimbabwean government leveraged Covid-19 lockdown measures as a means of suppressing domestic dissent (Mutsaka, 2020). Dozens of citizens, including lawyers, journalists, activists, and

opposition members of parliament, were arrested for violating Covid-19 restrictions or for protesting online or in the streets (Mutsaka, 2020). Within a six-month window (March–August), one local organization recorded over 800 perceived human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and assaults by state agents (Mutsaka, 2020). According to Human Rights Watch, more than 70 government critics were illegally detained and tortured by state security agents over the course of 2020; this includes an instance in which three female activists were abducted and sexually assaulted (2021a).

In February 2021, the government ordered more than 13,000 members of the Shangani indigenous minority to vacate their communal land in Chilonga, southeastern Zimbabwe, in order to make room for the production of lucerne grass for stockfeed (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). The community has since brought legal challenge to the government’s eviction notice, and while the case remains pending as of this writing, concerns remain that the incident may come to constitute mass forced displacement (Human Rights Watch, 2021b).

In addition to the suppression of political dissent, LGBTQI+ persons also face legal discrimination. The penal code outlaws homosexuality, and any same-sex sexual contact “that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” is punishable by a fine and/or one year in prison (U.S. Department of State, 2023). There is no legal route to changing one’s gender designation on state identity cards, leaving individuals whose gender presentation differs from that on their identity card vulnerable to harassment and arrest on charges of identity fraud (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Note that under PMAD coding guidelines, LGBTQI+ persons are not considered a social, cultural, ethnic, religious, or political group; rather, violence against LGBTQI+ persons is coded separately under PMAD’s Violence Against LGBTQI Severity index. As a result, violence against LGBTQI+ persons is not reflected in PMAD’s Total Magnitude, Total Prevalence, or Atrocities Scope and Scale Heuristic (ASSH) entries.

New for June 2023 release: In the lead-up to Zimbabwe’s next general elections—scheduled to be held August 23, 2023—the government has seemingly escalated its suppression of political opposition (Mahvunga, 2022). In January 2023, a viral video allegedly showed a group of ZANU-PF supporters kicking and beating attendees of a Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) political gathering (Amnesty International, 2023a). Later that month, police fired teargas at a private gathering of CCC supporters and arrested 25 members of the opposition party, including two members of parliament (Amnesty International, 2023b; Reuters, 2023a). Several of the opposition members were reportedly beaten by police before being taken away (Reuters, 2023a). Note that because the arrested CCC supporters were released on bail less than two weeks later, the event has not been coded as mass containment in PMAD (Reuters, 2023b).

New for September 2023 release: In a recent Human Rights Watch report, the Zimbabwe authorities are accused of using repressive laws, intimidation and violence against the opposition, and impunity for individuals responsible for election-related abuses in the lead-up to the August election (Human Rights Watch, 2023b). The Criminal Law Codification and Reform Amendment Bill 2022, commonly known as the “Patriotic Bill,” which took effect in July, contains overly broad provisions that criminalize the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association (Human Rights Watch, 2023b).

– Collin Van Son & Alexandra Brodsky, updated by Phoebe Cribb

New for April 2024 release: Through 2023, the main source of perceived mass atrocities in Zimbabwe was political violence, particularly in the lead up to and in the wake of the August 2023 general election. This

follows a pattern observed in recent decades, where human rights violations are on average more frequent during periods of elections than not (RAU, 2023: 8).

Looking ahead, the election results have at least two implications with respect to the likelihood of perceived mass atrocities. First, post-election disarray in the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) party and the death of a CCC campaigner, Tapfumanezi Masaya, have further decreased the viability of opposition politics to serve as a vent for minority group frustrations (Mafundikwa, 2023). Second, the election results mark a substantial decline in women's representation in parliament (Mtero et al., 2023). Both trends correlate with increased frequency of perceived mass atrocities in the PMAD data.

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for June 2024 release: In January, prominent political opposition figure Job Sikala was released from prison after 600 days of detention (Zvinavashe, 2024). Extended pre-trial detentions for political activists reportedly remains common, with civil society members running afoul of "political issues" facing jail sentences up to 10 years (BTI, 2024).

In recent months, the government has embarked on a campaign of forced evictions against so-called "land barons." Local police in an around Masvingo have reportedly removed more than 3,000 people from their property to reclaim it for the state (Crisis Watch, 2024; The Zimbabwean, 2024).

– Updated by Collin Meisel

New for September 2024 release: On 16 June 2024, Zimbabwean authorities arrested and detained 78 members of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) party, including interim leader Jameson Timba, during a peaceful gathering at Timba's home to commemorate the International Day of the African Child. The group was held for over 48 hours without being brought before a court, violating Zimbabwean law. While a 17-year-old and a nursing mother were released, 77 members remain in remand facing charges of "gathering with intent to promote public violence" (Amnesty, 2024a).

On 27 June, Zimbabwean police dispersed a peaceful protest calling for the release of detained Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) members. On 29 June, police arrested members of the National Democratic Working Group, a social justice movement, during a private meeting in Harare aimed at raising funds for impoverished families, labelling the gathering as "unsanctioned." Additionally, on 3 July, police arrested six members of the Community Voices Zimbabwe media organization in Gokwe (Amnesty, 2024b).

A new Zimbabwe Citizenship Policy, starting on March 1, 2024, aims to regulate the citizenship status of individuals born in Zimbabwe or with connections to the country. The policy mandates that adults with dual citizenship, except for those who are citizens by birth, must renounce one of their citizenships by March 1, 2024, or risk losing their Zimbabwean citizenship. This could lead to a reduction in the number of people who can legally claim dual citizenship, impacting members of the diaspora who may have acquired citizenship in other countries. The policy's emphasis on renunciation of other citizenships, strict residency requirements, and the exclusion of certain categories of individuals could lead to the disenfranchisement of some Zimbabweans. These could contribute to statelessness or reduced rights for individuals unable to meet the new conditions (Godwin, 2024).

Last updated: September 2024.

Case Narrative References

Afghanistan

Afzal, M., & Pita, A. (2022, August 30). *What's happening in Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal?* Brookings. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/whats-happening-in-afghanistan-one-year-after-the-u-s-withdrawal/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Afghanistan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/report-afghanistan/>

Barr, Heather and Sahar Fetrat. (2023, November 30). *Women's rights activists under attack in Afghanistan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/30/womens-rights-activists-under-attack-afghanistan>.

Blue, V. J., Gibbons-Neff, T., & Goldbaum, C. (2021, November 3). *ISIS Poses a Growing Threat to New Taliban Government in Afghanistan*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/world/asia/isis-afghanistan-taliban.html>

Center for Preventative Action. (2022, October 19). *Instability in Afghanistan | Global Conflict Tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Afghanistan: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=36&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Dawi, A. (2023, January 26). *Taliban refill Afghan jails*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-refill-afghan-jails/6935188.html>

Gul, A. (2022, December 13). *China says Kabul Hotel Attack Injured 5 Chinese Nationals*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/isis-k-claims-attack-on-kabul-hotel-housing-chinese-nationals/6873906.html>

Gul, Ayaz. (2024, July 16). *Pakistan: Attack on northwestern health facility killed 5 civilians, 2 soldiers*. VOA News. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-reports-8-fatalities-in-monday-attack-on-military-compound-/7699977.html>.

Hazara Inquiry. (2022, August). *The Situation of the Hazara in Afghanistan*. The Hazara Inquiry. Retrieved from https://www.hazarainquiry.com/_files/ugd/525f48_c697e483f02c4c10a7eb04947eefb72b.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2019, January 17). *World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Afghanistan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/afghanistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights Trends in Afghanistan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/afghanistan>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *Global conflict tracker*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=36&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

i24 News. (2023, January 11). *At least 20 dead in suicide blast near Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry*. I24NEWS. Retrieved from <https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1673439897-explosion-in-front-of-afghanistan-foreign-ministry-leaves-at-least-20-dead-report>

Kelly, Annie and Zahra Joya. (2024, 26 August). 'Frightening' Taliban law bans women from speaking in public. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/article/2024/aug/26/taliban-bar-on-afghan-women-speaking-in-public-un-afghanistan>.

Kumar, Ruchi. (2024, March 28) *Taliban edict to resume stoning women to death met with horror*. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/28/taliban-edict-to-resume-stoning-women-to-death-met-with-horror>

Najafizada, E. (2023, February 9). *ISIS Threatens to Target China, India, Iran Embassies in Afghanistan, UN says*. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-09/isis-threatens-to-target-chinese-embassy-in-afghanistan-un-says?leadSource=verify+wall>

Ochab, E. U. (2022, October 1). *Yet Another Attack on the Hazara in Afghanistan*. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2022/10/01/yet-another-attack-on-the-hazara-in-afghanistan/?sh=1bbf31982fa6>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan/>

United Nations. (2021, August 16). *Afghanistan: Alarming Scale of Grave Violations Against Children as Current Security Situation Collapses, Country Facing the Unknown*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2021/08/138737/>

United Nations. (2022a, July 20). *UN Releases Report on Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Taliban Takeover*. UNAMA. Retrieved from <https://unama.unmissions.org/un-releases-report-human-rights-afghanistan-taliban-takeover>

United Nations. (2022b, July). *Human Rights in Afghanistan: 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022*. UNAMA. Retrieved from https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_human_rights_in_afghanistan_report_-_june_2022_english.pdf

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. (2024, January). *Human rights situation in Afghanistan: October–December 2023 update*. Retrieved from https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_hr_update_22jan_2024.pdf

United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). (2024). *Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2024 update*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/unama-human-rights-situation-afghanistan-january-march-2024-update-endarips>

UN News. (2023, June 19). *Afghanistan: Taliban ‘may be responsible for gender apartheid’ says rights expert*. UN News. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137847>

Algeria

Alarme Phone Sahara. (2023, March 17). *Urgent appeal: Humanitarian crisis in Assamaka on the Niger-Algeria border: Thousands of people deported from Algeria in vulnerable conditions and left on their own in middle of the Sahara without shelter or care*. Alarme Phone Sahara. Retrieved from <https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/blog/posts/urgent-appeal-humanitarian-crisis-in-assamaka-on-the-niger-algeria-border-thousands-of-people-deported-from-algeria-in-vulnerable-conditions-and-left-on-their-own-in-the-middle-of-the-sahara-without-shelter-and-care>.

Alarme Phone Sahara. (2023b, December 22). *Alarme Phone Sahara mission to Assamaka, December 2023- Impressions from the Algeria-Niger border*. APS. Retrieved from <https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/blog/posts/assamaka-september-and-october-2023-frequent-mass-deportations-from-algeria-to-niger-continue-deportees-trapped-in-miserable-conditions>

Alarme Phone Sahara. (2024, May 10). *May 2024: 8 migrants die in Assamaka on the Niger-Algeria border*. Alarme Phone Sahara. Retrieved from <https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/blog/posts/may-2024-8-migrants-die-in-assamaka-on-the-niger-algeria-border>

Aljazeera. (2021, May 22). *Hundreds arrested as Algeria cracks down on protest movement*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/22/scores-arrested-as-algeria-cracks-down-on-protest-movement>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2021, June 10). *Helpless Hirak? Democratic Disappointments in Algeria*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84739>

Féminicides Algeria. (2022). *What is a Femicide?* Retrieved from <https://feminicides-dz.com/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, January 21). *Algeria: 3 Years On, Repression on Protest Tightens*. Féminicides Algeria. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/21/algeria-3-years-repression-protest-tightens>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Middle East Institute. (2021). *Algeria: War against women*. Middle East Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.mei.edu/publications/algeria-war-against-women>

North Africa Post. (2023, March 21). *US State Department draws bleak picture of human rights in Algeria*. North Africa Post. Retrieved from <https://northafricapost.com/66238-us-state-department-draws-bleak-picture-of-human-rights-in-algeria.html>

North Africa Post. (2024, May 8). *Algeria amends penal code to crackdown on freedom of speech*. North Africa Post. Retrieved from <https://northafricapost.com/77169-algeria-amends-penal-code-to-crackdown-on-freedom-of-speech.html>

Ouali, Akli. (2024, July 3). *Algeria tightens grip on freedoms ahead of presidential election*. La Croix International. Retrieved from <https://international.la-croix.com/world/algeria-tightens-grip-on-freedoms-ahead-of-presidential-election>

Radio Algérienne. (2019, November 26). *Violence against women: more than 5,600 cases recorded during the first nine months of 2019*. Radio Algérienne. Retrieved from <https://radioalgerie.dz/news/fr/article/20191126/185437.html>

The Tahir Institute of Middle East Policy. (2021, August 17). *Algeria's Multipronged Crackdown on the Hirak*. The Tahir Institute of Middle East Policy. Retrieved from <https://timep.org/explainers/algerias-multipronged-crackdown-on-the-hirak/>

Wilson Center. (2021, March 8). *Gender Equality in Algeria Requires an Immediate End to Violence Against Women*. Wilson Center. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/gender-equality-algeria-requires-immediate-end-violence-against-women>

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). (2024). *2024 Annual Report: Algeria*. USCIRF. Retrieved from <https://www.uscifr.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/Algeria.pdf>

Angola

Agence France-Presse. (2023). *Angolan Police Accused by HRW of Killing Over a Dozen Activists*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/angolan-police-accused-by-hrw-of-killing-over-a-dozen-activists-/7214488.html>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State Of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Bun, Mukuta. (2024, July 2). *Activists detained in Cafunfo for "reading statutes" of pro-autonomy movement in Lundas*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ativistas-detidos-no-cafunfo-por-lerem-estatutos-de-movimento-pr%C3%B3-autonomia-das-lundas-/7682363.html>

Bun, Mukuta. (2024b, March 14). *Angola: Preventive detention, a serious justice problem*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/angola-pris%C3%A3o-preventiva-um-grave-problema-de-justi%C3%A7a/7528391.html>

Bun, Mukuta. (2024c, April 22). *Angola: Police continue to be accused of rapes against street vendors*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/angola-pol%C3%ADcia-continua-a-ser-acusada-de-viola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-contra-vendedeiras-de-rua/7580383.html>

- Campos Lima, Eduardo. (2023, May 2). *Catholics call for dialogue in Angola's separatist Cabinda region*. Crux Now. Retrieved from <https://cruxnow.com/church-in-africa/2023/05/catholics-call-for-dialogue-in-angolas-separatist-cabinda-region>
- Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Angola: June 2023*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=17&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024
- Further Africa. (2020, February 21). *Operation Transparency seized thousands of diamonds in Angola*. Further Africa. Retrieved from <https://furtherafrica.com/2020/02/21/operation-transparency-seized-thousands-of-diamonds-in-angola/>
- Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in The World 2022: Angola*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/angola/freedom-world/2022>
- Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in The World 2024: Angola*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/angola/freedom-world/2024>
- Human Rights Watch. (2018, November 15). *Angola: Stop Abusive Expulsions of Migrants*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/15/angola-stop-abusive-expulsions-migrants>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf
- Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 2). *Angola: Hundreds Homeless in Forced Evictions, Demolitions*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/02/angola-hundreds-homeless-forced-evictions-demolitions>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023b, August 7). *Angola: Grave Police Abuses Against Activists*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/07/angola-grave-police-abuses-against-activists>
- Human Rights Watch. (2024, January 11). *World Report 2024 – Angola*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/angola>
- Reuters. (2018, October 26). *U.N. condemns human rights abuses in expulsion of Congolese from Angola*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-angola-drc-un/u-n-condemns-human-rights-abuses-in-expulsion-of-congolese-from-angola-idUSKCN1N023L>
- Rodrigues, Venancio. (2024, April 15). *Angola: Excessive preventive detention keeps hundreds of citizens in jail*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/angola-pris%C3%A3o-preventiva-em-excesso-mant%C3%A9m-na-cadeia-centenas-de-cidad%C3%A3os/7570983.html>
- U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/angola/>

Antigua and Barbuda

US State Department. (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Antigua and Barbuda*. US State Department. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/antigua-and-barbuda>

Argentina

Al Jazeera. (2022, July 18). *The truth about a massacre of Indigenous people in Argentina*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/podcasts/2022/7/18/the-truth-about-a-massacre-of-indigenous-people-in-argentina>

Al Jazeera. (2024, April 24). *Massive protests in Argentina slam Milei's education cuts*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/24/massive-protests-in-argentina-fight-against-university-spending-cuts>

Amnesty International. (2018). *Amnesty International Report 2017/18 The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/POL1067002018ENGLISH.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Booth, Amy. (2023, June 27). *Human rights secretariat files lawsuit over Jujuy protest crackdown*. Buenos Aires Herald. Retrieved from <https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/human-rights-secretariat-files-lawsuit-over-jujuy-protest-crackdown>

Buenos Aires Herald. (2024, June 18). *'It was a literal hunt': Argentines march demanding release of imprisoned protesters*. Buenos Aires Herald. Retrieved from <https://buenosairesherald.com/society/it-was-a-literal-hunt-argentines-march-demanding-release-of-imprisoned-protesters>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report 2020: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2020_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *World Report 2021: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

IACHR. (2023 June 20). *IACHR: Argentina Must Respect Standards for Use of Force During Protests in Jujuy Province*. IACHR. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2023/127.asp

IACHR. (2024, July 4). *Argentina Must Respect Rights to Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly While Keeping Its Citizens Safe, Say IACHR and Its Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression*. IACHR. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2024/158.asp

Naundorf, Karen. (2021, December 2). *Argentina recorded more than 250 femicides in 2020, one every 35 hours*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/photography/2021/12/02/argentina-suffered-more-than-250-femicides-2020-one-every-35-hours/>

The New Humanitarian. (2022, August 5). *In northern Argentina, gendered violence and discrimination leave their mark on Indigenous communities*. The New Humanitarian. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/08/05/northern-Argentina-gender-violence-discrimination-poverty>

Armenia

ACLEd. (2024, July 5). *Regional Overview: Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia, June 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/07/05/europe-caucasus-and-central-asia-overview-june-2024/>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Galstyan, Shoghik & Bulghadaryan, Naira. (2024, May 27). *Demonstrators block streets in Yerevan. 284 people were detained, 278 have already been released*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/protest-action-in-yerevan/32964966.html>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Events of 2023- Armenia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/armenia>

International Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Worldwide Conflict: Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict: September 2023*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=127&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

International Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking Worldwide Conflict: Armenia 2024*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=60&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Khuliam et al. (2024, May 13). *Scores Arrested As Anti-Government Protest Continues in Armenia*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32944485.html>

Pilishvili, Catherine. (2020, August 28). *Another Chance to Address Homophobic Violence in Armenia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/28/another-chance-address-homophobic-violence-armenia>

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2024, June 13). *Pressure on Pashinian Grows As Armenians Continue to Protest*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/32991054.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Armenia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/armenia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Armenia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/armenia/>

Yeghiazaryan, Nelly (2023, April 25). *According to "Polygraph" representatives, the policemen beat and mocked during the search*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32379081.html>

Australia

Diversity Council Australia. (2023, July 20). *First Nations Facing Increased Discrimination & Cultural Load*. Diversity Council Australia. Retrieved from <https://www.dca.org.au/news/media-releases/first-nations-facing-increased-discrimination>

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *World Report 2024: Australia- Events of 2023*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/australia>

Menon, Praveen. (2023, October 15). *'Reconciliation is Dead': Indigenous Australians vow silence after referendum fails*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-indigenous-leaders-call-week-silence-after-referendum-defeat-2023-10-15/>

US State Department. (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Australia*. US State Department. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/australia/>

Austria

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Azerbaijan

Amnesty International. (2021a). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2021b, December 15). *Azerbaijan: Latest Police Violence Against Peaceful Protesters*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur55/5110/2021/en/>

Amnesty International. (2023, February 9). *Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/>

- Armen Press. (2024, January 5). *2023 Azeri attack in Nagorno-Karabakh killed 223 people, including 5 children – says law enforcement official*. Armen Press. Retrieved from <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1127400/>
- BBC News. (2023, October 3). *Up to 1000 ethnic-Armenians left in Nagorno-Karabakh, UN says*. YouTube. Retrieved from <https://youtu.be/3VGAGWFoUow?si=6dV3I7BBVEzIPuC8>
- Caucasus Heritage Watch (CRW). (June 2024). *Monitor Report #7: June 2024*. CHW. Retrieved from <https://indd.adobe.com/view/b1b54fc0-dce2-4eb0-ba83-eb728c49dd20>
- Council on Foreign Relations. (2024). *Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict>
- Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Worldwide Conflict: Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict: September 2023-January 2024*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=127&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024
- EurasiaNet. (2023, April 13). *Mass Arrests of religious Shia reported in Azerbaijan*. EurasiaNet. Retrieved from <https://eurasianet.org/mass-arrests-of-religious-shias-reported-in-azerbaijan>
- Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World: Azerbaijan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-world/2022>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf
- Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD). (2024, June 14). *List of Political Prisoners- Union for the Freedom of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan*. IPD. Retrieved from <https://www.ipd-az.org/political-prisoners-for-14-jun2024/>
- Lister et al. (2023, September 20). *Azerbaijan launches operation against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/19/asia/armenia-azerbaijan-nagorno-karabakh-bombardment-intl/index.html>
- United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). (2024). *2024 Annual Report: Azerbaijan*. USCIRF. Retrieved from <https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/Azerbaijan.pdf>
- U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Azerbaijan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/azerbaijan/>
- U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Azerbaijan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/azerbaijan/>
- U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Azerbaijan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/azerbaijan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024b, January 4). *Religious Freedom Designations*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/religious-freedom-designations/>

Bahrain

Agence France-Presse. (2024, April 8). *Bahrain pardons more than 1,500 in largest amnesty in years*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/bahrain-pardons-more-than-1-500-in-largest-amnesty-in-years/7561803.html>

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). (2018, June 26). *On the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, ADHRB Calls for an End to Abuse Across the Globe*. ADHRB. Retrieved from <https://www.adhrb.org/2018/06/on-the-international-day-in-support-of-victims-of-torture-adhrb-calls-for-an-end-to-systematic-torture-practices-across-the-globe/>

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). (2024, May 10). *Bahrain pardoned 1584 unjustly jailed prisoners, yet 600 remain behind bars and on death row*. ADHRB. Retrieved from <https://www.adhrb.org/2024/05/bahrain-pardoned-1584-unjustly-jailed-prisoners-yet-600-remain-behind-bars-and-on-death-row/>

Amnesty International. (2018). *Amnesty International Report 2017/18 The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/POL1067002018ENGLISH.pdf>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World: Bahrain*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahrain/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, July 23). *Letter to the King of Bahrain on the Cases of Ramadan and Moosa*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/23/letter-king-bahrain-cases-ramadan-and-moosa>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, October 31). *You Can't Call Bahrain a Democracy*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/10/31/you-cant-call-bahrain-democracy/bahrains-political-isolation-laws#_ftn24

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Bahrain*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/bahrain>

Jamal, Urooba. (2023, August 28). *'Slow Murder': Hundreds of Prisoners Stage Bahrain's Largest Hunger Strike*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/28/slow-murder-hundreds-of-prisoners-stage-bahrains-largest-hunger-strike>

The Vatican: Migrants & Refugees Section. (2021, May 24). *Country Profiles: Bahrain*. Integral Human Development. Retrieved from <https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/bahrain/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bahrain/>

Wintour, Patrick. (2024, April 9). *Bahrain's king takes activists by surprise with pardon for at least 1,500 prisoners*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/09/bahrains-king-takes-activists-by-surprise-with-pardon-for-at-least-1500-prisoners>

Bangladesh

Agence France-Presse. (2024, July 18). *Protesters attack Bangladeshi state broadcaster after PM's call for calm*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/18/protesters-attack-bangladeshi-state-broadcaster-after-pms-call-for-calm>

Ahmed, R. & Ellis-Peterson, H. (2024a, July 16). *Two die and thousands hurt in crackdown on Bangladesh student protests*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/16/two-dead-and-thousands-injured-as-bangladesh-police-crack-down-on-anti-quota-protests>

Ahmed, R. & Ellis-Peterson, H. (2024b, August 1). *Bangladesh arrests more than 10,000 in crackdown on protests*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/01/bangladesh-arrests-protests-crackdown>

Alam, Julhas. (2024, July 31). *Bangladesh mourns some 200 deaths as student protests wind down and thousands are arrested*. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-student-protests-hasina-quota-arrests-mourning-e30fc4d7603edad5acacde1c97efbdc0>

Al Jazeera. (2024, July 18). *At least 17 dead as Bangladesh student protests over jobs intensify*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/18/bangladesh-cuts-mobile-internet-as-student-protests-over-jobs-intensify>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Azizur Rahman, Shaikh. (2024, May 30). *Young Rohingya men abducted, forced into 'human shield' roles by Myanmar military*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/young-rohingya-men-abducted-forced-into-human-shield-roles-by-myanmar-military/7636436.html>

Crisis Group. (2023, October 4). *Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar-bangladesh/rohingya-refugees-bangladesh-limiting-damage-protracted>

Crisis Group. (2023, December 6). *Crisis Mounts for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/355-crisis-mounts-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh>

Ellis-Peterson, H. and Azizur Rahman, S. (2023, November 9). *Full prisons and false charges: Bangladesh opposition faces pre-election crackdown*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/10/bangladesh-opposition-crackdown-election-sheikh-hasina-awami-league-bnp>

- Hasan, M., Macdonald, G., & Ooi, H. H. (2022, February 4). *How Facebook Fuels Religious Violence*. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/04/facebook-tech-moderation-violence-bangladesh-religion/>
- Human Rights Watch. (2021, August 16). *Where No Sun Can Enter: A Decade of Enforced Disappearances in Bangladesh*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/08/16/where-no-sun-can-enter/decade-enforced-disappearances-bangladesh>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf
- Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Bangladesh*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/bangladesh>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023b, January 17). *Bangladesh: Rampant Police Abuse of Rohingya Refugees*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/17/bangladesh-rampant-police-abuse-rohingya-refugees>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023c, November 26). *Bangladesh: Violent Autocratic Crackdown Ahead of Elections*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/26/bangladesh-violent-autocratic-crackdown-ahead-elections>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2021). *Figures Analysis 2021- Bangladesh*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://api.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/figures-analysis-2021-bgd.pdf>
- International Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Bangladesh, 2024*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=37&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024
- Islam, A. (2023, March 10). *Bangladesh: Aid cuts stoke fear of violence in refugee camps*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/bangladesh-food-cuts-stoke-fears-of-violence-in-rohingya-camps/a-64931983>
- Jarin, Nujhat Amina. (August 2023). *Evolution of Kuki Chin National Front as a Separatist Group and Impact on National and Regional Security*. Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS). Retrieved from <https://bipss.org.bd/evolution-of-kuki-chin-national-front-as-a-separatistgroup-and-impact-on-national-and-regional-security/>
- Mahjabeen, Sharmili. (2023, June 16). *Kuki-Chin Resurgence in Chittagong Hill Tracts: A new threat to regional security*. Organizer. Retrieved from <https://organiser.org/2023/06/16/177369/bharat/kuki-chin-resurgence-in-chittagong-hill-tracts-a-new-threat-to-regional-security/>
- Paul, R. and Ganguly, S. (2024, August 5). *Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina flees, army says interim government to be formed*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-protesters-call-march-dhaka-defiance-curfew-2024-08-05/>
- Prothom Alo (2024, August 8). *232 killed since the fall of government*. Retrieved from <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/0ytt2jqr77>

Radio Free Asia. (2024, May 8). *Myanmar insurgents accused of recruiting Rohingya in Bangladesh camps*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bangladesh-rohingya-recruitment-05082024065644.html>

Rahman, S. A. (2023, January 12). *Human rights watch voices concerns over attacks on Bangladesh opposition*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/human-rights-watch-voices-concerns-over-attacks-on-bangladesh-opposition/6915256.html>

Reuters. (2023, December 16). *Tens of thousands attend Bangladesh opposition rally calling for government to resign*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tens-thousands-attend-bangladesh-opposition-rally-calling-government-resign-2023-12-16/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bangladesh*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bangladesh*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bangladesh*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/>

Youth Congress Rohingya. (2023, September). *“The Persecution is the Worst There Is”: Restrictions on Rohingya Freedom of Movement in Bangladesh*. Youth Congress Rohingya. Retrieved from <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/60bf6286f8727b345cf75b1b/t/6507ca86395ef815d4f9d446/1695009504401/This+Persecution+Is+the+Worst+There+Is+-+Youth+Congress+Rohingya.pdf>

Barbados

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Barbados*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/barbados/>

Belarus

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World’s Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Anti-Discrimination Center Memorial (ADC). (2019, September 23). *Violence against Roma in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: police operations, forced evictions, pogroms*. ADC. Retrieved from <https://adcmemorial.org/en/news/violence-against-roma-in-russia-belarus-and-ukraine-police-operations-forced-evictions-pogroms/>

Council of Europe. (2024, June 10). *Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/countering-the-erasure-of-cultural-identity-in-war-and-peace/1680b00420>

European Roma Rights Center (ERRC). (2019, May 29). *Belarus: Interior Minister Unrepentant Following Mass Raids and Detention of Roma*. ERRC. Retrieved from <http://www.errc.org/news/belarus-interior-minister-unrepentant-following-mass-raids-and-detention-of-roma>

Henley, J., Rankin, J., & Roth, A. (2021, August 10). *Latvia and Lithuania act to counter migrants crossing Belarus border*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, June 8). *Violence and pushbacks at Poland-Belarus border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/violence-and-pushbacks-poland-belarus-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Belarus*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/belarus>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Belarus*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/belarus>

Human Rights Watch. (2024b, May 27). *“I Swear to Fulfill the Duties of Defense Lawyer Honestly and Faithfully”*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/27/i-swear-fulfill-duties-defense-lawyer-honestly-and-faithfully/politically>

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). (2019, June 28). *Belarus: Mass Roundups of Roma People Must Be Investigated*. FIDH. Retrieved from <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/belarus/belarus-mass-roundups-of-roma-people-must-be-investigated>

Karmanau, Yuras. (2023, December 16). *Belarus political prisoners face abuse, no medical care and isolation, former inmate says*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/belarus-lukashenko-crackdown-human-rights-prison-524cc5731bf03f62ebbbe64f640944ad>

Official Journal of the European Union. (2023, November 23). *Further repression against the people of Belarus, in particular the cases of Andrzej Poczobut and Ales Bialiatski*. Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023IP0075>

OHCHR. (2023, September 22). *Statement on the situation of human rights in Belarus*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/09/statement-situation-human-rights-belarus>

Pen Belarus. (2024, July 22). *4 years of repression in Belarus in general and in the cultural sector: June 2020 – June 2024*. Pen Belarus. Retrieved from <https://penbelarus.org/en/2024/07/22/4-years-of-repression-in-belarus-in-general-and-in-the-cultural-sector-in-particular-2020-june-2024.html>

Pen Belarus. (2024b, May 6). *Monitoring of violations of cultural rights and human rights of cultural figures. Belarus, January – March 2024*. Pen Belarus. Retrieved from

<https://penbelarus.org/en/2024/05/06/bel-manitoryng-parushennyau-kulturnyh-pravou-i-pravou-chalaveka-u-dachynenni-da-dzeyachau-kultury-belarus-studzen-sakavik-2024-goda.html>

United Nations. (2023, March 17). *Belarus must end systematic repression, release detainees, UN Human Rights Chief says*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/belarus-must-end-systematic-repression-release-detainees-un-human-rights>

United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). (2024, May 9). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Anaïs Marin (A/HRC/56/65)*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/belarus/report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-belarus-anais-marin-ahrc5665-enarruzh>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Belarus*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/belarus/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice: Belarus*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/belarus>

Viasna. (2024). *Human Rights Situation in Belarus in 2023*. Human Rights Center Viasna. Retrieved from https://spring96.org/files/reviews/en/review_2023_en.pdf

Belgium

Amnesty International. (2021). *Belgium 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/belgium/report-belgium/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World: Belgium*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belgium/freedom-world/2022>

OHCHR. (2019). *In dialogue with Belgium, Human Rights Committee experts ask about the protection of fundamental rights in the context of counter-terrorism and migration*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/10/dialogue-belgium-human-rights-committee-experts-ask-about-protection?LangID=E&NewsID=25153>

The Brussels Times. (2020). *Belgian police called out for use of excessive force during lockdown*. The Brussels Times. Retrieved from <https://www.brusselstimes.com/116983/belgian-police-called-out-for-use-of-excessive-force-during-lockdown>

The Brussels Times. (2024, May 4). *Police arrest 60 Extinction Rebellion activists for blocking Rue Belliard*. The Brussels Times. Retrieved from <https://www.brusselstimes.com/1033069/extinction-rebellion-block-rue-belliard-in-brussels>

The Law on Police Use of Force. (2021). *Belgium*. The Law on Police Use of Force. Retrieved from <https://www.policinglaw.info/country/belgium>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Belgium*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/belgium/>

Belize

Breaking Belize News. (2020, November 17). *'Police brutality will always be an issue,' says Commissioner of Police*. Breaking Belize News. Retrieved from <https://www.breakingbelizenews.com/2020/11/17/police-brutality-will-always-be-an-issue-says-commissioner-of-police/>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World: Belize*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belize/freedom-world/2021>

LoveFM. (2020). *Two Police brutality cases in Western Belize*. LoveFM. Retrieved from <https://lovefm.com/two-police-brutality-cases-in-western-belize/>

MONITOR, Civicus. (2021, October 28). *Belize: Protesters Demand Justice For Teenager Killed By Police*. MONITOR. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/10/28/belize-protesters-demand-justice-teenager-killed-police/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/belize/>

Benin

Ahissou, Virgile. (2023 May 4). *Killings Reported in Benin's North*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/benin-killings-farm-attack-6a977fbb32955de6b0f7ca4126c6ef29>

Amnesty International. (2019, April 26). *Benin: Crackdown on protests and wave of arrests fuel tense election period*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/04/benin-crackdown-on-protests-and-wave-of-arrests-fuel-tense-election-period/>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Armed Conflict and Location & Event Data Project, (2023 October 5). *Regional Overview Africa September 2023*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2023/10/05/regional-overview-africa-september-2023/#1675333275087-6bb36d6d-a568d008-e6b4>

Berger F., Tagziria L., Mossi A. (2024 February). *Hostage to Violent Extremism: Kidnapping Northern Benin*. Organized Crime: West African Response to Trafficking (OCWAR-T). Retrieved from https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/OCWAR-T_Benin_English.v4.pdf

BTI Transformation Index. (2022). *Benin Country Report 2022*. BTI Transformation Index. Retrieved from <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BEN#pos4>

de Bruijne, Kars. (2023 November). *Despite military progress, it's not going well in Northern Benin*. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Retrieved from https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/PB_Despite_military_progress_its_not_going_well_in_NB.pdf

France24. (2019, May 2). *Shots fired as post-election violence grips Benin*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/20190502-benin-gunfire-protests-cotonou-boni-yayi-talon>

France24. (2024, May 10). *In Benin, tensions soar over cost of living*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240510-in-benin-tensions-soar-over-cost-of-living>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World: Benin*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Without Frontiers International (Human Rights WatchF). (2022). *Report on Human Rights and Political Repression in Benin*. Human Rights WatchF. Retrieved from <https://hrwf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Human-Rights-WatchF-Benin-Human-Rights-and-Political-Repression-September-2022.pdf>

IDMC. (2023). *IDMC Data Portal: Benin*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data/>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Benin, January-June 2024*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=177&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Mednick, Sam. (2023 November 10). *Groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State take root on the coast of West Africa*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/benin-jihadi-violence-sahel-africa-70cf142cfedf49a2f59cc59664483d54>

Organized Crime Index. (2021). *Benin*. Organized Crime Index. Retrieved from <https://ocindex.net/country/benin>

UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF. (2024, March 18). *Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities - Benin Response Plan*. UNHCR. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/107335>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Benin*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/benin/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Benin*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/benin>

World Food Programme. (2023 October). *WFP Benin Country Brief, August 2023*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/benin/wfp-benin-country-brief-august-2023>

Bhutan

Association of Human Rights Activists (AHURA). (n.d.). *Government Repression of Southern Bhutanese*. AHURA. Retrieved from <https://www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/doc/other/Refugee/AHURA.htm>

CIJ Nepal. (2021, November 26). *Bhutanese political prisoners have been languishing in jails for nearly 30 years*. CIJ Nepal. Retrieved from <https://cijnepal.org.np/bhutanese-political-prisoners-have-been-languishing-in-jails-for-nearly-30-years/>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Bhutan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bhutan/freedom-world/2024>

Human Rights Watch. (2008, February 1). *Bhutan's ethnic cleansing*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/02/01/bhutans-ethnic-cleansing>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, July 10). *Bhutan: Urgently Reform Justice System, Prison Conditions*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/10/bhutan-urgently-reform-justice-system-prison-conditions>

MONITOR, Civicus. (2020, April 20). *Demands for Release Of Political Prisoners In Bhutan*. MONITOR. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/04/20/demands-release-political-prisoners-bhutan/>

Record Nepal. (2022, February 3). *Bhutan's shame: why the world must continue to remember the expulsion of ethnic Nepalis*. Record Nepal. Retrieved from <https://www.recordnepal.com/bhutans-shame-why-the-world-must-continue-to-remember-the-expulsion-of-ethnic-nepalis>

Seattle Times. (2016). *Bhutanese refugee crisis: a brief history*. Seattle Times. Retrieved from <https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/bhutanese-refugee-crisis-a-brief-history/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bhutan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bhutan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bhutan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bhutan/>

VoicePK. (2024, February 24). *'Bhutan must release its political prisoners': SAHR*. VoicePK. Retrieved from <https://voicepk.net/2024/02/bhutan-must-release-its-political-prisoners-sahr/>

Bolivia

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Crisis Group. (2019, November 13). *Keeping Violence in Check after Bolivia's Political Rupture*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/bolivia/keeping-violence-check-after-bolivias-political-rupture>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

IACHR. (2024 March 14). *IACHR Releases Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Bolivia*. IACHR. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/053.asp

International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), The University Network for Human Rights. (2019). *'They shot us like animals' Black November & Bolivia's Interim Government*. IHRC. Retrieved from http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Black-November-English-Final_Accessible.pdf

National Public Radio (NPR). (2020, August 11). *We Can't Stand It Anymore': Bolivian Protesters Demand Quick Elections*. NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2020/08/11/901334859/we-cant-stand-it-anymore-bolivian-protesters-demand-quick-elections>

OHCHR. (2023 December 8). *UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination publishes findings on Bolivia, Bulgaria, Germany, Morocco, South Africa and Vietnam*. United Nations OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/un-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-publishes-findings-bolivia>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bolivia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bolivia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bolivia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bolivia/>

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of The World's Human Rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Central Intelligence Agency. (2024). *The World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. CIA. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina/#people-and-society>

European Court of Human Rights. (2023, August 23). *Elections undemocratic in Bosnia and Herzegovina since main ethnic groups enjoy a privileged position*. ECHR. Retrieved from <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22003-7728774-10687753%22%7D>

Human Rights Watch. (2019, December 12). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Discrimination a Key Barrier*. HRW. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/13/bosnia-and-herzegovina-ethnic-discrimination-key-barrier>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2024*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=66&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

International Crisis Group. (2024b, May 23). *Watch List 2024- Spring Update*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-2024-spring-update>

The Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). (2021). *Report to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 11 to 21 June 2019*. The Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060641/2021-21-inf-eng.docx.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bosnia-and-herzegovina>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bosnia-and-herzegovina/>

Botswana

Aljazeera Center for Public Liberties and Human Rights. (2021). *Police brutality in Botswana: why it persists*. Aljazeera Center for Public Liberties and Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://liberties.aljazeera.com/en/13985/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Botswana Gazette. (2021, September 29). *No Action (yet) Against SoE Police Brutality*. Botswana Gazette. Retrieved from <https://www.thegazette.news/news/no-action-yet-against-soe-police-brutality/>

Human Rights Council. (2023, May 3). *Botswana Review - 43rd Session of Universal Periodic Review*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1uyawzk9o>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Botswana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/botswana/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Botswana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/botswana/>

Brazil

ADF International (2024, September 2). *Top human rights body called on to intervene against Brazil's "extreme" censorship of "X"*. Retrieved from <https://adfinternational.org/news/brazil-censorship-at-top-human-rights-body>

Debusmann, B. (2023, January 11). *Brazil riots: More than 1,200 to be charged for Brazil riot*. BBC News. Retrieved March 13, 2023, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64239442>

Finan, Michael. (2024, May 7). *Widespread evidence of political censorship and persecution in Brazil presented at human rights hearing chaired by Smith*. Office of U.S. Congressman Chris Smith. Retrieved from <https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=412166>

Freedom House (2024). *Brazil*. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024#:~:text=Violent%20homophobic%20rhetoric%20contributes%20to,that%20practice%20since%20taking%20office>

Garcia, R. T. (2023, January 11). *What happened in Brazil was not a repeat of Jan 6 in the US*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/1/11/what-happened-in-brazil-was-not-a-repeat-of-jan-6-in-the-us>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Brazil*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil>

John, T., & Pedroso, R. (2023, February 12). *The Yanomami people lived in harmony with nature. Invaders turned their lives into a fight for survival*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/11/americas/brazil-yanomami-mining-crackdown-intl-latam/index.html>

HRW (2024, March 15). *Brazil: Comply with Rulings on Police Violence*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/15/brazil-comply-rulings-police-violence#:~:text=%C2%A9%202024%20Cesar%20Mu%C3%B1oz/Human,the%20court%20six%20years%20ago>

Malleret, Constance. (2023, December 28). *Controversial Brazil law curbing Indigenous rights comes into force*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/28/brazil-law-indigenous-land-rights-claim-time-marker>.

Moncau, Gabriela. (2024, April 22). *Rural violence: Killings decreased, but conflicts have reached its peak since Brazil's re-democratization*. Brasil de Fato. Retrieved from

<https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/04/22/rural-violence-killings-decreased-but-conflicts-have-reached-its-peak-since-brazil-s-re-democratization>.

Organization of American States (OAS). (2024). *Precautionary Measure No. 50-24 Members of the Tapeba Indigenous People of Caucaia regarding Brazil*. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/mc/2024/res_28-24_mc_50-24_br_en.pdf

OHCHR. (2024, April 19). *Brazil: Systemic impunity and economic interests are killing human rights defenders one after the other, says UN expert*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/04/brazil-systemic-impunity-and-economic-interests-are-killing-human-rights>

OHCHR (2024, April 19). *Brazil: Systemic impunity and economic interests are killing human rights defenders one after the other, says UN expert*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/04/brazil-systemic-impunity-and-economic-interests-are-killing-human-rights>

Pinnacle Gazette (2024, August 15). *Bahia Police Violence Pressures Lula's Workers' Party*. Retrieved from <https://evrimagaci.org/tpg/bahia-police-violence-pressures-lulas-workers-party-20404>

Reuters. (2024, January 26). *Brazil's indigenous group's crisis persists after 308 deaths in 2023, report says*. US News. Retrieved from <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-26/brazil-indigenous-groups-crisis-persists-after-308-deaths-in-2023-report-says>.

Rocha, Ana Paula. (2024, April 25). *The American continent is among the most dangerous regions for human rights defenders*. Brasil de Fato. Retrieved from <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/04/25/the-american-continent-is-among-the-most-dangerous-regions-for-human-rights-defenders>

United Nations. (2023, January 21). *"We are not afraid": Indigenous Brazilian women stand up to gender violence*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132572>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brazil*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/brazil/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brazil*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/brazil/>

Brunei

Amnesty International. (2018). *Brunei Darussalam 2017/2018*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/brunei-darussalam/report-brunei-darussalam/>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World: Brunei*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brunei/freedom-world/2021>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, April 23). *Human Rights Watch Country Profiles: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2021/04/23/country-profiles-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity#brunei>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brunei*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/brunei/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Brunei*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/brunei/>

Bulgaria

Amnesty International. (2021). *Bulgaria 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/>

Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. (2023, June 27). *Anonymous Notices Leave Residents of Orlandovtsi District in Sofia Homeless*. BHC. Retrieved from <https://www.bghelsinki.org/en/news/2023-06-27-press-orlandovtsi>

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). (2024, April 15). *Ani Milanova Aleksieva and Others against Bulgaria*. ECHR. Retrieved from <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-233374>

France24. (2020, September 3). *Anti-government protests turn tense in Bulgaria as thousands rally against PM*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/20200903-anti-government-protests-turn-tense-in-bulgaria-as-thousands-rally-against-pm>

France24. (2021, September 18). *Beating video puts Bulgaria police violence in spotlight*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210918-beating-video-puts-bulgaria-police-violence-in-spotlight>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Bulgaria*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedom-world/2024>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, October 11). *Bulgaria: Migrants Brutally Pushed Back at Turkish Border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/26/bulgaria-migrants-brutally-pushed-back-turkish-border>

Kostova, Pavela. (2023 August 1). *No Swimming Allowed: Bulgarian Roma Face Racial Discrimination At Public Pools*. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-roma-discrimination-swimming-pools/32529839.html>

Mitov, Boris. (2024, August 7). *Bulgarian Parliament Adopts Amendment Banning LGBT 'Promotion' In Schools*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-lgbt-sexual-orientation-amendment-schools/33069623.html>

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (2021, August 17). *Surveillance Video Puts Bulgarian Police Brutality During Anti-Government Protests In Focus*. RFE/RL. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-police-violence-video/31415157.html>

Reuters. (2020, July 11). *Thousands call on Bulgarian government to resign in anti-graft protests*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-protests-corruption/thousands-call-on-bulgarian-government-to-resign-in-anti-graft-protests-idUSKCN24C0IK>

Tsoneva, T. (2020, September 10). *What is happening with the Bulgarian protest movement?* Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/9/10/what-is-happening-with-the-bulgarian-protest-movement>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/>

Burkina Faso

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data- ACLED. (2024, June 10). *Regional Overview: Africa, May 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/06/10/africa-overview-may-2024/>

Aljazeera. (2024, February 24). *Dozens dead after mosque attack in southern Burkina Faso, sources say*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/26/rebels-attack-mosque-eastern-burkina-faso>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Burkina Faso 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/burkina-faso/report-burkina-faso/>

Aljazeera. (2021, June 6). *UN 'outraged' as death toll in Burkina Faso attack rises to 132*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/6/un-outraged-as-death-toll-in-burkina-faso-attack-rises-to-132>

Chibelushi, Wedaeli. (2024, April 29). *Burkina Faso bans more foreign media over Human Rights Watch massacre report*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68920225>

France 24. (2023, January 20). *Military frees abducted women and children in Burkina Faso*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230120-military-frees-abducted-women-and-children-in-burkina-faso-says-state-tv>

- France 24. (2024, May 17). *New evidence shows atrocities committed by army in Burkina Faso*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240517-new-evidence-shows-atrocities-committed-army-burkina-faso>
- Hammerschlag, A. (2022, May 18). *Report: Jihadi-Linked Violence on Rise in Burkina Faso*. VAO News. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/report-jihadi-linked-violence-on-rise-in-burkina-faso-/6578654.html>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf
- Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Burkina Faso*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/burkina-faso>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023b, May 4). *Burkina Faso: Army Linked to Massacre of 156 Civilians*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/04/burkina-faso-army-linked-massacre-156-civilians>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 25). *Burkina Faso: Army Massacres 223 Villagers*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2024). *Global Internal Displacement Database*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>
- International Crisis Group. (2023). *Global conflict tracker*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=21&date_range=last_3_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023
- International Crisis Group. (2024, January-May). *Global Conflict Tracker: Burkina Faso*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database>
- Kabore, A., & Mednick, S. (2023, January 3). *Burkina Faso Rights Group alleges 28 dead in ethnic killings*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/politics-burkina-faso-crime-military-and-defense-violence-02aa75e6bcb471115186210f8d1217d9>
- Norwegian Refugee Council- NRC. (2024 June 3). *The world's most neglected displacement crises in 2023*. NRC. Retrieved from <https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crisis-in-2023/>
- United Nations. (2023, January 16). *Türk alarmed at abduction of at least 50 women in Burkina Faso*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/turk-alarmed-abduction-least-50-women-burkina-faso>
- U.S. Department of State. (2023a, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burkina Faso*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burkina-faso/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023b, January 16). *Abductions in Northern Burkina Faso*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/abductions-in-northern-burkina-faso/>

Burundi

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2019). *Burundi, the Forgotten Crisis, Still Burns*. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved from <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-the-forgotten-crisis-still-burns/>

Africa News. (2023, March 3). *Burundi's homosexuality crackdown: 24 people prosecuted*. Africa News. Retrieved from [https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/09/burundis-homosexuality-crackdown-24-people-prosecuted//](https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/09/burundis-homosexuality-crackdown-24-people-prosecuted/)

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

France 24. (2023, December 31). *Burundi's president says homosexuality 'imported from the West', calls for stoning gays*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231231-burundi-s-president-says-homosexuals-should-be-stoned>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World: Burundi*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/burundi/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2024, January 19). *Burundi President Stokes Fear Amongst LGBT People*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/19/burundi-president-stokes-fear-among-lgbt-people>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *Global conflict tracker*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=3&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Global conflict tracker*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=3&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2023&to_month=1&to_year=2023

Ligue ITEKA (2024, April 17). *Rapport trimestriel Iteka n'Ijambo de janvier à mars 2024*. Ligue ITEKA. Retrieved from <https://ligue-iteka.bi/rapport-trimestriel-iteka-nijambo-de-janvier-a-mars-2024/>

Ligue ITEKA (2024, June 5). *Rapport mensuel Iteka n'Ijambo de mai 2024*. Ligue ITEKA. Retrieved from <https://ligue-iteka.bi/rapport-mensuel-iteka-nijambo-de-mai-2024/>

OHCHR. (2018). *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi*. OHCHR. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColBurundi/ReportHRC39/A_HRC_39_63_EN.pdf

UNHCR, Refugees Operational Data Portal. (2022). *Burundi Situation*. UNHCR. Retrieved from https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi#_ga=2.187499560.1000016685.1664407655-99506272.1664407655

Cabo Verde

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World 2022: Cabo Verde*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cabo-verde/freedom-world/2022>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cabo-verde/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cabo Verde*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cabo-verde/>

Cambodia

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom On The Net 2021: Cambodia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-net/2021>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Radio Free Asia. (2024, March 6). *Authorities spray tear gas in northern Cambodia land dispute protest*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/tear-gas-land-protest-03062024163822.html>

Radio Free Asia. (2024b, March 21). *After clash, evicted Cambodian villagers hiding in forest, fearful of arrest*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/villagers-forest-03212024161823.html>

Sea, Eung. (2024, March 7). *Preah Vihear Provincial Authorities Arrest Villagers and Fire Weapons in Clash Over Land Dispute*. CamboJa News. Retrieved from <https://cambojanews.com/preah-vihear-provincial-authorities-arrest-villagers-and-fire-weapons-in-clash-over-land-dispute/>

Sovuthy, K. (2021). *Reporters remain unclear on scope of police powers in new directive on interference by media*. Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association. Retrieved from <https://cambojanews.com/reporters-remain-unclear-on-scope-of-police-powers-in-new-directive-on-interference-by-media/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cambodia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cambodia/>

Cameroon

ACLED. (2024). *ACLED Explorer*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/explorer/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Global Protection Cluster (GPC). (2024 May). *The Protection of Civilians Living Under Protracted Conflict in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon: July 2023 - Feb 2024*. GPC. Retrieved from https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/protection_cluster_key_updates_-_nsw_cameroon_july23_-_feb24.pdf

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (Global R2P). (2024 May 31). *Cameroon: Populations at Risk*. Global R2P. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/cameroon/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Cameroon*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/cameroon>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). (2021). *Global Internal Displacement Database*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Global conflict tracker: Cameroon*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=4&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2023a, March 15). *Cameroon: Situation Report, 15 March 2023*. ReliefWeb. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-situation-report-15-march-2023>

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2023b, February 14). *Cameroon: Situation Report, 14 February 2023*. ReliefWeb. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/cameroon-situation-report-14-february-2023>

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024, April 2024). *Cameroon: North-West and South-West - Situation Report No. 62 (February 2024)*. OCHA. Retrieved from <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/cameroon/cameroon-north-west-and-south-west-situation-report-no-62-february-2024>

U.S. Embassy in Cameroon. (2023, March 21). *2022 Human Rights Report: Cameroon*. U.S. Embassy in Cameroon. Retrieved from <https://cm.usembassy.gov/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices-cameroon/>

Canada

Amnesty International. (2021, June 17). *Canada: 'I Didn't Feel Like a Human in There': Immigration Detention in Canada and its Impact on Mental Health*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr20/4195/2021/en/?utm_source=annual_report&utm_medium=pdf&utm_campaign=2021&utm_term=english

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Central African Republic

ACLEDD. (2024, April 8). *Regional Overview: Africa, March 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/04/08/regional-overview-africa-march-2024/>

ACLEDD. (2024b). *ACLEDD Explorer*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/explorer/>

Amnesty International (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

AP. (2024, February 12). *Central African Republic: 10K Children Still Fighting Alongside Armed Groups*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/central-african-republic-10k-children-still-fighting-alongside-armed-groups/7485188.html>

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GlobalR2P). (2024, May 31). *Populations at Risk: Central African Republic*. Global R2P. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/central-african-republic/>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, December 23). *Central African Republic: Rebel Violence Threatens Elections*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/23/central-african-republic-rebel-violence-threatens-elections>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Central African Republic*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/central-african-republic>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Global conflict tracker: Central African Republic*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=5&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Olsson, S. (2018, May 25). *Why Child Soldiers Rarely Stay Free for Long in the Central African Republic*. TIME. Retrieved from <https://time.com/5290083/child-soldiers-central-african-republic/>

United Nations. (2023, February 20). *Central African Republic: Human rights violations against civilians by the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) are unacceptable, says UN expert*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/central-african-republic-human-rights-violations-against-civilians-central>

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024, March 28). *Human rights situation in Central African Republic still of serious concern, says Deputy*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/human-rights-situation-central-african-republic-still-serious>

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024b, February 19). *UN women's rights committee publishes findings on Central African Republic, Djibouti, Greece, Italy, Niger, Oman, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/un-womens-rights-committee-publishes-findings-central-african-republic-0>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Gabon*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Central African Republic*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/central-african-republic/>

Chad

ACLED. (2024, April 8). *Regional Overview: Africa, March 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/04/08/regional-overview-africa-march-2024/>

Agence France Presse. (2023, February 23). *128 Killed In Chad During Repression of Protests: Rights Body*. Barron's. Retrieved from <https://www.barrons.com/news/128-killed-in-chad-during-repression-of-protests-rights-body-6b55e172>

Agence France-Presse. (2024, May 12). *Chad opposition members arrested for alleged election interference*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voaafrica.com/a/chad-opposition-members-arrested-for-alleged-election-interference/7607891.html>

Aljazeera. (2021). *Protests erupt in Chad as Deby nominated to run for sixth term*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/6/chad-police-confront-protesters-as-deby-nominated-for-sixth-term>

Aljazeera. (2022). *Chad starts 'national dialogue' to pave way for elections*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/20/chad-national-dialogue-said-to-pave-way-for-elections>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Chad 2021*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/chad/report-chad/>

Crisis24. (2024, March 21). *Chad: Communal violence in Djourf Al Ammar Department; government forces deployed as of March 21*. Crisis24. Retrieved from

<https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/03/chad-communal-violence-in-djourf-al-ammar-department-government-forces-deployed-as-of-march-21>

Crisis Group. (2019). *Avoiding the Resurgence of Intercommunal Violence in Eastern Chad*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/284-eviter-la-reprise-des-violences-communautaires-lest-du-tchad>

Human Rights Watch. (2021a). *Chad: Déby Leaves Legacy of Abuse*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/chad-deby-leaves-legacy-abuse>

Human Rights Watch. (2021b). *Chad: Pre-Election Crackdown on Opponents*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/chad-pre-election-crackdown-opponents>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 13). *World Report 2023: Rights Trends in Chad*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/chad>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 13). *Chad: Political Transition Ends With Deby's Election*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/13/chad-political-transition-ends-debys-election>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). (2021). *Global Internal Displacement Database*. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-dat>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Global conflict tracker: Chad*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=6&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2024, June 18). *Chad – Sudan Crisis response: Situation update 36*. IOM. Retrieved from <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/chad-sudan-crisis-response-situation-update-36-18-june-2024>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Chad*. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/chad/>

Chile

Aljazeera. 2019. *Chile protests: What prompted the unrest?* Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/30/chile-protests-what-prompted-the-unrest>

Amnesty International. 2022. *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/#:~:text=The%20Amnesty%20International%20Report%202021,in%20the%20corridors%20of%20power>

Amnesty International. 2020. *Eyes on Chile*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/10/eyes-on-chile-police-violence-at-protests/>

AP News. (2023, April 27). *Hundreds stuck at Peru-Chile border in crackdown on migrants*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/ap-top-news/2023/04/28/hundreds-stuck-at-peru-chile-border-in-crackdown-on-migrants>

Freedom House. 2020. *Freedom in the World 2020: Chile*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2020>

Human Rights Watch. 2022. *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

China

Aldrich, R. (2011). An Examination of China's Treatment of North Korean Asylum Seekers. *North Korean Review*, 7(1), 36–48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908831>

Amnesty International. (2019, September 19). *Hong Kong: Arbitrary arrests, brutal beatings and torture in police detention revealed*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-arbitrary-arrests-brutal-beatings-and-torture-in-police-detention-revealed/>

Amnesty International. (2020, July 17). *Hong Kong's national security law: 10 things you need to know*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/>

Bellingcat. (2019, April 5). *Are historic mosques in Xinjiang being destroyed?* Bellingcat. Retrieved from <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2019/04/05/are-historic-mosques-in-xinjiang-being-destroyed/>

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2022, September 22). *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*. CFR. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights#chapter-title-0-1>

Deng, Y., & O'Brien, K. J. (2013). Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protesters. *The China Quarterly*, 215, 533–552. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23510801>

Elliott, T. (2019, November 9). *'Crimes against humanity': Is China killing political prisoners for their organs?* Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved from <https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/health-and-wellness/crimes-against-humanity-is-china-killing-political-prisoners-for-their-organs-20191105-p537md.html>

Enos, O, & Kao, E. (2020, October 14). *Religious persecution in China must be called out*. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from <https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/commentary/religious-persecution-china-must-be-called-out>

Freedom House. (2021). *China: Transnational repression case study*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/china>

Gao, Larissa. (2023, June 13). *For China's LGBTQ community, safe spaces are becoming harder to find*. ABC News. Retrieved from <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-beijing-lgbt-center-rcna85528>

- Gobel, C. (2020). The political logic of protest repression in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 30(128), 169–185. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1790897>
- Human Rights Watch. (2020). *China's global threat to human rights*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in China*. Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in China*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>
- Human Rights Watch. (2024a, January 31). *China: Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/31/china-religious-regulations-tighten-uyghurs>
- Human Rights Watch. (2024b, February 1). *Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies Complicity in Forced Labor in China*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/01/asleep-wheel/car-companies-complicity-forced-labor-china>
- Human Rights Watch. (2024c, June 18). *China: Hundreds of Uyghur Village Names Change*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/18/china-hundreds-uyghur-village-names-change>
- Human Rights Watch. (2024d, May 21). *Tibet: Mass Relocations of Tibetans Not Voluntary*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/22/tibet-mass-relocations-tibetans-not-voluntary>
- Lodoe, Kalden & Pema, Tenzin. (2024, February 23). *China arrests more than 1,000 Tibetans protesting dam project*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/protesters-arrested-02232024164340.html>
- Maizland, Lindsay. (2021, March 1). *China's repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights>
- García, A. B. (2019). Denouncing human trafficking in China: North Korean women's memoirs as evidence. *State Crime Journal*, 8(1). <https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.8.1.0059>
- O'Brien, K. J., & Deng, Y. (2017). Preventing Protest One Person at a Time: Psychological Coercion and Relational Repression in China. *China Review*, 17(2), 179–201. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44440175>
- Radio Free Asia. (2021, April 1). *Chinese Christians held in secretive brainwashing camps: sources*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/christians-camps-04012021081013.html>
- Rahn, P. (2002). The chemistry of a conflict: The Chinese government and the Falun Gong. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(4), 41–65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005633>

Ramzy, Austin, and Ezra Cheung. (2019, November 8). *Anger in Hong Kong after student dies from fall following clash with police*. New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-student-dies.html>

Su, Alice, and David Rennie. (2023, December 26). *Update on “The Cage”—part one*. The Economist. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/12/26/update-on-the-cage-part-one>

U.S. Department of State. (2021, January 19). *Determination of the secretary of State on atrocities in Xinjiang*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022c, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/>

The Week. (2020, August 23). *China’s war on religion*. The Week. Retrieved from <https://theweek.com/articles/932538/chinas-war-religion>

Washington Post. (2020, February 29). *How China corralled 1 million people into concentration camps*. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-spreadsheet-of-those-in-hell-how-china-corralled-ughurs-into-concentration-camps/2020/02/28/4daeca4a-58c8-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html

Wong, T., & Tsoi, G. (2023, February 18). *The protesters who've gone missing as China deepens crackdown*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64592333>

Yang, William. (2024, May 22). *China accelerates forced relocation of rural Tibetans to urban areas, report says*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-accelerates-forced-relocation-of-rural-tibetans-to-urban-areas-report-says/7622395.html>

Yueng, J. (2019, December 20). *From an extradition bill to a political crisis: A guide to the Hong Kong protests*. CNN World. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/15/asia/hong-kong-protests-explainer-intl-hnk-scli/index.html>

Zenz, Adrian. (2024, February 14). *Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024*. The Jamestown Foundation.

Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/forced-labor-in-the-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-assessing-the-continuation-of-coercive-labor-transfers-in-2023-and-early-2024/>

Colombia

ACAPS. (2024, April 15). *Colombia: Child Recruitment and Use*. ACAPS. Retrieved from https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240415_ACAPS_Colombia_Analysis_Hub_Child_recruitment_and_use_in_Colombia.pdf

ACLED. (2024a, April 8). *Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, March 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/04/08/regional-overview-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-march-2024/>

ACLED. (2024b, March 7). *Regional Overview: Latin America and the Caribbean, February 2024*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/03/07/regional-overview-latin-america-the-caribbean-february-2024/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Crisis Group. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Colombia*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=76&date_range=last_3_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). (2021). *Global Internal Displacement Database*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Colombia*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=76&crisis_state=&created=6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Colombia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/colombia>

Loaiza, Lara. (2024, June 21). *What is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?* InSight Crime. Retrieved from <https://insightcrime.org/news/what-is-behind-increased-violence-in-colombia/>

OCHA. (2024). *Situacion Humanitaria: Colombia*. OCHA. Retrieved from <https://monitor.unocha.org/colombia>

Radford, A., & Hancock, S. (2023, March 4). *Colombia protests: Seventy-nine police officers freed after being taken hostage*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64834573>

Reuters. (2023, January 31). *Violence in Colombia falls in first month of ceasefire*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/fighting-colombia-leaves-least-10-dead-2023-01-31/>

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2024, February 13). *Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/161)*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/children-and-armed-conflict-colombia-report-secretary-general-s2024161-enarruzh>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/colombia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/colombia/>

Comoros

Bureau Of International Labor Affairs. (2020). *2020 Findings on The Worst Forms Of Child Labor: Comoros*. Bureau Of International Labor Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2020/Comoros.pdf

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Global Organized Crime Index. (2022). *Comoros*. Retrieved from <https://ocindex.net/country/comoros>

Humanium. (2022). *Children of Comoros*. Humanium. Retrieved from <https://www.humanium.org/en/comoros/>

Moustoifa, Abdou. (2024, January 18). *One dead, at least 25 injured in Comoros protests over president's re-election*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/night-curfew-imposed-comoros-after-presidents-re-election-sparks-protests-2024-01-18/>

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024 January 17). *Comoros: UN Human Rights Chief calls for calm and urges the authorities to protect free assembly, uphold democratic principles*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/comoros-un-human-rights-chief-calls-calm-and-urges-authorities-protect-free>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Comoros*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/comoros/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Comoros*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/comoros/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Comoros*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/comoros/>

Congo-Brazzaville

Amnesty International. (2021a). *Congo 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/congo/report-congo/>

- Amnesty International. (2021b, April 19). *Congo: On the back of the crisis. Violations of the right to health and repression of economic and social rights defenders in the Republic of Congo*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr22/3887/2021/en>
- Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World 2022: Republic of the Congo*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/republic-congo/freedom-world/2022>
- Happi, C. (2021, August 24). *The Republic of The Congo Conflict Insights*. Africa Portal. Retrieved from <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/republic-congo-conflict-insights/>
- The New Humanitarian. (2018, June 18). *UPDATED: Congo-Brazzaville's hidden war*. The New Humanitarian. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/2018/06/18/updated-congo-brazzaville-s-hidden-war>
- U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Republic of Congo*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/republic-of-the-congo/>
- Congo-Kinshasa
- AFP. (2023, January 23). *Suspected ADF Islamists Kill 23 in East DR Congo Attack*. The Defense Post. Retrieved from <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/01/23/adf-attack-east-dr-congo/>
- Agence France-Presse. (2024, January 7.) *UN sounds alarms at rising hate speech in DRC*. Voice of America. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-sounds-alarm-at-rising-hate-speech-in-drc/7429794.html>.
- Al Jazeera. (2023, March 9). *At least 36 killed in eastern DR Congo attack*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/9/at-least-36-killed-in-east-congo-attack-officials>
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2023, May 23). *ACLED Dashboard*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>
- Bashi, Wendy. (2024, July 3). *Congo fears escalation as M23 seizes key towns*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/congo-fears-escalation-as-m23-seizes-key-towns/a-69549332>.
- Center for Preventative Action. (2022). *Instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. CFR. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo>
- Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Democratic Republic of Congo: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=7&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, February 7). *DR Congo: Atrocities by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, December 16). *DR Congo: Electoral Violence Threatens Vote*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/16/dr-congo-electoral-violence-threatens-vote>.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. (2021). *Global Internal Displacement Database: IDMC Query Tool - Conflict and violence*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>

Just Security. (2022). *New Armed Conflict in DR Congo: A Renewed Call for Civilian Protection*. Just Security. Retrieved from <https://www.justsecurity.org/82155/new-armed-conflict-in-dr-congo-a-renewed-call-for-civilian-protection/>

Kamale, Jean-Yves. (2024, August 17). *16 killed, 20 abducted in Congo in attacks blamed on Islamic State-linked rebels*. ABC News. Retrieved from <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/16-villagers-killed-20-abducted-congo-attacks-blamed-112910288>.

Kivu Security Tracker. (2022). *Armed Groups*. Kivu Security Tracker. Retrieved from <https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedGroups>

Mednick, Sam. (2023, March 11). *IS group says it killed more than 35 'Christians' in Congo*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-congo-jihadis-8a0dc8ddd9ead188c4733fc87b509f2>

OHCHR (2024, April 2). *In DRC, insecurity is at alarming levels, Turk reports*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/04/drc-insecurity-alarming-levels-turk-reports>

Reliefweb. (2022, June 29). *Alarming Uptick of Armed Groups' Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Threatening Stability, Mission Head Tells Security Council*. Reliefweb. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/alarming-uptick-armed-groups-violence-eastern-democratic-republic-congo-threatening-stability-mission-head-tells-security-council>

Reuters. (2023, January 19). *UN peacekeepers find mass graves in eastern Congo*. Reuters. Retrieved March 13, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-peacekeepers-find-mass-graves-eastern-congo-2023-01-19/>

UNICEF. (2023, November 14). *UNICEF condemns latest attack in eastern DR Congo as act of 'horrific brutality.'* Retrieved from <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-condemns-latest-attack-eastern-dr-congo-act-horrific-brutality>.

United Nations. (2023a, January 24). *Escalating violence leaves hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands on the move in eastern DRC*. UNHCR. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2023/1/63cf9fb24/escalating-violence-leaves-hundreds-dead-hundreds-thousands-move-eastern.html>

United Nations. (2023b, March 10). *300,000 flee ongoing violence in DR Congo in February alone: UNHCR*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134452>

United Nations Joint Human Rights Office. (2020). *Analytical note on the human rights situation in the highlands of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira territories, South Kivu province, between February 2019 and June 2020*. OHCHR-MONUSCO. Retrieved from https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20200806.unjhro.analyse_hauts_plateaux_en.pdf

UN News. (2024, July 2). *Tens of thousands displaced in fresh violence in DR Congo*. UN News. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1151701>.

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of the Congo*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of the Congo*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>

Walsh, Declan. (2023, December 17). *The overlooks crisis in Congo: 'We live in war.'* New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/17/world/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo-elections.html>.

Cote d'Ivoire

Amnesty International. (2019, February 11). *Côte d'Ivoire: Arbitrary arrests, crackdown on dissent and torture ahead of Presidential election*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/cote-divoire-arbitrary-arrests-crackdown-on-dissent-and-torture/>

Amnesty International. (2021, March 26). *Côte d'Ivoire: Hundreds arrested languishing in detention following presidential election unrest*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from [https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/cote-divoire-hundreds-arrested-still-languishing-in-detention/?](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/cote-divoire-hundreds-arrested-still-languishing-in-detention/)

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Article19. (2020, August 25). *Côte d'Ivoire: Civic space is shrinking with ten persons killed and government ban on protests*. Article19. Retrieved from <https://www.article19.org/resources/cote-divoire-civic-space-is-shrinking/>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Côte d'Ivoire*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cote-divoire/freedom-world/2021>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). (2021). *Global Internal Displacement Database*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-dat>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cote d'Ivoire*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cote-divoire/>

Croatia

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN). (2024 January 10). "When they finish beating and taunting you, they tell you to go to the river". BVMN. Retrieved from <https://borderviolence.eu/testimonies/january-10-2024-gejkovac-croatia/>

The Council of Europe. (2020, October). *Croatian authorities must stop pushbacks and border violence, and end impunity*. The Council of Europe. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/special-representative-secretary-general-migration-refugees/newsletter-october-2020/-/asset_publisher/cVKOAoroBOtI/content/croatian-authorities-must-stop-pushbacks-and-border-violence-and-end-impunity?_101_INSTANCE_cVKOAoroBOtI_viewMode=view/

Tondo, L. (2021, April 7). *Croatian border police accused of sexually assaulting Afghan migrant*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/07/croatian-border-police-accused-of-sexually-assaulting-afghan-migrant>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 29). *Violent Pushbacks on Croatia Border Require EU Action*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/29/violent-pushbacks-croatia-border-require-eu-action>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, August 2). *Croatia/EU: Strengthen Border Monitoring System*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/02/croatia/eu-strengthen-border-monitoring-system>

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2019). *Rapporteur, ending Balkan visit, expresses concern at reception centre conditions and questions 'pushback' denials*. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://pace.coe.int/en/news/7428>

OHCHR. (2019, October 1). *End of visit statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2019/10/end-visit-statement-un-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants-felipe-gonzalez?LangID=E&NewsID=25088>

Cuba

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Colomé, C. (2024, June 21). *Cuba, the 'safest country in the world' is getting less and less secure*. El País. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-06-22/cuba-the-safest-country-in-the-world-is-getting-less-and-less-secure.html>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World 2020: Cuba*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cuba/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cuba/>

Cyprus

Al Jazeera. (2023, September 3). *Police arrest 20 in Cyprus as anti-migrant violence spreads*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/3/over-a-dozen-arrested-in-cyprus-as-anti-migrant-violence-spreads>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Council of Europe. (2018, April 26). *Anti-torture Committee publishes report on its visit to Cyprus*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/anti-torture-committee-publishes-report-on-its-visit-to-cyprus>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, September 29). *Cyprus: Asylum Seekers Summarily Returned*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/29/cyprus-asylum-seekers-summarily-returned>

Sewell, Abby. (2023, August 11). *Cyprus is sending Syrian migrants back to Lebanon. The UN is concerned but Cypriots say it's lawful*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/cyprus-lebanon-migrants-pushbacks-returns-syria-unhcr-5c6b122acdc17de6e1cc6838b41b69b4>

United Nations Human Rights office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). (2019, November 18). *Committee against Torture's dialogue with Cyprus Centers on detention conditions and fundamental legal safeguards*. OHCHR Committee against Torture. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/11/committee-against-tortures-dialogue-cyprus-centers-detention-conditions-and>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cyprus*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cyprus/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cyprus*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cyprus/>

Czech Republic

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Council of Europe. (2019, July 4). *The CPT publishes report on the Czech Republic*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/the-cpt-publishes-report-on-the-czech-republic>

UN Committee against Torture. (2018, May 3). *Committee against Torture examines report of the Czech Republic*. UN Committee against Torture. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/05/committee-against-torture-examines-report-czech-republic>

Djibouti

CIVICUS, Monitor. (2020, October 12). *Police Crack Down On Protesters And Journalists Following Rare Demonstrations In Djibouti*. CIVICUS, Monitor. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/10/12/police-crack-down-protesters-and-journalists-following-rare-demonstrations-djibouti/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World 2022: Djibouti*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/djibouti/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Djibouti*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/djibouti/freedom-world/2021>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Djibouti*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/djibouti/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Djibouti*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/djibouti/>

Dominica

Crisis24. (2019, November 20). *Dominica: Violent protests reported in Roseau November 18*. Crisis24. Retrieved from <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2019/11/dominica-violent-protests-reported-in-roseau-november-18>

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Dominica*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/dominica/freedom-world/2020>

OHCHR Rights Committee. (2020). *Human Rights Committee asks Dominica about the use of force against political opposition and the infringement on the right of peaceful assembly*. OHCHR Rights

Committee. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/03/human-rights-committee-asks-dominica-about-use-force-against-political>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominica*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominica/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominica*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominica/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominica*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominica/>

Dominican Republic

Amnesty International. (2019a, March 28). *Dominican Republic: Police routinely use rape and commit other forms of torture to punish women sex workers*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/03/dominican-republic-police-routinely-rape-torture-women-sex-workers/>

Amnesty International. (2019b). *Sex Workers Stand Up Against Torture and Ill-Treatment by Police*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/03/dominican-republic-sex-workers-rights/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Dominican Republic: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/dominican-republic/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2015, July 1). *We Are Dominican*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/01/we-are-dominican/arbitrary-deprivation-nationality-dominican-republic>

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). (2015). *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic*. IACHR. Retrieved from <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/2016/DominicanRepublic/dominican-republic.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominican-republic/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic*. U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic. Retrieved from <https://do.usembassy.gov/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices-dominican-republic/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/dominican-republic>

Washington Post. (2023, March 17). *Dominican Republic sending children, pregnant migrants back to Haiti*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/16/haiti-dominican-republic-migrant-crackdown/>

Ecuador

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Cultural Survival. (2022, June 16). *Stop the Ecuadorian Government's Violence Against the A'i Cofán de Dureno Community Now*. Retrieved from <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/stop-ecuadorian-governments-violence-against-ai-cofan-de-dureno-community-now>

Gabay, Aimee. (2024, May 15). *As miner quells protests in Ecuador, Canadian firms' rights record faces scrutiny*. Mongabay. Retrieved from <https://news.mongabay.com/2024/05/as-miner-quells-protests-in-ecuador-canadian-firms-rights-record-faces-scrutiny/>.

Gregory, James and Will Grant. (2024, January 10). *Streets empty as Ecuador reels from violence*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67938285>.

Human Rights Watch. (2022a). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, August 13). *Ecuador's Recurrent Cycle of Violence over Indigenous Rights*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/13/ecuadors-recurrent-cycle-violence-over-indigenous-rights>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Ecuador events of 2023*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/ecuador>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ecuador*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ecuador/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ecuador*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_ECUADOR-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Egypt

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Amnesty International. (2024, June 14). *Egypt: Release protesters and activists detained over Palestine solidarity*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/egypt-release-protesters-and-activists-detained-over-palestine-solidarity/>.

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). (2019). *Egypt: Systematic torture is a state policy*. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. Retrieved from <https://cihrs.org/egypt-systematic-torture-is-a-state-policy/?lang=en>

Committee for Justice. (2021). *Egypt's Executions Frenzy Continues In Second Quarter Of 2021*. Committee for Justice. Retrieved from <https://www.cfjustice.org/egypts-executions-frenzy-continues-in-second-quarter-of-2021/?lang=ar>

Freedom House. (2021). *Egypt: NGOs Call on Authorities to End Crackdown on Freedoms*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/article/egypt-ngos-call-authorities-end-crackdown-freedoms>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Egypt*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/egypt>

Minority Rights Group (MRG) and Egyptian Front for Human Rights. (2024, May 24) Submission to the Committed on the Rights of the Child Report. Retrieved from <https://minorityrights.org/app/uploads/2024/04/crc-egypt-mrg-efhr.pdf>

Swart, M. (2020, March 23). *Rights group: Children in Egypt tortured in detention*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/23/rights-group-children-in-egypt-tortured-in-detention>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/egypt/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Egypt*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/egypt/>

El Salvador

Aljazeera. (2022, April 25). *El Salvador extends state of emergency to curb gang violence*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/25/el-salvador-extends-state-of-emergency-gang-violence-crackdown>

Amnesty International. (2023, March 31). *One year into El Salvador's state of emergency*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/el-salvador-state-emergency-systematic-human-rights-violations/>

BBC. (2020). *Did El Salvador's government make a deal with gangs?* BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-54192736>

Crisis24. (2024, June 14). *El Salvador: State of emergency extended until at least July 15*. Crisis24. Retrieved from <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/06/el-salvador-state-of-emergency-extended-until-at-least-july-15-update-27>.

EFE. (2024, February 3). *Fear of police replaces gang violence in El Salvador*. EFE Communica. Retrieved from <https://efe.com/en/other-news/2024-02-03/fear-of-police-replaces-gang-violence-in-el-salvador/>.

Gellman, Mneesha. (2024, February 3). *Salvadorans Have Traded Their Rights for Uncertain Security*. Jacobin. Retrieved from <https://jacobin.com/2024/03/el-salvador-incarceration-gangs-bukele>.

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, June 21). *Bukele's Old Recipes to Address Gang Violence Are Set to Fail*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/21/bukeles-old-recipes-address-gang-violence-are-set-fail>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in El Salvador*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/el-salvador>

Martínez, C. (2022, May 17). *Collapsed Government Talks with MS-13 Sparked Record Homicides in El Salvador, Audios Reveal*. El Faro. Retrieved from https://elfaro.net/en/202205/el_salvador/26177/Collapsed-Government-Talks-with-MS-13-Sparked-Record-Homicides-in-El-Salvador-Audios-Reveal.htm

OHCHR. (2022, April 5). *El Salvador: Concern at measures in response to rising gang violence*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/04/el-salvador-concern-measures-response-rising-gang-violence>

Pérez, D. M. (2023, March 17). *Bukele intensifies war on gangs: 2,000 more inmates transferred to 'biggest prison in all America'*. EL PAÍS English. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-03-17/bukele-intensifies-war-on-gangs-2000-more-inmates-transferred-to-biggest-prison-in-all-america.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/el-salvador/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: El Salvador*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/el-salvador/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 country reports on human rights practices: El Salvador*. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/el-salvador/>

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). (2022, April 6). *El Salvador Needs Long-Term Solutions to End Cycles of Violence: Can the country deal with gang violence while still respecting human rights?* USIP. Retrieved from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/el-salvador-needs-long-term-solutions-end-cycles-violence>

Equatorial Guinea

Amnesty International. (2022, August 18). *Equatorial Guinea: 'Cleaning Operation' tramples on human rights, not crime*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/equatorial-guinea-cleaning-operation-tramples-on-human-rights-not-crime/>

Ambo Legadu. (2024, July 19). *Kidnappings in Annobón: The Prime Minister asks for the intervention of the international community*. Ambo Legadu. Retrieved from <https://www.ambolegadu.com/en/secuestros-en-annobon-el-primer-ministro-pide-la-intervencion-de-la-comunidad-internacional/>.

Amnesty International. (2024, March 13). *Equatorial Guinea: Jailed human rights defender at risk of torture: Anacleto Micha Ndong*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr24/7794/2024/en/>.

Amnesty International. (2024, May 29). *Equatorial Guinea: Further information: Human rights defender's whereabouts unknown: Anacleto Micha Ndong*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr24/8083/2024/en/>.

European Parliament. (2023, February 16). *Violence against opposition activists in Equatorial Guinea, notably the case of Julio Obama Mefuman*. European Parliament. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0050_EN.html

Human Rights Watch. (2019, April 9). *Equatorial Guinea: UN Review Should Highlight Abuses*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/09/equatorial-guinea-un-review-should-highlight-abuses>

Reporters Without Borders. (2021). *The Ranking*. Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved from <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>

Swiss Info. (2024, July 21). *Twenty people arrested after peaceful protests in Equatorial Guinea*. Swiss Info. Retrieved from <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/una-veintena-de-detenidos-tras-manifestarse-pac%C3%ADficamente-en-guinea-ecuatorial/84539630>.

Watch. (2019). *UN Watch calls out Equatorial Guinea for arbitrary use of torture & violence*. UN Watch. Retrieved from <https://unwatch.org/529642-2/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Equatorial Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/equatorial-guinea/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Equatorial Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/equatorial-guinea>

Eritrea

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Crux. (2021, May 13). *Christian groups say Eritrea still persecutes believers, despite recent prisoner release*. Crux. Retrieved from <https://cruxnow.com/church-in-africa/2021/03/christian-groups-say-eritrea-still-persecutes-believers-despite-recent-prisoner-release>

The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). (2022). *Eritrea*. Globalr2p. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/eritrea/>

Global Slavery Index. (2018). *Country Data: Eritrea*. Global Slavery Index. Retrieved from <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/data/country-data/eritrea/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019, August 8). *'They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us.'* Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/08/08/they-are-making-us-slaves-not-educating-us/how-indefinite-conscription-restricts>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20df_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Eritrea*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/eritrea>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, February 9). *Eritrea: Crackdown on Draft Evaders' Families*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/09/eritrea-crackdown-draft-evaders-families>

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner and Human Rights Council. (2023, May 9). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker*. UNOHCHR. Retrieved from <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g23/092/08/pdf/g2309208.pdf?token=8XPc53LcEMw6SKc8cd&fe=true>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eritrea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_ERITREA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Estonia

Freedom House. (2023). *Freedom in the World 2023*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/estonia/freedom-world/2023>

Grossthal, Kelly. (2024, January 22). *Standing for Freedom of Expression: Understanding the Defense of Young Protesters in Estonia FAQ*. Estonian Human Rights Centre. Retrieved from <https://humanrights.ee/en/2024/01/meeleavalduselt-ara-viidud-noori-kohtus-kaitstes-seisame-valjendusvabaduse-est-eestis-kuidas-sellest-arusaada/>.

Lietuvos nacionalinis radijas ir televizija. (2020, July 13). *Estonia's mainly Russian stateless population continues to decline*. LRT. Retrieved from <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1196438/estonia-s-mainly-russian-stateless-population-continues-to-decline>

Ethiopia

Al Jazeera. (2020, August 20). *Protesters shot, 9 killed in Ethiopia clashes, say doctors*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/20/protesters-shot-9-killed-in-ethiopia-clashes-say-doctors>

Al Jazeera. (2024, April 4). *Ethiopia's army accused of committing war crimes in Amhara region*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/4/ethiopias-army-accused-of-committing-war-crimes-in-amhara-region>

Angelo, Mark. (2019). *Damming the Omo River Could Stop the Flow of Ethiopia's Cultural Diversity*. National Geographic. Retrieved from <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/lessons-from-the-field-omo-river-ethiopia>

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2023, May 23). *ACLED Dashboard*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

BBC. (2021a, January 16). *Ethiopia's Oromia conflict: Why a teacher was killed 'execution-style'*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55530351>

BBC. (2021b, November 1). *Oromo Liberation Army: On the ground with Ethiopian fighters*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-59095778>

Corey-Boulet, R. (2019, October 15). *'Killing without any reason': Deaths in rural Ethiopia spark outcry*. Yahoo! News. Retrieved from <https://m.naharnet.com/stories/en/265656-killing-without-any-reason-deaths-in-rural-ethiopia-spark-outcry>

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Ethiopia: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=116&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024.

Endeshaw, Dawit. (2023, December 28). *Aerial strike on Ethiopia church grounds kills eight – witnesses*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/aerial-strike-ethiopia-church-grounds-kills-eight-witnesses-2023-12-28/>.

Green, M. (2022, October 25). *Ukraine understandably in focus, but Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict is world's largest*. Wilson Center. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-understandably-focus-ethiopias-tigray-conflict-worlds-largest>

Harter, F. (2023, January 12). *Ethiopia's Oromia Conflict: 'People Are Dying On a Daily Basis'*. The New Humanitarian. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/01/12/Ethiopia-Oromia-conflict-OLA>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, June 1). *Ethiopia: Ethnic cleansing persists under Tigray truce*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce>.

Human Rights Watch. (2021, January 18). *World Report 2021: Rights trends in Ethiopia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/ethiopia>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 18). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Ethiopia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/ethiopia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Ethiopia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia>

International Crisis Group. (2020). *Defusing Ethiopia's latest perilous crisis*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/defusing-ethiopias-latest-perilous-crisis>

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). (2020). *Indigenous world 2020: Ethiopia*. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. Retrieved from <https://iwgia.org/en/ethiopia/3581-indigenous-world-2020-ethiopia.html>

Jackson, L. (2022, December 11). *Ending a civil war: A cease-fire in Ethiopia could bring an end to years of violence*. The Morning (newsletter). New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/11/briefing/ethiopia-war-tigray.html>.

Marks, Simon. (2024, March 4). *US voices concern of human rights violations in Ethiopia ahead of IMF visit*. Bloomberg. Retrieved from <https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-04/us-raises-alarm-over-ethiopian-rights-abuses-before-imf-visit>

Muhumuza, R. (2022, April 6). *Rights groups charge Ethiopia with 'ethnic cleansing' in Tigray Region*. PBS. Retrieved from <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/rights-groups-charge-ethiopia-with-ethnic-cleansing-in-tigray-region>

Nashed, Mat. (2024, July 10). *Sudanese refugees hiding in Ethiopian forest to escape bandits and militias*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/7/10/sudanese-refugees-dwell-in-ethiopian-forest-away-from-bandits-and-militias>.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2023, December 28). *Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the findings of community consultations on transitional justice (TF) with victims and affected populations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/report/flash-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-the-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-following-the-attacks-on-7-october-2023/OHCHR-EHRC-Report-TJ-28-12-23.pdf>.

Pearce, Jeff. (2023, September 8). *“The government has much tears and blood on its hands” – A brief exclusive interview with Eskinder Nega*. Medium. Retrieved from <https://jeffpearce.medium.com/the-government-has-much-tears-and-blood-on-its-hands-a-brief-exclusive-interview-with-eskinder-ac6074981292>.

Renouil, B. (2021, January 12). *War in Ethiopia: Oromo Liberation Army advances towards Addis Ababa*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/focus/20211201-war-in-ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-advances-towards-addis-ababa>

Reuters. (2021, May 6). *Police hold children in ‘dire’ conditions in Ethiopia’s Oromiya – rights commission*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/police-hold-children-dire-conditions-ethiopias-oromiya-rights-commission-2021-05-06/>

Reuters. (2023a, February 20). *Ethiopia Commission Accuses Oromiya Rebels of Killing 50 People*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-commission-accuses-oromiya-rebels-killing-50-people-2023-02-15/>

Reuters. (2023b, February 10). *Social Media Restricted in Ethiopia After Church Rift Turns Violent*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/social-media-restricted-ethiopia-after-church-rift-turns-violent-2023-02-10/>

Solomon, S. (2019, July 19). *Forced displacement causes controversy in Ethiopia’s Omo Valley*. VOA News. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_forced-displacement-causes-controversy-ethiopias-omo-valley/6172224.html

Sudan Tribune. (2024, July 17). *Sudanese refugees caught in crossfire as violence escalates in Ethiopia*. Sudan Tribune. Retrieved from <https://sudantribune.com/article288375/>.

Swart, M. (2020, May 29). *Ethiopian security forces accused of grave human rights abuses*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/29/ethiopian-security-forces-accused-of-grave-human-rights-abuses>

UN News. (2023, July 13). *Ethiopia: Rights experts denounce mass deportation of Eritreans*. UN News. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138662>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia>

Fiji

Amnesty International. (2020). *Fiji: Stop Harassing Peaceful Protesters at The University Of The South Pacific*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa18/2551/2020/en/?utm_source=annual_report&utm_medium=pdf&utm_campaign=2021&utm_term=english

Fiji Sun. (2022). *Police Brutality*. Fiji Sun. Retrieved from <https://fijisun.com.fj/tag/police-brutality/>

The Diplomat. (2020). *A Spotlight on Police Brutality in Fiji: The Fiji Law Society voices its concern about mounting reports of police brutality in the country*. The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/a-spotlight-on-police-brutality-in-fiji/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Fiji*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/fiji/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Fiji*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/415610_FIJI-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

Finland

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Finland*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/415610_FINLAND-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

France

Al Jazeera. (2024, May 16). *Why are protests against France raging in New Caledonia?* Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/16/why-are-protests-against-france-raging-in-new-caledonia>

Amnesty International. (2018). *Amnesty International Report 2027/28: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/POL1067002018ENGLISH.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Barbero, Michele. (2023, April 25). *Liberty, Equality, Police Brutality*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/25/france-pension-protests-police-violence-macron-europe/>

Cossé, Eva. (2023, March 24). *France Protests Test Government's Commitment to Rights*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/24/france-protests-test-governments-commitment-rights>

France24. (2018, August 12). *As it happened: More than a thousand arrested in Paris 'Yellow Vest' protests*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/20181208-live-hundreds-detained-paris-france-braces-new-anti-macron-riots>

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: France*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-net/2020>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 24). *France Protests Test Government's Commitment to Rights*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/24/france-protests-test-governments-commitment-rights>

InfoMigrants. (2022, June 23). *Paris: Cycle of migrant camp evictions continues*. InfoMigrants. Retrieved from <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/41429/paris-cycle-of-migrant-camp-evictions-continues>

National Public Radio (NPR). (2018, December 3). *Who Are France's Yellow Vest Protesters, And What Do They Want?* NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-frances-yellow-vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want>

RFI. (2023, July 6). *Probes into 'excessive force' by police as France recovers from week of riots*. RFI. Retrieved from <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20230706-probes-into-excessive-force-by-police-underway-as-france-recovers-from-week-of-violence>

Singh, Namita, Maryam Zakir-Hussain & Matt Mathers. (2023, July 4) *France riots – live: Children as young as 12 detained for attacking police amid Paris protests*. The Independent (UK). Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-riots-2023-paris-protests-nahel-latest-b2369037.html>.

Trujillo, Marco and Pineau, Elizabeth. (2024, July 20). *French police clash with reservoir protesters in La Rochelle*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-police-clash-with-reservoir-protesters-la-rochelle-2024-07-20/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: France*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/france/>

Gabon

Freedom House. (2023). *Freedom in the World: Gabon*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2023>.

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Gabon*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/415610_GABON-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Gabon*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon>.

Gambia

U.S. State Department. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: The Gambia*. U.S. State Department. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/the-gambia/>.

Georgia

Amnesty International. (2022). *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The state of the world's human rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/en/>

Amnesty International. (2019, June 21). *Georgia: Heavy-handed police response calls for urgent investigation*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/06/georgia-heavy-handed-police-response-calls-for-urgent-investigation/>

Council of Europe. (2022). *Report to the Georgian government on the ad hoc visit to Georgia carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 24 May 2021*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/1680a6eabd>.

Demytrie, Rayhan. (2024, May 28). *Georgia parliament overturns veto on foreign agents law*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxrre3qy2n4o>.

FIDH. (2024, June 26). *Georgia: Serious deterioration of the situation of human rights defenders*. International Federation for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/georgia/georgia-serious-deterioration-of-the-situation-of-human-rights>.

FIDH. (2024, May 7). *Georgia: Parliament must drop the legislation on “transparency of foreign influence”*. International Federation for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/georgia/georgia-parliament-must-drop-the-legislation-on-transparency-of>.

France24. (2021). *Thousands protest in Tbilisi after arrest of Georgian opposition leader*. France24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210223-georgian-police-arrest-top-opposition-leader-deepening-political-crisis>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World 2020: Georgia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2022>

Gogia, Giorgi. (2023, March 8). *'Dark Day' for Georgia's Democracy: Authorities Should Reject 'Foreign Agent' Bill*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/08/dark-day-georgias-democracy>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2022: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Open Democracy. (2016). *Torture was once 'normal' in Georgia's prisons — this is how they 'effectively abolished' it*. Open Democracy. Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/torture-georgia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/georgia/>

Germany

Amnesty International. (2022). *Germany 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/germany/report-germany/>.

Casey, Ruairi. (2024, May 25). *Punched, choked, kicked: German police crack down on student protests*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/5/25/punched-choked-kicked-german-police-crack-down-on-student-protests>.

France 24. (2023, January 15). *Anti-Coal Protestors Accuse German Police of "Pure Violence" Following Demonstration Clashes*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230115-anti-coal-protestors-accuse-german-police-of-pure-violence-following-demonstration-clashes>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 30). *Germany Falling Short in Curbing Anti-Muslim Racism*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/30/germany-falling-short-curbing-anti-muslim-racism>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Germany*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/germany/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Germany*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/germany/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Germany*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_GERMANY-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

Ghana

Barriga, S. (2014, October 10). *The (in)human dimension of Ghana's prayer camps*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/10/inhuman-dimension-ghanas-prayer-camps>

Gyamfi, K. (2022, June 14). *Ghana suspends police officers over crackdown on protesting students*. Africanews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2022/06/14/ghana-suspends-police-officers-over-crackdown-on-protesting-students/>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2022). *Ghana*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ghana>

Media Foundation for West Africa. (2022, June 14). *Ghana: Police brutalities against student protestors must trigger comprehensive reforms*. Media Foundation For West Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.mfwa.org/ghana-police-brutalities-against-student-protestors-must-trigger-comprehensive-reforms/>

Mingle, E. (2022, June 27). *Land guards attack residents at Dome, Destroys Homes*. GhanaWeb. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/regional/Land-guards-attack-residents-at-Dome-destroys-homes-1570448>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ghana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ghana/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ghana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ghana>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ghana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ghana/>

Greece

Amnesty International. (2021, June 23). *Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/06/greece-pushbacks-and-violence-against-refugees-and-migrants-are-de-facto-border-policy/>

Antonopoulos, Victorias. (2024, March 26). *In Greece, Anti-Trans Violence Puts Hate Crimes Back in Spotlight*. Inkstick. Retrieved from <https://inkstickmedia.com/in-greece-anti-trans-violence-puts-hate-crimes-back-in-spotlight/>.

Beake, N. & Kallergis, K. (2024, May 20). *Greek court throws out shipwreck trial against nine men*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c255njzxx2lo>

Border Violence Monitoring Network. (2024, January 24). *Violence Within State Borders: Greece*. Border Violence Monitoring Network. Retrieved from <https://borderviolence.eu/app/uploads/Violence-Within-State-Borders-Greece-1.pdf>.

Deutsche Welle. (2022, February 21). *Greece: UN calls for end to 'deplorable' migrant pushbacks*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/greece-un-calls-for-end-to-deplorable-migrant-pushbacks/a-60863744>

European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (2022, February 4). *Greece: People on the move caught in deadly Greek-Turkish stand-off, government attempts to hide lack of access to asylum procedures, EU-funded "Prison structures" face local opposition*. European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). Retrieved from <https://ecre.org/greece-people-on-the-move-caught-in-deadly-greek-turkish-stand-off-government-attempts-to-hide-lack-of-access-to-asylum-procedures-eu-funded-prison-structures-face-local-oppositio/>

Fallon, K. et al. (2023, July 10). *Greek shipwreck: hi-tech investigation suggests coastguard responsible for sinking*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/10/greek-shipwreck-hi-tech-investigation-suggests-coastguard-responsible-for-sinking>.

Freedom House. (2022). *Greece: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/greece/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, April 7). *Greece using other migrants to expel asylum seekers*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/07/greece-using-other-migrants-expel-asylum-seekers>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, December 13). *Greece: 6 Months On, No Justice for Pylos Shipwreck*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/14/greece-6-months-no-justice-pylos-shipwreck>

International Rescue Committee. (2022). *Greece*. International Rescue Committee. Retrieved from <https://www.rescue.org/country/greece>

Kitsantonis, N. (2022, October 9). *Greece tries stationing police on campus, and students fight back*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/09/world/europe/greece-universities-campus-police.html>

Psaropoulos, J. (2022, October 18). *Greece, Turkey spar on Twitter after 92 refugees found stripped*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/18/athens-turkey-trade-accusation-after-greece-finds-naked-refugees>

Refugees International. (2022, September 21). *One year since Greece opened new "prison-like" refugee camps, NGOs call for a more humane approach*. Refugees International. Retrieved from <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/9/20/one-year-since-greece-opened-new-prison-like-refugee-camps-ngos-call-for-a-more-humane-approach>

Stamatoukou, E. (2022, July 29). *Greeks protest refusal to parole hunger striking prisoner*. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/29/the-rejection-of-a-request-to-release-a-hunger-striker-in-greece-divides-public-opinion/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Greece*. U.S.

Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/greece/>

Grenada

Human Rights Watch. (2018, March 21). *I Have to Leave to Be Me: Discriminatory Laws against LGBT People in the Eastern Caribbean*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/03/21/i-have-leave-be-me/discriminatory-laws-against-lgbt-people-eastern-caribbean>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Grenada*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/grenada/>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Grenada*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/grenada/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Grenada*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/grenada/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Grenada*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/grenada/>

Guatemala

Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=79&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Grassroots International. (2024, June 11). *Guatemala Mourns Murder of Peasants' Rights Defenders*. Grassroots International. Retrieved from https://grassrootsonline.org/learning_hub/guatemala-murder-peasants-defenders/

Human Rights Watch. (2021, December 10). *Guatemala: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/guatemala>

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. (2024). *The Indigenous world 2024: Guatemala*. IWGIA. Retrieved from <https://www.iwgia.org/en/guatemala/5384-iw-2024-guatemala.html>.

Patterson, Brent. (2023, September 29). *Global Witness: 200 land and environmental defenders killed worldwide in 2021*. PBI Canada. Retrieved from <https://pbicanada.org/2022/09/29/global-witness-200-land-and-environmental-defenders-killed-worldwide-in-2021/>

Santiago, Aldo. (2024, July 11). *Indigenous Maya Q'eqchi' Denounce Eviction Threats of New Communities in El Estor*. Avispa Midia. Retrieved from <https://avispa.org/indigenous-maya-qeqchi-denounce-eviction-threats-of-new-communities-in-el-estor/>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/>

Guinea

Aljazeera. (2024, February 27). *Two people shot dead as Guinea protest turns bloody*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/27/two-people-shot-dead-as-guinea-protest-turns-bloody>.

Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=23&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Diallo, Boubacar. (2024, February 20). *Guinea's military dissolves the government without explanation, saying a new one will be appointed*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/guinea-government-dissolved-military-generals-444e7924e4ddc9b25a7cc6c1790a0a1d>.

Freedom House. (2022). *Guinea: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guinea/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Guinea*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/guinea>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea*, U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guinea/>

Guinea-Bissau

CPJ. (2024, February 16). *Guinea-Bissau president threatens media, 30 armed men raid 2 state broadcasters*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/02/guinea-bissau-president-threatens-media-30-armed-men-raid-2-state-broadcasters/>.

MFWA. (2024, January 17). *Demonstrations formally banned in Guinea Bissau*. Media Foundation for West Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.mfwa.org/country-highlights/demonstrations-formally-banned-in-guinea-bissau/>.

UNFPA. (2023, February 6). *International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation in Guinea-Bissau*. United Nations Population Fund. Retrieved from <https://guinea-bissau.unfpa.org/en/news/international-day-zero-tolerance-female-genital-mutilation-guinea-bissau>

UNICEF. (2021, March 30). *Female Genital Mutilation in Guinea-Bissau: Insights from a statistical analysis*. United Nations Children's Fund. Retrieved from <https://data.unicef.org/resources/female-genital-mutilation-in-guinea-bissau/>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea-Bissau*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Guinea-Bissau-2018.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea-Bissau*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GUINEA-BISSAU-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea-Bissau*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GUINEA-BISSAU-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guinea-Bissau*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/313615_GUINEA-BISSAU-2021-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Guyana

Belgrave, S. (2022, June 29). *Misleading report triggers violent protest across 15 East Coast Villages*. *Kaieteur News*. Retrieved from <https://www.kaieteurnews.com/2022/06/29/misleading-report-triggers-violent-protest-across-15-east-coast-villages/>

Coto, Danica. (2023, May 17). *Tiny Amerindian village in Guyana fights gold mine in key court battle over indigenous land rights*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/guyana-amerindians-miners-gold-land-59b2dc6d2cf52cf5257bd2541bdfa755>

Freedom House. (2022). *Guyana: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/guyana/freedom-world/2022>

Gabay, Aimee. (2024, January 17). *Guyana Amerindian communities fear Venezuela's move to annex oil-rich region*. *Mongabay*. Retrieved from <https://news.mongabay.com/2024/01/guyana-amerindian-communities-fear-venezuelas-move-to-annex-oil-rich-region/>.

GSA News. (2022, June 29). *Yesterday's riots and looting had little to do with Quindon Bacchus*. GSA News. Retrieved from <https://guyanasouthamerica.gy/news/2022/06/29/yesterdays-riots-and-looting-had-little-to-do-with-quindon-bacchus/>

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. (2023). *The Indigenous world 2023: Guyana*. IWGIA. Retrieved from <https://www.iwgia.org/en/guyana/5094-iw-2023-guyana.html>

Netto, Andrei and Camille Rodríguez Montilla. (2024, July 21). *Tensions rise in Guyana as Maduro uses border dispute to build support ahead of Venezuela poll*. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/article/2024/jul/21/venezuela-guyana-latin-america-tensions-rise-maduro-essequibo-border-dispute-support-elections-oil-indigenous>.

News Room Guyana. (2022, November 8). *No more jail time for small amounts of Ganja*. *News Room Guyana*. Retrieved from <https://newsroom.gy/2022/11/08/no-more-jail-time-for-small-amounts-of-ganja/>

Stabroek News. (2022, July 5). *Protesters at Buxton Target Gov't over police killings, uneven sharing of resources*. *Stabroek News*. Retrieved from <https://www.stabroeknews.com/2022/07/05/news/guyana/protesters-at-buxton-target-govt-over-police-killings-uneven-sharing-of-resources/>

Taylor, Luke. (2023, December 6). *Guyana appeals to US and UN as Maduro advances annexation of territory*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/06/venezuela-annex-guyana-maduro>.

UNHCR. (2024, August 12). *UNHCR Guyana Factsheet - April to June 2024*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/110518>.

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guyana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guyana/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *Report on Religious Freedom: Guyana*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/guyana/>

Younge, M. (2022, July 3). *Guyanese are better than this! Guyana Chronicle*. Retrieved from <https://guyanachronicle.com/2022/07/03/guyanese-are-better-than-this/>

Haiti

Adams, David C. and Andre Paultre. (2024, August 11). *Sidestepping Deployed Kenyan Forces, Haiti Gangs Continue Reign of Terror*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/11/world/americas/haiti-gangs-kenya-police.html>

Associated Press. (2021, January 28). *Haiti journalists denounce police brutality, demand justice*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-police-journalists-a57e67e021b0efeb9d715666bc62edf0>

Associated Press. (2023, February 24). *UN Condemns New Surge of Gang Violence in Central Haiti*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/crime-caribbean-united-nations-haiti-violence-ce76663e13fa4c440ef00952d38aa4ca>

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Haiti: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=80&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Daras, Marina, Gloria Aradi, and Pascal Fletcher. (2024, June 26). *Haiti vows to restore order with Kenya-led force's help*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20240829111357/https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy7772v3j89o>.

Dominican Today. (2022, September 16). *Abinader insists Haiti crisis threatens National Security*. Dominican Today. Retrieved from <https://dominantoday.com/dr/local/2022/09/16/abinader-insists-haiti-crisis-threatens-national-security/>

Felbab-Brown, V. (2023, February 3). *Haiti in 2023: Political Abyss and Vicious Gangs*. Brookings. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/02/03/haiti-in-2023-political-abyss-and-vicious-gangs/>

- Human Rights Watch. (2024). *Haiti on the brink: Six urgent measures to overcome the human rights crisis*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/haiti-brink-six-urgent-measures-overcome-human-rights-crisis>
- International Organization for Migration. (2022, October 28). *96,000 Haitians displaced by recent gang violence in capital: IOM Report*. International Organization for Migration. Retrieved 2022, from <https://www.iom.int/news/96000-haitians-displaced-recent-gang-violence-capital-iom-report>
- Karadeglija, A. (2022, November 10). *Opening of Haiti fuel terminal means less pressure on Canada to intervene, experts say*. National Post. Retrieved from <https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/opening-of-haiti-fuel-terminal-means-less-pressure-on-canada-to-intervene-experts-say/ar-AA13Y6yA>
- Milfort, M., Kurmanaev, A., & Paultre, A. (2022, September 16). *Fuel hike plunges Haiti into near anarchy*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/americas/haiti-protests-fuel-price.html>
- Mistler-Ferguson, S. (2022, July 21). *G9 vs. G-pep - the two gang alliances tearing Haiti apart*. InSight Crime. Retrieved from <https://insightcrime.org/news/g9-gpep-two-gang-alliances-tearing-haiti-apart/>
- Nino, C. (2023, February 3). *Criminal Power in Haiti and hunger as an instrument of governance*. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Retrieved from <https://gja.georgetown.edu/2023/02/08/criminal-power-in-haiti-and-hunger-as-an-instrument-of-governance/>
- Nkala, Sizo. (2023, October 8). *Kenya's 'peace mission' a pan-African smokescreen*. The African. Retrieved from <https://theafrican.co.za/politics/kenyas-peace-mission-a-pan-african-smokescreen-f316da4a-71fb-4df4-a018-35436a5f875d/>.
- OHCHR. (2024, March 28). *Haiti: "Cataclysmic" situation demands immediate and bold action – UN report*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/haiti-cataclysmic-situation-demands-immediate-and-bold-action-un-report>
- Osborn, C. (2022, October 14). *Haiti's crisis escalates*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/14/haiti-crisis-violence-cholera-ariel-henry-military-intervention-us/>
- UNICEF. (2023, December 26). *UNICEF statement following the killing of children and families in Port-au-Prince, Haiti*. Retrieved from <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/unicef-statement-following-killing-children-and-families-port-au-prince-haiti>.
- United Nations. (2023, December 18). *'Visible signs of hope' for Haiti, Assembly President Francis insists*. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144902>.
- United Nations. (2022a, November 3). *Haiti 'on the verge of an abyss', warns UN rights chief*. United Nations. Retrieved November 12, 2022, from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130182>
- United Nations. (2022b, October 10). *Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=S%2F2022%2F747&Lang=E>

United Nations. (2023, January 24). *Police Overwhelmed, Development Stalled, as Gang Violence Spirals in Haiti*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132797>

United Nations. (2024, April 22). *Deadly violence in Haiti at record high, some worst scenarios now realities, special representative tells Security Council, urging deployment of support mission*. Retrieved from <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15674.doc.htm>

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. (2022a, October 14). *Haiti: Gangs use sexual violence to instill fear – UN report*. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. Retrieved from <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/haiti-gangs-use-sexual-violence-instill-fear-%E2%80%93-un-report>

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. (2022b, October 13). *Report of the Secretary-General*. United Nations Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiYrrGjs6n7AhWaHzQIHRQdCJoQFnoECAwQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbinuh.unmissions.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fs-2022-761.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PN_VXyFlITX7qv-l7I_RA

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. (2022c, August 2). *Press Release / Haiti: UN reports gross human rights abuses in northwest Port-au-Prince during deadly gang clashes in April and May 2022*. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. Retrieved from <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/press-release-haiti-un-reports-gross-human-rights-abuses-northwest-port-au-prince-during-deadly-gang>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Haiti*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/haiti/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Haiti*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/haiti>

Honduras

CIVICUS. (2023, September 30). *Killing of Activists and Violence Against Social Leaders and Garifuna Members Continue Across Honduras*. CIVICUS. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/killing-of-activists-and-violence-against-social-leaders-and-garifuna-members-continue-across-honduras/>

France 24. (2022, December 7). *Honduras suspends rights to fight gangs*. France 24. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221207-honduras-suspends-rights-to-fight-gangs>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Honduras*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/honduras/freedom-world/2024>

Gabay, Aimee. (2024, July 17). *Garifuna land rights abuses persist in Honduras, despite court ruling*. Mongabay. Retrieved from <https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/garifuna-land-rights-abuses-persist-in-honduras-despite-court-ruling/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Honduras*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/honduras>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Honduras*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/honduras>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *Fighting broke out between rival gangs at women's prison, leaving dozens dead and triggering military takeover; anti-corruption efforts continued*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=166&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Neau, Adeline. (2023, December 11). *The state of exception in Honduras is endangering innocent lives*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/12/11/the-state-of-exception-in-honduras-is-endangering-innocent-lives>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Honduras*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/HONDURAS-2018.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Honduras*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/honduras/>

UNHCR. (2022, March 3). *UNHCR Factsheet March 2022 - Honduras*. ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/honduras/unhcr-factsheet-march-2022>

Hungary

Boldizsar, Gyori. (2023, July 15). *Thousands join Budapest Pride in protest at state's anti-LGBT moves*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/thousands-join-budapest-pride-protest-states-anti-lgbt-moves-2023-07-15/>

ERRC. (2024, August 23). *Hungary: Day One of Orbán's Latest Decree Sees 120 Romani Refugees Cast onto the Streets*. European Roma Rights Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.errc.org/news/hungary-day-one-of-orbans-latest-decree-sees-120-romani-refugees-cast-onto-the-streets>.

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 14). *Hungary: Events of 2019 - Part of the EU Chapter*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/hungary>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, December 14). *Hungary: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/hungary>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Hungary*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/hungary>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, February 9). *Hungary Court Closes Door on Transgender Legal Recognition*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/09/hungary-court-closes-door-transgender-legal-recognition>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Hungary*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/hungary/>

Verseck, Keno. (2024, August 23). *Hungary's government makes Ukrainian refugees homeless*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-government-makes-ukrainian-refugees-homeless/a-70026664>.

Iceland

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iceland*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iceland/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iceland*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iceland/>

India

Al Jazeera. (2023, December 4). *At least 13 killed in armed fighting in India's ethnic riots-hit Manipur*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/4/at-least-13-killed-in-armed-fighting-in-indias-ethnic-riots-hit-manipur>.

Al Jazeera. (2021a, August 20). *In Indian-administered Kashmir, few now dare to speak out*. Human Rights News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/20/kashmir-arbitrary-arrests-intimidation-india-forces>

Al Jazeera. (2021b, December 25). *India: Hindu event calling for genocide of Muslims sparks outrage*. Islamophobia News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/24/india-hindu-event-calling-for-genocide-of-muslims-sparks-outrage>

Amnesty International. (2023, February 28). *India: Demolitions in Kashmir must be immediately halted and those affected compensated*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/india-demolitions-in-kashmir-must-be-immediately-halted-and-those-affected-compensated/>

BBC. (2024, March 11). *CAA: India's new citizenship law explained*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393>.

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: India: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=123&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

De, Abhishek (2024, August 31) *Migrant killed in Haryana on suspicion of eating beef, 2 minors among 7 arrested*. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bengal-migrant-worker-beaten-to-death-haryana-cow-vigilante-group-beef-consumption-police-2591366-2024-08-31>

EFE. (2024, February 27). *Anti-Muslim hate speech soared in 2023 in India, says report*. Retrieved from <https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2024-02-27/anti-muslim-hate-speech-soared-in-2023-in-india-says-report/>.

Freedom House. (2022). *India: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved November 22, 2022, from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2022>

Gettleman, J. (2018, February 17). *The peculiar position of India's third gender*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/style/india-third-gender-hijras-transgender.html>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, February 19). *India: Government policies, actions target minorities*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/19/india-government-policies-actions-target-minorities>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, February 10). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in India*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/india>

Hussain, Zarir. (2023, December 20). *India's Manipur state buries victims of ethnic clashes*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-manipur-state-buries-victims-ethnic-clashes-2023-12-20/>.

Kashmir Law & Justice Project. (2024). *Key developments in the human rights situation in Indian-administered Kashmir April 1–April 30, 2024*. Retrieved from <https://www.kljp.org/articles/key-developments-in-the-human-rights-situation-in-indian-administered-kashmir-april-1---april-30-2024>

Kumar, Hari. (2023, August 1). *Under Hindu nationalist leaders, sectarian violence flares in India*. New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/asia/india-hindu-muslim-violence.html>.

Kumar, H., & Mashal, M. (2022, June 3). *As targeted killings spike, Hindus are desperate to flee Kashmir*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/world/asia/india-kashmir-hindu-pandits-attacks.html>

Masih, N. (2021, April 8). *An Indian man died after being beaten by police on video. One year later, no one has been held accountable*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/06/india-delhi-riots-deaths/>

Middle East Monitor. (2023, January 17). *India demolishes 500-year-old historic mosque to widen road*. Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230117-india-demolishes-500-year-old-historic-mosque-to-widen-road/>

Mogul, Rhea; Iyer, Aishwarya; Sehgal, Kunal and Ripley, Will. (2024, May 1). *Rising Hindu nationalism leaves Muslims fearful in India's holy city*. Retrieved from

<https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/30/india/india-elections-varanasi-hindu-muslim-tensions-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>

Mollan, Cherylann. (2023, July 20). *Manipur: India outrage after women paraded naked in violence-hit state*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66253389>

Press Trust of India (PTI). (2023, February 4). *Anti-encroachment drive intensified in Kashmir*. Rediff. Retrieved from <https://www.rediff.com/news/report/anti-encroachment-drive-intensified-in-kashmir/20230204.htm>

Sah, Purnima (2024, September 1). *Elderly man slapped, abused on train over suspicion of carrying beef in Maharashtra*. Retrieved from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/maharashtra/elderly-man-slapped-abused-on-train-over-suspicion-of-carrying-beef-in-maharashtra/article68590137.ece>

Sharma, Ashutosh. (2023, July 12). *Over 400 anti-Christian attacks in 2023 alone: report*. Frontline Magazine. Retrieved from <https://frontline.thehindu.com/news/united-christian-forum-slams-government-denial-of-rising-attacks-on-christians-and-calls-for-independent-probe/article67070728.ece>.

Sharma, Yashraj (2024, June 25). *'Eid means mourning': Muslims lynched in India after shock election result*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/6/25/eid-means-mourning-muslims-lynched-in-india-after-shock-election-result>

Shih, G., & Gupta, A. (2022, April 20). *Religious clashes across India Spark fears of further violence*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/india-hindu-muslim-communal-violence/>

Shih, G., & Irfan, S. (2023, February 1). *Hindu Mobs, Enraged by Conversions, Attack Christians in India*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/31/india-chhattisgarh-christians-violence-attacks/>

Singh, Namita (2024, September 3). *Schoolboy chased for 30km and shot dead by 'cow protection' vigilantes in India*. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/india/haryana-faridabad-student-cow-vigilantes-smuggler-dead-b2605992.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/india/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b, June 10). *Report on International Religious Freedom: India*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/india/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/india>

United Nations. (2024, March 7). *India: UN experts urge corrective action to protect human rights and end attacks against minorities in lead up to elections*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/india-un-experts-urge-corrective-action-protect-human-rights-and-end-attacks>

Warsi, Zeba (2024, June 21). *India's Muslims continue to face discrimination and hate following Modi's election win*. Retrieved from <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/indias-muslims-continue-to-face-discrimination-and-hate-following-modis-election-win>

Indonesia

Amnesty International. (2024, August 23). *Indonesia: Police use 'excessive force' against peaceful protesters*. Amnesty International UK. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/indonesia-police-use-excessive-force-against-peaceful-protesters>.

Attwell, R. (2018, December 24). *Massacre in Nduga: Indonesia's Papuan insurgency*. The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/massacre-in-nduga-indonesias-papuan-insurgency/>

Brook, J. (2023, February 27). *'Killing Us as if We Were Animals': 12 Dead After Police Open Fire on Civilians*. VICE. Retrieved from <https://www.vice.com/en/article/88qwe3/mass-killing-civilians-indonesia-papua>

CIVICUS. (2021, July 16). *Indonesia: Unilateral renewal of special autonomy and arbitrary arrest of protesters in West Papua*. CIVICUS Global Alliance. Retrieved from <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/5178-indonesia-unilateral-renewal-of-special-autonomy-and-arbitrary-arrest-of-protesters-in-west-papua>

Condon, G. (2022, September 6). *Country report: West Papua*. Genocide Watch. Retrieved 2022, from <https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/country-report-west-papua>

Freedom House. (2022). *Indonesia: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved 2022, from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Monitor. (2024, April 3). *Police prevent peaceful protests against torture in Sentani and Jayapura City – 77 activists arrested in Sentani on 1 and 2 April*. Human Rights Monitor. Retrieved from <https://humanrightsmonitor.org/case/police-prevent-peaceful-protests-against-torture-in-sentani-and-jayapura-city-77-activists-arrested-in-sentani-on-1-and-2-april/>.

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Indonesia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/indonesia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Indonesia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia>

Jong, H. N. (2022, February 14). *Crackdown on villagers highlights heavy hand of Indonesia's 'strategic' projects*. Mongabay Environmental News. Retrieved from <https://news.mongabay.com/2022/02/crackdown-on-villagers-highlights-heavy-hand-of-indonesias-strategic-projects/>

Muthiariny, D. E. (2022, November 16). *26 students protesting G20 in Lombok arrested*. Tempo. Retrieved from <https://en.tempo.co/read/1657403/26-students-protesting-g20-in-lombok-arrested>

United Nations. (2022, March 1). *Indonesia: Shocking abuses against Indigenous Papuans, Rights Experts Report*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113062>

United Nations. (2023, March 1). *Indonesia: UN experts alarmed by reports of increased militarisation and intimidation around Mandalika project*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/indonesia-un-experts-alarmed-reports-increased-militarisation-and>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/>

West Papua Daily News. (2022, November 1). *6000 Maybrat residents West Papua refuge due to KKB actions*. West Papua Daily News. Retrieved from <https://westpauadaily.com/6000-maybrat-residents-west-papua-refuge-due-to-kkb-actions.html>

Iran

Amnesty International. (2022, November 10). *Iran: Urgent international action needed to stop mass killings of Baluchi protesters*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde13/6193/2022/en/>

Amnesty International. (2022, July 27). *Iran: Horrific wave of executions must be stopped*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/07/iran-horrific-wave-of-executions-must-be-stopped/>

Amnesty International. (2023, March 20). *Iran's brutal protest crackdown: Child detainees subjected to torture*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/iran-child-detainees-subjected-to-flogging-electric-shocks-and-sexual-violence-in-brutal-protest-crackdown/>

Associated Press. (2022, October 26). *Gunmen attack major Shiite holy site in Iran, killing 15*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/iran-religion-dubai-united-arab-emirates-e0e0a8ca6e900d8693e59443e73a882c>

BBC. (2022, November 9). *Iran protester: 'we could hear the beatings and screams in jail'*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63559971>

Berger, M., & Mahoozi, S. (2022, October 20). *At the center of Iran's uprising, Kurds now face a mounting crackdown*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/18/iran-kurds-protests-mahsa-amini/>

Bubola, E. (2022, December 12). *As protests rage, Iran executes another man, this time in public*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/12/world/middleeast/iran-protests-execution.html>

France 24. (2022, November 11). *Angry Iranians protest 'bloody Friday' massacre*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221111-angry-iranians-protest-bloody-friday-massacre>

The Guardian. (2022, October 26). *Iran: Gunmen kill at least 15 people at Shia shrine in Shiraz*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/26/iran-at-least-15-killed-after-gunmen-attack-shrine-in-shiraz>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Iran*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/iran>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, August 20). *Iran: Alarming Surge in Executions*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/20/iran-alarming-surge-executions>.

McGrath, M. (2022, December 7). *Mahsa Amini: The spark that ignited a women-led revolution*. Forbes. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2022/12/06/mahsa-amini-the-spark-that-ignited-a-women-led-revolution/?sh=f611185c3dbb>

OHCHR. (2022, November 11). *Iran: Stop sentencing peaceful protesters to death, say UN experts*. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/11/iran-stop-sentencing-peaceful-protesters-death-say-un-experts>

Tabrizy, N., & Jhaveri, I. (2022, November 23). *How Iran's security forces use ambulances to suppress protests*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/23/world/middleeast/iran-protesters-detained-ambulance.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article>

Tawfeeq, M., & Chen, H. (2023, March 12). *Iran arrests more than 100 people over suspected poisonings of schoolgirls*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/11/world/iran-schoolgirl-poisonings-arrests-intl-hnk/index.html>

United Nations. (2023, March 16). *Iran: Deliberate poisoning of schoolgirls further evidence of continuous violence against women and girls*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/iran-deliberate-poisoning-schoolgirls-further-evidence-continuous-violence>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/415610_IRAN-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Iraq

BBC. (2019, December 2). *The Iraq protests explained in 100 and 500 words*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212>

- Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the world 2022: Iraq*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2022>
- Human Rights Council. (2016). *“They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis*. Human Rights Council. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf
- Human Rights Watch. (2015). *Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/iraq-isis-escapees-describe-systematic-rape>
- Human Rights Watch. (2019, September 25). *Iraq: Appeals Courts Ignoring Torture Claims*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/25/iraq-appeals-courts-ignoring-torture-claims>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf
- Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Iraq: Events of 2022. In World Report 2023*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/iraq>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Internal Displacement Database. (2021). *IDMC Query Tool - Conflict and violence*. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>
- International Crisis Group. (2023). *CrisisWatch Database: Iraq*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=87](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=87)
- OHCHR. (2020). *Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Demonstrations in Iraq October 2019 to April 2020*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IQ/Demonstrations-Iraq-UNAMI-OHCHR-report.pdf>
- United Nations. (2021). *Iraq: Ending torture through accountability, compliance and prevention – UN*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://iraq.un.org/en/138505-iraq-ending-torture-through-accountability-compliance-and-prevention-un>
- U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iraq>
- United States Institute of Peace (USIP). (2022). *ISIS is a Problem of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. USIP. Retrieved from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/isis-problem-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow>

Zeyad, Abdulrahman and Kareem Chehayeb. (2024, June 7). *Attacks on businesses linked to US brands rattle Baghdad as anger over the war in Gaza surges*. ABC News. Retrieved from <https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/attacks-businesses-linked-us-brands-rattle-baghdad-anger-110919573>.

Israel-Palestine

Al Jazeera. (2024, July 11). *Israel's war on Gaza live: 60 bodies found in Shujayea after Israeli raid*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/7/11/israels-war-on-gaza-live-bodies-filling-the-streets-in-gaza-city>

Associated Press. (2022, October 29). *2022 likely to be deadliest year for Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, U.N. says*. NBCNews.com. Retrieved from <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-west-bank-palestinians-deadliest-year-united-nations-report-rcna54643>

BBC. (2024, April 5). *What is Hamas and why is it fighting with Israel in Gaza*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67039975>.

Brader, C. (2023, March 2). *Israel-Palestine Conflict: Recent developments and statements*. UK Parliament. Retrieved from <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/israel-palestine-conflict-recent-developments-and-statements/>

CNN International Investigations and Visuals teams. (2024, May 11). *Strapped down, blindfolded, held in diapers: Israeli whistleblowers detail abuse of Palestinians in shadowy detention center*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/10/middleeast/israel-sde-teiman-detention-whistleblowers-intl-cmd/index.html>.

Freedom House. (2022a). *Israel: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/israel/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2022b). *West Bank: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/west-bank/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2022c). *Gaza Strip: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2022>

Hendrix, S., & Rubin, S. (2022, May 22). *Ahead of Biden visit, Israel launches biggest eviction of Palestinians in decades*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/22/israel-palestinian-masafer-yatta-biden/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, April 11). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Israel and Palestine*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/israel/palestine>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Israel and Palestine*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/israel-and-palestine>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 5). *Gaza: Israel strike killing 106 civilians an apparent war crime*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/04/gaza-israeli-strike-killing-106-civilians-apparent-war-crime>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *CrisisWatch Database: Israel/Palestine*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=91](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=91)

OHCHR. (2024, February 19) *Israel/oPt: UN experts appalled by reported human rights violations against Palestinian women and girls*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/israelopt-un-experts-appalled-reported-human-rights-violations-against>

Ott, H. (2023, April 5). *Israeli forces Storm Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque, arresting hundreds of Palestinian worshippers*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-jerusalem-al-aqsa-mosque-violence-israeli-arrests-palestinians/>

Oxfam International. (2024, January 11). *Daily death rate in Gaza higher than any other major 21st Century conflict*. Oxfam International. Retrieved from <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/daily-death-rate-gaza-higher-any-other-major-21st-century-conflict-oxfam>.

ReliefWeb. (2024, July 8) *On-the-record update #5 on situation in Gaza, Palestine, Monday 8th July 2024*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/record-update-5-situation-gaza-palestine-monday-8th-july-2024>

Roche, Daniel Jonas. (2024, May 21). *Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveils regional plan to build a "massive free trade zone" with rail service to NEOM*. The Architect's Newspaper. Retrieved from <https://www.archpaper.com/2024/05/benjamin-netanyahu-unveils-regional-plan-free-trade-zone-rail-service-neom/>

United Nations. (2023, April 25). *Violence in Middle East Increased Despite Major Religious Observances, Special Coordinator Tells Security Council, Urging Two-State Solution*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15264.doc.htm>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/>

United Nations. (2023, October 14). *UN expert warns of new instance of mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, calls for immediate ceasefire*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/un-expert-warns-new-instance-mass-ethnic-cleansing-palestinians-calls>

UNRWA. (2024, July 9) *UNRWA SITUATION REPORT #119 ON THE SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM*. Retrieved from

<https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-119-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-Jerusalem>

Italy

European Committee of Social Rights. (2024, May 13). *Decision on the merits: Amnesty International v. Italy, Complaint No. 178/2019*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng?i=cc-178-2019-dmerits-en>.

Legorano, Giovanni. (2024, May 2). *Protest turns violent after migrant found dead in Italian repatriation center*. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/protest-turns-violent-after-migrant-found-dead-in-italian-repatriation-center/3128385#>.

Santos, Ana P. (2024, March 19). *Administrative detention: A form of unlawful violence against migrants*. Info Migrants. Retrieved from <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/55884/administrative-detention-a-form-of-unlawful-violence-against-migrants>.

Saric, Ivana. (2022, September 15). *Italian politician's threat highlights dangers Europe's Roma face*. Axios. Retrieved from <https://www.axios.com/2022/09/15/italy-politician-roma-threat-election-discrimination>.

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Italy*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/italy/>

Jamaica

Romo, Vanessa. (2024, February 9). *Jamaica and the Bahamas are pushing back against U.S. travel warnings*. NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2024/02/09/1230297825/jamaica-and-the-bahamas-are-pushing-back-against-u-s-travel-warnings>.

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country reports on Human Rights Practises: Jamaica*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/jamaica/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Jamaica*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_JAMAICA-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Japan

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights: Japan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/japan/>

Jordan

Amnesty International. (2024, August 13). *Jordan: New Cybercrimes Law stifling freedom of expression one year on*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/jordan-new-cybercrimes-law-stifling-freedom-of-expression-one-year-on/>.

Amnesty International (2024) *Seventy Years of Suffocation*. Retrieved from <https://nakba.amnesty.org/en/chapters/jordan/>

Davis, Hanna. (2024, April 10). *As Jordan Cracks Down on Palestine Protests, Arrests Soar*. Inkstick. Retrieved from <https://inkstickmedia.com/as-jordan-cracks-down-on-palestine-protests-arrests-soar/>.

DAWN. (2022, April 6). *Jordan: Mass "preemptive" arrests to block protests against government*. Democracy for the Arab World Now. Retrieved from <https://dawnmena.org/jordan-mass-preemptive-arrests-to-block-protests-against-government/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Jordan: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Jordan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/jordan>

Nusairat, T. (2021, April 9). *Jordan was never 'boring.' A vibrant protest movement has been ignored for too long*. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jordan-was-never-boring-a-vibrant-protest-movement-has-been-ignored-for-too-long/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights: Jordan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/jordan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *Report on International Religious Freedom: Jordan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/jordan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights: Jordan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/jordan/>

Vicente Perez, Michael. (2024, March 7). *Living as Stateless Palestinians in Jordan*. SAPIENS. Retrieved from <https://www.sapiens.org/culture/palestinian-refugees-exile-displacement-jordan/>.

Kazakhstan

Amnesty International. (2020). *Kazakhstan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/kazakhstan/report-kazakhstan/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Kazakhstan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/kazakhstan/report-kazakhstan/>

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Kazakhstan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2020>

Freedom House. (2022). *Kazakhstan: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2022>

Front Line Defenders. (2024, February 9). *Veronika Fonova targeted while protesting the ban of International Women's Day Demonstration in Almaty*. Front Line Defenders. Retrieved from <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/veronika-fonova-targeted-while-protesting-ban-international-women%E2%80%99s-day-demonstration-almaty>.

Grishin, Andrey. (2021, January 3). *Torture in Kazakhstan: Beyond Some Cases*. Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (CABAR). Retrieved from <https://cabar.asia/en/torture-in-kazakhstan-beyond-some-cases>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *Kazakhstan: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/kazakhstan>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Kazakhstan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kazakhstan>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Kazakhstan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/kazakhstan>

Kim, L. (2023, January 5). *The other Jan. 6*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/05/kazakhstan-bloody-january-violence-tokayev-nazarbayev-conspiracy-protest/>

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). (2019, October 26). *Kazakh Police Forcibly Detain Dozens of Would-Be Protesters*. RFE/RL Kazakh Service. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakh-authorities-forcibly-detain-dozens-near-planned-anti-government-protests/30237675.html>

Rickleton, Chris, Petr Trotsenko, and Ainur Saparova. (2024, May 27). *In Kazakhstan, 'The Floods Are Over But The Problems Have Just Begun'*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-floods-problems-compensation/32965887.html>.

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights: Kazakhstan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/KAZAKHSTAN-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_KAZAKHSTAN-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Kenya

Freedom House. (2022). *Kenya: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/kenya/freedom-world/2022>

The Guardian. (2024, July 1). *At least 39 killed in Kenya's anti-tax protests, says rights watchdog*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/01/at-least-39-killed-in-kenyas-anti-tax-protests-says-rights-watchdog>.

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Kenya*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kenya>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2022). *Kenya*. IDMC. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/kenya>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *CrisisWatch Database: Kenya*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=11&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Mersie, A. (2023, March 30). *Kenya Police, crowds clash in third wave of price rise protests*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/renewed-protests-kenya-authorities-vow-halt-descent-2023-03-30/>

Miriri, D. (2023, May 4). *Inside a Kenyan starvation cult and its tragic end in a forest of death*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/inside-kenyan-starvation-cult-its-tragic-end-forest-death-2023-05-04/>

Omuka, Shadrack. (2024, July 31). *Kenyan Police Target Journalists Covering Anti-government Protests*. New Internationalist. Retrieved from <https://newint.org/crime-and-justice/2024/kenyan-police-target-journalists-covering-anti-government-protests>.

Rédaction Africanews & AFP. (2023, March 30). *Violent clashes as Kenya opposition stages third day of protests*. Africanews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/30/violent-clashes-as-kenya-opposition-stages-third-day-of-protests/>

Schulze, U. (2023, March 29). *Violence and protests on Kenya's streets*. dw.com. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/violence-and-protests-on-kenyas-streets/g-65163091>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kenya*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kenya/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kenya*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kenya/>

Kiribati

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kiribati*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kiribati/>

Korea, Republic of

Amnesty International. (2022, April 22). *South Korea: Landmark judgement on same-sex sexual acts in military a huge victory for LGBTI rights*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/south-korea-landmark-judgement-on-same-sex-sexual-acts-in-military-a-huge-victory-for-lgbti-rights/>

Gyu-hyun, Kim. (2024, March 29). *Anti-immigration candidate marauds across Korea with squad detaining foreigners*. Hankyoreh. Retrieved from https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1134447.

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/>

Kosovo

Haxhiaj, S. (2022, June 13). *In Kosovo, frustration grows over promised road to Montenegro*. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/13/in-kosovo-frustration-grows-over-promised-road-to-montenegro/>

Kennedy, N. (2022, December 12). *Kosovo calls for NATO intervention after weekend of violence amid rising ethnic tensions*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/12/europe/kosovo-serbia-nato-violence-protests-intl-hnk/index.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>

Kuwait

AP News. (2024, June 1). *Kuwait's emir names new crown prince, Sheikh Sabah Khalid Al Sabah*. Associated Press News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/kuwait-crown-prince-08ce28b15a2f4ab6b365cb259c94ccbc>.

Fanous, L. (2022, August 30). *The kafala system: An issue of modern slavery*. Human Trafficking Search. Retrieved from <https://humantraffickingsearch.org/the-kafala-system-an-issue-of-modern-slavery/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Kuwait: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/kuwait/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Kuwait*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kuwait>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Kuwait*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/kuwait>

Mahmoud Saleh, Saeed. (2024, January 2). *Kuwait gov't returns amended Penal Trials Law to parliament*. Arab Times Kuwait. Retrieved from <https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-govt-returns-amended-penal-trials-law-to-parliament/>.

Robinson, K. (2022, November 18). *What is the kafala system?* Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kuwait*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kuwait>

Kyrgyzstan

Dzhumashova, A. (2022, November 21). *Mass arrests: Term of detention of Kanat Isaev extended*. 24.kg. Retrieved from https://24.kg/english/251216_Mass_arrests_Term_of_detention_of_Kanat_Isaev_extended/

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Kyrgyzstan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan>

Imanaliyeva, A. (2021, April 15). *Kyrgyzstan: National-Patriots Attack Women's Rights Rally*. Eurasianet. Retrieved from <https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-national-patriots-attack-womens-rights-rally>

International Crisis Group. (2023). *CrisisWatch Database: Kyrgyzstan*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=52&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

International Partnership for Human Rights. (2022, October 30). *Kyrgyzstan: Mass arrests of government critics in escalating crackdown on dissent*. IPHR. Retrieved from <https://www.iphronline.org/kyrgyzstan-mass-arrests-of-government-critics.html>

Sultanalieva, S. (2022, October 25). *Kyrgyzstan arrests activists en masse*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/25/kyrgyzstan-arrests-activists-en-masse>

World Population Review. (2022). *Kyrgyzstan Population 2022 (Live)*. World Population Review. Retrieved from <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kyrgyzstan-population>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kyrgyz Republic*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kyrgyzstan/>

Laos

Amnesty. (2023) *LAOS 2023*. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/laos/report-laos/#:~:text=Human%20rights%20defenders%20were%20under,trials%20due%20to%20their%20activism.>

Civics Monitor. (2023) *Laos: UN Raises concerns about summary executions, enforced disappearance and deportation of activists*. <https://monitor.civics.org/explore/laos-un-raises-concerns-about-summary-executions-enforced-disappearance-and-deportation-of-activists/>

Gerin, R. (2022, March 8). *Hundreds of Lao women trapped in Chinese-run SEZ, unable to pay off debt*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/sez-women-03082022133235.html>

Gerin, R. (2022, July 28). *Lao authorities order Golden Triangle SEZ to suspend hiring locals*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/hiring-suspension-07282022170307.html>

Hmong American Center. (2018, October 4). *What were the Hmong's roles in the Vietnam War?* Hmong American Center. Retrieved from <https://www.hmongamericancenter.org/uFAQs/what-were-the-hmongs-roles-in-the-vietnam-war/>

Nemeh, N. (2022, September 22). *Rights concerns as Laos bans LGBTQ+ beauty pageants*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/lgbtq-ban-09162022141508.html>

Strangio, S. (2022, October 6). *Report claims 700 Malaysians held for ransom in Lao SEZ*. The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/report-claims-700-malaysians-held-for-ransom-in-lao-sez/>

UNPO. (2020, October 30). *UN special rapporteurs send joint allegation letter to Lao Government raising issue of ChaoFa Hmong*. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Retrieved from <https://unpo.org/article/22110>

UNPO. (2021, February 8). *Hmong*. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Retrieved from <https://unpo.org/members/7891>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Laos*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/laos>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Laos*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/laos/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Laos*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_LAOS-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf

Whong, E. (2022, November 25). *Lao authorities seem powerless to stop crime in Golden Triangle Economic Zone*. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/golden-triangle-11252022131629.html>

Latvia

Amnesty International. (2022, October 12). *Latvia: Refugees and migrants arbitrarily detained, tortured and forced to 'voluntarily' return to their countries*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/latvia-refugees-and-migrants-arbitrarily-detained-tortured-and-forced-to-voluntarily-return-to-their-countries/>

Amnesty International. (2022, October 12). *Latvia: Return home or never leave the woods: Refugees and migrants arbitrarily detained, beaten and coerced into "voluntary" returns*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur52/5913/2022/en/>

BBC. (2022, October 13). *Amnesty accuses Latvia of abusing migrants on Belarus border*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-63237670>

Henley, J., Rankin, J., & Roth, A. (2021, August 10). *Latvia and Lithuania act to counter migrants crossing Belarus border*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border>

Tanner, J. (2022, October 13). *Latvia calls Watchdog's migrant mistreatment claims 'absurd'*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-migration-latvia-belarus-1785e47e85e11fad673e16b4ab54f7c9>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Latvia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/latvia/>

Lebanon

Al Jazeera. (2021, August 5). *In pictures: Dozens hurt in Beirut clashes on Blast Anniversary*. Protests News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/8/5/dozens-hurt-in-lebanon-clashes-on-blast-anniversary>

Amnesty International. (2023, May 2). *Lebanese authorities must halt unlawful deportations of Syrian refugees*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/lebanon-authorities-must-halt-unlawful-deportations-of-syrian-refugees/>

Beirut Today. (2022, March 18). *ACHR: 139 arbitrary arrests against Syrians in Lebanon during 2021 - Beirut Today*. Beirut Today. Retrieved from <https://beirut-today.com/2022/03/18/achr-139-arbitrary-arrests-against-syrians-in-lebanon-during-2021/>

Chehayeb, K. (2021, July 13). *Lebanese riot police clash with families of Beirut Blast Victims*. Beirut explosion News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/13/lebanese-riot-police-clash-with-families-of-beirut-blast-victims>

Freedom House. (2022). *Lebanon: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/lebanon/freedom-world/2022>

Gebeily, M. (2023, May 1). *Syrian refugees deported from Lebanon face arrest, conscription, say relatives*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-refugees-deported-lebanon-face-arrest-conscription-say-relatives-2023-05-01/>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, July 5). *Lebanon: Armed Forces Summarily Deporting Syrians*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/05/lebanon-armed-forces-summarily-deporting-syrians>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 7). *Israel: US Arms Used in Strike that Killed Lebanon Aid Workers*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/07/israel-us-arms-used-strike-killed-lebanon-aid-workers>

OCHA. (2024, May 21). *Lebanon: Flash Update #18 – Escalation of hostilities in south Lebanon, as of 17 May, 2024*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-18-escalation-hostilities-south-lebanon-17-may-2024>

OHCHR. (2022, August 3). *UN experts call for international investigation into 2020 Beirut Explosion*. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/08/un-experts-call-international-investigation-2020-beirut-explosion>

Perry, T., El Dahan, M., & Bassam, L. (2021, October 14). *Deadly shooting rocks Beirut as tensions over blast probe erupt*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/deadly-shooting-rocks-beirut-tensions-over-blast-probe-erupt-2021-10-14/>

Qiblawi, T., & Salem, M. (2021, October 15). *Beirut's worst street violence in more than a decade kills at least 6*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/14/middleeast/lebanon-blast-gunfire-protest-intl/index.html>

Reuters. (2021, August 15). *At least 28 killed in Lebanon fuel tank explosion*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/least-20-killed-lebanon-fuel-tank-explosion-mtv-news-2021-08-15/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lebanon*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/lebanon/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/lebanon/>

Williamson, H. (2021, August 16). *Protesters attempt raid on Lebanon PM's residence amid dire conditions*. WhoWhatWhy. Retrieved from <https://whowhatwhy.org/politics/international/protesters-attempt-raid-on-lebanon-pms-residence-amid-dire-conditions/>

Lesotho

Amnesty International. (2022, September 28). *Lesotho: Authorities must tackle police brutality, torture and unlawful killings before and after election*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/lesotho-authorities-must-tackle-police-brutality/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lesotho*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/lesotho/>

Liberia

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Liberia*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/liberia/freedom-world/2024>

Timsit, A., & Paquette, D. (2022, January 20). *At least 29 killed as armed gang sparks stampede at Church Gathering in Liberia*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/20/liberia-stampede-monrovia-christian/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Liberia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/liberia>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Liberia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/liberia/>

Yates, D. A. (2021, May 21). *Liberia: 'Next Ramadan, Muslims will have a holiday'*. allAfrica.com. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/202105210164.html>

Libya

Aljazeera. (2022, February 11). *Five things to know about Libya's political crisis*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/11/five-things-to-know-about-libyas-political-crisis>

Amnesty International. (2020, April 20). *Libya: Historic discrimination threatens right to health of minorities in the south amid COVID-19*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/libya-historic-discrimination-threatens-right-to-health-of-minorities-in-the-south-amid-covid19/>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Libya 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/report-libya/#endnote-2>

Amnesty. (2024, February 14). *Libya: Internal Security Agency must end abuses in name of 'guarding virtue'*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/libya-internal-security-agency-must-end-abuses-in-name-of-guarding-virtue/>

Fares, Nora Adin. (2024, March 24) *'Never-ending humiliation': Recalling horrors in Libya's migration centres*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/3/24/never-ending-humiliation-recalling-horrors-in-libyas-migration-centres>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the world 2022: Libya*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-world/2022>

Geneva Academy. (2022). *Non-international armed conflicts in Libya*. Geneva Academy. Retrieved from <https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-libya#collapse2accord>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/libya>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch, (2024, January 11) *Libya: Rights Violations Unchecked as Divisions Persist*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/libya-rights-violations-unchecked-divisions-persist>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Internal Displacement Database. (2021). *IDMC Query Tool - Conflict and violence*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Libya*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/libya>

Liechtenstein

OMCT. (2024, April 25). *Liechtenstein: Concerns raised about the lack of appropriate detention facilities*. OMCT World Organisation Against Torture. Retrieved from <https://www.omct.org/en/resources/news/liechtenstein-concerns-raised-about-the-lack-of-appropriate-detention-facilities>

U.S. Department of State (2024). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Liechtenstein*. United States Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/liechtenstein/>

Lithuania

Amnesty International. (2022a, June 27). *Lithuania: Forced out or locked up - refugees and migrants abused and abandoned*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur53/5735/2022/en/>

Amnesty International. (2022b, July 1). *EU/Lithuania: In milestone judgement, EU Court Slams Automatic Detention and denial of asylum*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/lithuania-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-rejects-national-law-restricting-the-right-to-asylum-and-imposing-automatic-detention-on-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/>

Amnesty International. (2023, April 21). *Lithuania: Legalizing illegal pushbacks gives green-light to torture*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/lithuania-legalizing-illegal-pushbacks-gives-green-light-to-torture/>

Amnesty International. (2023) *Human rights in Lithuania*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/lithuania/report-lithuania/>

Crisis 24. (2024, February 29). *Belarus, Lithuania, Russia: Lithuania will close two more border crossings with Belarus and restrict rail traffic with Russia from March 1*. Crisis 24. Retrieved from <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2024/02/belarus-lithuania-russia-lithuania-will-close-two-more-border-crossings-with-belarus-and-restrict-rail-traffic-with-russia-from-march-1>

Freedom House. (2022). *Lithuania: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2022>

Henley, J., Rankin, J., & Roth, A. (2021, August 10). *Latvia and Lithuania act to counter migrants crossing Belarus border*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border>

Human Rights Monitoring Institute. (2024, March 12). *Litigation concerning the pushback policy of migrants and the restrictions of their liberty implemented in the Republic of Lithuania*. Human Rights Monitoring Institute. Retrieved from <https://hrmi.lt/en/litigation-concerning-the-pushback-policy-of-migrants-and-the-restrictions-of-their-liberty-implemented-in-the-republic-of-lithuania/>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 15). *Tajikistan: EU States, Türkiye Should Not Return Dissidents*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/16/tajikistan-eu-states-turkiye-should-not-return-dissidents>

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) *International*. (2022, November 4). *Prolonged detention of over 2,500 migrants in Lithuania must end now: MSF*. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International. Retrieved from <https://www.msf.org/prolonged-detention-over-2500-migrants-lithuania-must-end-now>

Platform, E. L. (2021, August 12). *Lithuania's response to the migrant crisis: Milling about in confusion, curtailing human rights, and building a wall*. Liberties.eu. Retrieved from <https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/lithuania-migrant-crisis/43723>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lithuania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/lithuania/>

Luxembourg

Freedom House. (2024). *Luxembourg*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/luxembourg/freedom-world/2024>

U.S. Department of State (2024). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Luxembourg*. United States Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/luxembourg/>

Madagascar

Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2022a, August 30). *Madagascar police confirm killing 19 civilians after albino kidnap*. The Guardian Nigeria News - Nigeria and World News. Retrieved from <https://guardian.ng/news/madagascar-police-confirm-killing-19-civilians-after-albino-kidnap/>

Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2022b, August 1). *Madagascar massacre village deserted as first arrests made - Africa - world*. Ahram Online. Retrieved from <https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/472448.aspx>

Crisis Group. (2024, June). *Africa: Madagascar*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=18&created=](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=18&created=)

Deutsche Welle. (2022, July 31). *Madagascar: At least 32 killed as bandits set homes on fire*. dw.com. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/madagascar-at-least-32-killed-as-bandits-set-homes-on-fire/a-62661254>

Freedom House. (2022). *Madagascar: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/madagascar/freedom-world/2022>

Hierro, L. (2023, August 8). *Minority Karanas in Madagascar lead clandestine lives with no citizenship*. EL PAÍS. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-08-08/minority-karanas-in-madagascar-lead-clandestine-lives-with-no-citizenship.html>

OHCHR. (2022, February 28). *Madagascar: UN experts urge protection for people with albinism amid attacks*. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/02/madagascar-un-experts-urge-protection-people-albinism-amid-attacks>

Tetaud, S. (2024, February 11). *Madagascar law allowing castration of child rapists prompts criticism from rights groups*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-castration-law-andry-rajoelina-rape-criticism-d5efb32b72e48929f95fae1e6d7baefd>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Madagascar*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/madagascar/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Madagascar*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/madagascar/>

Malawi

Burke, J., & Pensulo, C. (2022, November 1). *Ethiopians found in Malawi mass grave thought to have suffocated*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/01/ethiopians-found-in-malawi-mass-grave-thought-to-have-suffocated>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024, April 17). *Malawi football fans assault TV reporter Yasin Limu*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/04/malawi-football-fans-assault-tv-reporter-yasin-limu/>

Global State of Democracy Initiative. (2024, February). *Malawi*. Global State of Democracy Initiative. Retrieved from <https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/malawi/february-2024>

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Malawi: Events of 2023*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/malawi>

Human Rights Watch (2024) *Malawi: Refugees, including children, forcibly relocated* (2023, June 5). <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/malawi-refugees-including-children-forcibly-relocated>

Kojoué, L. (2024, July 11). *'Dark Day' in Malawi for Rights of LGBT People*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/11/dark-day-malawi-rights-lgbt-people>

Kunchezera, B.. (2024, April 12). *Malawian journalists arrested over article accusing businessman of corruption*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/apr/12/malawian-journalist-arrested-over-article-accusing-businessman-of-corruption>

Malawi Voice. (2024, May 18). *DPP condemns MCP's continued political violence*. Malawi Voice. Retrieved from <https://www.malawivoice.com/2024/05/18/dpp-condemns-mcps-continued-political-violence/>

Masina, L. (2024, February 15). *Malawi Police Seize Journalists' Equipment Over Fake Facebook Account*. VOA News. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-police-seize-journalists-equipment-over-fake-facebook-account-/7490035.html>

Masina, L. (2022, November 25). *Malawi police arrest four more people over Ethiopians' mass grave*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-police-arrest-four-more-people-over-ethiopians-mass-grave-/6850360.html>

Nassah, I. (2024, February 2). *Malawi Military's Threats Send Journalist into Hiding*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/02/malawi-militarys-threats-send-journalist-hiding>

Relief Web. (2024, February). *Malawi: Floods - Feb 2024*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2024-000031-mwi>

UNODC. (2022, May). *90 victims of human trafficking rescued at refugee camp in Malawi; five arrests made*. United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2022/June/90-victims-of-human-trafficking-rescued-at-refugee-camp-in-malawi-five-arrests-made.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Malawi*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/malawi>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Malawi*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/malawi/>

Malaysia

Azhar, D. (2024, January 28). *Malaysia ex-finance minister charged amid widening graft crackdown*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-ex-finance-minister-charged-with-alleged-failure-declare-assets-2024-01-29/>

Bernama. (2023, August 5). *Immigration rounds up over 400 undocumented migrants*. Free Malaysia Today. Retrieved from <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2023/08/05/immigration-rounds-up-over-400-undocumented-migrants/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Malaysia: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/malaysia/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, October 23). *Malaysia: Surge in summary deportations to Myanmar*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/24/malaysia-surge-summary-deportations-myanmar>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Malaysia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/malaysia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Malaysia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/malaysia>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *Malaysia: Events of 2023*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/malaysia>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, March 5). *"We Can't See the Sun"*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/03/05/we-cant-see-sun/malysias-arbitrary-detention-migrants-and-refugees>

Latiff, R. (2024, June 6). *Malaysia evicts 500 sea nomads in crackdown on migrants, activists say*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-evicts-500-sea-nomads-crackdown-migrants-activists-say-2024-06-06/>

Lemière, S. (2024, April 15). *Malaysia's Violent Inroads in Immigration Detention*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/malaysias-violent-inroads-immigration-detention>

Marsden, H. (2024). *The campaign of destruction against 'sea gypsies'*. The Week. Retrieved from <https://theweek.com/politics/the-campaign-of-destruction-against-sea-gypsies>

Reuters. (2022, December 13). *Malaysia court lifts stay on deportation of 114 Myanmar nationals*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-court-lifts-stay-deportation-114-myanmar-nationals-2022-12-13/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Malaysia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/malaysia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Malaysia*. United States Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/malaysia/>

Wee, S. (2022, April 20). *6 Rohingya refugees are killed fleeing detention center in Malaysia*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/asia/rohingya-refugees-malaysia-deaths.html>

Maldives

Al Jazeera. (2024, June 2). *Maldives ban Israeli passport holders over war on Gaza*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/2/maldives-bans-israeli-passport-holders-from-entering-the-country>

Freedom House. (2022). *Maldives: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/maldives/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Maldives: Events of 2023*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/maldives>

International Federation for Human Rights & Maldivian Democracy Network. (2024, June 3). *Joint submission for the review of the second periodic report: MALDIVES*. United Human Rights Committee. Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh-mdn_ccpr_141_maldives_joint__submission.pdf

Reuters. (2022, June 21). *Protesters attack yoga day event in Maldives*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/protesters-attack-yoga-day-event-maldives-2022-06-21/>

Newton, Robbie. (2023, May 3). *Maldives Press Freedom in Danger*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/03/maldives-press-freedom-danger>

Sibal, S. (2022, June 21). *Watch: Extremists disrupt international yoga day event in Maldives*. WION. Retrieved from <https://www.wionews.com/india-news/extremists-disrupt-yoga-day-event-in-maldives-490186>

Times of India. (2024, June 28). *Black magic performed over Maldives President? Bizarre incident sees arrest of two ministers*. Times of India. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/etimes/trending/black-magic-performed-over-maldives-president-bizarre-incident-sees-arrest-of-two-ministers/articleshow/111338710.cms>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Maldives*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/maldives/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Report on Human Rights Practices: Maldives*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/maldives/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Maldives*. United States Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/maldives/>

Mali

Al Jazeera. (2024a, May 8). *Armed groups committing atrocities in Mali: HRW*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/8/armed-groups-committing-atrocities-in-mali-hrw>

Al Jazeera. (2024b, July 3). *Dozens killed in attack on village in central Mali*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/3/dozens-killed-in-attack-on-village-in-central-mali>

Al Jazeera. (2024c, February 1). *UN rights chief decries death of 50 people in Mali attacks*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/1/un-rights-chief-decries-death-of-50-people-in-maliattacks>

Associated Press. (2024, July 5). *Mali's army, Russian mercenaries accused of killing dozens of civilians*. VOA News. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/mali-s-army-russian-mercenaries-accused-of-killing-dozens-of-civilians-/7686806.html>

Bridger, B. (2024, July 14). *Wagner Enters the Tuareg's Existential War in Mali*. Atlas News. Retrieved from <https://theatlasnews.co/latest/2024/07/14/wagner-enters-the-tuaregs-existential-war-in-mali/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024, April 11). *Mali's media regulator bans outlets from covering political groups*. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/04/malis-media-regulator-bans-outlets-from-covering-political-groups/>

Crisis Group. (2024, June). *Mali*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=26&created=](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=26&created=)

Diallo, T. (2024, January 25). *Mali junta ends 2015 peace deal with separatist rebels*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-junta-ends-2015-algiers-peace-deal-with-separatist-rebels-2024-01-25/>

Doxsee, C., & Thompson, J. (2022, December 13). *Massacres, executions, and falsified graves: The Wagner Group's mounting humanitarian cost in Mali*. CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali>

France 24. (2023, March 24). *Mali questions "credibility" of UN rights report claiming steep rise in civilian killings*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230324-mali-questions-credibility-of-un-rights-report-claiming-steep-rise-in-civilian-killings>

Freedom House. (2022). *Mali: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mali/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, May 13). *Mali: Massacre by Army, foreign soldiers*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/05/mali-massacre-army-foreign-soldiers>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, June 21). *Mali: New wave of executions of civilians*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/15/mali-new-wave-executions-civilians>

Human Rights Watch. (2022c, October 27). *Mali: Coordinated massacres by Islamist armed groups*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/27/mali-coordinated-massacres-islamist-armed-groups>

Human Rights Watch. (2022d, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Mali*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/mali>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mali/>

Human Rights Watch (2023, July 13). *Mali: Mounting Islamist Armed Group Killings, Rape*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/13/mali-mounting-islamist-armed-group-killings-rape>

Human Rights Watch. (2023). *Mali: Events of 2023*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mali>

Reuters. (2024, May 26). *Over 20 killed in attack on central Mali village*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-20-killed-attack-central-mali-village-2024-05-26/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on Religious Freedom: Mali*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/mali/>

U.S. Department of State (2024) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali*. United States Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mali/>

Malta

Amnesty International. (2022). *Malta 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/malta/report-malta/>

Associated Press. (2023, May 29). *Rescue groups say Malta coordinated the return of 500 migrants to Libya instead of saving them*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/migration-libya-malta-rescue-hifter-e880c2d43ab989be7f6b532798192d42#>

Daniela DeBono & Ċetta Mainwaring (2024, January 5). *Weaponizing the law against the vulnerable: the case of the El Hiblu 3*. University of Oxford. Retrieved from <https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/border-criminologies-blog/blog-post/2024/01/weaponizing-law-against-vulnerable-case-el-hiblu-3>

ECRE. (2024a, April 19). *Mediterranean: Cyprus Suspends Processing Asylum Requests of Syrians Enduring Unbearable Conditions in Lebanon and Syria—NGOs Call on Malta to Halt Pushbacks to Unsafe Libya—Refugees in Greece Face Systematic Abuse in Reception and Detention Centres and Denial of Rights, ECtHR Issues Another Ruling About Human Rights Violations in Greek ‘Hotspots’*. Retrieved from <https://ecre.org/mediterranean-cyprus-suspends-processing-asylum-requests-of-syrians-enduring-unbearable-conditions-in-lebanon-and-syria-%E2%80%95-ngos-call-on-malta-to-halt-pushbacks-to-unsafe-libya-%E2%80%95-refugee/>

ECRE. (2024b, March 8). *Mediterranean: 2023 is Record Year for Number of Migrant Deaths Along Borders—Obstacles and Delays in Sea Rescue by Libyan and Italian Coastguards Lead to Death—Cyprus’ Quest to Declare Syria a Safe Country Gains Traction—The El Hiblu 3 Trial Continues Amid Questions Over Latest Tragedy Off Malta*. European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Retrieved from <https://ecre.org/mediterranean-2023-is-record-year-for-number-of-migrant-deaths-along-borders-%E2%80%95-obstacles-and-delays-in-sea-rescue-by-libyan-and-italian-coastguards-lead-to-death-%E2%80%95-cyprus-quest-to-declare-syria-a-safe-country-gains-traction-%E2%80%95-the-el-hiblu-3-trial-continues-amid-questions-over-latest-tragedy-off-malta>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World: Malta*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/malta/freedom-world/2024>

Gordon Watson. (2020, March 27). *Campaign launched for El Hiblu 1 case to be dropped*. Times of Malta. Retrieved from <https://timesofmalta.com/article/campaign-launched-for-el-hiblu-1-case-to-be-dropped.781346>

Magri, G. (2024, February 26). *Over 2,000 domestic violence reports filed in 2023 - up from 1,645 in 2020*. Times of Malta. Retrieved from <https://timesofmalta.com/article/over-2000-domestic-violence-reports-filed-2023-1645-2020.1086289>

Reuters. (2024, February 23). *Five migrants die as boat capsizes during rescue off Malta*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/five-migrants-die-boat-capsizes-during-rescue-off-malta-2024-02-23/>

Taylor, A. (2022, December 15). *Frontex, Malta accused of facilitating migrant human rights violations*. www.euractiv.com. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/frontex-malta-accused-of-facilitating-migrant-human-rights-violations/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Malta*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/malta/>

Marshall Islands

Freedom House. (2024). *Marshall Islands*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/marshall-islands/freedom-world/2024>

U.S. Department of State (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Marshall Islands*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/marshall-islands/>

Mauritania

BBC. (2024, July 9). *Mauritania country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881985>

Faiola, A., Piper, I., & Sohyun Lee, J. (2024, May 20). *With Europe's support, North African nations push migrants to the desert*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/eu-migrant-north-africa-mediterranean/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Mauritania: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mauritania/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World: Mauritania*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mauritania/freedom-world/2024>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, January 13). *World Report 2021: Rights trends in Mauritania*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/mauritania>

InDepthNews. (2024, July 2). *Slavery Still Ingrained in Mauritania, Activist Says*. IDN-InDepthNews. Retrieved from <https://indepthnews.net/slavery-still-ingrained-in-mauritania-activist-says/>

Lespiaut, A.F. & Kaledzi, I. (2024, June 10). *Migrants turn to Mauritania as new EU transit route*. DW. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/migrants-turn-to-mauritania-as-new-eu-transit-route/a-69311885>

Lighthouse Reports. (2024, May 21). *Desert Dumps*. Lighthouse Reports. Retrieved from <https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/desert-dumps/>

Martín, M., Hierro, L., & Stacey, D. (2024, June 1). *Mass arrests and forced transfers: How migrants are exiled in North Africa with European money*. EL PAÍS. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-06-01/mass-arrests-and-forced-transfers-how-migrants-are-exiled-in-north-africa-with-european-money.html>

Reporters Without Borders. (2024, May 10). *RSF decries police violence against three reporters covering protest in Mauritania*. Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved from <https://rsf.org/en/rsf-decries-police-violence-against-three-reporters-covering-protest-mauritania>

Reuters. (2024, July 2). *Three die in Mauritanian detention after post-election protests, ministry says*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/three-die-mauritanian-detention-after-post-election-protests-ministry-says-2024-07-02/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mauritania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mauritania/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Religious Freedom: Mauritania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/mauritania/>

U.S. Department of State (2024a). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mauritania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mauritania/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024b). *2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Mauritania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/mauritania/>

Mauritius

THE BTI Transformation Index. (2024). *Mauritius Country Report 2024*. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MUS>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mauritius*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mauritius/>

Mexico

ACLED: Armed Conflict Location & Events Data. (2024, January 17). *Mexico: Confronting Deadly and Criminal Power Struggles in an Election Year*. Armed Conflict Location & Events Data. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/mexico/>

AFP News. (2024, January 25). *Four Police Officers Killed In Shooting In Mexico*. BARRON'S. Retrieved from <https://www.barrons.com/news/four-police-officers-killed-in-shooting-in-mexico-2970b1f5>

Alvarado, A. (2024, July 2). *19 bodies found in abandoned truck in the violence-heavy Mexican state of Chiapas*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/02/americas/19-dead-truck-chiapas-mexico-intl-latam/index.html>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Mexico 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/mexico/report-mexico/>

Amnesty International. (2024, January 22). *Mexico's Disappearance Strategy Risks Missing Persons Search*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://amnesty.ca/urgent-actions/mexicos-disappearance-strategy-risks-missing-persons-search/#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20Mexico%20continued%20to,women%2C%20and%209%20remained%20unidentified.>

Associated Press. (2023a, May 18). *Mexico finds 49 migrants who had been kidnapped from bus*. Associated Press. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-migrants-kidnapped-found-f8c2060c8c4250abc53e7322f9f5afa1#>

Associated Press. (2023b, April 10). *Mexico charges 4 soldiers with killings in Nuevo Laredo*. Associated Press. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/nuevo-laredo-mexican-army-killings-35056c39b8f1d8153d039f955c63ac43>

AP News. (2024a, January 24). *Mexican tourist haven and silversmithing town of Taxco shutters by gang killings and threats*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-tourist-town-taxco-detectives-killed-36d33e30043d073cc76caddf90b7fdd1>

AP News. (2024b, January 29). *Undetermined number of hacked-up bodies found in vehicles on Mexico's Gulf coast*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-violence-veracruz-tuxpan-gangs-6e72b5d5e1fbefd9a2184b0e27fdc62a>

AP News. (2024c, February 5). *4 bus and taxi drivers shot to death in violent southern Mexico city*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-gangs-extortion-drivers-killed-a36dabf6581870c67bd1422c54e1af3f> AP News.

(2024d, February 26). *Suspected illegal loggers kill 3 forest rangers on patrol in a forest in central Mexico*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-rangers-patrol-attack-illegal-loggers-6c837333c779af8d5b1b1dbb70134400>

AP News. (2024e, June 6). *Mexican authorities clear one of Mexico City's largest downtown migrant tent encampments*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-migrants-tent-encampment-downtown-mexico-city-cleared-c7c9aea6cfc4f3d2233edeae33fa7e55>

AP News. (2024f, July 26). *Mexico's president downplays cartel violence that drove nearly 600 Mexicans into Guatemala*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-guatemala-violence-drug-cartels-chiapas-8bb8ab7225e58cda2b013aa58be72fac>

Associated Press. (2024, March 18). *3 Mexican police officers killed in highway assault*. FOX News. Retrieved from <https://www.foxnews.com/world/3-mexican-police-officers-killed-highway-assault>

Barragán, Almudena. (2023, November 25). *More than 3,000 women are murdered in Mexico each year: How violence affects the youngest victims*. El País. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-25/more-than-3000-women-are-murdered-in-mexico-each-year-how-violence-affects-the-youngest-victims.html>

Borunda, D. (2024, June 25). *'Vile and horrific': Abducted migrants tortured by smugglers at Juárez stash house*. El Paso Times. Retrieved from <https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/immigration/2024/06/25/mexico-border-migrants-torture-stash-house-smugglers-juarez/74203766007/>

Brewer, Stephanie. (2023, February 23). *International Ruling Finds Mexico's Legal Framework on Detentions Violates Human Rights*. WOLA. Retrieved from <https://www.wola.org/analysis/international-ruling-finds-mexico-detentions-violates-human-rights/>

Buschschlüter, V. (2024a, April 9). *Mexican police officer killed while intervening in lynching*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68769917>

Buschschlüter, V. (2024b, May 14). *Police injured in protest over Mexico missing students*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c29661nl3edo>

Bustamante, J. (2024, July 31). *After El Mayo's arrest, Mexicans fear violence may engulf Sinaloa*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/after-powerful-kingpins-arrest-mexicans-fear-violence-may-engulf-sinaloa-2024-07-31/>

Camhaji, E. (2024, April 26). *Mexico is heading towards its most violent election ever, with 30 candidates murdered, 77 threatened and 11 kidnapped*. EL PAÍS. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-04-27/mexico-is-heading-towards-its-most-violent-election-ever-with-30-candidates-murdered-77-threatened-and-11-kidnapped.html>

CBS News. (2024a, March 21). *5 bodies found piled in bulletproof SUV in Mexico, 7 others discovered near U.S. border*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/5-bodies-found-bulletproof-suv-mexico-7-bodies-near-us-border/>

CBS News. (2024b, April 8). *Mexican police find 7 bodies, 5 of them decapitated, inside a car with messages "detailing the reason they were killed"*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-police-find-decapitated-bodies-car-messages-reason-they-were-killed/>

CBS News. (2024c, April 12). *Police official shot to death in Acapulco, latest incident of deadly violence in Mexico's resort*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-official-killed-acapulco-mexico/>

CBS News. (2024d, May 9). *18 bodies found in Mexico state plagued by cartel violence, including 9 left with messages attached*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-cartel-violence-bodies-found-zacatecas-morelos-fresnillo/>

CBS News. (2024e, May 22). *10 bodies found scattered around Mexico's resort city of Acapulco*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/10-bodies-found-acapulco-mexico/>

CBS News. (2024f, July 22). *Police chief shot dead days after activist, wife and daughter killed in Mexico*. CBS News. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-chief-killed-mexico-city-indigenous-activist-wife-daughter-killed-oaxaca/>

Center for Preventative Action. (2022). *Criminal Violence in Mexico*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/criminal-violence-mexico>

Center for Preventative Action. (2024, July 24). *Criminal Violence in Mexico*. Global Conflict Tracker. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/criminal-violence-mexico#:~:text=Gangs%20and%20drug%20cartels%20largely,migrants%20to%20the%20U.S.%20border>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024a, February 1). *Personal information of hundreds of Mexican journalists exposed in government data leak*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/02/personal-information-of-hundreds-of-mexican-journalists-exposed-in-government-data-leak/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024b, May 2). *Mexican journalist Roberto Carlos Figueroa abducted, killed in Morelos*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/05/mexican-journalist-roberto-carlos-figueroa-abducted-killed-in-morelos/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024c, May 23). *Mexican journalist Alberto Amaro Jordán receives death threats in Tlaxcala*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/05/mexican-journalist-alberto-amaro-jordan-receives-death-threats-in-tlaxcala/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024d, July 11). *Mexican journalist Victor Morales found dead on highway*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/07/mexican-journalist-victor-morales-found-dead-on-highway/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024e, August 5). *Mexican crime reporter Alejandro Martínez Noguez killed while under police protection*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/08/mexican-crime-reporter-alejandro-martinez-noguez-killed-while-under-police-protection/>

Crisis Watch. (2024, June). *Latin America & Caribbean: Mexico*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=74&created=](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=74&created=)

Felbab-Brown, V. (2021, January 4). *Crime and anti-crime security policy in Mexico in 2020*. Brookings. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/04/crime-and-anti-crime-security-policy-in-mexico-in-2020/>

Gooding, D. (2024, July 29). *Mexico Increases Detentions of Illegal Immigrants by 200%*. Newsweek. Retrieved from <https://www.newsweek.com/mexico-illegal-immigrants-detentions-increase-us-border-1931704>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a). *World Report 2021: Events of 2021*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/01/World%20Report%202022%20web%20pdf_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, June 6). *Mexico: Asylum Seekers Face Abuses at Southern Border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/06/mexico-asylum-seekers-face-abuses-southern-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Mexico*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2023: Mexico*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mexico>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Internal Displacement Database. (2021). *IDMC Query Tool - Conflict and violence*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>

Janetsky, M. & Márquez, F. (2024, June 11). *Mexico's tactic to cut immigration to the US: wear out migrants*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-immigration-border-lopez-obrador-biden-a5498f0791f5f1ef99f1dfd9accce8f4>

Kloppe-Santamaria, Gema. (2023, June 27). *Beyond Collateral Damage: Femicides, Disappearances, and New Trends in Gender-Based Violence in Mexico*. The Wilson Center. Retrieved from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/beyond-collateral-damage-femicides-disappearances-and-new-trends-gender-based-violence>

McDonnell, P. (2024, July 2). *Gang violence in Mexico: 19 bodies discovered in latest grisly find*. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2024-07-02/gang-violence-mexico-bodies-found-cartel-battle-for-drug-migrant-trafficking-routes>

Morales, M. (2024, April 9). *[Video] Pobladores de Zacatelco linchan a elemento de la SSC tras asalto y homicidio de un taxista*. El Sol de Tlaxcala. Retrieved from <https://www.elsoldetlaxcala.com.mx/policiaca/video-pobladores-de-zacatelco-linchan-a-elemento-de-la-ssc-tras-asalto-y-homicidio-de-un-taxista-11728019.html>

Morley, Priya. (2021, February 16). *Reckoning with racism against Black migrants in Mexico*. Open Global Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.openglobalrights.org/reckoning-with-racism-against-black-migrants-in-mexico/>

OHCHR. (2023, July 3). *"We're here to tell it:" Mexican women break silence over femicides*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/07/were-here-tell-it-mexican-women-break-silence-over-femicides>

Retana, A. & Fuhrman, D. (2024, July 19). *Two police officers killed, one injured after cartel attack*. FOX 9. Retrieved from <https://kyma.com/news/mexico/2024/07/19/two-police-officers-killed-one-injured-after-cartel-attack/>

Rodriguez, F., Aguilera, J., & Rivas, O. (2024, June 3). *San Luis, Mexico police chief killed*. FOX 9. Retrieved from <https://kyma.com/news/mexico/2024/06/03/san-luis-mexico-police-chief-killed/>

Romero, S. (2024, February 22). *Mexico's President Faces Inquiry for Disclosing Phone Number of Times Journalist*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/22/world/americas/mexico-president-inquiry-times-journalist.html>

Reed-Sandoval, A. (2024, July 25). *The Struggle to Identify All the Dead Bodies in Mexico*. The New Yorker. Retrieved from <https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-struggle-to-identify-all-the-dead-bodies-in-mexico>

- Sanabria, G. & Diaz, L. (2024, June 12). *Shootings and extortion create ghost town in southern Mexico*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/shootings-extortion-create-ghost-town-southern-mexico-2024-06-12/>
- Sanchez, Fabiola. (2022, December 27). *Why Mexico has made little progress on femicide*. PBS. Retrieved from <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/femicides-in-mexico-little-progress-on-longstanding-issue>
- Stevenson, M. (2024a, March 7). *Mexico's most dangerous city for police refuses to give up or negotiate with cartels*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-police-cartels-officers-killed-86548e81e62689628078bc3f1df042e2>
- Stevenson, M. (2024b, May 10). *Mother's Day is a sad reminder for the mothers of Mexico's over 100,000 missing people*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mexico-disappeared-mothers-day-protest-searchers-dc943bcb6c74a713b92c2a3a46bad9d9>
- TeleSUR. (2024, June 12). *28 Kidnapped Migrants Rescued in Border Areas of Mexico*. TeleSUR. Retrieved from <https://www.telesurenglish.net/28-kidnapped-migrants-rescued-in-border-areas-of-mexico/>
- UN Human Rights Office. (2023). *Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Preliminary Findings from its visit to Mexico (18 to 29 September 2023)*. UN Human Rights Office. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/detention-wg/country-visit/20230929-mexico-preliminary-findings-en.pdf>
- U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/>
- U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/>
- Vaquero Simancas, J. (2024, March 23). *Kidnapping and escape of 95 Ecuadorian migrants in Chiapas: 'If you continue informing we will return them in bags'*. EL PAÍS. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-03-23/kidnapping-and-escape-of-95-ecuadorian-migrants-in-chiapas-if-you-continue-informing-we-will-return-them-in-bags.html>
- Vasquez, A. (2024, May 28). *Mexico Election Is Most Violent Since 2018 with 749 Victims*. Bloomberg. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-29/mexico-election-is-most-violent-since-2018-with-749-victims?embedded-checkout=true>
- Verza, M., Llano, F. & Vera, R. (2024, July 9). *AP Team Untangles Violence Behind Largest Displacement of People in Decades in Southern Mexico*. The Associated Press. Retrieved from <https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/best-of-the-week/2024/ap-team-untangles-violence-behind-largest-displacement-of-people-in-decades-in-southern-mexico/>

Micronesia

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Micronesia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/micronesia/freedom-world/2024>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Micronesia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/micronesia/>

Moldova

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024a, February 12). *Moldovan journalists Viorica Tătaru and Andrei Captarenco detained in Tiraspol*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved <https://cpj.org/2024/02/moldovan-journalists-viorica-tataru-and-andrei-captarenco-detained-in-tiraspol/>

Committee to Protect Journalists. (2024b, June 28). *Russian journalist Timofei Ilyushin held for 2 days in Transnistria*. Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved from <https://cpj.org/2024/06/russian-journalist-timofei-ilyushin-held-for-2-days-in-transnistria/>

Crisis Watch. (2024, June). *Europe & Central Asia: Moldova*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=63](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=63)

Freedom House. (2022). *Transnistria: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/transnistria/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, May 25). *Moldova: Romani refugees from Ukraine face segregation*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/25/moldova-romani-refugees-ukraine-face-segregation>

Ibragimova, G. (2024, May 22). *Will Gagauzia Become Moldova's Second Breakaway Region?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/gagauzia-moldova-putin-shor?lang=en>

Necsutu, M. (2024a, March 1). *Moldovans Still Intolerant Towards LGBT Community, Study Shows*. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2024/03/01/moldovans-still-intolerant-towards-lgbt-community-study-shows/>

Necsutu, M. (2024b, May 21). *Legal Experts Warn New Moldovan Citizenship Rules Risk Statelessness*. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2024/05/21/legal-experts-warn-new-moldovan-citizenship-rules-risk-statelessness/>

Norwegian Refugee Council. (2024, April 16). *Two years on Ukrainian refugees in neighbouring countries struggle to make ends meet*. Norwegian Refugee Council. Retrieved from <https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/april/two-years-on-ukrainian-refugees-in-neighbouring-countries-struggle-to-make-ends-meet/>

Rosca, Matei. (2023, March 2). *Family of Transnistrian man jailed for protesting Russia's war speak out*. Open Democracy. Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/victor-plescanov-transnistria-jailed-russia-ukraine-war-protest/>

Tanas, A. (2024, June 10). *Moldovan president signs changes to treason law denounced by opposition*, *Amnesty International*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-president-signs-changes-treason-law-denounced-by-opposition-amnesty-2024-06-10/>

United Nations. (2024, May 20). *The Role of Community Mediators in the Integration of Roma Refugees in Moldova*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://moldova.un.org/en/269142-role-community-mediators-integration-roma-refugees-moldova>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Moldova*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/moldova/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Moldova*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/moldova/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Moldova*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/moldova/>

Monaco

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Monaco*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/monaco/freedom-world/2024>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Monaco*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/monaco/>

Mongolia

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Mongolia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mongolia/freedom-world/2024>

CIVICUS Monitor. (2024, July 8). *Mongolia: Press Freedom at Risk with Arrest and Prosecution of Journalists While Protesters Detained*. CIVICUS Monitor. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/mongolia-press-freedom-at-risk-with-arrest-and-prosecution-of-journalists-while-protesters-detained/>

Moritsugu, K. (2024, June 27). *Mongolia holds an election Friday. Its people see the government as benefiting the wealthy*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/mongolia-election-parliament-democracy-dd652827fdf990bc25c4a9e6e3348071>

Scott, L. (2024, July 2024). *Mongolia sentences prominent journalist to nearly 5 years in prison*. VOA News. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/mongolia-sentences-prominent-journalist-to-nearly-5-years-in-prison/7705478.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mongolia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mongolia/>

Montenegro

Aljazeera. (2021, September 4). *Montenegro protesters, police clash over Church head inauguration*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/4/protesters-police-clash-in-montenegro-over-church-ceremony>

Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024, March 22). *Montenegro: Seize the moment to strengthen protection of human rights*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/montenegro-seize-the-moment-to-strengthen-protection-of-human-rights>

European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. (2023, June 22). *Report to the Government of Montenegro on the ad hoc visit to Montenegro carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)*. Council of Europe. Retrieved from <https://rm.coe.int/1680abb132>

Freedom House. (2022). *Montenegro: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Montenegro*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/freedom-world/2024>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Montenegro*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/montenegro/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on Human Rights Practices: Montenegro*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/montenegro/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Montenegro*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/montenegro/>

Morocco

Ahmed, K. (2021, March 12). *Moroccan police accused of burning migrant shelters near Spanish enclave*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/12/moroccan-police-accused-of-burning-migrant-shelters-near-spanish-enclave>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Morocco and Western Sahara 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-western-sahara/report-morocco-and-western-sahara/>

El Atti, B. (2024, April 2). *In Morocco, women's rights activists face death threats amid family code reform*. The New Arab. Retrieved from <https://www.newarab.com/news/moroccos-feminists-face-death-threats-amid-code-reform>

Eljechtimi, A. (2022, June 28). *Morocco prosecutes 65 migrants involved in deadly Melilla incident*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/morocco-prosecutes-65-migrants-involved-deadly-melilla-incident-2022-06-27/>

Euro Med Monitor. (2023, March 26). *Morocco: Violent Suppression Of Student Activism At Hassan II University Is Unjustified; Immediate Investigation A Must*. Scoop World Independent News. Retrieved from <https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO2303/S00192/morocco-violent-suppression-of-student-activism-at-hassan-ii-university-is-unjustified-immediate-investigation-a-must.htm>

Farge, E. (2024, July 30). *Morocco's king pardons journalists and human rights activists critical of government*. Middle East Eye. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/morocco-three-journalists-and-intellectual-critical-government-pardoned-king-mohammed-vi>

Freedom House. (2022). *Morocco: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2022). *Western Sahara: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/western-sahara/freedom-world/2022>

González, Ricard. (2023, February 10). *The stifling gag on civil society in Morocco*. Equal Times. Retrieved from <https://www.equaltimes.org/the-stifling-gag-on-civil-society?lang=en#.ZCHR1-zMLHo>

Human Dignity Trust. (2024). *Morocco*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/morocco/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, June 29). *Morocco/Spain: Horrific migrant deaths at Melilla border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/29/morocco/spain-horrific-migrant-deaths-melilla-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Morocco*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/morocco-and-western-sahara>

Lighthouse Reports. (2024, May 21). *Desert Dumps*. Lighthouse Reports. Retrieved from <https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/desert-dumps/>

Metz, S. (2024, July 22). *Moroccan ex-minister who defended government critics sentenced to five years*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/morocco-political-prisoner-mohammed-ziane-5fced7bf894dc2682d172ded6f162be9>

Middle East Monitor. (2024, July 11). *Morocco police use water cannons to disperse doctors' protest*. Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240711-morocco-police-use-water-cannons-to-disperse-doctors-protest/>

Rédaction Africanews & AP. (2024, April 10). *A Moroccan activist handed 5-year jail term for criticizing the country's ties to Israel*. Africanews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2024/04/10/a-moroccan-activist-handed-5-year-jail-term-for-criticizing-the-countrys-ties-to-israel/>

Saada, H. (2024, August 14). Moroccan Intelligence Services Detain Families of Dissident Soldiers Amidst Media Blackout. Dzair Tube Media Group. Retrieved from <https://www.dzair-tube.dz/en/moroccan-intelligence-detains-families-of-dissident-soldiers-amidst-media-blackout/>

The Guardian. (2023, August 2). *Moroccan man jailed for five years for criticising king in Facebook posts*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/03/moroccan-man-jailed-for-five-years-for-criticising-king-in-facebook-posts>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Morocco*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/morocco>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Morocco*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/morocco/>

Mozambique

AFP. (2021, April 23). *Back from Mozambique, mercenary sees 'only hardships' for insurgent-hit North*. The Economic Times. Retrieved from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/back-from-mozambique-mercenary-sees-only-hardships-for-insurgent-hit-north/articleshow/82214280.cms?from=mdr>

AfricaNews. (2021, August 16). *Palma returnees accuse Mozambican security forces of abuses*. AfricaNews English. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/embed/1634998>

Aineah, A. (2023, January 18). *'Extreme brutality': Catholic Peace Entity on Burning of Bodies in Mozambique*. ACI Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.aciafrica.org/news/7472/extreme-brutality-catholic-peace-entity-on-burning-of-bodies-in-mozambique>

Aljazeera. (2021, March 2). *Army, private firm, fighters accused of Mozambique war crimes*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/2/mozambique-forces-armed-fighters-committing-war-crimes-amnesty>

Amnesty International. (2020, September 9). *Mozambique: Torture by security forces in gruesome videos must be investigated*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/mozambique-torture-by-security-forces-in-gruesome-videos-must-be-investigated/>

Amnesty International. (2021a). *Mozambique: Civilians killed as war crimes committed by armed group, government forces, and private military contractors – new report*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/>

Amnesty International. (2021b). *'What I saw is Death': War Crimes in Mozambique's Forgotten Cape*. Amnesty International.

Amnesty International. (2023, January 11). *Mozambique: Video Showing Soldiers Burning Corpses is Latest Evidence of Atrocities in Forgotten War in Cabo Delgado*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/mozambique-video-showing-soldiers-burning-corpses/>

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. (2021). *Mozambique Conflict Observatory*. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Retrieved from www.cabologado.com

BTI. (2024). *Mozambique country report 2024*. Retrieved from <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MOZ>

Campbell, J. (2020). *The Military-First Approach in Northern Mozambique is Bound to Fail*. Council on Foreign Relations, Africa in Transition. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/>

Cowling, Natalie. (2024, March 26). *Risk of mass killing in Mozambique from 2017-2018 to 2023-2024*. Retrieved from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1239301/risk-of-mass-killing-in-mozambique/>

Crisis Group. (2024, January). *January alerts and December trends*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/january-alerts-and-december-trends-2023>.

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Mozambique: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=118&crisis_state=&created=6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Eick, M. (2021, November 8). *Mozambique: Humanitarian crisis grows in Cabo Delgado as conflict continues*. OCHA Reliefweb.

Estelle, E., & Darden, J. T. (2021). *Assessing the Northern Mozambique Insurgency*. Combating the Islamic State's Spread in Africa.

Human Rights Watch. (2021, August 6). *Mozambique: Civilians Prevented from Fleeing Fighting*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/06/mozambique-civilians-prevented-fleeing-fighting>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Mozambique*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/mozambique>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Mozambique*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mozambique>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 15). *Mozambique: Child soldiers used in raid on Northern town*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/15/mozambique-child-soldiers-used-raid-northern-town>

International Crisis Group. (2021, June 11). *Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado*. Africa Report.

International Crisis Group / CrisisWatch. (2024a). *On The Horizon: June - November 2024*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/burundi-colombia-mozambique-pakistan/horizon-june-november-2024>

International Crisis Group / CrisisWatch. (2024b). *Mozambique*. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/june-trends-and-july-alerts-2024>

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). (2024, June 7). *Mozambique: Arbitrary arrests, physical attacks, and subsequent release of Sheila Wilson*. Retrieved from <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/mozambique-arbitrary-arrest-physical-attacks-and-subsequent-release>

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2024, March 8). *Over 110,000 displaced in Mozambique amidst surging violence as needs soar*. Retrieved from <https://www.iom.int/news/over-110000-displaced-mozambique-amidst-surging-violence-needs-soar>

Lister, T. (2021). The March 2021 Palma Attack and the Evolving Jihadi Terror Threat to Mozambique. *CTC Sentinel*, 14(4).

Machado, Zenaida (2024, March 1). *Thousands Flee New Violence in Northern Mozambique*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/01/thousands-flee-new-violence-northern-mozambique>

McKenzie, D. (2021, March 31). *Leader of mercenary group in Mozambique says that ISIS-linked insurgents hold Palma*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/30/africa/lionel-dyck-mozambique-insurgents-hold-palma-intl/>

MSF (2024, March 4) *Violence continues to displace and traumatise thousands in Cabo Delgado*. Retrieved from <https://www.msf.org/mozambique-violence-continues-displace-and-traumatise-thousands-cabo-delgado>

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024, February 26). *Mozambique access snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province – December 2023*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/mozambique/mozambique-access-snapshot-cabo-delgado-province-december-2023-enpt>.

Office of the Spokesperson. (2021). *State Department Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and Leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique*. U.S. Department of State.

Turse, N. (2021, March 1). *White South African mercenaries are indiscriminately killing people in Mozambique*. Vice World News. Retrieved from <https://www.vice.com/en/article/white-south-african-mercenaries-are-killing-people-at-random-in-mozambique/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mozambique*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mozambique/>

West, S. (2018). Ansar al-Sunna: A New Militant Islamist Group Emerges in Mozambique. *Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor*, 16(12).

Myanmar

Al Jazeera. (2022, March 24). *Myanmar military deliberately killed civilians after coup: Report*. Crimes Against Humanity News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/military-committing-crimes-against-humanity-in-myanmar-report>

Amnesty (2024a, August 21). *Myanmar: New attacks against Rohingya a disturbing echo of 2017 mass violence*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/myanmar-new-attacks-against-rohingya-a-disturbing-echo-of-2017-mass-violence/>

Amnesty (2024, July 8). *Myanmar: 'Reckless' shipments of jet fuel continue as air strikes multiply*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/myanmar-reckless-shipments-of-jet-fuel-continue-as-air-strikes-multiply/>

Associated Press. (2024, March 20). *As Myanmar's army faces setbacks, it is stepping up attacks on civilians, a UN expert warns*. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-fighting-civilians-tom-andrews-un-sanctions-2ab6553cf87dcbd49177e31856afa585>

Chau, Thompson. (2023, July 14). *Myanmar military regime accused of murdering political prisoners*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/14/myanmar-military-regime-accused-of-murdering-political-prisoners>

Chaudhuri, Pooja. (2024, June 5). *Burning villages: Violence escalates as Myanmar military reacts to territorial losses*. Bellingcat. Retrieved from <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2024/06/05/myanmar-military-territorial-losses-war-conflict-human-rights-burma/>

Fishbein, Emily and Zau Myet Awng. (2023, December 14). *'Fighting is all around': Myanmar faces deepening humanitarian crisis*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/14/fighting-is-all-around-myanmar-faces-deepening-humanitarian-crisis>.

Freedom House. (2022). *Myanmar: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Myanmar*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/myanmar-burma>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, May 5). *Myanmar: US recognizes genocide against Rohingya*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/21/myanmar-us-recognizes-genocide-against-rohingya>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 31). *Myanmar: 2 Years Since Coup, Worsening Repression*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/myanmar-2-years-coup-worsening-repression>

HRW (2024, August 22). *Myanmar: New Atrocities Against Rohingya*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/22/myanmar-new-atrocities-against-rohingya>

Lubov, D. C. (2023, January 18). *Army Destroys Catholic Church in Myanmar*. Vatican News. Retrieved from <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2023-01/army-destroys-catholic-church-in-myanmar.html>

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2023, December 6). *Urgent action needed to save lives amid intensifying conflict in Myanmar, says UN expert*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/urgent-action-needed-save-lives-amid-intensifying-conflict-myanmar-says-un>.

OHCHR. (2024, January 30). *Myanmar: Human rights situation worsens as military lashes out indiscriminately amid losses – Turk*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/01/myanmar-human-rights-situation-worsens-military-lashes-out-indiscriminately>

Paddock, R. C. (2022, October 25). *Airstrike kills at least 80 during outdoor concert in Myanmar*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/25/world/asia/myanmar-coup-concert-killed.html>

Peck, Grant (2024, May 13). *Reports of army killing of villagers in Myanmar supported by photos and harrowing tale of a survivor*. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-massacre-of-civilians-by-army-c4b65ef8a61b327d77950e237a5b80b1>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on Religious Freedom: Burma*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/>

Wright, Rebecca; Coren, Anna; Ripon, Tanibiral Miraj; and Phillips, Mark. (2024, August 29). *Massacre survivors say history is repeating – with new perpetrators*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/29/asia/myanmar-massacre-survivor-testimonies-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>

Namibia

AfricaNews. (2023, July 20). *Namibia: vote on a law against same-sex marriage*. AfricaNews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/20/namibia-vote-on-a-law-against-same-sex-marriage/>

Markowitz, J. (2024, May 3). *LAC calls for action on violence in Namibia*. The Namibian. Retrieved from <https://www.namibian.com.na/lac-calls-for-action-on-violence-in-namibia/>

Savage, R. (2024, June 21). *Namibia high court overturns law banning gay sex*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/21/namibia-high-court-overturns-law-banning-consensual-gay-sex>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Namibia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/namibia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Namibia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/namibia/>

Nepal

Chepang, B. (2024, February 2). *The perils of extracting limestone in Nepal's Indigenous Chepang communities*. Global Voices. Retrieved from <https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/02/the-perils-of-extracting-limestone-in-nepals-indigenous-chepang-communities/>

Civics Monitor. (2024, February 2). *Nepal: Civic freedoms at risk with Tik Tok ban, social media directive and targeting of journalists and protesters*. Civics Monitor. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civics.org/explore/nepal-civic-freedoms-at-risk-with-tik-tok-ban-social-media-directive-and-targeting-of-journalists-and-protesters/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Nepal: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nepal/freedom-world/2022>

Ghimire, B. (2024a, June 27). *Government dragging feet on torture perpetrators: NHRC*. The Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/06/27/government-dragging-feet-on-torture-perpetrators-nhrc>

Ghimire, B. (2024b, July 10). *Recurrent violence plagues Nepal's juvenile correction centres*. The Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/07/10/recurrent-violence-plagues-nepal-s-juvenile-correction-centres>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, October 18). *Nepal: Police allegedly use excessive force on protesters, Target activists*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/18/nepal-police-allegedly-use-excessive-force-protesters-target-activists>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Nepal*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/nepal>

Human Rights Watch. (2024a, January 11). *Nepal: More Progress Needed on Transitional Justice Law*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/nepal-more-progress-needed-transitional-justice-law>

Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. (2024, May 14). *Nepal: Retaliations against human rights defenders over business complex 'deplorable', say UN Experts*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/05/nepal-retaliations-against-human-rights-defenders-over-business-complex>

OpIndia. (2024, July 2). *Nepal: Muslim mob stops road construction work in Sarlahi, houses of Dalit Hindus attacked in stone pelting*. OpIndia. Retrieved from <https://www.opindia.com/2024/07/nepal-muslim-mob-stops-road-construction-work-in-sarlahi-houses-of-dalit-hindus-attacked/>

Nepali Times. (2024, May 12). *Who cares?* Nepali Times. Retrieved from <https://nepalitimes.com/news/who-cares>

Sunar, P. (2024, June 7). *Study reveals 71 percent of Dalit women face violence due to inter-caste marriage.* myRepública. Retrieved from <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/study-reveals-71-percent-of-dalit-women-face-violence-due-to-inter-caste-marriage/>

The Kathmandu Post. (2024, April 9). *Police, pro-monarchy protesters clash in Kathmandu.* The Kathmandu Post. Retrieved from <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2024/04/09/police-pro-monarchy-protesters-clash-in-kathmandu>

Tibetan Review. (2024, July 11). *Previously banned, Dalai Lama's 89th birthday celebrated in Nepal's capital.* Tibetan Review. Retrieved from <https://www.tibetanreview.net/previously-banned-dalai-lamas-89th-birthday-celebrated-in-nepals-capital/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nepal.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nepal/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nepal.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nepal/>

Netherlands

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: Netherlands.* Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/netherlands/freedom-world/2024>

Human Rights Council. (2024, April 2). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Balakrishnan Rajagopal.* United Nations. Retrieved from <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/033/33/pdf/g2403333.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, June 2). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Netherlands.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/netherlands/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: The Netherlands.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/netherlands>

New Zealand

Freedom House. (2024). *Freedom in the World 2024: New Zealand.* Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/new-zealand/freedom-world/2024>

Te Kāhui Tika Tangata Human Rights Commission. (2024). *Our Work.* Te Kāhui Tika Tangata Human Rights Commission. Retrieved from <https://tikatangata.org.nz/about-us>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: New Zealand*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/new-zealand/>

Nicaragua

Aburto, W. M. (2024, February 21). *Trials via video call, disappearances and disease: this is what political prisoners are subjected to in Nicaragua*. EL PAÍS. Retrieved from <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-02-21/trials-via-video-call-disappearances-and-disease-this-is-what-political-prisoners-are-subjected-to-in-nicaragua.html>

AFP. (2024, July 11). *Journalists Flee Nicaragua Amidst Government Crackdown*. The Tico Times. Retrieved from <https://ticotimes.net/2024/07/11/journalists-flee-nicaragua-amidst-government-crackdown>

Agencia EFE. (2024, July 13). *Indígenas de Nicaragua denuncian “etnocidio” ante la CIDH*. Confidencial. Retrieved from <https://confidencial.digital/nacion/indigenas-de-nicaragua-denuncian-etnocidio-ante-la-cidh/>

Bermúdez, A. F., Kurmanaev, A., & Mendoza, Y. (2022, August 23). *Nicaragua silences its last outspoken critics: Catholic priests*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/23/world/americas/nicaragua-catholic-church-daniel-ortega.html>

Crisis Watch. (2024, July). *Nicaragua*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from [https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location\[\]=158](https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location[]=158)

Elhabbal, M. (2024, August 5). *12 Nicaraguan Catholic priests missing after slew of weekend arrests*. Catholic Vote. Retrieved from <https://catholicvote.org/twelve-nicaraguan-priests-arrested-government-crackdown/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Nicaragua: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nicaragua/freedom-world/2022>

Genocide Watch. (2024, July 8). *Country Report: Nicaragua July 2024*. Genocide Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/country-report-nicaragua-july-2024>

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024, May 31). *Nicaragua*. Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nicaragua/>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Nicaragua*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/nicaragua>

Human Rights Watch. (2024). *World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Nicaragua*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/nicaragua>

Janetsky, M. & Selser, G. (2024, February 29). *UN experts accuse Nicaragua’s government of abuses ‘tantamount to crimes against humanity’*. AP News. Retrieved from

<https://apnews.com/article/nicaragua-united-nations-daniel-ortega-human-rights-822da5ffbb588dfe1deb3aceb9b45ff0>

Mosaico CSI. (2024, August 9). *Pueblos indígenas bajo ataque y criminalización en Nicaragua*. Mosaico. Retrieved from <https://mosaicocsi.com/2024/08/09/pueblos-indigenas-bajo-ataque-y-criminalizacion-en-nicaragua/>

Peralta, E. (2023, February 17). *In a continued crackdown on dissent, Nicaragua strips 94 people of their citizenship*. NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2023/02/17/1157773671/in-a-continued-crackdown-on-dissent-nicaragua-strips-94-people-of-their-citizens>

Radwin, M. (2024, July 29). *Activists ask for help combatting violence against Nicaragua's Indigenous communities*. Mongabay. Retrieved from <https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/activists-ask-for-help-combatting-violence-against-nicaraguas-indigenous-communities/>

Redacción Confidencial. (2024, February 11). *Nicaragua: Mayangna Forest Rangers Get 22 Years in Prison*. CONFIDENCIAL. Retrieved from <https://confidencial.digital/english/nicaragua-mayangna-forest-rangers-get-22-years-in-prison/>

Relief Web. (2024, June 20). *Oral update on promotion and protection of human rights in Nicaragua*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/nicaragua/oral-update-promotion-and-protection-human-rights-nicaragua-20-june-2024>

Reuters. (2023, May 4). *Nicaragua arrests 40 opposition figures in new round-up of critics*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-arrests-40-opposition-figures-new-round-up-critics-2023-05-04/>

United Nations. (2023, March 2). *Nicaragua: Crimes against humanity being committed against civilians for political reasons, investigation says*. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/nicaragua-crimes-against-humanity-being-committed-against-civilians>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nicaragua*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nicaragua/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Nicaragua*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nicaragua/>

U.S. Department of State. (2024). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nicaragua*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nicaragua/>

Vatican News. (2024, August 9). *Nicaragua exiles seven more priests*. Vatican News. Retrieved from <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2024-08/nicaragua-exiles-seven-priests-to-rome.html>

Niger

Africa News. (2024, May 20). *US troops to depart from Niger by mid-September, the Pentagon says*. Africa News. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2024/05/20/us-troops-to-depart-from-niger-by-mid-september-the-pentagon-says/>

Al Jazeera. (2024, June 14). *Niger court scraps immunity of deposed President Bazoum*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/14/niger-court-scraps-immunity-of-deposed-president-bazoum>

Amnesty International. (2024, May 3). *Niger: Press Freedom in Jeopardy as journalists working on conflict intimidated and arrested*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/niger-press-freedom-in-jeopardy-as-journalists-working-on-conflict-intimidated-and-arrested/>

Crisis Group. (2024, May). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Pakistan*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/may-trends-and-june-alerts-2024#pakistan>

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. (2024, May 28). *Niger*. European Union. Retrieved from https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/niger_en#:~:text=Niger%20continues%20to%20suffer%20significant,people%20to%20leave%20their%20homes.

Defense Post. (2024a, April 11). *Bomb kills six Niger soldiers prompting air strikes*. The Defense Post. Retrieved from <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/04/11/bomb-kills-niger-soldiers/>

Defense Post. (2024b, March 7). *Niger, Mali, Burkina creating joint anti-Jihadist force*. The Defense Post. Retrieved from <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/03/07/niger-mali-burkina-anti-jihadist-force/>

Defense Post. (2024c, February 9). *Suspected Jihadists kill nine in volatile Niger region*. The Defense Post. Retrieved from <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/02/09/jihadists-attack-niger-tillaberi/>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, August 11). *Niger: Surging atrocities by armed Islamist groups*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/11/niger-surging-atrocities-armed-islamist-groups>

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2022). *Niger*. IDMC. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/niger>

News24. (2022, May 25). *Niger violence sparks new wave of displacement: UN*. News24. Retrieved from <https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/niger-violence-sparks-new-wave-of-displacement-un-20220525>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Niger*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/niger/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Reports on Human Rights Practices: Niger*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/niger/>

International Crisis Group. (2023, July). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=27&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Nigeria

Al Jazeera. (2023, May 19). *More than 100 people dead in communal clashes in central Nigeria*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/19/more-than-100-people-dead-in-communal-clashes-in-central-nigeria>.

Al Jazeera (2024a, September 4). *Dozens killed in Boko Haram attack on village in northeastern Nigeria*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/4/dozens-killed-in-boko-haram-attack-on-village-in-northeastern-nigeria>

Al Jazeera (2024, June 30). *At least 18 killed, dozens injured in Nigeria suicide attacks*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/30/at-least-18-killed-dozens-injured-in-nigeria-suicide-attacks>

Amnesty International. (2021, August 5). *Nigeria: At least 115 people killed by security forces in four months in country's southeast*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/nigeria-at-least-115-people-killed-by-security-forces-in-four-months-in-countrys-southeast/>

Carboni, A., & Serwat, L. (2023, February 22). *Political Violence and the 2023 Nigerian Election*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2023/02/22/political-violence-and-the-2023-nigerian-election/>

Carsten, P., Lewis, D., Levinson, R., & George, L. (2022, December 12). *Nigerian Army massacred children in war on insurgents, witnesses say*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/nigeria-military-children/>

Crisis Group. (2024, March). *CrisisWatch Database*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=28&crisis_state=&created=&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024.

Defense Post (2024, June 11). *Nigeria Gunmen Kill 26, Kidnap Dozens*. Retrieved from <https://thedefensepost.com/2024/06/11/nigeria-gunmen-kill-26/>

Early Warning Project (2024, January 12). *Countries at Risk for Mass Killing 2023–24: Early Warning Project Statistical Risk Assessment Results*. Retrieved from <https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/reports/countries-at-risk-for-mass-killing-2023-24-early-warning-project-statistical-risk-assessment-results>

Freedom House. (2022). *Nigeria: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2022>

Global R2P (2024, September 1). *Nigeria*. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nigeria/>
 Human Rights Watch. (2022, December 13). *Reports allege Nigerian Army abuses*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/13/reports-allege-nigerian-army-abuses>

International Crisis Group. (2023, July). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=28&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). (2023, February 14). *Elections in Nigeria: 2023 General Elections*. IFES. Retrieved from <https://www.ifes.org/tools-resources/election-snapshots/elections-nigeria-2023-general-elections>

Kingimi, Ahmed. (2024, September 3) *Suspected Boko Haram militants kill at least 37 in Nigeria attack*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/suspected-boko-haram-militants-kill-least-37-nigeria-attack-2024-09-03/>

Momoh, M. (2023, January 26). *Another military air strike kills 27 civilians in Nigeria*. The East African. Retrieved from <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/nigeria-military-strike-kills-27-civilians-4100098>

NPR. (2022, June 7). *What we know about the deadly church shooting in Nigeria*. NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/07/1103445411/what-we-know-about-the-deadly-church-shooting-in-nigeria>

Obiezu, T. (2022, August 10). *Nigerian authorities make arrests in Deadly Church attack*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerian-authorities-make-arrests-in-deadly-church-attack-6696255.html>

OHCHR. (2024, March 15). *Nigeria: UN Human Rights Chief appalled by recent mass abductions*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/nigeria-un-human-rights-chief-appalled-recent-mass-abductions>

Pinedo, Peter. (2024, January 31). *Is persecution in Nigeria a Christian genocide? This bishop says ‘yes.’* Eurasia Review. Retrieved from <https://www.eurasiareview.com/31012024-is-persecution-in-nigeria-a-christian-genocide-this-bishop-says-yes/>

Radio France Internationale. (2023, December 27). *After the “Black Christmas” massacres, central Nigeria in mourning calls for justice*. Retrieved from <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231227-le-centre-du-nigeria-en-deuil-apr%C3%AAs-les-massacres-du-black-christmas-r%C3%A9clame-justice>.

Sarafa Babatunde Shittu and Sunmola Kazeem Adebayo (2023). *Forced migration in Nigeria: Trends patterns and determinants*. Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 1, no. 2: 218–227.

United Nations. (2023, February 2). *Nigeria: UN genocide expert warns against worsening security situation*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133107>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nigeria>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nigeria/>

Vanguard News. (2024, February 14). *Rising human rights violations worrisome – NHRC*. Retrieved from <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2024/02/rising-human-rights-violations-worrisome-nhrc/>

North Korea

Amnesty International. (2022). *North Korea*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/north-korea/report-korea-democratic-peoples-republic-of/>

Bremer, I. & O'Carroll, C. (2024, June 13). *UN Security Council debates North Korean human rights, exposing fissures again*. NK News. Retrieved from <https://www.nknews.org/2024/06/un-security-council-debates-north-korean-human-rights-exposing-fissures-again/>

CIVICUS Monitor. (2024, May 7). *North Korea: Thousands held in prison camps while authorities maintain control over speech and clothing*. CIVICUS. Retrieved from [https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/north-korea-thousands-held-in-prison-camps-while-authorities-maintain-control-over-speech-and-clothing/#:~:text=Political%20prison%20camps%20\(kwanliso\)%20were,Korea%20forcibly%20in%20October%202023.](https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/north-korea-thousands-held-in-prison-camps-while-authorities-maintain-control-over-speech-and-clothing/#:~:text=Political%20prison%20camps%20(kwanliso)%20were,Korea%20forcibly%20in%20October%202023.)

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (2024, April 8). *Universal Periodic Review of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)*. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Retrieved from <https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/UPR-2024.pdf>

Freedom House. (2022). *North Korea: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-korea/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in North Korea*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/north-korea>

Jang, S. (2024, April 29). *N. Korean military orders end to violence at boot camps*. Daily NK. Retrieved from <https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-military-orders-end-violence-boot-camps/>

Ochab, E. (2022, July 18). *Crimes against humanity continue unabated in North Korea - will Kim Jong-un face justice?* Forbes. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2022/07/16/crimes-against-humanity-continue-unabated-in-north-koreawill-kim-jong-un-face-justice/?sh=7e901d527adf>

Seo, Y., Raine, A., & Bae, G. (2023, March 24). *Torture, forced abortions and insects for food: Life inside North Korean jails, says this NGO.* CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/23/asia/north-korea-torture-prison-report-intl-hnk-dst/index.html>

United Nations. (2023a). *52nd regular session of the Human Rights Council: Reports.* OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session52/list-reports>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/north-korea/>

Yoon, L. (2024, May 8). *China Forcibly Returns 60 Refugees to North Korea.* Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/08/china-forcibly-returns-60-refugees-north-korea>

North Macedonia

BBC News. (2024, 10 June). *North Macedonia country profile.* BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17550407>

Norway

Freedom House. (2024). *Norway.* Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/norway/freedom-world/2024>

Oman

Al Maashani, Q. (2023, May 23). *Expatriate workforce reaches 1.776 million in Oman.* Oman Daily Observer. Retrieved from <https://www.omandailyobserver.com/article/1137648/oman/community/expatriate-workforce-reaches-1776-million-in-oman>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Oman.* Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/oman/report-oman/>

Fanack. (2023, January 23). *Kafala system continues to entrap workers, despite reforms.* Retrieved from <https://fanack.com/human-rights/migrant-labour-in-the-middle-east/kafala-system-continues-to-entrap-workers-despite-reforms/>.

Freedom House. (2022). *Oman: Freedom in the world 2022 country report.* Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/oman/freedom-world/2022>

Freedom House. (2024). *Oman.* Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/oman/freedom-world/2024>

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *Oman*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/oman>

Migrant-Rights. (2023, August 14). *Oman's new labour law: An overview*. Retrieved from <https://www.migrant-rights.org/2023/08/omans-new-labour-law-an-overview/>

Rosen, B. (2022, December 7). *Migrant Domestic Workers in Oman: A lost population*. Brown Political Review. Retrieved from <https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2022/12/migrant-domestic-workers-in-oman/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/oman/>

Yates, D. A. (2022, August 31). *Oman: Kafala system enables recruitment agencies to exploit workers as 27 Liberian "trafficked" women are repatriated, says Liberian Authority*. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/oman-kafala-system-enables-recruitment-agencies-to-exploit-workers-as-27-liberian-trafficked-women-are-repatriated-says-liberian-authority/>

Pakistan

Aamir, A. (2023, January 2). *Pakistan: Mass arrests and imposition of emergency law following protests against China-Pakistan economic corridor in Gwadar has a chilling effect, warns right group*. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/pakistan-mass-arrests-and-imposition-of-emergency-law-following-protests-against-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-in-gwadar-has-a-chilling-effect-warns-right-group/>

Aljazeera. (2021, August 19). *Ashura procession in Pakistan hit by blast, 3 killed*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/19/blast-hits-ashura-procession-in-pakistan-dozens-wounded>

Al Jazeera. (2024, February 26). *Arabic calligraphy on dress design causes chaos in Pakistan*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/2/26/arabic-calligraphy-on-dress-design-causes-chaos-in-pakistan>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Pakistan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/pakistan/report-pakistan/>

Amnesty International. (2024, June 21). *Pakistan: Authorities must end escalating attacks on minority Ahmadiyya community*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/end-escalating-attacks-on-minority-ahmadiyya-community/>

Banerjee, A. (2024, March 22). *Pakistan court sentences woman to life imprisonment for burning pages of Quran*. India TV News. Retrieved from <https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/pakistan-court-sentences-woman-to-life-imprisonment-for-burning-pages-of-quran-latest-updates-2024-03-22-922782>

CIVICUS Monitor. (2024a, May 14). *Pakistan: Activists and journalists targeted, increased controls on online expression and crackdown on protests*. CIVICUS. Retrieved from

<https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/pakistan-activists-and-journalists-targeted-increased-controls-on-online-expression-and-crackdown-on-protests/>

CIVICUS Monitor. (2024b, January 22). *Pakistan: Crackdown on the opposition, Baloch protestors and other civic freedoms ahead of elections*. CIVICUS. Retrieved from

<https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/pakistan-crackdown-on-the-opposition-baloch-protesters-and-other-civic-freedoms-ahead-of-elections/>

Crisis Group. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Pakistan*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=40&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

Freedom House. (2022). *Pakistan: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Pakistan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/pakistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, May 11). *Pakistan: Excessive force against violent Khan protests*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/11/pakistan-excessive-force-against-violent-khan-protests>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, May 20). *Pakistan: Mass Arrests Target Political Opposition*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/20/pakistan-mass-arrests-target-political-opposition>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 28). *"I Escaped with Only My Life"*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/28/i-escaped-only-my-life/abusive-forced-evictions-pakistan>

Hussain, A. (2024, May 3). *Why are Pakistan's wheat farmers protesting against the government?*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/3/why-are-pakistans-farmers-protesting-against-the-government>

International Crisis Group. (2024). *Pakistan*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan>

Khan, H. N., & Hussain, S. (2022, March 4). *Islamic State claims attack that killed dozens at Pakistani Mosque*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/04/pakistan-mosque-blast/>

NPR. (2023, August 16). *A mob in Pakistan burned a church and Christian homes after blasphemy accusations*. NPR. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2023/08/16/1194162768/pakistan-christians-churches-attacked-mob-blasphemy>

Relief Web. (2024, February 9). *Pakistan: 30 people killed in twin bombings on election offices in Balochistan, 7 Feb 2024*. Relief Web. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-30-people-killed-twin-bombings-election-officesbalochistan-7-feb-2024>

Shami, E. (2024, March 8). *Pakistan blasphemy: Student sentenced to death over Whatsapp messages*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68511557>

Siddique, A. (2022, December 14). *'Everyone is anxious': Pakistan's mass arrests of Afghan refugees fuel fear of new crackdown*. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-mass-arrests-afghan-refugees-crackdown/32133823.html>

Times of India. (2024, April 1). *Pakistan witnessed 245 terror attacks, counter-terror operations in first quarter of 2024: Think tank report*. Times of India. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-witnessed-245-terror-attacks-counter-terror-operations-in-first-quarter-of-2024-think-tank-report/articleshow/108940654.cms>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/pakistan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/pakistan/>

Venema, V., & Davies, C. (2023, May 11). *Imran Khan: Deadly violence in Pakistan as EX-PM charged with corruption*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65541215>

Palau

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2024). *Palau to Become the 124th State Party to ICSANT*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/icsant/en/web-stories/2024-palau.html>

Panama

Council on Foreign Relations. (2024, February 1). *Crossing the Darién Gap: Migrants Risk Death on the Journey to the U.S.*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/article/crossing-darien-gap-migrants-risk-death-journey-us>

Freedom House. (2022). *Panama: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/panama/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, September 27). *Migrants crossing a dangerous area need Panama's help*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/27/migrants-crossing-dangerous-area-need-panamas-help>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 3). *Colombia, Panama Fail to Protect Migrants in Darién Gap*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/03/colombia-panama-fail-protect-migrants-darien-gap>

Reuters. (2022, October 11). *Panama says record 150,000 migrants crossed dangerous Darien Gap this year*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/panama-says-record-150000-migrants-crossed-dangerous-darien-gap-this-year-2022-10-11/>

Papua New Guinea

ACLED. (2024). *Papua New Guinea: Country descends into chaos during police strike*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/02/09/regional-overview-asia-pacific-january-2024/#:~:text=Papua%20New%20Guinea%3A%20Country%20descends%20into%20chaos%20during%20Opolice%20strike>

Al Jazeera. (2024, February 19). *At least 64 killed in 'largest' tribal clashes in Papua New Guinea*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/dozens-killed-in-largest-tribal-clashes-in-papua-new-guinea>

Freedom House. (2022). *Papua New Guinea: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/papua-new-guinea/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, February 10). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Papua New Guinea*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea>

IDMC. (2022). *Papua New Guinea*. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/papua-new-guinea>

Kuku, R. (2022, October 25). *More than 30 dead in tribal fighting on Papua New Guinea's 'Island of love'*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/25/more-than-30-dead-in-tribal-fighting-on-papua-new-guineas-kiriwina-island>

Togiba, L. (2022, July 22). *Dozens killed and thousands displaced in election fighting in Papua New Guinea, UN says*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/22/dozens-killed-and-thousands-displaced-in-election-fighting-in-papua-new-guinea-un-says>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Papua New Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/papua-new-guinea/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Papua New Guinea*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/papua-new-guinea/>

United Nations. (2022, September 6). *Papua New Guinea: Conflict and election-related violence trigger wave of displacement | UN news*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1126051>

Yayboke, E., Rice, B., Nzuki, C., & Strouboulis, A. (2022, August 17). *Addressing fragility in Papua New Guinea*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-fragility-papua-new-guinea>

Zarriga, M. (2022, July 21). *18 people hacked to death in Porgera in under an hour amid PNG elections*. Asia Pacific Report. Retrieved from <https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/07/21/18-people-hacked-to-death-in-porgera-in-under-an-hour-amid-png-elections/>

Paraguay

CIVICUS. (2022a, January 26). *Paraguay: Protests for land rights amid wave of forced evictions*. Monitor: Tracking Civil Space. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2022/01/26/paraguay-protests-land-rights-amid-wave-forced-evictions/>

CIVICUS. (2022b, July 21). *Paraguay: Violent evictions affect land rights defenders*. Monitor: Tracking Civil Space. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2022/01/26/paraguay-protests-land-rights-amid-wave-forced-evictions/>

The Guardian. (2024, February 14). *Paraguay senate expels one of few opposition members, sparking protests*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/14/paraguay-opposition-expelled-senate>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Paraguay*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/paraguay/>

Peru

Chaparro, A. (2024, February 17). *A trial highlights violence against environmentalists in Peru*. Le Monde. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/02/17/in-peru-a-trial-highlights-violence-against-environmentalists_6533172_4.html

Garzon, E. F. (2023, January 13). *Over 300 civilians imprisoned, confirms Public Ministry in Peru*. Prensa Latina - Latin American News Agency. Retrieved from <https://www.plenglish.com/news/2023/01/13/over-300-civilians-imprisoned-confirms-public-ministry-in-peru/>

González Cabrera, C. (2024a, May 15). *Peru Chooses Bigotry in Medical Services*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/15/peru-chooses-bigotry-medical-services>

González Cabrera, C. (2024b, June 17). *Peru Walks Back Anti-Trans Guidance in Health System*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/27/peru-walks-back-anti-trans-guidance-health-system>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, June 12). *Peru: Congress Ramps Up Assault on Democratic System*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/12/peru-congress-ramps-assault-democratic-system>

Newell, C. (2024, January 23). *Peruvian Gold Mining Gangs Launch Increasingly Brazen Attacks*. InSight Crime. Retrieved from <https://insightcrime.org/news/peruvian-gold-mining-gangs-launch-increasingly-brazen-attacks/>

Perez, R. & Hoetmer, R. (2024, June 27). *Indigenous Women Denounce Violence and Call for Gender Justice in the Peruvian Amazon*. Amazon Watch. Retrieved from <https://amazonwatch.org/news/2024/0627-indigenous-women-denounce-violence-and-call-for-gender-justice-in-the-peruvian-amazon>

Rebaza, C. (2024, June 25). *Human rights groups accuse Peru's president of crimes against humanity in submission to ICC*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/25/americas/boluarte-allegations-icc-crimes-against-humanity-intl-latam/index.html>

Taj, M. (2022, December 16). *Death toll in Peru protests rises as new leader struggles for Control*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/16/world/americas/peru-protests-castillo-boluarte.html>

Taj, M., Turkewitz, J., & Glatky, G. (2023, January 10). *Death toll in Peru rises to 47 amid extraordinary violence*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/americas/peru-protests-deaths.html>

Turkewitz, J. (2022, December 18). *In heart of Peru's protest, a pause to mourn the dead*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/18/world/americas/peru-protests.html>

United Nations. (2024, June 26). *Peru: UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances alarmed by draft bill establishing a statute of limitations on crimes against humanity and war crimes*. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/06/peru-un-committee-enforced-disappearances-alarmed-draft-bill-establishing>

US Mission Lima. (2024, February 14). *Security Alert: Curfew and State of Emergency Declared in Trujillo and Pataz*. U.S. Embassy In Peru. Retrieved from <https://pe.usembassy.gov/security-alert-curfew-and-state-of-emergency-declared-in-trujillo-and-pataz-u-s-embassy-lima-peru-february-13-2024>.

Philippines

Abella, V. (2024, May 1). *Four UP Students Arrested Amid Police Violence in Labor Day Protest*. Philippine Collegian. Retrieved from <https://phkule.org/article/1201/four-up-students-arrested-amid-police-violence-in-labor-day-protest>

Baron, G. (2024, February 15). *One-third of Filipino children experience sexual violence before reaching 18*. Daily Tribune. Retrieved from <https://tribune.net.ph/2024/02/15/one-third-of-filipino-children-experience-sexual-violence-before-reaching-18-cptcsa>

Crisis Watch. (2024, June). *Philippines: Security operations continued in south, as authorities continued to fight communist rebels*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/june-trends-and-july-alerts-2024#philippines>

Feng, E. (2024, June 18). *President Marcos Jr. hasn't put an end to the killings in the Philippines' drug war*. National Public Radio. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2024/06/18/nx-s1-4902842/president-marcos-jr-hasnt-put-an-end-to-killings-in-the-philippines-drug-war>

Gomez, J. (2023, March 6). *Philippine leader orders crackdown after governor's killing*. ABC News. Retrieved from <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/philippine-leader-orders-crackdown-after-governors-killing-97650918>

Human Rights Watch. (2017, March 2). *Philippines' 'war on drugs'*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/tag/philippines-war-drugs>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Philippines*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/philippines>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Philippines*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/philippines>

Human Rights Watch. (2024a, April 7). *Philippines: New 'Drug War' Declared in Davao City*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/07/philippines-new-drug-war-declared-davao-city>

Human Rights Watch. (2024b, May 8). *Philippines: Supreme Court Rejects 'Red-Tagging'*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/08/philippines-supreme-court-rejects-red-tagging>

IBON International. (2022, June 10). *On the illegal, mass arrest of 92 peasants and advocates in the Philippines*. IBON International. Retrieved from <https://iboninternational.org/2022/06/10/mass-arrest-92-peasants-philippines/>

The Philippine Star. (2024, April 4). *Davao's new drug war: 51 suspects nabbed*. The Philippine Star. Retrieved from <https://www.philstar.com/nation/2024/04/04/2345129/davaos-new-drug-war-51-suspects-nabbed>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Philippines*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/philippines/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b, June 2). *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Philippines*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/philippines/>

Poland

AP News. (2024, June 13). *Poland reintroduces restrictions on accessing areas along Belarus border due to migration pressure*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/poland-belarus-border-migration-c27e8aaaefecb2475e50eb5d95eaf815>

Ciobanu, C. (2024, May 27). *Poland's New Government Continues Migrant Pushbacks on Belarus Border*. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2024/05/27/polands-new-government-continues-migrant-pushbacks-on-belarus-border>

Freedom House. (2022). *Poland: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/poland/freedom-world/2022>

Henley, J., Rankin, J., & Roth, A. (2021, August 10). *Latvia and Lithuania act to counter migrants crossing Belarus border*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/10/latvia-and-lithuania-act-to-counter-migrants-crossing-belarus-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, June 8). *Violence and pushbacks at Poland-Belarus border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/violence-and-pushbacks-poland-belarus-border>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Poland*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/poland>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Poland*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/poland>

Kennedy, N., & Mortensen, A. (2021, October 11). *Record number of people attempt to cross the border between Poland and Belarus, officials say*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/10/europe/poland-belarus-border-crossing-migrants-record-number-intl/index.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Poland*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/poland/>

Portugal

United Nations. (2024). *Portugal*. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved <https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/portugal>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Portugal*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/portugal/>

Qatar

Freedom House. (2022). *Qatar: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2022>

Grothe, C. (2022). *The Long Shadow of Qatar's human rights abuses*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/article/long-shadow-qatars-human-rights-abuses>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, November 21). *Qatar: Rights abuses stain FIFA World Cup*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/14/qatar-rights-abuses-stain-fifa-world-cup>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, October 24). *Qatar: Security forces arrest, abuse LGBT people*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/24/qatar-security-forces-arrest-abuse-lgbt-people>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, June 16). *Qatar: Six Months Post-World Cup, Migrant Workers Suffer*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/16/qatar-six-months-post-world-cup-migrant-workers-suffer>

Mills, A. (2022, October 29). *Exclusive: Thousands of workers evicted in Qatar's capital ahead of World Cup*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/exclusive-thousands-workers-evicted-qatars-capital-ahead-world-cup-2022-10-28/>

McQue, K. (2024, April 25). *'Every day I cry': 50 women talk about life as a domestic worker under the Gulf's kafala system*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/apr/25/kafala-labour-system-gulf-women-talk-about-life-as-a-domestic-worker-in-the-gulf>

Parry, J. (2024, June 5). *Man arrested in Qatar Grindr 'sting' sentenced*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj55y7v23y0o>

Reuters. (2022, December 15). *World Cup 2022: How many migrant workers have died in Qatar?* Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/world-cup-2022-how-many-migrant-workers-have-died-qatar-2022-11-24/>

Saul, D. (2022, October 12). *Qatar World Cup controversy continues: 60 migrant workers arrested protesting dire conditions*. Forbes. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/08/22/qatar-world-cup-controversy-continues-60-migrant-workers-arrested-protesting-dire-conditions/?sh=7ee9fc9962ed>

U.S. Department of State. (2022a, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Qatar*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/qatar>

U.S. Department of State. (2022b, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on International Religious Freedom: Qatar*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/qatar/>

Romania

Freedom House. (2024). *Nations in Transit 2024: Romania*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/romania/nations-transit/2024>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Romania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://ro.usembassy.gov/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices-romania/>

Russia

Fisher, M. (2022, February 19). *Putin's baseless claims of genocide hint at more than war*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/europe/putin-ukraine-genocide.html>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 9). *Russia: Escalating Persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/09/russia-escalating-persecution-jehovahs-witnesses>

Human Rights Watch. (2022a, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Russia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/russia>

Human Rights Watch. (2022b, February 28). *Russia: Arbitrary detentions of anti-war protesters*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/26/russia-arbitrary-detentions-anti-war-protesters>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, March 22). *Russia: Brutal arrests and torture, ill-treatment of anti-war protesters*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/09/russia-brutal-arrests-and-torture-ill-treatment-anti-war-protesters>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, February 1). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Russian Federation*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/russian-federation>

Litvinova, D., & Jordans, F. (2023, April 28). *Russia cracks down on more rights groups, raids activists*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-alexei-navalny-jail-human-rights-1f8ad94112a9b076ae79077de6f87a23>

OHCHR. (2022, September 27). *Arrests in Russia at protests over Troop Mobilization*. OHCHR. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/09/arrests-russia-protests-over-troop-mobilization>

OVD-Info. (2022a, April 14). *No to war: How Russian authorities are suppressing anti-war protests*. OVD-Info. Retrieved from <https://reports.ovdinfo.org/no-to-war-en#1>

OVD-Info. (2022b, August 17). *Summary of anti-war repressions. Six months of war*. OVD-Info. Retrieved from <https://data.ovdinfo.org/summary-anti-war-repressions-six-months-war#1>

Saveliev, D. (2022, October 15). *The war in Ukraine is decimating Russia's Asian minorities*. The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/the-war-in-ukraine-is-decimating-russias-asian-minorities/>

Seddon, M., Ivanova, P., & Hall, B. (2022, October 4). *'We're minor losses': Russia's mobilisation targets ethnic minorities*. Financial Times. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/ae06c532-e1ff-488a-b77c-cb93422d3dd7>

Shvets, A., El Deeb, S., & Tilna, E. (2022, October 13). *How Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6>

Troianovski, A. (2022, September 23). *Putin's draft draws resistance in Russia's far-flung regions*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/world/europe/russia-draft-ukraine-putin.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/russia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023, March 20). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Russia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/russia/>

Rwanda

Freedom House. (2022). *Rwanda: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 27). *"As Long as We Live on the Streets, They Will Beat Us" Rwanda's Abusive Detention of Children*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/01/27/long-we-live-streets-they-will-beat-us/rwandas-abusive-detention-children>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Rwanda*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/rwanda>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, October 19). *Rwanda: Lockdown arrests, abuses surge*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/24/rwanda-lockdown-arrests-abuses-surge>

Kigali, A. N., & Steinwehr, U. (2022, January 18). *Rwandans report being forcibly vaccinated*. dw.com. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-forcibly-vaccinating-people-against-covid-victims-say/a-60413978>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Rwanda*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/rwanda/>

Saint Lucia

Human Dignity Trust. (2023). *Saint Lucia*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/saint-lucia/>

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Human Dignity Trust. (2023). *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, July 20). *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: LGBT People Face Bias*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/20/saint-vincent-and-grenadines-lgbt-people-face-bias>

Samoa

Human Dignity Trust. (2023). *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/>

Saudi Arabia

Al Sherbini, R. (2023, February 5). *Saudi Arabia: Over 16,000 illegals arrested in week-long crackdown*. *Saudi – Gulf News*. Retrieved from <https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/saudi-arabia-over-16000-illegals-arrested-in-week-long-crackdown-1.93654511>

ALQST_ORG. (2024). *The soaring fantasy, the harsh reality: Human rights in Saudi Arabia in 2023*. In ALQST Annual Report. Retrieved from <https://alqst.org/uploads/the-soaring-fantasy-the-harsh-reality-human-rights-in-saudi-arabia-en.pdf>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Saudi Arabia*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia/report-saudi-arabia/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Saudi Arabia: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, July 12). *Saudi Arabia: New details of alleged torture leaked*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/11/saudi-arabia-new-details-alleged-torture-leaked>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Saudi Arabia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, August 21). *“They Fired on Us Like Rain” Saudi Arabian Mass Killings of Ethiopian Migrants at the Yemen-Saudi Border*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/08/21/they-fired-us-rain/saudi-arabian-mass-killings-ethiopian-migrants-yemen-saudi>

Human Rights Watch (2024, March 28) *Saudi Arabia: Football fans imprisoned for chant*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/saudi-arabia-football-fans-imprisoned-chant>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, April 29). *Escalating concerns over the lives of minors threatened with death in Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/29/escalating-concerns-over-lives-minors-threatened-death-saudi-arabia>

Human Rights Watch (2024, June 27). *Saudi Arabia falls short of respecting migrants’ rights*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/26/saudi-arabia-falls-short-respecting-migrants-rights>

IDEA (n.d.) *Saudi Arabia - December 2023 | The Global State of Democracy*. Retrieved from <https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/saudi-arabia/december-2023>

MEE staff (2024, July 16). *Saudi Arabia executes a person every two days so far in 2024*. Middle East Eye. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-executes-person-every-two-days-2024>

Rasool, M. (2022, October 11). *Saudi Arabia sentences 3 men to death for refusing to vacate NEOM Development Site*. VICE. Retrieved from <https://www.vice.com/en/article/5d3kkd/neom-saudi-arabia-howeitat-tribe>

Tolentino, J. (2023, May 8). *Massive crackdown in Saudi Arabia: 11,000 arrested for residency and labour violations*. Construction Week Middle East. Retrieved from <https://www.constructionweekonline.com/news/massive-crackdown-in-saudi-arabia-11000-arrested>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/saudi-arabia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/saudi-arabia/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>

Senegal

AfricaNews. (2023, January 17). *Senegalese soldier killed in clash with Casamance rebels - Army*. Africanews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2023/01/17/senegalese-soldier-killed-in-clash-with-casamance-rebels-army/>

Aljazeera. (2023a, May 10). *One dead, 30 injured in new wave of unrest in Senegal*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/10/senegal-opposition-leader-calls-for-mass-protest-after-court-ruling>

Aljazeera. (2023b, August 1). *Two killed in Senegal in protests over arrest of opposition figure Sonko*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/two-killed-in-senegal-protests-over-arrest-of-opposition-figure-sonko>

Allegrozzi, Ilaria. (2023, August 1). *Senegalese Government Dissolves Opposition Party, Cuts Internet*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/01/senegalese-government-dissolves-opposition-party-cuts-internet>

Amnesty International. (2021). *International Report: Senegal 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/senegal/report-senegal/>

Amnesty International. (2023, June 9). *Senegal: Amnesty International calls for independent enquiry into deadly crackdown on protests*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/senegal-amnesty-international-demande-une-enquete-independante-sur-la-repression-meurtriere-lors-des-manifestations/>

Amnesty International. (n.d.). *Human rights in Senegal*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/senegal/report-senegal/>

Elian, P., & Dionne, S. (2023, August 1). *Deadly protests in Senegal as opposition party is dissolved and leader detained*. New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/africa/senegal-protests-sonko.html>

Human Rights Watch (2024, February 14), *Senegal: Delayed elections spark violence, repression*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/12/senegal-delayed-elections-spark-violence-repression-0>

Kiennemann, L. (2023, May 15). *A police station or a high school? deadly clashes in Senegal as locals and gendarmes dispute land use*. The Observers - France 24. Retrieved from <https://observers.france24.com/en/africa/20230515-a-police-station-or-a-high-school-deadly-clashes-in-senegal-as-locals-and-gendarmes-dispute-land-use>

News24. (2024, March 15). *Thousands celebrate release of jailed Senegal opposition leaders*. News24. Retrieved from <https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/thousands-celebrate-release-of-jailed-senegal-opposition-leaders-20240315>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Senegal*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/senegal/>

Serbia

Amnesty International. (2021). *International Report: Serbia 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/serbia/report-serbia/>

Article 19. (2021, April 26). *Media Freedom and Safety of Journalists in Serbia*. Article 19. Retrieved from <https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/MFRR-Serbia-mission-report.pdf>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Serbia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2021>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *2021 World Report: Serbia: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo>

Kingsley, P. (2020, July 8). *Serbia Protests Meet Violent Response in Europe's 1st Major Virus Unrest*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/world/europe/serbia-protests-coronavirus.html>

Reuters. (2020, July 8). *Thousands protest against Serbian leader despite warnings of virus risk*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-serbia-protests/thousands-protest-against-serbian-leader-despite-warnings-of-virus-risk-idUSKBN2491U7>

O'Toole, S. (2017, October 5). *A Cry for Help from Serbia's Independent Media*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/article/cry-help-serbias-independent-media>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Serbia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/serbia/>

Sierra Leone

AfricaNews. (2022, August 23). *S.Leone families arrive to identify loved ones killed in protests*. AfricaNews. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/23/sleone-families-arrive-to-identify-loved-ones-killed-in-protests/>

Aljazeera. (2023, June 26). *Police fire tear gas at Sierra Leone opposition after vote*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/26/police-fire-tear-gas-at-sierra-leone-opposition-after-vote>

Crisis Watch. (2023). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Sierra Leone*. Crisis Watch. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=29&date_range=last_3_months&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=01&to_year=2023

France 24. (2022, October 17). *Sierra Leone Buries Riot Dead Amid Outcry*. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221017-sierra-leone-buries-riot-dead-amid-outcry>

Hashim, I. (2022, October 9). *Sierra Leone Security Forces arrest more than 100 Sierra Leoneans and foreigners*. Sierraloade. Retrieved from <https://sierraloade.sl/local/security-forces-arrest-more-than-100-sierra-leoneans-foreigners-makeni/#>

Thomas, A. R. (2022, October 10). *Dozens of youths arrested by Sierra Leone's military in the opposition heartland of Makeni*. The Sierra Leone Telegraph. Retrieved from <https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/dozens-of-youths-arrested-by-sierra-leones-military-in-the-opposition-heartland-of-makeni/>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sierra Leone*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/sierra-leone/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sierra-leone/>

Slovakia

Amnesty International. (2017, March 1). *Slovakia: Unlawful ethnic segregation in schools is failing Romani children*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/slovakia-unlawful-ethnic-segregation-in-schools-is-failing-romani-children-2/>

Chudzikova, A. (2020, September 29). *The long-awaited change-the Ministry of Education acknowledges the problem of segregation of Roma children and is taking steps to change it*. Minority Policy in Slovakia. Retrieved from <https://mensinovapolitika.eu/en/the-long-awaited-change-the-ministry-of-education-acknowledges-the-problem-of-segregation-of-roma-children-and-is-taking-steps-to-change-it/>

Macejova, Z., Kristian, P., Janicko, M., Halanova, M., Drazilova, S., Antolova, D., Marekova, M., Pella, D., Madarasova-Geckova, A., & Jarcuska, P. (2020). The Roma population living in segregated settlements in eastern Slovakia has a higher prevalence of metabolic syndrome, kidney disease, viral hepatitis B and E, and some parasitic diseases compared to the majority population. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 17(9), 3112. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17093112>

Radovan, S. (2023, December 19). *Thousands of Slovaks continue protesting government's criminal law reforms*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/thousands-slovaks-continue-protesting-governments-criminal-law-reforms-2023-12-19/>

Sirotnikova, M. (2019, November 27). *Roma Children Face Growing Segregation in Slovak Schools*. Balkaninsight. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/11/27/roma-children-face-growing-segregation-in-slovak-schools/>

Strickland, P. (2017, March 10). *Life in Slovakia's Roma slums: Poverty and segregation*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/10/life-in-slovakias-roma-slums-poverty-and-segregation>

Slovenia

Amnesty International. (2021). *International Report: Slovenia 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/slovenia/report-slovenia/>

Amnesty International. (2023). *Human rights in Slovenia*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/slovenia/report-slovenia/>

European Commission. (2023). *Rule of Law report – Communication and country chapters*. European Commission. Retrieved from https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Slovenia*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/slovenia/freedom-world/2021>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Slovenia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/slovenia/>

Somalia

ACLED. (2023a, April 21). *Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2023/04/21/somalia-situation-update-april-2023-counter-insurgency-operation-gains-regional-support-in-phase-two-as-al-shabaab-attacks-and-political-differences-persist/>

ACLED. (2023b, July 28). *Somalia: Political Crisis Deepens Amid Transition to Direct Elections*. ACLED. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2023/07/28/somalia-situation-update-july-2023-electoral-crisis-deepens-as-somalia-transitions-to-direct-elections/>

Amnesty International. (2018, December 14). *Somalia: Use of lethal force to quell protests in Baidoa unjustifiable*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/12/somalia-use-of-lethal-force-to-quell-protests-in-baidoa-unjustifiable-2/>

Amnesty International. (2020, November 9). *Somalia: Conflict Exacerbates Human Rights Violations and Abuses*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR5233152020ENGLISH.pdf>

Amnesty International (AI). (2021). *International Reports: Somalia 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/somalia/report-somalia/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Somalia*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/somalia/report-somalia/>

BBC. (2018, December 14). *Somalia violence Deadly Baidoa clashes over Robow arrest*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46566484>

Center for Preventative Action. (2022, December 14). *Conflict with Al-Shabab in Somalia | Global Conflict Tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia>

Crisis Watch Database | Crisis Group. (2024, July 1). Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=12&crisis_state=&created=custom&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=8&to_year=2024

Horn Observer (2024, August 20) *Somalia: Wave of violence and intimidation targeted journalists covering Mogadishu protests*. Retrieved from <https://hornobserver.com/articles/2915/Somalia-Wave-of-violence-and-intimidation-targeted-journalists-covering-Mogadishu-protests>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Somalia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/somalia>

Inwood, J. (2021, January 26). *Hope and fear as Somalia marks 30 years of civil war*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025>

Mohamed, H. (2024, August 3). *Terrorist Attack on Crowded Beachfront in Somalia Kills at Least 32*. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/03/world/africa/terrorist-attack-somalia-al-shabab.html>

Secretary-General to the Security Council. (2021, March 30). *Sexual Violence in Conflict: Somalia*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/countries/somalia/>

UNHCR Somalia - PSMN Internal Displacements Dashboard- Jul 2024. (n.d.). *UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP)*. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/110598>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/somalia/>

Viner, K. (2019, January 3). *Somalia tells UN not to interfere after expelling envoy*. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46566484>

South Africa

Aljazeera. (2023, April 21). *South Africa evicts asylum seekers camped outside UN office*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/21/south-africa-evicts-asylum-seekers-camped-outside-un-office>

Amnesty International. (2019, September 4). *South Africa: Years of impunity for xenophobic crimes driving the latest attacks*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/09/south-africa-years-of-impunity-for-xenophobic-crimes-driving-the-latest-attacks/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *2019 World Report: South Africa: Events of 2018*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/south-africa>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *2020 World Report: South Africa: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/south-africa>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *2021 World Report: South Africa: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-africa>

Human Rights Watch (2024, May 6). *South Africa: Toxic rhetoric endangers migrants*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/06/south-africa-toxic-rhetoric-endangers-migrants>

Messner, J., and Skinner, A. (2015, April 22). *The Military is Not the Answer to South Africa's Xenophobic Violence*. Fund for Peace. Retrieved from <https://fundforpeace.org/2015/04/22/the-military-is-not-the-answer-to-south-africas-xenophobic-violence/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-africa/>

South Sudan

Amnesty International. (2022). *South Sudan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/south-sudan/report-south-sudan/>

Center for Preventive Action. (2022, May 12). *Civil War in South Sudan | global conflict tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>

Crisis Group. (2023, June). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: South Sudan*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=13&date_range=custom&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=07&to_year=2023

Freedom House. (2022). *South Sudan: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in South Sudan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/south-sudan>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in South Sudan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-sudan>

OCHA (2024, July 5) *South Sudan: Humanitarian snapshot (June 2024)*. Retrieved from <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-june-2024>

United Nations Mission in South Sudan. (2022). *Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians*. United Nations Human Rights Division. Retrieved from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_q2_20_july_2022_clean_version_for_coss.pdf

United Nations. (2024). Situation in South Sudan. In Report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/212/85/pdf/n2421285.pdf>

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2024, July 31). *South Sudan: Rise in extrajudicial executions [Statement]*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2024/07/south-sudan-rise-extrajudicial-executions>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>

United Nations Mission in South Sudan. (2022). *Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians*. United Nations Human Rights Division. Retrieved from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_q2_20_july_2022_clean_version_for_coss.pdf

United Nations Mission in South Sudan. (2023). *ANNUAL BRIEF ON VIOLENCE AFFECTING CIVILIANS*. In United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Retrieved from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/annual_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_2023.pdf

Sri Lanka

Al Jazeera. (2022, May 10). *Protests rage in Sri Lanka; Mahinda Rajapaksa forced to quit*. Protests News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/9/sri-lanka-govt-supporters-attack-protesters-demolish-tents>

Amnesty International. (2023, February 27). *Sri Lanka: Authorities must exercise restraint in use of force and facilitate the right to peaceful assembly*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/sri-lanka-authorities-must-exercise-restraint-in-use-of-force-and-facilitate-the-right-to-peaceful-assembly/>

Francis, K. (2020, April 21). *Sri Lankans remember Easter bomb victims at home amid virus*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/6a218ff6b60aa06d595b1ede0515a926>

Ganguly, Meenakshi. (2023, July 12). *A Year After Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka Remains in Crisis*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/12/year-after-rajapaksa-sri-lanka-remains-crisis>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 17). *World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Sri Lanka*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/sri-lanka>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, February 10). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Sri Lanka*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/sri-lanka>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Sri Lanka*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/sri-lanka>

NDTV. (2022, April 3). *Over 600 protestors arrested in Sri Lanka for violating curfew: Report*. NDTV.com. Retrieved from <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/sri-lanka-economic-crisis-over-600-protestors-arrested-in-sri-lanka-for-violating-curfew-report-2859636>

Team Print. (2024, September 10). *UK raises concerns over human rights violations in Sri Lanka*. ThePrint. Retrieved from <https://theprint.in/world/uk-raises-concerns-over-human-rights-violations-in-sri-lanka/2260737/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022, April 12). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sri-lanka/>

Wipulasena, A., & Ellis-Petersen, H. (2022, August 5). *Sri Lankan government accused of draconian treatment of protesters*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/05/sri-lanka-police-draconian-protesters-wickremesinghe>

Sudan

ACLED (2024, April 14). *One Year of War in Sudan*. Retrieved from <https://acleddata.com/2024/04/14/sudan-situation-update-april-2024-one-year-of-war-in-sudan/>

Agence France-Presse. (2023, June 7). *'No Woman Feels Safe': Sexual Violence Rampant in Sudan War*. VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/no-woman-feels-safe-sexual-violence-rampant-in-sudan-war-/7127981.html>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Sudan 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/sudan/report-sudan/>

Amnesty International. (2023, August 3). *SUDAN: WAR CRIMES RAMPANT AS CIVILIANS KILLED IN BOTH DELIBERATE AND INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/sudan-war-crimes-rampant-as-civilians-killed-in-both-deliberate-and-indiscriminate-attacks-new-report/>

Aljazeera. (2020, May 6). *Sudan's June crackdown may have killed 241 people: Rights group*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/6/sudans-june-crackdown-may-have-killed-241-people-rights-group>

BBC. (2019, August 16). *Sudan crisis: What you need to know*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48511226>

BBC Monitoring. (2019, September 9). *Sudan country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094995>

Center for Preventive Action. (2023, July 11). *Power Struggle in Sudan*. Global Conflict Tracker. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan>

Formanek, Ingrid. (2023, July 26). *10,000 reported killed in one West Darfur city, as ethnic violence ravages Sudanese region*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/sudan-west-darfur-thousands-killed-intl/index.html>

Human Dignity Trust. (2023). *Sudan*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/sudan/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *2019 World Report: Sudan: Events of 2018*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/sudan>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *2020 World Report: Sudan: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/sudan>

Human Rights Watch. (2021a). *2021 World Report: Sudan: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/sudan>

Human Rights Watch. (2021b, March 1). *Sudan: Unlawful Detentions by Rapid Support Forces*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/01/sudan-unlawful-detentions-rapid-support-forces>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a). *2023 World Report: Sudan: Events of 2023*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/sudan>.

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, July 11). *Sudan: Darfur Town Destroyed*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/11/sudan-darfur-town-destroyed>

HRW (2024, May 9). *“The Massalit Will Not Come Home”- Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/09/massalit-will-not-come-home/ethnic-cleansing-and-crimes-against-humanity-el>

International Crisis Group. (2023, July). *Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Sudan*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=14&date_range=custom&from_month=01&from_year=2023&to_month=08&to_year=2023

Operation Broken Silence 2024, September 2). *Sudan Crisis 2024 - What You Need To Know*. Retrieved from <https://operationbrokensilence.org/blog/sudan-crisis-2024-what-you-need-to-know>

Reuters. (2022, December 9). *Protests continue in Sudan's capital days after political deal*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/protests-continue-sudans-capital-days-after-political-deal-2022-12-08/>

UNFPA (2024, June 18). *Sexual violence and conflict in Sudan: A war on the bodies of women and girls*. Retrieved from <https://www.unfpa.org/news/sexual-violence-and-conflict-sudan-war-bodies-women-and-girls>

UNHCR. (2023, August 1). *Operational Data Portal: Sudan*. UNHCR. Retrieved from <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>

UNHCR (2024, April 12). *Women and girls mired in Sudan crisis suffer surge in sexual violence*. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/stories/women-and-girls-mired-sudan-crisis-suffer-surge-sexual-violence>

U.S. Department of State. (2020). *2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/>

Walsh, D. (2019, June 3). *Sudan's Military Abandons Talks and Opens Fire on Democracy Protesters*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/world/africa/sudan-security-forces-protesters-violence.html>

Suriname

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Suriname*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/suriname/freedom-world/2020>

Swaziland

Amnesty International. (2018, August 30). *Eswatini: Forced evictions expose flawed land laws as hundreds face homelessness*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/eswatini-forced-evictions-expose-flawed-land-laws-as-hundreds-face-homelessness/>

Amnesty International. (2019, August 29). *Eswatini: Snapshots: "they don't see us as people": Security of tenure and forced evictions in Eswatini*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr55/0891/2019/en/>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Eswatini the system is broken*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/11/eswatini-the-system-is-broken/>

Amnesty (2024). *Eswatini*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/eswatini/report-eswatini/>

CIVICUS. (2022, August 30). *Government embarks on brutal wave of retaliatory tactics against pro-democracy activists amid political impasse*. CIVICUS. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2022/08/30/government-embarks-brutal-wave-retaliatory-tactics-against-pro-democracy-activists-amid-political-impasse/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Eswatini: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/eswatini/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Eswatini (formerly Swaziland)*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/eswatini-formerly-swaziland>

HRW (2024). *Eswatini*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/eswatini>

Masiko-Mpaka, Nomathamsanqa (2024, March 28). *Eswatini Authorities Target Activist's Widow*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/eswatini-authorities-target-activists-widow>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eswatini*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/eswatini/>

Syria

Amnesty International. (2022). *Syria*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/>

Amnesty (2024, April 17). *Syria: Mass death, torture and other violations against people detained in aftermath of Islamic State defeat – new report*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/syria-mass-death-torture-and-other-violations-against-people-detained-in-aftermath-of-islamic-state-defeat-new-report/>

Center for Preventive Action. (2023, January 6). *Conflict in Syria | global conflict tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 29). *World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Syria*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/syria>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, January 13). *World Report 2021: Rights trends in Syria*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/syria>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Syria*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Syria*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/syria>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, April 27). *Turkish Border Guards Torture, Kill Syrians*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/27/turkish-border-guards-torture-kill-syrians>

Kajjo, S. (2020, June 11). *Rights groups concerned about continued abuses in Afrin*. VOA. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_rights-groups-concerned-about-continued-abuses-afrin/6190898.html

Syrian Network for Human Rights (2024, July 1). *429 Civilian Deaths, Including 65 Children and 38 Women, as well as 53 Deaths due to Torture, Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2024*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/429-civilian-deaths-including-65-children-and-38-women-well-53-deaths-due-torture-documented-syria-first-half-2024-enar#:~:text=Press%20release%3A,who%20died%20due%20to%20torture>

United Nations. (2022, June 28). *Syria: Decade of Brutal War left nearly 307,000 civilians dead | UN news*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1121532>

US State Department (2024). *2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Syria*. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/syria/#:~:text=Some%20armed%20groups%20fighting%20for,Syria%2C%20in%20particular%20in%20Libya>.

WorldVision (2024). *Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs, and how to help*. Retrieved from [https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts#:~:text=Children's%20Fund%20\(UNICEF\)%2C%20as,with%20over%203%20million%20refugees](https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts#:~:text=Children's%20Fund%20(UNICEF)%2C%20as,with%20over%203%20million%20refugees)

Taiwan

Amnesty International. (2021). *2021 Report: Taiwan*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/taiwan/report-taiwan/#endnote-4>

BBC Monitoring. (2019, February 1). *Taiwan country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16164639>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Taiwan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2021>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Taiwan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/taiwan/>

Tajikistan

BBC Monitoring. (2018, October 4). *Tajikistan country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16201032>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Tajikistan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tajikistan/freedom-world/2021>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *2021 World Report: Tajikistan: Events of 2020*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/tajikistan>

International Crisis Group. (2009, February 12). *Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/tajikistan/tajikistan-road-failure>

Morton, J. (2020, November). *Issue Update: Tajikistan: Promoting Religious Freedom and Countering Violent Extremism in Tajikistan*. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. Retrieved from <https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/pictures/optimized/2020%20Issue%20Update%20-%20Tajikistan.pdf>

Reuters. (2020, January 28). *Tajikistan arrests 113 alleged Muslim Brotherhood members*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tajikistan-islamist/tajikistan-arrests-113-alleged-muslim-brotherhood-members-idUSKBN1ZR1C5>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tajikistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/tajikistan/>

Tanzania

Al Jazeera. (2022, June 16). *In Tanzania, the Maasai fight eviction over State conservation plot*. Features News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/16/in-tanzania-the-maasai-fight-eviction-over-statconservation-plot>

Amnesty International. (2023, August 25). *Tanzania: End the crackdown on the Maasai standing up against forced evictions in Ngorongoro*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/tanzania-must-end-crackdown-on-masaai-fighting-forced-evictions/>

GhanaWeb. (2024, June 15) *Tanzania conservation plan takes another hit as EU withdraws funding*. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/africa/Tanzania-conservation-plan-takes-another-hit-as-EU-withdraws-funding-1935776>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *2020 World Report: Tanzania: Events of 2019*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/tanzania-and-zanzibar>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, November 30). *Tanzania: No Justice for Zanzibar Election Violence*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/29/tanzania-no-justice-zanzibar-election-violence>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 3). *Tanzania Undermines Right to Health of Maasai Community*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/30/tanzania-undermines-right-health-maasai-community>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tanzania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/tanzania/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tanzania*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/tanzania/>

United Nations. (2022, June 15). *Tanzania: More violence feared over bid to evict Maasai from ancestral lands*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120442>

Thailand

Al Jazeera (2024, February 7). *Thailand, Muslim separatists agree on new plan to end violence*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/7/thailand-muslim-separatists-agree-on-new-plan-to-end-insurgency>

Amnesty International. (2021). *Thailand 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/thailand/report-thailand/>

Amnesty International. (2020a, November 6). *#WhatsHappeningInThailand: 10 things you need to know*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/whats-happening-thailand-10-things/>

Amnesty International. (2020b, November 25). *Thailand: Joint statement on pro-democracy protests on 17 and 20 November 2020*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/joint-statement-thailand-pro-democracy/>

BBC Monitoring. (2019a, March 7). *Thailand country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15581957>

BBC Monitoring. (2019b, March 7). *Thailand profile – timeline*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15641745>

Chitty, T. (2019, August 20). *Why does Thailand have so many coups?* CNBC. Retrieved from <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/20/why-does-thailand-have-so-many-coups.html>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *2021 World Report: Thailand: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/thailand>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Thailand*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/thailand/freedom-world/2021>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Thailand*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/thailand/>

Togo

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Togo*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/togo/>

Trinidad and Tobago

Amnesty International. (2023, August 17). *Trinidad and Tobago: Authorities must stop deporting refugees and asylum seekers*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/trinidad-tobago-must-stop-deporting-refugees/>

Freedom House. (2022). *Freedom in the World: Trinidad and Tobago*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/trinidad-and-tobago/freedom-world/2022>

Outright International. (2022). *Country Overview: Trinidad and Tobago*. Outright International. Retrieved from <https://outrightinternational.org/our-work/americas/trinidad-and-tobago>

UNHCR. (2023, July 26). *Trinidad and Tobago: Court ruling on deportations will gravely impact refugees and migrants, UN experts say*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/trinidad-and-tobago-court-ruling-deportations-will-gravely-impact-refugees>

Tunisia

Amara, T. (2022, February 19). *Tunisian president extends state of emergency until end of 2022*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisian-president-extends-state-emergency-until-end-2022-2022-02-18/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Tunisia*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/tunisia/report-tunisia/>

Amnesty International. (2023, March 10). *Tunisia: President's racist speech incites a wave of violence against Black Africans*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/tunisia-presidents-racist-speech-incites-a-wave-of-violence-against-black-africans/>

Associated Press. (2024, June 9). *Stranded Migrants Confront Violence and Despair as Tunisia Partners to Keep Them from Europe*. US News. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-06-09/stranded-migrants-confront-violence-and-despair-as-tunisia-partners-to-keep-them-from-europe>

Freedom House. (2022). *Tunisia: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2022>

Human Rights Watch. (2019, January 17). *World Report 2019: Rights trends in Tunisia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/tunisia>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, September 7). *Universal Periodic Review submission on Tunisia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/30/universal-periodic-review-submission-tunisia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, February 3). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Tunisia*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/tunisia>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 10). *Tunisia: Racist Violence Targets Black Migrants, Refugees*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/10/tunisia-racist-violence-targets-black-migrants-refugees>

Human Rights Watch (2024, May17) *Tunisia: Deepening civil society crackdown*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/17/tunisia-deepening-civil-society-crackdown>

Middle East Monitor. (2019, May 9). *Tunisia: Organisations warn of systematic torture in prisons and Detention Centres*. Middle East Monitor. Retrieved from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190509-tunisia-organisations-warn-of-systematic-torture-in-prisons-and-detention-centres/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tunisia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/tunisia/>

Turkey

Amnesty International. (2020, June 16). *Turkey: Stifling free expression during the COVID-19 pandemic*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/turkey-stifling-free-expression-during-the-covid19-pandemic/>

Amnesty International. (2022). *Turkey*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/>

AP News (2024, January 13). *Turkey launches airstrikes against Kurdish militants in Iraq, Syria after 9 soldiers killed*. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/iraq-syria-turkey-airstrikes-soldiers-killed-b745c2f315bee57731df2e861a91603a>

Bianet. (2024, June 6). *Men killed 40 women in May*. Retrieved from <https://bianet.org/haber/men-killed-40-women-in-may-296234>

Crisis Group. (2023, February 1). *Turkey's PKK Conflict: A visual explainer*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer>

Freedom House. (2022). *Turkey: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2022>

Guzel, Mehmet. (2023, March 8). *Women in Turkey brave ban on Istanbul march, get tear-gassed*. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/turkey-womens-day-banned-march-tear-gas-495c5b6e3080a95a2a30c46d1af5be05>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Turkey*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, April 27). *Turkish Border Guards Torture, Kill Syrians*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/27/turkish-border-guards-torture-kill-syrians>

Human Rights Watch. (2023c, June 27). *Turkey: Mass Detentions at Pride Marches: Conflict With Court Decisions on Right to Free Assembly*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/27/turkey-mass-detentions-pride-marches>

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 16). *Türkiye: Kurdish politicians convicted in unjust mass trial*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/16/turkiye-kurdish-politicians-convicted-unjust-mass-trial>

Kirby, Paul. (2023, April 25). *Turkish mass arrests target Kurdish areas ahead of election*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65385119>

Rasul, A. (2024, June 25). *Turkey sets up checkpoints within Kurdistan Region, residents say*. RUDAW. Retrieved from <https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/250620241>

ReliefWeb. (2024, January 17) *Escalation of hostilities in northeast Syria, January 16th, 2024 - Syrian Arab Republic*. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/escalation-hostilities-northeast-syria-january-16th-2024>

Stockholm Center for Freedom. (2022, November 4). *Femicide in Turkey: At least 275 women killed in first 10 months of 2022*. Stockholm Center for Freedom. Retrieved from <https://stockholmcf.org/femicide-in-turkey-at-least-275-women-killed-in-first-10-months-of-2022/>

Turkmenistan

Amnesty International. (2021). *Turkmenistan 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkmenistan/report-turkmenistan/>

BBC Monitoring. (2022). *Turkmenistan country profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16094646>

Freedom House. (2021). *Freedom in the World 2021: Turkmenistan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkmenistan/freedom-world/2021>

Freedom House. (2024, February 14). *NEW DATA: More than 20 percent of the world's governments engage in transnational repression*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-data-more-20-percent-worlds-governments-engage-transnational-repression>

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *World Report: Turkmenistan: Events of 2018*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkmenistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report: Turkmenistan: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkmenistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *World Report: Turkmenistan: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/turkmenistan>.

Jardine, B. (2015, July 30). *Turkmenistan's Ongoing Media Crackdown*. The Diplomat. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/turkmenistans-ongoing-media-crackdown/>

Pannier, B. (2020, December 11). *25 Years Later, Turkmenistan Reaps Zero Benefits From 'Positive Neutrality'*. Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-neutrality-25-years-no-benefits-qishloq-ovozi/30995903.html>

Rickleton, Chris. (2023, March 7). *Not Much For Turkmen Women To Celebrate On International Women's Day*. RFE. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-women-no-celebration/32307424.html>

Radio Azatlyk (2024, June 30). *Turkmenistan continues to persecute citizens for visiting websites of independent publications*. Retrieved from <https://rus.azathabar.com/a/v-turkmenistane-prodolzhaetsya-presledovanie-grazhdan-za-poseschenie-saytov-nezavisimyh-izdaniy-/33013866.html>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkmenistan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkmenistan/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkmenistan/>

USCIRF (2024, March 25) *USCIRF implores State Department to lift waiver amid Turkmenistan's treatment of Muslims and others during Ramadan*. Retrieved from <https://www.uscifr.gov/newsroom/releases-statements/uscifr-implores-state-department-lift-waiver-amid-turkmenistans>

Uganda

Adidi, R. (2024, January 31). *500 displaced locals cry to govt for help*. Monitor. Retrieved from <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/500-displaced-locals-cry-to-govt-for-help-4509030>

Amnesty International. (2018, August 23). *Uganda: Drop fabricated treason charges and set Bobi Wine free*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-drop-fabricated-treason-charges-and-set-bobi-wine-free/>

Amnesty International. (2021). *2021 International Report: Uganda*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/uganda/report-uganda/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *2019 World Report: Uganda: Events of 2018*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/uganda>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *2020 World Report: Uganda: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/uganda>

Human Rights Watch. (2021a, January 21). *Uganda: Elections Marred by Violence*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence>

Human Rights Watch. (2021b). *2020 World Report: Uganda: Events of 2020*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/uganda>

International Federation for Human Rights (2024, June) *Uganda: Alarming crackdown on environment and human rights defenders*. Retrieved from <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/uganda-alarming-crackdown-on-environment-and-human-rights-defenders>

Kagumire, R. (2018, August 21). *#FreeBobiWine: Protests mount over torture and arrest of a young political force in Uganda*. Global Voices. Retrieved from <https://globalvoices.org/2018/08/21/freebobiwine-protests-mount-over-torture-and-arrest-of-a-young-political-force-in-uganda/>

Kyatuheire, J. (2015, December 2). *Uganda's Sham Electoral Reforms*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/article/ugandas-sham-electoral-reforms>

Kyeyune, H. (2021, September 10). *Uganda gained independence but still retains colonialist rulers' mindset*. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/uganda-gained-independence-but-still-retains-colonialist-rulers-mindset/2387408>

Madowo, Larry. (2023, June 29). *Uganda passed one of the world's harshest anti-gay laws. LGBTQ people describe living there as 'hell'*. CNN. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/29/africa/uganda-life-for-lgbt-community-intl-cmd/index.html>

Mutiga, M. (2021, January 19). *Uganda's Museveni Clings to Power – But Trouble Lies Ahead*. International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/uganda/ugandas-museveni-clings-power-trouble-lies-ahead>

Romeo, B. O. L. (2024, March 9). *TOP STORY: 'Security laxity' blamed as '200 die' in Acholi-Madi tribal clashes*. tndNews. Retrieved from <https://tndnewsuganda.com/2024/03/09/top-story-security-laxity-blamed-as-200-die-in-acholi-madi-tribal-clashes/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/uganda/>

Ukraine

Bigg, M. M. (2022, March 26). *A history of the tensions between Ukraine and Russia*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/26/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions-timeline.html>

Biesecker, M. (2022, December 30). *Evidence of Russian war crimes mounts as invasion of Ukraine drags on*. PBS. Retrieved from <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/evidence-of-russian-war-crimes-mounts-as-invasion-of-ukraine-drags-on>

Crisis Group. (2022, March 28). *Conflict in Ukraine's Donbas: A visual explainer*. Crisis Group. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer>

Crimea Platform (2024, June 25). *THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FINDS RUSSIA RESPONSIBLE FOR SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CRIMEA*. Retrieved from <https://crimea->

platform.org/en/news/the-european-court-of-human-rights-finds-russia-responsible-for-systematic-human-rights-violations-in-crimea/

Crimea Platform (2024, July). *WEEKLY UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA ON JULY 9, 2024*. Retrieved from <https://crimea-platform.org/en/news/weekly-update-on-the-situation-in-occupied-crimea-on-july-9-2024/>

Gettleman, J. (2022, May 2). *They fell deeply in love in Bucha. One Russian bullet ended it all*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/02/world/asia/ukraine-bucha-russia-atrocities.html>

Honcharuk, A. (2024). *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 March – 31 May 2024*. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/24-07-02-OHCHR-39th-periodic-report-Ukraine.pdf>

Human Rights Watch. (2017, November 14). *Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars intensifies*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/14/crimea-persecution-crimean-tatars-intensifies>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Ukraine*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ukraine>

Kakissis, J. (2024, June 11). *Russia has destroyed half of Ukraine's energy production. How is the country coping?* NPR. <https://www.npr.org/2024/06/11/nx-s1-5001804/russia-has-destroyed-half-of-ukraines-energy-production-how-is-the-country->

Knickmeyer, E. (2022, April 13). *Biden called Russia's war in Ukraine 'genocide.' here's why that matters*. PBS. Retrieved from <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/biden-called-russias-war-in-ukraine-genocide-heres-why-that-matters>

Lee, M. (2024, July 12). *Takeaways from the NATO summit, which was about Ukraine and Biden* | AP News. AP News. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/nato-summit-ukraine-biden-china-d9f2b83dc0956d75f6f75efe85cbefb4>

Olena, H., & Max, H. (2024, July 9). *Russian missile attacks kill at least 41, hit children's hospital, Ukraine says*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-air-defence-engaged-repelling-russian-missile-attack-kyiv-officials-2024-07-08/>

Reinhard, S. (2022, November 14). *Ukraine has reclaimed more than half the territory Russia has taken this year*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html>

Revill, J. (2024, June 15). *Ukrainian children abducted by Russia left with psychological scars, campaigners say*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-children-abducted-by-russia-left-with-psychological-scars-campaigners-2024-06-15/>

Shvets, A., El Deeb, S., & Tilna, E. (2022, October 13). *How Moscow grabs Ukrainian kids and makes them Russians*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6>

Starcevic, Seb. (2024, January 11). *Deported Ukrainian children sent to 'survival training' with Belarus military*. POLITICO. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/deported-ukrainian-children-sent-to-survival-training-with-the-belarusian-military/>.

United Arab Emirates

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain. (2018, April 9). *UAE 94: Five Years, No Progress*. ADHRB. Retrieved from <https://www.adhrb.org/2018/04/uae-94-five-years-no-progress/>

Amnesty International. (2021a). *Reports: United Arab Emirates 2021*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/report-united-arab-emirates/>

Amnesty International. (2021b, July 2). *UAE: Nearly a decade of unjust imprisonment for 'UAE- 94' dissidents*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/07/uae-nearly-a-decade-of-unjust-imprisonment-for-uae-94-dissidents/>

Freedom House. (2021). *United Arab Emirates: Freedom in the World 2021*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-arab-emirates/freedom-world/2021>

Gritten, David. (2023, March 16). *UAE arbitrarily detaining 2,400 Afghan asylum seekers - report*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64963423>

Gulf Center for Human Rights. (2016, April 3). *United Arab Emirates (UAE): Human rights organisations renew call for release of peaceful activist convicted at grossly unfair mass "UAE 94" trial*. Gulf Center for Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/1193>

Human Dignity Trust. (2023). *United Arab Emirates*. Human Dignity Trust. Retrieved from <https://www.humandignitytrust.org/country-profile/united-arab-emirates/>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *World Report: United Arab Emirates: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch, Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/united-arab-emirates>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: United Arab Emirates*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/united-arab-emirates/>

Uzbekistan

Babajanov-Ozodlik, H. (2024, February 10). *"Either you shave off your beard or go to jail for 15 days." In Tashkent, raids against wearing beards began again*. Radio Ozodlik. Retrieved from <https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/32812887.html>

BBC Monitoring. (2018, May 8). *Uzbekistan Country Profile*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16218112>

Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (CABAR). (2020, April 23). *Uzbekistan: Torture Remains a Major Issue*. Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting. Retrieved from <https://cabar.asia/en/uzbekistan-torture-remains-a-major-issue>

Cotton Campaign. (2018, December 13). *Despite Commitment and Efforts, Systematic Forced Labor in Uzbekistan's Cotton Fields was Present During the 2018 Harvest*. Cotton Campaign. Retrieved from <https://www.cottoncampaign.org/resources-uzbekistan/despite-commitment-and-efforts-systematic-forced-labor-in-uzbekistans-cotton-fields-was-present-during-the-2018-harvest>

Cotton, Campaign (2024, March 18). *Uzbekistan should emphasize workers' rights to maintain momentum for responsible sourcing*. Retrieved from <https://www.cottoncampaign.org/news/uzbekistan-should-emphasize-workers-rights-to-maintain-momentum-for-responsible-sourcing>

Evans, J. & Gill, A. (2017, June 27). *"We Can't Refuse to Pick Cotton": Forced and Child Labor Linked to World Bank Group Investments in Uzbekistan*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/27/we-cant-refuse-pick-cotton/forced-and-child-labor-linked-world-bank-group>

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Uzbekistan*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2020>

Human Rights Watch. (2016, September 2). *Uzbekistan: Authoritarian President Karimov Reported Dead*. Human Right Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/02/uzbekistan-authoritarian-president-karimov-reported-dead>

Human Rights Watch. (2019a, December 9). *Uzbekistan: Torture Widespread, Routine: UN Expert Body Says Judges Should Query All Defendants if Tortured*. Human Right Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/09/uzbekistan-torture-widespread-routine>

Human Rights Watch. (2019b). *World Report: Uzbekistan: Events of 2018*. Human Right Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/uzbekistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report: Uzbekistan: Events of 2019*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/uzbekistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2021). *World Report: Uzbekistan: Events of 2020*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/uzbekistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2021, March 23). *Uzbekistan: Gay Men Face Abuse, Prison*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/uzbekistan-gay-men-face-abuse-prison>

Reyes, C. (2015, October 19). *History of State-Imposed Forced Labor in Uzbekistan's Cotton Industry*. End Slavery Now. Retrieved from <https://www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/history-of-state-imposed-forced-labor-in-uzbekistans-cotton-industry>

Rickleton, C. (2024, July 15). *Foreign “Undesirables”: Who are the targets of Uzbekistan’s incoming deportation law?* RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-foreign-undesirables-law-deportation/33035898.html>

Synovitz, R. (2020, September 17). *Uzbek State Workers Say They’re Still Being Forced to Pick Cotton.* Radio Free Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/30843866.html>

Vanuatu

Transparency International. (2021, January 28). *Vanuatu: Corruption Worsening the Impacts of Covid-19 and Natural Disasters.* Transparency International. Retrieved from <https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/cpi-2020-vanuatu-corruption-worsening-the-impacts-of-covid-19-natural-disasters>

U.S. Department of State. (2019). *2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vanuatu.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vanuatu/>

U.S. Department of State. (2021). *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vanuatu.* U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vanuatu/>

U.S. Department of Labor. (2021). *Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Vanuatu: 2020 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor.* U.S. Department of Labor. Retrieved from <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/vanuatu>

Venezuela

Amnesty International. (2018). *This is no way to live: Public security and right to life in Venezuela.* Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/8975/2018/en/>

Amnesty International. (2019). *Venezuela: State Steps up Repression of Protests in the Midst of the Crisis.* Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/venezuela-state-steps-up-repression-protests-crisis/>

Amnesty International. (2020). *Venezuela 2020.* Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/venezuela/report-venezuela/>

Brewer-Carias, A. (2010). *Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chavez Authoritarian Experiment.* Cambridge University Press.

Chin, J. J., Carter, D. B., & Wright, J. G. (2021). The varieties of coups d’état: Introducing the colpus dataset. *International Studies Quarterly*, 65(4), 1040–1051. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab058>

Corrales, J. (2020). Authoritarian survival: Why Maduro hasn't fallen. *Journal of Democracy*, 31(3), 39–53. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0044>

- Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GlobalR2P). (2023, May 31). *Venezuela*. GlobalR2P. Retrieved from <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/venezuela/>
- Hellinger, D. (2011). Book review: Nationalism, Chavismo, and socialism in Venezuela, past and present. *Latin American Perspectives*, 38(5), 142–154. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582x10390625>
- Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Venezuela*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/venezuela>
- Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Venezuela*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/venezuela>
- International Rescue Committee (IRC). (2022). *For Venezuelan women, gender-based violence is a widespread risk at home and abroad, warns IRC*. IRC. Retrieved from <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/venezuelan-women-gender-based-violence-widespread-risk-home-and-abroad-warns-irc>
- Jiménez, M. (2021). Contesting autocracy: Repression and opposition coordination in Venezuela. *Political Studies*, 71(1), 47–68. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321721999975>
- Kessler, Jacob. (2023, August 10). *Mass arrest at LGBTQ club in Venezuela prompts outcry over discrimination*. Aljazeera. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/10/mass-arrest-at-lgbtq-club-in-venezuela-prompts-outcry-over-discrimination>
- Philipps, T. (2020, January 7). *Venezuela: Maduro opponents storm parliament to reinstall Guaido as leader*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/07/venezuela-maduro-parliament-juan-guaido-leader>
- Robles, F. (2024, August 10). *‘Operation Knock-Knock’: Venezuela Sweeps Up Dissenters After Disputed Vote*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/10/world/americas/venezuela-election-maduro.html>
- UN Human Rights Council. (2019). *Venezuela: UN report urges accountability for crimes against humanity*. UN Human Rights Council. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26247&LangID=E>
- Venezuela Investigation Unit. (2021, March 2). *Colectivos ramp up property seizures in Venezuela*. InSight Crime. Retrieved from <https://insightcrime.org/news/colectivos-ramp-up-property-seizures-in-venezuela/>
- Wallis, D. (2014, February 13). *Venezuela violence puts focus on militant ‘colectivo’ groups*. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/venezuela-violence-puts-focus-on-militant-colectivo-groups-idUSBREA1C1YW/>
- Vietnam
- Human Rights Watch. (2020). *World Report: Uzbekistan: Events of 2019*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/uzbekistan>

Human Rights Watch. (2018). *World Report: Vietnam Events of 2017*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/vietnam>.

Human Rights Watch. (2019). *World Report: Vietnam Events of 2018*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/vietnam>.

Freedom House. (2020). *Vietnam: Freedom on the Net 2020*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-net/2020>.

Ngu, V. (2018, June 22). *Mass protests sweep Vietnam for the first time in decades*. Waging Nonviolence. Retrieved from <https://wagingnonviolence.org/2018/06/vietnam-protests-economic-zones-cyber-security/>.

United Nations Committee Against Torture. (2018, October). *Vietnam's Persecution against Protestors during June 2018 Mass Demonstration*. United Nations Human Rights Office. Retrieved from https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/VNM/INT_CAT_CSS_VNM_32821_E.pdf.

Vietnam Committee on Human Rights. (2019, March). *Joint briefing paper on key human rights issues of concern*. [Brief]. International Federation for Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/20190301_vietnam_eu_dialogue_bp_en.pdf

Western Sahara

Amnesty International. (2019, August 1). *Morocco/Western Sahara: Investigate brutal crackdown on Sahrawi protesters*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/08/morocco-western-sahara-investigate-brutal-crackdown-on-sahrawi-protesters/>

Equaldex. (2023). *LGBT Rights in Western Sahara*. Equaldex. Retrieved from <https://www.equaldex.com/region/western-sahara>

Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Western Sahara*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/western-sahara/freedom-world/2020>

Human Rights Watch. (2020). *Morocco/Western Sahara: Events of 2019*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/morocco/western-sahara>

Lovatt, H. & Mundy, J. (2021, May 26). *Free to choose: A new plan for peace in Western Sahara*. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://ecfr.eu/publication/free-to-choose-a-new-plan-for-peace-in-western-sahara/>

SMACO. (2024). *Drone Strikes SMACO Annual Report 2024*. SMACO. Retrieved from <https://smaco-ws.com/2024/05/31/drone-strikes-smaco-annual-report-2024/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Morocco*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/morocco>

Yemen

Center for Civilians in Conflict. (2022, March 14). *Yemen: Civilians face increased harm as war entered deadlier phase*. Center for Civilians in Conflict. Retrieved from <https://civiliansinconflict.org/press-releases/yemen-civilians-face-increased-harm-as-war-entered-deadlier-phase/>

Center for Preventative Action. (2022, May 4). *War in Yemen | global conflict tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen>

Human Rights Watch. (2022, January 13). *World Report 2022: Rights trends in Yemen*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/yemen>

Human Rights Watch. (2023, January 12). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Yemen*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/yemen>

Knickmeyer, E. (2021, February 5). *Biden ending US support for Saudi-led offensive in Yemen*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/biden-end-support-saudi-offense-yemen-b68f58493dbfc530b9fcfdb80a13098f>

Peoples Dispatch. (2023, January 4). *Over 3,000 Yemenis were killed or injured in 2022, says report*. Peoples Dispatch. Retrieved from <https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/01/04/over-3000-yemenis-were-killed-or-injured-in-2022-says-report/#>

Robinson, K. (2022, October 21). *Yemen's tragedy: War, stalemate, and suffering*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/background/yemen-crisis>

UNICEF. (2022, December 12). *More than 11,000 children killed or injured in Yemen*. UNICEF. Retrieved from <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/more-11000-children-killed-or-injured-yemen>

United Nations. (2022, April 18). *New action plan to strengthen the protection of children affected by armed conflict in Yemen signed with the Houthis – Office of the Special Representative of the secretary-general for children and armed conflict*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2022/04/new-action-plan-to-strengthen-the-protection-of-children-affected-by-armed-conflict-in-yemen-signed-with-the-houthis/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zambia*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/zambia>

World Organisation Against Torture. (2022, September 22). *Torture in slow motion: The economic blockade of Yemen and its grave humanitarian consequences - Yemen*. ReliefWeb. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/torture-slow-motion-economic-blockade-yemen-and-its-grave-humanitarian-consequences>

Zimbabwe

Amnesty International. (2023a, January 9). *Zimbabwe: Violent attacks against political opposition supporters must be promptly investigated*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/zimbabwe-violent-attacks-against-political-opposition-supporters/>

Amnesty International. (2023b, January 23). *Zimbabwe: Arrest of members of opposition shows an escalating crackdown against Freedom of Association and Assembly*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/zimbabwe-arrest-of-members-of-opposition/>

Amnesty (19 June, 2024a). *Zimbabwe: Authorities must immediately release arbitrarily detained opposition activists*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/authorities-in-zimbabwe-must-immediately-release-arbitrarily-detained-opposition-activists/>

Amnesty (17 July, 2024b). *Zimbabwe: Authorities must immediately release detained opposition members*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/zimbabwe-authorities-must-immediately-release-detained-opposition-members/>

BTI. (2024). *Zimbabwe country report 2024*. Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ZWE>

Burke, J. (2019, January 16). *Civilians beaten and abducted in major Zimbabwe crackdown*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/16/authorities-launch-major-crackdown-amid-protests-zimbabwe>

Crisis Watch. (2024). *Tracking conflict worldwide: Zimbabwe: January–May 2024*. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=19&crisis_state=&created=-6+months&from_month=1&from_year=2024&to_month=1&to_year=2024

Freedom House. (2022). *Zimbabwe: Freedom in the world 2022 country report*. Freedom House. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/zimbabwe/freedom-world/2022>

Godwin, Paul Ugbede (2024, February 1). *Saudi Arabia finally joins BRICS Bloc, as Zimbabwe unveils new Citizenship Policy*. Retrieved from <https://www.tekedia.com/saudi-arabia-finally-joins-brics-bloc-as-zimbabwe-unveils-new-citizenship-policy/>

Human Rights Watch. (2019, January 17). *World Report 2019: Rights trends in Zimbabwe*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/zimbabwe>

Human Rights Watch. (2020, January 14). *World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Zimbabwe*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/zimbabwe>

Human Rights Watch. (2021a, January 13). *World Report 2021: Rights trends in Zimbabwe*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/zimbabwe>

Human Rights Watch. (2021b, March 6). *Zimbabwe: Thousands of villagers facing eviction*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/06/zimbabwe-thousands-villagers-facing-eviction>

Human Rights Watch. (2023a, January 20). *World Report 2023: Rights trends in Zimbabwe*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/zimbabwe>

Human Rights Watch. (2023b, August 3). *Zimbabwe: Repression, Violence Loom over August Election*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/03/zimbabwe-repression-violence-loom-over-august-election>

Mafundikwa, Ish. (2023, December 7). *Zimbabwe's CCC crisis: Farce turning to tragedy for the opposition*. BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67647449>.

Mahvunga, C. (2022, December 30). *Zimbabwe gears up for 2023 election amid economic woes – DW – 12/30/2022*. dw.com. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-gears-up-for-2023-election-amid-economic-woes/a-64232802>

Mtero, Shingirai, Mandiedza Parichi, and Diana Hojlund Madsen. (2023, December 13). *Patriarchal politics, online violence and silenced voices: The decline of women in politics in Zimbabwe*. The Nordic Africa Institute. Retrieved from <https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2023-12-13-patriarchal-politics-online-violence-and-silenced-voices.html>.

Mutsaka, F. (2020, September 15). *Zimbabwe government abuses critics, allege rights groups*. AP NEWS. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/africa-ap-top-news-zimbabwe-virus-outbreak-harare-508cfd55afe1eadbe4351c4341d956e2>

Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU). (2023, November). *A consolidated report on pre- and post-organised violence and torture during the 2023 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe*. Joint report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Counseling Services Unit, Research and Advocacy Unit, Veritas, and Heal Zimbabwe. Retrieved from <https://researchandadvocacyunit.org/report/a-consolidated-report-on-pre-and-post-organised-violence-and-torture-during-the-2023-harmonised-elections-in-zimbabwe/>.

Reuters. (2023a, January 15). *Zimbabwe police arrest 25 opposition members ahead of presidential election*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-police-arrest-25-opposition-members-ahead-presidential-election-2023-01-14/>

Reuters. (2023b, January 28). *Zimbabwe Court grants bail to 26 opposition party members*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-court-grants-bail-26-opposition-party-members-2023-01-27/>

The Zimbabwean. (2024, February 25). *Rising anger as govt evicts villagers, demolishes homes*. Retrieved from <https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2024/02/rising-anger-as-govt-evicts-villagers-demolishes-homes/>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/zimbabwe/>

U.S. Department of State. (2023). *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/zimbabwe/>

Zvinavashe, Kudzayi. (2024, January 31). *Zimbabwe's opposition figure regains freedom*. Voice of America. Retrieved from <https://www.voaafrica.com/a/zimbabwe-s-opposition-figure-regains-freedom/7464442.html>